產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)（雙語）知到智慧樹章節(jié)測試課后答案2024年秋山東財經(jīng)大學(xué)

產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)（雙語）知到智慧樹章節(jié)測試課后答案2024年秋山東財經(jīng)大學(xué)第一章單元測試

()referstheproductionofaneconomicgoodorservicewithinaneconomy.

A:SectorB:ManufactureC:IndustryD:Market

答案:Industry()refersthewayandstructureinwhichthefirmsinonesectorarearranged.

A:IndustrialorganizationB:SectorC:IndustryD:Competition

答案:Industrialorganization()denotesanation'sdeclared,official,totalstrategicefforttoinfluencesectoraldevelopment

A:IndustrialeconomicsB:IndustrialPolicyC:IndustrialstructureD:Industrialorganization

答案:IndustrialPolicyThecoreissuesofindustrialorganizationare(

)and(

).

A:competitionB:monopolyC:marketpowerD:oligopoly

答案:competition；monopolyDemandconditionsareaffectedby().

A:MarketgrowthB:PriceelasticityC:TypeofgoodD:Substitutes

答案:Marketgrowth；Priceelasticity；Typeofgood；SubstitutesProductioninonesectorhaslowsubstitutability.

A:錯B:對

答案:錯Allfirmsseekhighermarketsharesinordertogainhigherprofits.

A:對B:錯

答案:對Ifoneorseveralfirmshavemarketpowerandcometodominate,competitionisusuallyeffective

A:錯B:對

答案:錯ChicagoSchooleconomistsarguedthatincreasedefficiencyledtoincreasedmarketpowerandincreasedprofits.

A:對B:錯

答案:對TheSCPparadigmwasdevelopedbyEdwardMasonandJoeBaininthe1940sand1950s.

A:錯B:對

答案:對ChicagoSchooleconomistsquestionedmanyofthemajorempiricalconclusionsreachedbyfollowersoftheSCPapproach.

A:對B:錯

答案:對HarvardSchooleconomistsarguedthatincreasedefficiencyledtoincreasedmarketpowerandincreasedprofits.

A:錯B:對

答案:錯TheSCPparadigmarguesthatbasicmarketconditionsdeterminemarketstructure;marketstructuredeterminesconduct;andconductdeterminesperformance.

A:對B:錯

答案:對thereisagrowingconsensusinrecentdevelopmenttheorythatstateinterventionsareoftenunnecessarywhenmarketfailuresprevail.

A:對B:錯

答案:錯Thefieldofindustrialorganizationdevelopedasanoffshootofmicroeconomictheory.

A:對B:錯

答案:對

第二章單元測試

Assetspecificityreferstothedegreetowhichsomeassetsareofvalueprimarilytoone

firm.（）

A:錯B:對

答案:對Animportantadvantageofacorporationisthatitsownershaveunlimitedliability（）.

A:對B:錯

答案:錯Intheshortrunsomeinputsarefixed;thefirmhastodothebestitcanwithagivencapitalstockandplantsize.（）

A:對B:錯

答案:對MESshowsthebestsizeforproduction().

A:對B:錯

答案:對BelowtheMESlevel,theremaybediseconomiesofscale.（）

A:錯B:對

答案:錯Specializationletsworkerslearntodotheirspecifictasksmuchmorerapidlyandprecisely.（）

A:錯B:對

答案:對Learningcurvesshowadeclineinthecurrentaveragecostofproductionastotalproductionmounts.（）

A:對B:錯

答案:對Animportanttypeofsharedinputisanintangibleassetsuchasresearchknowledgeorbusinessknow-howaboutproduction.（）

A:對B:錯

答案:對Eachfirmisassumedtomaximize（）.

