戰(zhàn)略經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)(四)

戰(zhàn)略經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)(四)2024/3/26戰(zhàn)略經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)(四)VerticalChainBeginswiththeacquisitionofrawmaterialsEndswiththesaleoffinishedgoods/servicesIncludessupportservicessuchasfinanceandmarketingOrganizingtheverticalchainisanimportantpartofbusinessstrategy戰(zhàn)略經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)(四)VerticalBoundariesoftheFirmWhichstepsoftheverticalchainaretobeperformedinsidethefirm?Whichstepsoftheverticalchaintobeout-sourced?Choicebetweenthe“invisiblehand”ofthemarketandthe“visiblehand”oftheorganization(MakeorBuy)戰(zhàn)略經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)(四)VerticallyIntegratedFirmsInaverticallyintegratedfirm,manyofthestepsintheverticalchainareperformedin-house.Example:UIBESomefirmschoosetooutsourcemanyoftheverticalchaintasksandbecomeverticallydisintegrated.Example:Nike戰(zhàn)略經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)(四)MakeversusBuyDecisiondependsonthecostsandbenefitsofusingthemarketasopposedtoperformingthetaskin-houseOutsidespecialistsmayperformataskbetterthanthefirmcanIntermediatesolutionsarepossible(Examples:Strategicallianceswithsuppliers,Jointventures)戰(zhàn)略經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)(四)上游下游戰(zhàn)略經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)(四)SupportServicesAccountingFinanceLegalSupportMarketingPlanningHumanResourceManagement戰(zhàn)略經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)(四)SupportServicesSupportservicescanbemajorsourcesofvaluecreationUPS–LogisticsToyota–HumanResourceManagerNike-Marketing戰(zhàn)略經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)(四)DefiningBoundariesFirmsneedtodefinetheirverticalboundariesConsiderationsEconomiesofscaleachievedbymarketfirmsValueofmarketdisciplineEaseofcoordinationofproductionflowsin-houseTransactionscostswhendealingwithmarketfirms戰(zhàn)略經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)(四)SomeMake-or-BuyFallaciesFirmshouldmakeratherthanbuyassetsthatprovidecompetitiveadvantagesOutsourcinganactivityeliminatesthecostofthatactivityBackwardintegrationcapturestheprofitmarginofthesupplierBackwardintegrationinsuresagainsttheriskofhighinputpricesItmakessensetotieupthedistributionchannelinordertodenyaccesstotherivals戰(zhàn)略經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)(四)ReasonstoBuyratherthanMakeMarketfirms(outsidespecialists)mayhavepatents/proprietaryinformationthatmakeslowcostproductionpossibleMarketfirmscanachieveeconomiesofscalethatin-houseunitscannotMarketfirmsaresubjecttomarketdiscipline,whereasin-houseunitsmaybeabletohidetheirinefficienciesbehindoverallcorporatesuccess(Agencyandinfluencecosts)戰(zhàn)略經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)(四)EconomiesofScale戰(zhàn)略經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)(四)Make-or-BuyinInsuranceBuyinginsuranceutilizeseconomiesofscaleavailabletoinsurersLargefirmswithsufficientcapitalcan“self-insure”戰(zhàn)略經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)(四)案例：Self-InsurancebyBritishPetroleumBPself-insureslargelossesbutbuysinsuranceforsmalllossesWhy戰(zhàn)略經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)(四)AgencyandInfluenceCostsTheincentivestobeinefficientandinnovativeareweakerwhenataskisperformedin-houseAgencycostsareparticularlyproblematicifthetaskisperformedbya“costcenter”withinanorganization忽視代理成本優(yōu)于消除代理成本Itisdifficulttointernallyreplicatetheincentivesfacedbymarketfirms戰(zhàn)略經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)(四)InfluencecostsInadditiontoagencycosts,performingataskin-housewillleadto“influencecosts”aswell“InternalCapitalMarkets”allocatesscarcecapitalAllocationscanbefavorablyaffectedbyinfluenceactivitiesResourcesconsumedbyinfluenceactivitiesrepresent“influencecosts”為什么在過去幾十年里，GM在擁有世界上最高生產(chǎn)量的同時，它的許多零部件供應(yīng)部門的成本也是最高的戰(zhàn)略經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)(四)ReasonstoMakeCostsimposedbypoorcoordinationReluctanceofpartnerstodevelopandsharevaluableprivateinformationTransactionscostthatcanbeavoidedbyperformingthetaskin-houseEachproblemcanbetracedtodifficultiesincontracting戰(zhàn)略經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)(四)RoleofContractsFirmsoftenusecontractswhencertaintasksareperformedoutsidethefirmContractslistthesetoftasksthatneedtobeperformedtheremediesifonepartyfailstofulfillitsobligation戰(zhàn)略經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)(四)ContractsContractsprotecteachpartytoatransactionfromopportunisticbehaviorofother(s)Contracts’abilitytoprovidethisprotectiondependsonthe“completeness”ofcontractsthebodyofcontractlaw戰(zhàn)略經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)(四)CompleteContractAcompletecontractstipulateswhateachpartyshoulddoforeverypossiblecontingencyNopartycanexploitothers’weaknessesTocreateacompetecontractoneshouldbeabletocontemplateallpossiblecontingenciesOneshouldbeableto“map”fromeachpossiblecontingencytoasetofactionsOneshouldbeabletodefineandmeasureperformancesOneshouldbeabletoenforcethecontract戰(zhàn)略經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)(四)CompleteContract(Continued)Toenforceacontract,anoutsideparty(judge,arbitrator)shouldbeabletoobservethecontingencyobservetheactionsbythepartiesimposethestatedpenaltiesfornon-performanceReallifecontractsareusuallyincompletecontracts戰(zhàn)略經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)(四)IncompleteContractsIncompletecontractsInvolvesomeambiguitiesNeednotanticipateallpossiblecontingenciesDonotspelloutrightsandresponsibilitiesofpartiescompletely戰(zhàn)略經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)(四)FactorsthatPreventCompleteContractingBoundedrationalityDifficultiesinspecifying/measuringperformanceAsymmetricinformation戰(zhàn)略經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)(四)BoundedRationalityIndividualshavelimitedcapacitytoProcessinformationDealwithcomplexityPursuerationalaimsIndividualscannotforeseeallpossiblecontingencies戰(zhàn)略經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)(四)Specifying/MeasuringPerformanceTermslike“normalwearandtear”mayhavedifferentinterpretationsPerformancecannotalwaysbemeasuredunambiguously戰(zhàn)略經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)(四)AsymmetricInformationPartiestothecontractmaynothaveequalaccesstocontract-relevantinformationOnepartycanmisrepresentinformationwithimpurity戰(zhàn)略經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)(四)ContractLawContractlawfacilitatestransactionswithincompletecontractsPartiesneednotspecifyprovisionsthatarecommontoawideclassoftransactions戰(zhàn)略經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)(四)LimitationsofContractLawDoctrinesofcontractlawareinbroadlanguagethatcouldbeinterpretedindifferentwaysLitigationcanbeacostlywaytodealwithbreachofcontractLitigationcanbetimeconsumingLitigationweakensthebusinessrelationship戰(zhàn)略經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)(四)CoordinationofProductionFlowsForsuccessfulcoordinationonepartyneedstomakedecisionsthatdependonthedecisionmadebyothersAgoodfitshouldbeaccomplishedinseveraldimensions.Someexamplesare:TimingSizeColorSequence戰(zhàn)略經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)(四)CoordinationProblemsWithoutgoodcoordination,bottlenecksariseintheverticalchainToensurecoordination,firmsrelyoncontractsthatspecifydeliverydates,designtolerancesandotherperformancetargets戰(zhàn)略經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)(四)DesignAttributesDesignattributesareattributesthatneedtorelatetoeachotherprecisely;significantlossineconomicvalueresultsSomeexamplesSequencingofcoursesinMBAcurriculumFitofautosunroofglasstoapertureTimelydeliveryofacriticalcomponent戰(zhàn)略經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)(四)DesignAttributesIfcoordinationiscritical,administrationcontrolmayreplacethemarketmechanismDesignattributesmaybemovedin-house戰(zhàn)略經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)(四)LeakageofPrivateInformationandOutsourcingWell-definedpatentscanhelpbutmaynotprovidefullprotectionContractswithnoncompeteclausescanbeusedtoprotectagainstleakageofinformationInpracticenon-competeclausescanbehardtoenforce例如競業(yè)禁止條款戰(zhàn)略經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)(四)TransactionsCostsIfthemarketmechanismimprovesefficiency,whydosomanyoftheactivitiestakeplaceoutsidethepricesystem?(Coase)Costsofusingthemarketthataresavedbycentralizeddirection–transactionscosts戰(zhàn)略經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)(四)TransactionsCostsOutsourcingentailcostsofnegotiating,writingandenforcingcontractsCostsareincurredduetoopportunisticbehaviorofpartiestothecontractandeffortstopreventsuchbehaviorTransactionscostsexplainwhyeconomicactivitiesoccuroutsidethepricesystem戰(zhàn)略經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)(四)TransactionsCostsSources