新聞報(bào)道高等教育決策-在新聞報(bào)道的國家決策偏差分析高等教育

1、Press Coverage of Higher Education Policymaking-Analyzing Bias in Press Coverage of State Policymaking for Higher Education AbstractTheoretically-grounded analysis of press coverage that examines what newsaccounts convey about the interactions of higher education institutions during periods of treme

2、ndous legislative conflict is virtually non-existent. This study utilized a theory of news construction to predict and to analyze patterns of press coverage of legislative conflict between two nationally-prominent universities. The chief finding is that newspapers with competing political interests

3、give preferential treatment to their "local" universities, producing "biased" news coverage of critical state policy episodes. Introduction The role of America's mass media in shaping governmental processes and public policy outcomes has been the focus of intensive scholarshi

4、p among political scientists and mass communication researchers for much of the 20th century. This interest has grown acute over the past three decades as increasingly scholars have come to view the United States as a "media democracy" (Linsky, 1986), where in powerful mass media systems h

5、ave usurped the "linking" function historically attributed to political parties and now serve as the main conduit between the mass citizenry and governmental decision-makers. Policymakers themselves attest to the growing influence of the mass media over governmental decision making. One st

6、udy found that a majority of 500 former government officials surveyed believe the media has a "substantial" impact upon federal policy (Linsky, 1986). More recently, a national survey of state legislators found that among a welter of influence agents, the media was perceived to have most i

7、ncreased its influence over legislative decision making in the past fifteen years (Moncrief, Thompson, and Kurtz, 1996). Anecdotal evidence from the states suggests that the press also plays an important role in state-level policymaking for higher education. In California, for example, the press'

8、; reporting and framing of remarks made by campus leaders is said to have negatively affected state funding decisions for public higher education (Trombley, 1994). Yet, scant scholarly attention has been paid to the press' role in and coverage of important state policymaking episodes1. In partic

9、ular, theory-based, critical and comparative analysis of press coverage that examines what news accounts actually convey about the interactions between and among institutions, policy elites, and governmental processes is virtually non-existent in the research literature. Michigan's historic, 199

10、5 appropriations conflict between the University of Michigan and Michigan State University provides a rare opportunity to gain critical insights into the poorly-understood phenomenon of press coverage of state-level policymaking for higher education. The conflict between the universities engulfed Mi

11、chigan's entire university appropriations process, attracting press coverage throughout the nation and the state, with especially intensive coverage in the antagonist's hometowns of Ann Arbor, home to the Ann Arbor News and the University of Michigan, and Lansing, home to the Lansing State J

12、ournal, Michigan State, and the state legislature. This paper will report the results of a study that utilized a theory of news construction from the mass communication literature to predict and to analyze patterns of press coverage of the appropriations conflict between the University of Michigan a

13、nd Michigan State University. Specifically, the study compared the quantity and quality of press coverage devoted to the conflict by the Ann Arbor News and the Lansing State Journal, with the purpose of determining whether newspapers give preferential treatment to their local universities, thereby,

14、producing "biased" news coverage of critical state policy events. In a society that idealizes the media's function as facilitator of a pluralistic public debate, a finding of press bias would provoke concern and would force reappraissal of the press' role in policy formation. Altho

15、ugh the primary focus of this paper is directed toward comparing and analyzing higher education press coverage, the inquiry is framed by a case study of Michigan's unique "system" of university governance and finance and of legislative events surrounding the 1995 appropriations conflic

16、t. An overview of Michigan's unique, "voluntarily-coordinated" system of higher education and its highly fluid university appropriations process provides context for understanding the role of the press as a key actor in state policymaking. Moreover, the content analysis is grounded wit

17、hin the real-world context of the appropriations conflict to enhance the study's descriptive and interpretive validity; that is, the case study allows for a more accurate description of the phenomenon that is the focus of the content analysis and for a more accurate interpretation of the content

18、-analyzed data (Maxwell, 1992; Vockell and Asher, 1995). Higher Education Policymaking in Michigan In 1961, Chambers classified Michigan as among a handful of states whose higeducational systems were characterized by "voluntary coordination". Such voluntary coordination relied on interinst

19、itutional cooperation, rather than formal state-level control, to plan and to govern the state's system of higher education. While state control over higher education increased almost everywhere from the 1950s through the 1980s (Carnegie Foundation, 1982; McGuinness, 1994), Michigan retained its

20、 tradition of voluntary coordination and Michigan's universities remained free from formal regulatory control. A variety of legal, political, and institutional forces have been critical determinants in preserving the integrity of institutional autonomy in Michigan. To be sure, Michigan's fif