A:assetsB:servicesC:profitsD:outputs

答案:profitsThecostsofusingthemarkettoconductbusinessarecalled.（）。

A:productioncostsB:fixedcostsC:variedcostsD:transactioncosts

答案:transactioncostsThecostsavingsthatresultfromproducingjointproductsiscalledas(

)

A:economiesofscaleB:diseconomiesofscaleC:economiesofscopeD:diseconomiesofscope

答案:economiesofscopeWilliamsonpointsoutthreeproductioncostadvantagesofusingthemarket,theyare（）。

A:economiesofscaleB:transactioncostsC:economiesofscopeD:productioncosts

答案:economiesofscale；economiesofscope；productioncostsThereareseveralpossiblebenefits(orso-calledsynergies)fromdiversification.（）。

A:LearningcurvesB:ReducingriskC:TransferoftechnologyD:Allocatingcapital

答案:Reducingrisk；Transferoftechnology；AllocatingcapitalThemorefrequentafirm’sneedforaninput,themorethefirmcansaveontransactioncostsbyinternalproduction.()

A:對B:錯

答案:對thehigherthedegreeofuncertainty,thehigherarethetransactioncosts.（）

A:對B:錯

答案:對

第三章單元測試

Theelasticityofdemand,isameasure

ofhowsensitivequantitydemandedistoachangein().

A:quanlityB:outputC:costD:price

答案:price（）isthedifferencebetweenthemaximumamountconsumersarewillingtopayforagoodandtheamounttheyactuallypay。

A:consumersurplusB:producersurplusC:socialwelfareD:governmentsurplus

答案:consumersurplusIfafirmcouldhavetheabilitytosetpriceabove(),thenwecansayithasmarketpower.

A:marginalcostB:averagecostC:maximumprofitD:totalcost

答案:marginalcostInaperfectlycompetitivemarket,transactioncostsarezerofor(

)

A:onlybuyersB:onlysellersC:sellersD:buyers

答案:sellers；buyersInaperfectlycompetitivemarket,

transactioncostsarezeroforbothbuyersandsellers.

A:錯B:對

答案:對Theprofit-maximizingruletellsafirmtoproducethatquantityofoutputforwhichmarginalrevenueequalsmarginalcost.

A:錯B:對

答案:對Economistsoftenevaluatethewelfareeffectsofchangesinmarketstructureorofgovernmentpoliciesbylookingatchangesinconsumersurplus.

A:錯B:對

答案:錯Amonopolyisthesoleproducerofagoodforwhichtherearenoclosesubstitutes

A:對B:錯

答案:對TheLernerIndexindicatesthatamonopolisthasunlimitedcontroloverprice.

A:對B:錯

答案:錯Iftheelasticityequals-10,theLernerIndexequals0.01

A:錯B:對

答案:錯Ifmonopolizationofanindustryraisescosts,thedeadweightlossislarger

A:對B:錯

答案:對Thecompetitivemarketequilibriumisallocativelyefficient:Itmaximizesthesumofconsumerandproducersurplus.

A:對B:錯

答案:對Thedeadweightlosstriangleisameasureofthemisallocationofresourcesresulting

frommonopoly.

A:錯B:對

答案:對Thesimplecomparisonofcompetitionandmonopolyhighlightstheresourcemisallocationassociatedwithmarketpower.

A:錯B:對

答案:對Producersurplusisthedifferencebetweenthe(

)theproducerreceivesforsellingaunitofoutputanditsreservation(

）

A:marketprice,demandpriceB:marketprice,supplypriceC:demandprice,marketpriceD:marginalprice,demandprice

答案:marketprice,supplyprice

第四章單元測試

Marketshareisthefirm’spercentageshareofthemarket’stotalsalesrevenue.Itrangesfromzeroupto()percent.

A:1000B:100C:10000D:80

答案:100TheHHInumbercanrangefrom(

)to（）。

A:0,5000B:100,100C:0,10000D:1000,1000

答案:0,10000Verticalmergerinvolvesfirmsthatproduceat()ofproductioninthesameindustry.

