國貿(mào)畢業(yè)外文文獻(xiàn)及其翻譯.doc

Chinas Competitive Performance: A Threat To East Asian Manufactured Exports?There is growing concern in Southeast and East Asia about the competitive threat posed by Chinas burgeoning exports, exacerbated by its accession to the WTO. The threat is not confined to labor-intensive products but spans the whole technological and skill range. At the same time, China is rapidly raising its imports from the region, and it is not clear whether its burgeoning exports will damage its neighbors. We examine the dimensions of Chinas competitive threat in the 1990s, benchmarking competitive performance by technology and market, and finds that market share losses are so far mainly in low technology products, with Japan being the most vulnerable market. We analyze market share changes and highlight product groups that are directly or indirectly exposed to a competitive threat. We examine intra-regional trade and find that China and its neighbors are raising high technology exports in tandem: the nature of the international production systems involved lead to complementarily rather than confrontation. China is thus acting as an engine of export growth for its neighbors in terms of direct trade. However, this will change as China moves up the value chain and takes on the activities that have driven East Asian export growth.IntroductionConcern about Chinas competitive threat is widespread (in developed economies like US as well as developing ones like Mexico), but is strongest in East and Southeast Asia. Chinas burgeoning exportsbacked by cheap and productive labor, a large stock of technical manpower, huge and diversified industrial sector, attractiveness to foreign investors, pragmatic use of industrial policy, and, now, freer access to world markets under WTO lead to apocalyptic visions of export losses.2 China is most threatening to neighbors that rely primarily on low wages for their export advantage. However, as it upgrades its export structure, the more advanced economies (Singapore, Hong Kong, Korea and Taiwan) also fear for their competitiveness. The current hollowing out of their low-end manufacturing may soon extend to complex production, design, development and related services. Domestic markets are also threatened by China, but so far most attention seems to have been on exports. Offsetting this threat are the promise of the giant Chinese market (WTO accession is only one of several initiatives to liberalize regional trade) and the potential for collaboration with it in exporting to the rest of the world. Trade within the East Asian region is flourishing. China is a growing importer from the region of natural resources that it does not possess. It is also raisin g imports of manufactured products. Its advanced neighbors are selling it sophisticated consumer and producer goods, and using it as a base for processing exports to third countries. The multinational companies (MNCs) that now account for around half of Chinese exports (and far more of its high technology exports, UNCTAD,2002) are incorporating China into production systems spanning the region (fragmentation and segmentation are used to describe this phenomenon3), so promoting considerable intra-firm trade with other regional bases. Chinas own enterprises are likely to specialize with respect to regional counterparts and so raise intra-industry trade in differentiated products. Perhaps worryingly for competitors in other regions, such integration can lead China to complement regional competitiveness as a whole, rather than substitute its exports for those of its neighbors.It is difficult to assess, however, whether complementarily between China and the regional economies will fully offset its competitive threat. The dynamics and complexity of the interactions make it impossible to quantify the outcome, even to predict broad directions. The basic issue is whether Chinas higher wage neighbors can move into more advanced export activities or functions rapidly enough to permit continued export expansion. If they can, they can continue with