中小企業(yè)融資【外文+翻譯】【最新版本】

1、精選優(yōu)質(zhì)文檔-傾情為你奉上本科畢業(yè)論文（設(shè)計(jì)）外 文 + 翻 譯原文：Financing of SMEsAbstractThe main sources of financing for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) are equity, trade credit paid on time, long and short term bank credits, delayed payment on trade credit and other debt. The marginal costs of each financing instru

2、ment are driven by asymmetric information and transactions costs associated with nonpayment. According to the Pecking Order Theory, firms will choose the cheapest source in terms of cost. In the case of the static trade-off theory, firms choose finance so that the marginal costs across financing sou

3、rces are all equal, thus an additional Euro of financing is obtained from all the sources whereas under the Pecking Order Theory the source is determined by how far down the Pecking Order the firm is presently located. In this paper, we argue that both of these theories miss the point that the margi

4、nal costs are dependent of the use of the funds, and the asset side of the balance sheet primarily determines the financing source for an additional Euro. An empirical analysis on a unique dataset of Portuguese SMEs confirms that the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet has an impact o

5、f the type of financing used and the Pecking Order Theory and the traditional Static Trade-off theory are For SMEs the main sources of financing are equity (internally generated cash), trade credit, bank credit and other debt. The choice of financing is driven by the costs of the sources which is pr

6、imarily determined by costs of solving the asymmetric information problem and the expected costs associated with non-payment of debt. Asymmetric information costs arise from collecting and analysing information to support the decision of extending credit, and the non-payment costs are from collectin

7、g the collateral and selling it to recover the debt. Since SMEs management and shareholders are often the same person, equity and internally generated funds have no asymmetric information costs and equity is therefore the cheapest source.2. Asset side theory of SME financingIn the previous section w

8、e have suggested that SMEs in Portugal are financed using internal generated cash, cheap trade credits, long and short-term bank loans and expensive trade credits and other loans. In this section the motives behind the different types of financing are discussed.2.1. Cheap Trade creditsThe first exte

9、rnal financing source we will discuss is trade-credits. Trade credits are interesting since they represent financial services provided by non-financial firms in competition with financial intermediaries. The early research within this area focused on the role of trade credits in relation to the cred

10、it channel or the so called “Meltzer” effect and in relation to the efficiency of monetary policy. The basic idea is that firms with direct access to financial markets, in general large well known firms, issue trade credits to small financially constrained firms . The more recent research breaks the

11、 role of trade credits into a strategic motive and financial motive for issuing and using these credits.Strategic motivesThe first theory centers on asymmetric information regarding the firms products. Trade credits are offered to the buyers so that the buyer can verify the quantity and quality befo

12、re submitting payments. By offering trade finance the supplier signals to the buyers that they offer products of good quality. Since small firms, in general, have no reputation then these firms are forced to use trade credits to signal the quality of their products. The use of trade credits is there

13、fore driven by asymmetric information of the products and is therefore more likely to be used by small firms, if the buyer has little information about the supplier, or the products are complicated and it is difficult to asses their quality.The second strategic motive is pricing. Offering trade fina

14、nce on favorable terms is the same as a price reduction for the goods. Thus firms can use trade credits to promote sales without officially reducing prices or use them as a tool for price discrimination between different buyers. Trade credits are most advantageous to risky borrowers since their cost

15、s of alternative financing are higher than for borrowers with good credit ratings. Thus trade credits can be used as tool for direct price discrimination but also as an indirect tool (if all buyers are offered the same terms) in favor of borrowers with a low credit standing. Trade credits are also u

16、sed to develop long term relationships between the supplier and the buyers. This often manifests itself by the supplier extending the credit period in case the buyer has temporary financial difficulties. Compared to financial institutions suppliers have better knowledge of the industry and are there

17、fore better able to judge whether the firm has temporary problems or the problems are of a more permanent nature.The last motive in not strictly a strategic motive but is based on transactions costs. Trade credits are an efficient way of performing the transactions since it is possible to separate b

18、etween delivery and payment. In basic terms the truck driver delivering the goods does not have to run around to find the person responsible for paying the bills. The buyer also saves transactions costs by reducing the amount of cash required on“hand” .Financing motivesThe basis for this view is tha

19、t firms compete with financial institutions in offering credit to other firms. The traditional view of financial institutions is that they extend credit to firms where asymmetric information is a major problem. Financial institutions have advantages in collecting and analyzing information from, in p

20、articular, smaller and medium sized firms that suffer from problems of asymmetric information. The key to this advantage over financial markets lies in the close relationship between the bank and the firm and in the payment function. The financial institution is able to monitor the cash inflow and o

21、utflows of the firm by monitoring the accounts of the firm.But with trade credits non-financial firms are competing with financial institutions in solving these problems and extending credit. How can non-financial institutions compete in this market? Petersen and Rajan 1997 briefly discusses several

22、 ways that suppliers may have advantages over financial institutions. The supplier has a close working association with the borrower and more frequently visits the premises than a financial institution does. The size and timing of the lenders orders with the supplier provides information about the c

23、onditions of the borrowers business. Notice that this information is available to the supplier before it is available to the financial institution since the financial institution has to wait for the cash flow associated with the orders. The use of early payment discounts provides the supplier with a

24、n indication of problems with creditworthiness in the firm. Again the supplier obtains the information before the financial institution does. Thus the supplier may be able to obtain information about the creditworthiness faster and cheaper than the financial institution.The supplier may also have ad

25、vantages in collecting payments. If the supplier has at least a local monopoly for the goods then the ability to withhold future deliveries is a powerful incentive for the firm to pay. This is a particular powerful threat if the borrower only accounts for a small fraction of the suppliers business.