21、teen public universities have remained free from formal state control largely because of their "constitutional" standing. Following a decade of failed legislative interference in its affairs, the University of Michigan became the nation's first constitutionally-autonomous public univer

22、sity when the state's second constitution of 1850 established the University as a fourth, coequal branch of government responsible for the supervision of its own academic and financial affairs (Glenny and Dalglish, 1973). Subsequent constitutional conventions in 1908 and 1963 extended the consti

23、tutional mantle of authority to Michigan's other public four-year universities, including Michigan State University, Wayne State University, and what became over time 12 regional, comprehensive universities (Peterson and McLendon, in press). Constitutional autonomy has endured in Michigan where

24、it was reduced to an historical artifact in other states chiefly because of a series of judicial decisions which buttressed the state's initial grant of constitutional authority, reinforcing regental power over key areas of academic and fiscal decision making. Throughout the 19th and 20th centur

25、ies, Michigan's courts played a critical role in protecting and extending the universities' authority, ruling that the universities enjoy the exclusive right to appoint faculty, to establish and terminate academic departments, to set tuition rates, and to decide residency requirements. Moreo

26、ver, in a landmark 1974 decision, the state Supreme Court also held that a recently-created statewide coordinating board represented an unconstitutional interference into the internal affairs of the universities and thus possessed no real authority over the universities (Cudlip, 1969; Gill, 1987; Sc

27、hwarz, 1992). A second key element contributing to the survival of voluntary coordinationMichigan is a long history of interinstitutional cooperation, typified by the creation of the Michigan Council of State College Presidents in 1952. The purpose of the "Presidents Council" was to counte

28、r a growing state interest in the creation of a coordinating board by providing a vehicle through which the institutional presidents could meet to resolve conflict and to discuss ways to manage the expansion of higher education in the state (Gill, 1987). Historically, the Presidents Council has play

29、ed a pivotal role in aggregating interests and mediating conflict during periods of turbulence and strain both between the state and the universities and among the several universities. Absent formal state-level regulatory control, the annual appropriation of statfunds has become the predominant mec

30、hanism through which political elites attempt to influence the otherwise-autonomous universities. Funding for Michigan's universities is based on an incremental process in which the state makes lump sum appropriations to the universities' general funds. This approach makes Michigan's uni

31、versities among the most autonomous public higher education institutions in the nation, but it also means they can become vulnerable to political interference during the legislative appropriations process. Yet, despite the potential for exploitation of the appropriations process by political allies

32、of any one university, over time there has been little variation among the universities in the percentage increase in funding appropriated annually from the state. Two factors have contributed to this stability. First, the long tradition of interinstitutional collaboration promoted relative cooperat

33、ion among the universities during the appropriations process. Historically, the University of Michigan and Michigan State University made great efforts to cooperate with one another-to some extent out of fear of reprisal by political allies of the offended institution. A second reason for the stabil

34、ity is a history of balanced political representation of the universities within the state legislature. The University of Michigan and Michigan State and, to a lesser extent, Wayne State University and several of the regional universities, each have had their own cadre of supporters who ensured the

35、universities were treated relatively equally during the appropriations process (Peterson and McLendon, in press). Thus, Michigan's universities have enjoyed a remarkable degree of autonomy, with state-level policymaking restricted to a narrow range of issues pertaining primarily to the appropria

36、tion of state funds-a process that traditionally has been characterized by a delicate balance between competition and cooperation. Although each institution competes for its "fair share" during the annual funding cycle, all parties recognize certain conventions, chief of which is the expec

37、tation that the University of Michigan and Michigan State will receive relatively equivalent annual increases in state funding. As a result, open conflict among the institutions during the legislative appropriations process is rare. Michigan's 1995 University Appropriations Conflict The 1995 Mic

38、higan legislative session, however, signaled a radical departure from the long-standing tradition of interinstitutional cooperation and ignited a higher education funding war unrivaled in the state's history. In January, 1995, Governor John Engler unveiled a higher education budget which provide

39、d a large funding increase for Michigan State University (MSU) while allotting only a small inflation adjustment for the University of Michigan (U-M). This act of "decoupling" the appropriation of funds to Michigan's two largest and most politically-powerful universities resulted in a

40、bitterly-intense political contest between the universities and their respective allies. One powerful state senator whose leadership in the area of university finance is preeminent, characterized the political conflict as having engendered "the most intensive institutional legislative lobbying