A:samestagesB:unrelatedstagesC:marketextensionsD:differentstages

答案:differentstagesThemotivesformergerare（）。

A:financialmotivesB:riskreductionC:reduceentrybarriersD:marketpower

答案:financialmotives；riskreduction；reduceentrybarriers；marketpowerStaticorstructuralbarrierstoentryinclude（）。

A:productdifferentiationB:economiesofscaleC:absolutecostadvantagesD:capitalcosts

答案:productdifferentiation；economiesofscale；absolutecostadvantages；capitalcostsAtoo-broaddefinitionincludestoomanyfirms,withtheresultthatreportedmeasuresofmarketpowertendtobebiaseddownward.

A:對B:錯

答案:對Entryandexitconditionsareimportantdeterminantsofexistingfirms’marketpower.

A:對B:錯

答案:對Firmswithintheindustryhavecontroloverstructuralbarrierstoentry

A:錯B:對

答案:錯Behavioralorstrategicbarrierstoentryarethoseexistingfirmsmightdeliberatelybehaveinwaysthatdecreasedtheprobabilityofentrybyotherfirms

A:對B:錯

答案:對Establishedfirmshasabsolutecostadvantagesoverpotentialentrants.

A:錯B:對

答案:對Productdifferentiationcreatesanadvantageforestablishedfirmsrelativetonewcomers.

A:對B:錯

答案:錯Expectingprofitabilityisanincentivestoenter

A:對B:錯

答案:對Anycostthatafirmmustincurtoleaveanindustryisanexitbarrier,whichisgenerallythoughtofassometypeofmarginalcost.

A:錯B:對

答案:錯Industrieswithhighratesofentrytendtohavehighratesofexit

A:對B:錯

答案:對Eachsourceofentrybarrierscanalsoerectabarriertoexitbygoingfirms.

A:錯B:對

答案:對

第五章單元測試

Inamarketwithadominantfirm,itmakessensetoassumethat(

)

A:thefringefirmswillsettheindustrypriceandthedominantfirmwilltakethatpriceasgiven.

B:noneoftheaboveC:thedominantfirmwillsettheindustrypriceandthefringefirmswilltakethatpriceasgiven.D:

thedominantfirmwillsettheindustrypriceandthefringefirmswillalsomaketheirprice.

答案:thedominantfirmwillsettheindustrypriceandthefringefirmswilltakethatpriceasgiven.InUSSteelmodel,wecanfindthedominantfirm’sresidualdemandcurvebysubtractingthefringesupplycurvefromthetotaldemandcurveateverypricegreaterthanP=$25.

A:對B:錯

答案:對Accordingtotheassumptionof“Entryisfree”inthetheoryofcontestablemarket,(

)

A:

Entrantscouldbeoncompletelyequalfootingwithestablishedfirms,evenwithanestablishedmonopolist.B:Therestofthechoicesarewrong

C:Entrantscouldnotbeoncompletelyequalfootingwithestablishedfirms,evenwithanestablishedmonopolist.D:Entrantscouldbeoncompletelyequalfootingwithestablishedfirms,butcouldnotbewithanestablishedmonopolist.

答案:

Entrantscouldbeoncompletelyequalfootingwithestablishedfirms,evenwithanestablishedmonopolist.Accordingtocontestablemarketassumption,absoluteentryimpliesthattheentrylagismorethanthepriceadjustmentlag:anewfirmcanenteramarketandsellitsproductbeforetheestablishedfirmscanreactandchangetheirprices.

A:錯B:對

答案:錯Accordingtotheoryofcontestablemarketassumption,

theassumptionofnosunkcostsimpliesthatafirmcouldsellitsproductionfacilitiesfortheirpresentvalueinaresalemarketorcouldusetheminanothermarketwithoutanylosses.