export-led growth. If they cannot, they will suffer export deceleration and/or a shift in specialization towards primary products or slow-growing segments of manufactured exports. The outcome, in other words, will depend on the relative growth of technological and other capabilities in Chinese and regional enterprises, with the former having such advantages as lower wages, larger scale economies, greater industrial depth, pools of technical skill and a proactive government. However, as East Asian countries differ widely in these factors (Lall, 2001), they face different kinds and intensity of competitive threat. The nature of the threat depends, moreover, on the organization of the production and marketing system: independent local firms are likely to compete more directly than affiliates of the same MNC spread over different countries in an integrated system.This paper does not try to measure Chinas competitive threat or its effects, but to map relative export performance in the 1990s by technology and destination and so assess where the threat appears most intense. We focus on major East Asian exporters5 and on exports to third markets, but we also analyses complementarities between China and East Asia, particularly in electronics, the regions largest export and the one where MNC systems dominate. As the 1990s predate Chinas WTO accession, we do not go into the implications of this accession; however, the analysis of competitive trends has implications for the evolution of future trade by the region as liberalization grows.Background on Chinese export performanceChinese manufactured exports grew by 16.9% per annum over 1990-2000, compared to 6.4% for the world, 12.0% for all developing countries and 10.3% for the rest of East Asia. Its share of world manufactured exports rose from 1.7% to 4.4% over the decade and continued rising rapidly. 6 Thus, by 2002 China accounted for 5.1% of world merchandise exports; it was then the fifth largest exporter (after USA, Germany, Japan and France, and ahead of the UK). Chinas share of developing world manufactured exports rose from 11% to 20% over the 1990s and of the East Asian region excluding China from 18.7% to 41.8%. Its export gains (see below) spanned the entire technological spectrum, and were most dynamic in the complex end of the range, in products that have recently driven the export growth of the rest of East Asia.This export surge is likely to be sustained for some time to come. China has spare capacity in that its per capita exports are still relatively small,7 wages are much lower than in its main neighbors and it has large reserves of cheap and disciplined labor (though drawing it into exports will involve the cost of building links with the interior).8 More importantly, its advantages are not static (confined to cheap labor); they are upgrading rapidly. China is investing heavily in technology and advanced skills; for example, the share of the relevant age group enrolled in tertiary education rose from 9 percent in 1997 to 13 percent in 2000 (UNESCO website). It is exploiting the scale offered by its giant market to become competitive in capital-intensive activities beyond the reach of many neighbors. It is using its diverse industrial base to deepen local content. It is drawing in export-oriented FDI at an impressive rate, using its market attractions to induce investors to raise local R&D and linkages; till now it has been able to impose performance requirements of the type soon to be banned under WTO rules.WTO accession may constrain Chinas ability to use industrial policy (Nolan, 2001) but it will also open up new export opportunities, particularly in textiles and garments.9 Accession may also enhance its domestic competitiveness: it will improve the investment climate for FDI, make imported inputs cheaper (for enterprises outside special export regimes) and induce faster restructuring of domestic enterprises (Ianchovichinaetal, 2003, and Lemoyne and Unal-Kesenci, 2002). Market share changes in major developed country marketsWe analyze market shares of China