41、campaigns in the history of Michigan higher education". With strong support from the Governor's office and from leading state legislators allied with Michigan State, the appropriation package moved rather effortlessly through the legislature. Despite numerous attempts by the University of M

42、ichigan and its president, James Duderstadt, to publicly and privately pressure MSU President M. Peter McPherson into a compromise, the differential funding provision was passed by the state legislature in June, 1995. In interviews with a dozen university officials, state legislators, and state agen

43、cy officials conducted throughout 1995, two quite divergent accounts of the university appropriations conflict emerged. Informants aligned with the University of Michigan and those aligned with Michigan State both told essentially the same story with regard to the chronology and intensity of the leg

44、islative conflict. However, these informants offered contrasting explanations as to conflict's origins and its potential implications for the future of interinstitutional relations in Michigan. For MSU officials and state legislators allied with the University, the Governor's funding proposa

45、l was perceived as an attempt to rectify historic funding inequities between MSU and the University of Michigan. These informants argued that MSU's per-student appropriation from the state had always lagged behind that of its more prestigious and politically-powerful down-state rival, and that p

46、ast attempts to bridge the funding gap had been defeated by the U-M's legislative allies. Moreover, the informants justified the funding increase by arguing that MSU planned to use the additional monies to renovate campus computing facilities and to purchase much-needed computers for students. M

47、SU-affiliated informants also maintained that although Governor Engler was, clearly, an influential alumnus of the institution and that newly-installed MSU President McPherson, indeed, had advanced his institution's interests vigorously before the state legislature, the funding increase resulted

48、 not from special political treatment but from a conviction among "policymakers and the public" that such funding was fair and appropriate given MSU's record of service to the state of Michigan. One legislative informant characterized the rationale for MSU's funding increase in the

49、 following way: "Unlike the U-M, Michigan State serves the state of Michigan, rather than its own narrow interest in international fame." The implication was that the University of Michigan, which long had boasted of its reputation as a world-renown research university, was guilty of ignor

50、ing the greater interests of the state in selfish pursuit of international research excellence. One example of such "selfishness" and "snobbery" put forward by numerous MSU backers was the U-M's continuing fight with the legislature over the number of non-resident undergradua

51、te students enrolled at its campus2, a fight which to supporters of Michigan State underscored the Ann Arbor school's blatant disregard for statewide priorities and concerns. The "arrogance" of the U-M was a theme that arose repeatedly in interviews with institutional and state officia

52、ls sympathetic to MSU's proposed funding increase. Accounts of the origin, nature, and potential impact of the appropriations conflict limned from interviews with University of Michigan officials and legislative allies differed dramatically from those provided by MSU's supporters. Informants

53、 affiliated with the U-M argued that the Governor's funding proposal was a politically-motivated action stemming from two interrelated developments. First, informants recounted that in recent years, Michigan had experienced a shift in the political landscape-a "geopolitical realignment"

54、;, as one institutional informant put it-with power moving away from the University of Michigan's southeastern portion of the state and toward the more conservative Western and Northern areas of the state, the base of Michigan State's political support. According to informants, this realignm

55、ent had resulted in Michigan State's growing political stature, a commodity which MSU was now leveraging against the U-M. A second political development was the purported "lobbying excesses" of MSU President M. Peter McPherson. Informants allied with the UM argued that McPherson had br

56、oken with the long-standing spirit of interinstitutional cooperation by aggressively lobbying the legislature for increased funding for his institution. An oft-repeated charge offered as evidence of "dirty politics" among U-M-allied informants was McPherson's announcement prior to the

57、start of the 1995 legislative session that MSU would limit tuition hikes to no more than the rise in inflation for each of the next three years. The issue of escalating tuition charges among the state's public universities had been a key agenda item of several Michigan governors, including John

58、Engler, and had been a source of concern to the general public and to more than a few legislators. Thus, U-M supporters believed McPherson's pledge was part of a larger political deal intended to ensure preferential treatment for Michigan State during the legislative appropriations process: more

59、 state money in exchange for a promise to hold down tuition rates, thus exerting pressure upon the tuition policies of Michigan's other universities, especially the University of Michigan. As this case suggests, the absence of formal mechanisms of state control means that the power to affect pol

60、icymaking for higher education in Michigan is dispersed, contested, and fluid. When crises among the universities arise, the state's print media become important participants in the policy process as institutions try to disseminate their "message" to the public and to policymakres in order to shore-up political support for their legislative agenda. One U-M official crystallized the media's role in Michigan in the following way: "We certainly use the papers as a way to fight these t