A:對B:錯

答案:對Ifaconsumerfeelsmuchbetterasmoreconsumersuse"wechat",thenetworkexternalityis(

)

A:positiveB:notsureC:negativeD:zero

答案:positiveNegativeExternalityexistswhenconsumersarebetteroffasthenumberofusersofthesamebrandincreases

A:錯B:對

答案:錯DirectNetworkExternalityreferstothebenefittoanindividualconsumerdependsdirectlyonthenumberofotherusersoftheproduct.

A:對B:錯

答案:對IndirectNetworkExternalityarisesbecauseofcomplementarity.

A:錯B:對

答案:對Inemail'sapplication,itshowsnetworkexternalityanditshouldbenegative.

A:對B:錯

答案:錯

第六章單元測試

LetX1standforameasureofmarketstructureand

Yforameasureofeconomicprofits,wecanexpressthehypothesisabouttherelationshipbetweenmarketstructureandprofitsusingasimplelinearequationas:,isanerrorterm.

A:對B:錯

答案:對Infigure1(a),hypotheticalscatterdiagramofdataonY(economicprofits)andX1(marketstructure),theverticaldistancebetweeneachdatapointandastraightlinefittedthroughtheobservationsiscalledthe()

A:varianceB:deviationC:errortermD:residual

答案:residualTheLernerIndexisdifficulttoestimatebecausedataarelackingonfirms’marginalcosts.

A:錯B:對

答案:對Excessreturnonsalesistheratioofeconomicprofitstosalescost.

A:錯B:對

答案:錯Economicprofitsaredifficulttocalculate.

A:錯B:對

答案:對Tobin’sqhasseveraladvantagesoverrateofreturnmeasures().

A:qismuchlesssensitivetoerrorsinmeasuringitscomponentsthanareprofits.B:Thenumeratorofq,marketvalue,reflectsexpectedfutureprofits,whereasaccountingdatareflectonlypastprofits.C:qreflectstheoperationsoftheentirefirm,creatingcomplicationsfordiversifiedfirms.D:Themarketvalueofafirmdependspartlyonrisk,soqincorporatesanadjustmentforrisk.

答案:qismuchlesssensitivetoerrorsinmeasuringitscomponentsthanareprofits.；Thenumeratorofq,marketvalue,reflectsexpectedfutureprofits,whereasaccountingdatareflectonlypastprofits.；Themarketvalueofafirmdependspartlyonrisk,soqincorporatesanadjustmentforrisk.Inthemeasuringofcapitalrequirements,typicallymeasuredbytheestimatedamountofcapitalrequiredbyamidpointplant.

A:對B:錯

答案:對Manyeconomistshaveusedproxiesforentrybarriersasindependentvariablesintheirregressionequations.Commonlyusedmeasuresofbarrierstoentryincludethefollowing():

A:ProductdifferentiationB:EconomiesofscaleC:ResearchintensityD:Capitalrequirements

答案:Productdifferentiation；Economiesofscale；Researchintensity；CapitalrequirementsAdvertisingandotherformsofproductdifferentiationareexpectedtohavelesseffectonconcentrationandprofitabilityinproducergoodsindustriesthaninconsumergoodsindustries,()

A:becausebuyersinproducergoodsindustriestendtobelargeandnotwellinformed.B:becausebuyersinproducergoodsindustriestendtobemediumandwellinformed.C:becausebuyersinproducergoodsindustriestendtobelargeandwellinformed.D:becausebuyersinproducergoodsindustriestendtobesmallandwellinformed.

答案:becausebuyersinproducergoodsindustriestendtobelargeandwellinformed.Inthemeasuringofeconomiesofscale,oftenapproximatedbytheratioofmidpointplantsales(thesalesoftheplantinthemiddleofthesizedistributionofplants)tototalindustrysales.

A:錯B:對

答案:對

第七章單元測試

TheWaldmanmodelisagameofperfectinformationbecausebothtrucksmovesimultaneouslytopickalocation.

A:對B:錯

答案:錯InWaldmanmodel,ifbothlocateatthesamepoint,thetruckssplitsales50-50.