and its neighbors in three major markets: Japan, the US and West Europe, according to technology categories (Annex Table 1). In terms of value, the most important market for China in 2000 is the US ($49 billion), followed by Japan ($36 billion) and West Europe ($38 billion). However, the rest of the world is almost as large a destination for Chinese exports as these together ($106 billion in 2000) and within this the rest of East Asia is larger than any major OECD market by itself ($74.6 billion). The competitive position of each country can be analyzed in terms of the market share in 1990 and 2000 and the change over the decade. The annex table shows the following:Total manufactured exports: China does best in Japan, followed at some distance by the US. In common with most neighbors, its market share gain is weakest in West Europe. Korea loses market shares in both Japan and US, while Taiwan loses only in the US. Hong Kongs loses market shares in all markets, particularly in the US and Japan. Like Taiwan, Singapore loses only in the US. The new Tigers gain share in all markets. With the exception of Indonesia, with a rather tepid performance, the others all gain most share in the Japanese market.Resource based products: China again leads the region in terms of market share increases, with a pattern similar to that for total exports. However, Korea has a large gain in Japan, in contrast to Taiwan and Singapore, which lose shares; the latter two also lose in the US. Thailand is a big gainer in Japan while Indonesia and the Philippines lose out in the US. Low technology products: Chinas massive market share gains are again concentrated in Japan. The four mature Tigers generally suffer losses in market share, but Singapore sees an increase in Japanese market share. The best overall performance among the new Tigers is by Indonesia.Medium technology products: While the Chinese pattern of success recurs, the new Tigers make significant gains in Japan and Korea incurs a significant loss. Taiwan and Singapore suffer losses in the US market. High technology exports: Taiwan again diverges from Korea in its performance in Japan, the former showing the second largest gain in the group (after China) and the latter the largest loss. In the US market, the situation is reversed, with Singapore joining Taiwan in losing market shares. Among the new Tigers, Malaysia and the Philippines are the big gainers in Japan, but the other two also benefit significantly. The Philippines is the second largest winner in the group in the US market. In sum, Chinas main market share gains in the developed world are concentrated in Japan (though the US accounts for a larger dollar value of export growth). This is also true of its neighbors with the exceptions of Korea and Indonesia (Hong Kong was an all-round loser). To the extent that we can interpret market share changes to be causally related to Chinas export surge, it would seem that the mature Tigers suffered the most from Chinese competition. The largest such loss is in low technology products, which is to be expected, but this not take into account the growth of LT exports by Korea and Taiwan to China. The relatively low gains by the lower-income new Tigers in LT may also reflect the impact of Chinese competition without the offsetting increase in exports of intermediates to China. ConclusionsChinas export surge has raised grave concerns in the region. While some of the apocalyptic predictions may have been overdone, it is certainly possible that rapid export growth by such a massive entrant will adversely affects export growth in its neighbors. As this analysis shows,however, the outcome is complex. For a start, the rise in Chinas exports is matched by that in its imports within the region its import growth outpaces its export growth. With appropriate restructuring of activities to match new competitive needs, its neighbors should be able to maintain high rates of export growth. There are two main drivers of regional exports to China. The first is to meet its burgeoning demand for imported products: primary products and resource-based manufactures that it cannot produce capital goods and intermediates for domestic -oriented production and more sophisticated consumer goods than its industry can currently provide. The second is to meet the needs of its export industries. This has two components: processing activity in special economic zones that use imported inputs for export activities, and other exporters that also need imports. Processing activity is increasingly organized as part of integrated production systems, particularly its high technology segments, though some domestic oriented industries are also being plugged into this system as they realize scale and learning economies and become globally competitive. Both drivers are likely to continue into the foreseeable future, though their composition will change as Chinese and regional capabilities develop.中國競爭力的表現(xiàn)：是對東亞制成品出口的威脅嗎？越來越多的東南亞和東亞地區(qū)關(guān)注中國出口的迅速增長所帶來的競爭威脅，中國加入WTO后，更加劇了這種情況。這種威脅并不局限于勞動密集型產(chǎn)品，而是跨越整個技術(shù)和技能范圍的產(chǎn)品，同時，中國正在迅速提高其在東南亞和東亞的進(jìn)口，目前尚不清楚其是否其蓬勃發(fā)展的出口將是否損害其鄰國的利益，本文研究了中國20世紀(jì)90年代中國競爭威脅的大小，市場競爭力表現(xiàn)的基準(zhǔn)是技術(shù)和市場份額，研究發(fā)現(xiàn)，發(fā)現(xiàn)市場份額的損失迄今為止主要在低技術(shù)產(chǎn)品，日本是其最脆弱的市場。我們分析了市場份額的變化，直接或間接地突出了產(chǎn)品集群的競爭威脅。區(qū)域內(nèi)貿(mào)易的研究表明，中國和其鄰國同步提高了高技術(shù)產(chǎn)品的出口，參與國際生產(chǎn)系統(tǒng)的性質(zhì)導(dǎo)致的是互補(bǔ)性，而不是對抗。因此，在直接貿(mào)易條件下，中國在出口增長方面是其鄰國的領(lǐng)頭人，但是，這將改變中國價值鏈的移動，帶動?xùn)|亞出口的迅速增長，引言中國競爭威脅論的擔(dān)心是普遍存在的，（像發(fā)達(dá)國家中的美國和發(fā)展中國家的墨西哥等）作為東亞和南亞最大的出口國，中國的新興出口憑借廉價的勞動生產(chǎn)力，大量的人力技術(shù)存量，巨大的和多元化的工業(yè)部門，吸引外國投資，以及優(yōu)惠的產(chǎn)業(yè)政策，如今，加入WTO后，中國更加自由的進(jìn)入國際市場，導(dǎo)致了出口損失末日的嚴(yán)重觀點。中國依靠低工資的出口優(yōu)勢造成了對鄰國的最大威脅。中國的出口結(jié)構(gòu)升級以后，更多的發(fā)達(dá)經(jīng)濟(jì)體（新加坡，香港，南韓和臺灣）也會擔(dān)憂其強(qiáng)大的競爭力，當(dāng)前其低端工業(yè)制成的漏洞將很快由其他復(fù)雜生產(chǎn)、設(shè)計和發(fā)展的產(chǎn)品以及相關(guān)的服務(wù)產(chǎn)業(yè)所填充。各個國家的國內(nèi)市場也受到中國的威脅，但目前為止，主要關(guān)注的還是在出口方面。弱化這種威脅論的是中國政府的承諾(加入WTO只是區(qū)域貿(mào)易自由化的若干舉措之一)，和出口到世界各地的潛在合作。中國與東亞地區(qū)的貿(mào)易正在蓬勃發(fā)展，在這些地區(qū)進(jìn)口其不具備自然資源的速度在快速增長。工業(yè)制成品的進(jìn)口也在上升，發(fā)達(dá)的鄰國向其銷售消費制成品和生產(chǎn)制成品，并利用其作為向第三國產(chǎn)品出口的加工基地。多國公司（跨國公司），現(xiàn)在占到中國出口的一半（目前主要是高技術(shù)產(chǎn)品的出口，UNCTAD,2002）,不斷融入中國生產(chǎn)系統(tǒng)的方方面面，（用分裂和分割是用來描述這種現(xiàn)象）,更好地促進(jìn)了與其他區(qū)域企業(yè)之間的貿(mào)易。中國的國有企業(yè)有可能專業(yè)化同業(yè)生產(chǎn)，以此提高同業(yè)差異化產(chǎn)品的貿(mào)易。與其擔(dān)心在其他地區(qū)的競爭對手，這種整合反而會導(dǎo)致中國以配合整個區(qū)域的競爭力，而不是替代其鄰國的出口。但是，中國和各區(qū)域經(jīng)濟(jì)體的互補(bǔ)性是否能完全抵消其競爭威脅，這是難以估計的。動態(tài)性和復(fù)雜性的相互作用使其無法量化這個結(jié)果，我們甚至可以預(yù)知大方向。這里的基本問題是，中國高工資的鄰國是否帶來更先進(jìn)的技術(shù)活動，而且能夠迅地速繼續(xù)擴(kuò)大出口額。如果能，那么可以繼續(xù)出口引致的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長，否則他們將受到出口減速和/或在對初級產(chǎn)品或工業(yè)制成品出口增長緩慢的部分進(jìn)行專業(yè)化轉(zhuǎn)變。換言之，產(chǎn)出將取決于技術(shù)和能力，中國和其他地區(qū)企業(yè)的相對增長，前者優(yōu)勢有工資較低，規(guī)模效益較大，產(chǎn)業(yè)深度更廣，技術(shù)技能集群更大，以及一個積極的政府。然而，東亞國家在這些因素方面的差異很大，(Lall, 2001),他們面對著不同種類和密集度的競爭威脅。威脅的性質(zhì)更多地體現(xiàn)在產(chǎn)品組織和營銷系統(tǒng)，獨立的當(dāng)?shù)仄髽I(yè)可能比一體化系統(tǒng)中遍布不同國家的相同跨國公司分支機(jī)構(gòu)的競爭更加直接。本文并不試圖衡量中國的競爭威脅或其影響力，而是衡量上世紀(jì)90年代由技術(shù)和目的評估找出相關(guān)產(chǎn)品出口競爭威脅最激烈的地方。我們專注于東亞的主要出口國和第三市場的出口，我們還分析了中國和東亞地區(qū)之間的互補(bǔ)性，特別是在電子產(chǎn)品方面，該地區(qū)是最大的出口方，而且跨國公司系統(tǒng)占主導(dǎo)地位。早在中國未進(jìn)入WTO的90年代，我們沒有阻止其進(jìn)入的影響力，競爭力趨勢的研究表明其對區(qū)域自由化增長引起的未來貿(mào)易變革是有影響的。中國出口結(jié)構(gòu)表現(xiàn)的背景中國工業(yè)制成品年出口增長率超過1990-2000的16.9%，超出世界平均水平的6.4%,超過其余東亞發(fā)展中國家的10.3%，近幾年中國的國際工業(yè)制成品的份額從1.7%上升到4.4%，并且在迅速增長，因此，到2002年中國占世界商品出口的5.1; 是第五大出口國（僅次于美國，德國，日本和法國，并領(lǐng)先于英國），中國在發(fā)展中國家的工業(yè)制成品出口份額從20世紀(jì)90年代的11上升到20，東亞地區(qū)除中國以外，從18.7上升到41.8。中國出口的增長跨越了整個技術(shù)領(lǐng)域，在復(fù)雜產(chǎn)品以及目前對其余東亞國家的出口增長起主導(dǎo)作用的產(chǎn)品范圍內(nèi)最具影響。出口激增可能需要一段時間來實現(xiàn)，中國的“閑置能力”導(dǎo)致人均資本出口額仍舊相對較小，工資比主要鄰國要低，廉價的規(guī)范化的勞動量儲存較大(雖然它們拉動了出口，但是帶來了建立內(nèi)部聯(lián)動機(jī)制的成本)，最重要的是，這種優(yōu)勢不是靜態(tài)的（限于廉價勞動力），是迅速升級的，中國正在加大技術(shù)和先進(jìn)的技能的投資;例如，各年齡段的專業(yè)教育比例從1997年的9%上升到2000年的13%(UNESCO website). 中國利用其巨大的規(guī)模產(chǎn)出增加市場占有量，其資本密集型產(chǎn)品的競爭力超出了許多鄰近國家，利用其多元化的工業(yè)基礎(chǔ)，以加深本國容量，發(fā)展原產(chǎn)地出口；外國直接投資以顯著的速度，利用其市場吸引力減少投資者，以提高本國的溢出效應(yīng)和聯(lián)動機(jī)制，直到現(xiàn)在，已經(jīng)能夠以這種形式采取必要措施，但不久