A:對B:錯

答案:對Adominantstrategyisastrategythatoutperformsanyotherstrategynomatterwhatstrategyanopponentselects.

A:對B:錯

答案:對AlthoughalldominantsolutionsareNashequilibria,somegameswithoutadominantsolutioncanhave()Nashequilibrium.

A:oneB:morethanoneC:noD:notsure

答案:morethanoneIfWaldmanplaysastrategythatminimizesthemaximumpossibleoutcomeforOtherTruck,Waldmanwillbeplayinghisdominatedstrategy.

A:對B:錯

答案:錯GeneralElectric(GE)andWestinghousegameisofimperfectinformationbecauseGEandWestinghousesimultaneouslyselectprices.

A:錯B:對

答案:對Adominatedstrategyisastrategythatcanalwaysbebeatenbysomeotherstrategy.

A:錯B:對

答案:對Insequentialgames,theplayerstaketurnsmovinginsteadofmovingsimultaneously.

A:對B:錯

答案:對oneofthecharacteristicsofallmixedstrategyequilibriaisthatoncetheequilibriumisobtained,bothplayersareindifferentbetweenplayingtheirequilibriumstrategyandanyotherstrategy.

A:對B:錯

答案:對AmixedstrategyNashequilibriumisinherentlystablebecauseprofitsarethesameregardlessofthestrategyadoptedbythefirms,andtherefore,bothfirmshavelittleincentivetomaintaintheequilibrium.

A:錯B:對

答案:錯

第八章單元測試

IntheStackelbergModel,onefirmmakechoicefirst,thenanotheronewillselectoutputlevel.

A:錯B:對

答案:對InBertrandModel,twofirmsselectoutputoftheproductsinordertomaximizeprofit.

A:對B:錯

答案:錯Cournot'sduopolymodelisusedtodescribeanindustrystructureinwhichcompaniescompeteonthepriceofproducttheywillproduce,whichtheydecideonindependentlyofeachotherandatthesametime.

A:對B:錯

答案:錯InCournot'sduopolymodel,twofirmsfaceidenticalcosts.

A:對B:錯

答案:對Cournot'sduopolymodelassumptionincludes():

A:thereisproductdifferentiationB:thereisnocollusionC:twofirmsfaceidenticalcostsD:eachfirmbelievesthatitscompetitorwillalwaysmaintainitscurrentoutput.

答案:thereisnocollusion；twofirmsfaceidenticalcosts；eachfirmbelievesthatitscompetitorwillalwaysmaintainitscurrentoutput.Inequilibrium,amongCournotoutput,jointprofit-maximizingoutputandtheperfectlycompetitiveoutput,ifweweretosortbytheoutputlevelfromthelargesttothesmallest,itshouldbe():

A:Cournotoutput,jointprofit-maximizingoutput,theperfectlycompetitiveoutputB:jointprofit-maximizingoutput,Cournotoutput,theperfectlycompetitiveoutputC:jointprofit-maximizingoutput,theperfectlycompetitiveoutput,CournotoutputD:theperfectlycompetitiveoutput,Cournotoutput,jointprofit-maximizingoutput

答案:theperfectlycompetitiveoutput,Cournotoutput,jointprofit-maximizingoutputCournotequilibriumisnotaNashequilibrium

A:對B:錯

答案:錯TheCournot–Nashgameisasequentialgame.

A:錯B:對

答案:錯TheStackelbergequilibriumyieldsagreatertotalindustryoutputandhigherpricethantheCournot–Nashequilibrium.

A:錯B:對

答案:錯IntheSouthwest-U.S.Airways’farecompetinggame,anyfarelessthanMC=$70willresultinoneairlinereducingfares,whichinturnwillresultinafarereductionbytheother,andsoon.

A:錯B:對

答案:錯

第九章單元測試

Inordertoachievethejointprofit-maximizingresult,thefirmsmustestablishanenvironmentinwhicheachbelievestheotherwillsticktothecollusivehigh-pricepolicy.Anysolutiontothedilemmahastobecharacterizedby():

A:anabilitytopersuadecheatersB:anabilitytodetectcheatingC:anabilitytocontrolpriceD:anabilitytopunishcheaters

答案:anabilitytodetectcheating；anabilitytopunishcheatersThecharacteristicsofatit-for-tatstrategyincludes(

)

A:swiftandaggressivepunishmentinagameassociatedwithdefectingB:Ineverysubsequentround,adoptthestrategyplayedbyyouropponentinthepreviousround.C:thenicenessD:Startingbycooperatinginthefirstround.

答案:Ineverysubsequentround,adoptthestrategyplayedbyyouropponentinthepreviousround.；theniceness；Startingbycooperatinginthefirstround.Tacitcollusionresultswhenagroupofcompetitorssitsdowntodiscussandsetprice.

A:錯B:對

答案:錯Inperfectcollusion,thefirmsareproducingthejointprofit-maximizingoutput.

A:錯B:對

答案:對Themostimportantadvantageoftit-for-tatstrategyisthenicenesscharacteristic.

A:對B:錯

答案:對InJensen–WaldmanMiniTournament,whereJensenplaystit-for-tatandWaldmanplaysthedominantstrategy,Jensenmustwinthehead-to-headcompetition.

A:錯B:對

答案:錯Tit-for-tatisforgivinginthatitrewardsdefectorswhoreverttocooperationbyalsorevertingtocooperation.

A:錯B:對

答案:對Oligopolistsshouldsimplyadoptthetit-for-tatstrategyinallcircumstances.

A:錯B:對

答案:錯Inatriggerpricestrategy,evenasingledeviationfromcooperationwillcausetheendsofcooperationforever.

A:錯B:對

答案:對tit-for-tatstrategyisalsooftencalledthegrimstrategy.

A:對B:錯

答案:錯Acartelisaformal(explicit)agreementamongcompetingfirms.

A:對B:錯

答案:對InWal-Mart-Searsmodel,todeterminethejointprofit-maximizingprice,theindustryaveragecostcurvemustbeequatedtotheindustrymarginalrevenuecurve.

A:錯B:對

答案:錯Whichofthefollowingfactorcouldhindereffectivecollusion

A:lowentrybarriersB:lowfrequencyofsalesC:differingcostsbetweenfirmsD:slowrateofdemandgrowthordecliningdemand

答案:lowentrybarriers；differingcostsbetweenfirms；slowrateofdemandgrowthordecliningdemandThemoreelasticthedemand,therefore,thegreaterthecartel’spotentialmarketpowerandthegreatertheincentivetocolludebecauseitiseasiertoraisepricewithouthavingtosignificantlyreduceindustryoutput.

A:對B:錯

答案:錯Slowratesofdemandgrowthmaybeassociatedwithhigherlevelsofcollusion.

A:對B:錯

答案:對

第十章單元測試

Thetheoryoflimitpricingsuggeststhatfirmsmaychargehighershort-runpricestorestrictfutureentry.

A:錯B:對

答案:錯Intheoriginallimitpricingmodels,onecriticalassumptionwastheCournotassumptionthatthemonopolistwouldmaintainitsoutputevenafterentryoccurred.

A:對B:錯

答案:對Inlimitpricingmodel,todeterentry,themonopolistmust()itspricesufficientlytoensurethatthepotentialentrant’sresidualdemandcurvelieseverywhere()thepotentialentrant’saveragecostcurve.

A:lower,aboveB:lower,belowC:raise.aboveD:raisebelow

答案:lower,belowThelowestpossiblepricethemonopolistcanchargeandstillprevententryiscalledthelimitprice

A:對B:錯

答案:錯Evenifeconomiesofscaleexist,alimitpricingpolicystillmaynotworkintheabsenceofacostadvantageforthemonopolist.

A:錯B:對

答案:錯Predatorypricingassumesthatamonopolistmaximizesprofituntilentryoccurs,andthatafterentry,themonopolistexpandsoutputaggressivelyandcutsprice.

A:錯B:對

答案:對Accordingtochainstoreparadoxtheory,evenwithhundredsorthousandsofroundsinapredatorypricinggame,entrywillbeaccommodatedonlyinthefirstround.

A:錯B:對

答案:錯Aweakmonopolistenjoysbeingpredatoryandisalwayspredatory.

A:對B:錯

答案:錯Aweakmonopolistispredatoryinonemarketonlyifitbelievesitwillincreaseitsfutureprofitinothermarketstoatleastcompensateforitslowercurrentprofit.

A:對B:錯

答案:對Inpredatorypricinggamewithinformationisimperfect,certain,incomplete,andasymmetric,themonopolistandthepotentialentrantallknowwhetherthemonopolistisstrongorweak.

A:對B:錯

答案:錯

第十一章單元測試

Fromaneconomicstandpoint,nonpricingstrategiesaremorelikelytobemisinterpretedbycompetitorsasaggressiveacts.

A:錯B:對

答案:錯Inexcesscapacitymodel,thepotentialentrantmovesfirstandselectsalevelofcapacity,thenthemonopolistdecideswhethertoenter,thenthemonopolistselectsacapacitylevelandanoutput.Thepotentialentrantproducesaquantityofzeroifitstaysout.

A:對B:錯

答案:錯Inexcesscapacitymodel,themonopolistinvestsinexcesscapacityinperiod1inorderto()itscostsinperiod2;moreimportantly,thisinvestment()themonopolist’scostsinrelationtoapotentialentrant’scostsinperiod2.Asaresult,themonopolistdetersentryandearnslargerprofitsoverthetwoperiods.

A:increase,increasesB:lower,increasesC:lower,lowersD:increase,lowers

答案:lower,lowersInexcesscapacitymodel,themonopolistcanthreatentobuildtheextracapacityafterthepotentialentranthasalreadyentered,butsuchathreatisnotcredible.

A:錯B:對

答案:對Inexcesscapacitymodel,themonopolistcannotbuildtheextracapacityinadvanceofthepotentialentrant’sdecisionofwhethertoenter.Themonopolist’searlyexpansionofcapacitywouldonlyaffecttheprofitpayoffsofitself.

A:錯B:對

答案:錯Whenlearningbydoingisimportant,earlyentrantsintothemarketmaybeabletomaintainalargemarketshareandincreasethepresentvalueoftheirprofitsbystrategicallyproducingsignificantlylargeroutputsearlyonthanwouldbejustifiedbyshort-runprofit-maximizingbehavior.

A:對B:錯

答案:對AccordingtoSmiley’sresultsaboutthefrequencyuseofdifferentstrategies,themoststrikingfindingwasthatthestrategicuseofadvertisingandproductproliferationwascommoninbothnewandexistingproductmarkets.

A:錯B:對

答案:對Inexcesscapacitymodel,themonopolistinvestsinexcesscapacityin()inordertoloweritscostsin();moreimportantly,thisinvestmentlowersthemonopolist’scostsinrelationtoapotentialentrant’scostsinperiod2.Asaresult,themonopolistdetersentryandearnslargerprofitsover().

A:period2,period1,thetwoperiods.B:period2,period1,period1.C:period1,period2,period1.D:period1,period2,thetwoperiods.

答案:period1,period2,thetwoperiods.Facedwithathreatofentry,themonopolistcaninvestinresearchanddevelopmentinperiod1andearnasmallerprofitin(

);however,ifthemonopolist’slowercostsinperiod2deterentry,themonopolist’sprofitswillbesignificantlyincreasedin(

)

A:period2,period1B:period1,period1.C:period2,period2.D:period1,period2

答案:period2,period2.Whichofthefollowingmethodscouldbeusedforamonopolisttoraiseitsrivals’costs?

A:increasingadvertisingexpenditurestoforceentrantstoincreasetheiradvertisingexpendituresB:sabotagingcorporatecompetitorsC:lobbyingthegovernmenttoerectbarrierstoentryD:providingcomplementarygoodsandservicestoforceentrantstoalsoprovidecomplementaryproducts

答案:increasingadvertisingexpenditurestoforceentrantstoincreasetheiradvertisingexpenditures；sabotagingcorporatecompetitors；lobbyingthegovernmenttoerectbarrierstoentry；providingcomplementarygoodsandservicestoforceentrantstoalsoprovidecomplementaryproducts

第十二章單元測試

Productdifferentiationisassociatedwithpossibleadvantagesforincumbentfirms.Theseadvantagesinclude():

A:alloftheaboveB:possiblecostadvantagesforincumbentsC:anincreaseinthecapitalbarriertoentryD:increasedeconomiesofscale

答案:alloftheabove；possiblecostadvantagesforincumbents；anincreaseinthecapitalbarriertoentry；increasedeconomiesofscaleSmartphonesellersattempttodifferentiatetheirproductsinmanyways,suchas(

):

A:chipbrandB:appearanceC:

internalstorageD:batterylife

答案:chipbrand；appearance；

internalstorage；batterylifeInHotelling’sspatialmodel,ifthereisonly1store,themainstreet'slengthis1mile,sothemonopolistshouldlocatethestoreon(

)milefromoneendofthemainstreet.

A:1/2B:1/8C:1/3D:1/4

答案:1/2Inthespatialmodelofproductdifferentiation,theTotalSocialSurplus(TSS)equalsthetotalvalueoftheNunitssoldtoconsumersincaseswhereallNconsumerspurchaseexactlyoneunitofthegoodfromoneofnstores(NR)minus():

A:monopolist’saveragecostsB:totaltransportationcostsC:thetotalvariablecostsofproduction(Nc)D:thefixedcostsofbuildingnstores(nF)

答案:totaltransportationcosts；thetotalvariablecostsofproduction(Nc)；thefixedcostsofbuildingnstores(nF)Inthespatialmodelofproductdifferentiation,totaltransportationcostsdependon():

A:thetransportationcostsperunitofdistancet.B:thetotalvariablecostsofproduction(Nc)C:thefixedcostsofbuildingnstores(nF)D:thenumberofstoresn

答案:thetransportationcostsperunitofdistancet.；thenumberofstoresnThetwoimportantcharacteristicsofmonopolisticcompetitionare()

A:highentryandexitbarrierB:productdifferentiationC:producthomogeneityD:easyentryandexit

答案:productdifferentiation；easyentryandexitVerticaldifferentiationreferstodifferencesbetweenbrandsbasedondifferentproductcharacteristicsbutnotondifferentoverallquality.

A:對B:錯

答案:錯AMcDonald’sQuarterPounderissomewhatdifferentfromaBurgerKingWhopperoraWendy’sSingle,buttheoverallqualityofthethreeburgersissimilar.Thisishorizontaldifferentiation.

A:對B:錯

答案:對Inthespatialmodelofproductdifferentiation,thesociallyoptimalnumberofstoresisthesamenumberofstoresthatmaximizesthemonopolist’sprofit.

A:對B:錯

答案:錯Accordingtofirstmovermodelintheproductdifferentiationadvantagestheory,iftherepeatpurchasesfrequenceissmall,therisk-costfactor

issmall.

A:錯B:對

答案:錯

第十三章單元測試

Advertisinginbusinessisaformofmarketingcommunicationusedtoencourage,orpersuadeanaudiencetotakeorcontinuetotakesomeactions.（）

A:錯B:對

答案:對Informativeadvertisingimprovescompetitionandconsumerchoiceandissociallybeneficial.（）

A:錯B:對

答案:對Persuasiveadvertisingmerelytriestochangeconsumerreferencesortodivertattentionfromfactstoimag