26、In case of defaults the supplier can seize the goods and in general has a better use for them than a financial intermediary sizing the same goods. Through its sales network the supplier can sell the reclaimed goods faster and at a higher price than what is available to a financial intermediary. Thes

27、e advantages, of course, depend on the durability of the goods and how much the borrower has transformed them.If asymmetric information is one of the driving forces the explanation of trade credits then firms can use the fact that their suppliers have issued them credits in order to obtain additiona

28、l credit from the banks. The banks are aware that the supplier has better information thus the bank can use trade credits as signal of the credit worthiness of the firm. That trade credits are in general secured by the goods delivered also puts a limit on the amount of trade credits the firm can obt

29、ain, thus the firm cannot use trade credits to finance the entire operations of the firm.In summary the prediction is that the level of asymmetric information is relatively low between the providers of trade credit and the borrowers due to the issuers general knowledge of the firm and the industry.

30、In the empirical work below the variables explaining the use of trade credit are credit risk factors and Cost of Goods Sold. Since these trade credits are secured by the materials delivered to the firm, firms cannot “borrow” for more than the delivery value of the goods and services.2.2 Bank loansBa

31、nks have less information than providers of trade credit and the costs of gathering information are also higher for banks than for providers of trade credit. Providers of trade credits also have an advantage over banks in selling the collateral they have themselves delivered, but due to their size a

32、nd number of transactions banks have an advantage in selling general collateral such as buildings, machinery etc. Banks therefore prefer to issue loans using tangible assets as collateral, also due to asymmetric information, they are less likely to issue loans to more opaque firms such as small and

33、high growth firms. Banks are therefore willing to lend long term provided that tangible assets are available for collateral. In the empirical work below tangible assets and credit risk variables are expected to explain the use of long-term bank loans and the amount of long-term bank loans are limite

34、d by the value of tangible assets.The basis for issuing Short Term Bank Loans is the comparative advantages banks have in evaluating and collecting on accounts receivables, i.e. Debtors. It is also possible to use Cash and Cash equivalents as collateral but banks do not have any comparative advantag

35、es over other providers of credit in terms of evaluating and collecting these since they consist of cash and marketable securities. In terms of inventories, again banks do not have any comparative advantages in evaluating these. Thus, we expect the amounts of debtors to be the key variable in explai

36、ning the behaviour of Short Term Bank Loans.2.3. Expensive trade credit and other loansAfter other sources of finance have been exhausted firms can delay payment on their trade credits. However, this is expensive since it involves giving up the discount and maybe incurs penalty payments. Also the us

37、e of this type of credit can have reputational costs and it may be difficult to obtain trade credit in the future. The nature of the costs, of course, depends on the number of suppliers, if there is only one supplier then these costs can be rather high whereas if the firm can obtain the same goods a

38、nd services from other suppliers then these costs are not particularly high.Other debt is composed of credit card debt, car loans etc. that are dearer than bank loans. Again, the variables determining this type of debt are financial health and performance. Below, however, we do not have any good inf

39、ormation regarding these types of loans and what they consists of thus we pay little attention to them in the empirical work.ConclusionsCurrently there exist two theories of capital structure The Pecking Order Theory where firms first exhaust all funding of the cheapest source first, then the second

40、 cheapest source and so on. The differences in funding costs are due to adverse selection costs from asymmetric information. The second theory is the Tradeoff Theory where firms increase the amount of debt as long as the benefits are greater than the costs from doing so. The benefits of debt are tax

41、-shields and “positive agency costs” and the costs of debt are the expected bankruptcy costs and the “negative agency costs”. In both of these theories, the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet is not important and in this paper, that proposition is strongly rejected. So the main concl

42、usion is that the composition of the asset side of the balance sheet influences the composition of the liability side of the balance sheet in terms of the different types of debt used to finance the firm, or that the use of the funds is important in deciding the type of financing available.We furthe

43、r argue that it is asymmetric information and collateral that determines the relationship between the asset side and liability side of the balance sheet. The theory works reasonable well for Cheap Trade Credits and Long Term Bank Loans but the tests for Short Term Bank Loans are disappointing.Source

44、: Jan Bartholdy, Cesario Mateus, “Financing of SMEs”.London business review. 2007(9).pp.43-45譯文：中小企業(yè)融資摘要中小企業(yè)融資的主要來(lái)源有：股權(quán)融資、按時(shí)兌現(xiàn)的貿(mào)易信貸融資、中長(zhǎng)期銀行信貸融資、延遲兌現(xiàn)的貿(mào)易信貸融資以及其他債務(wù)融資，每種融資方式的邊際成本取決于與其滯納金相關(guān)的信息不對(duì)稱成本和交易成本。根據(jù)啄食理論，企業(yè)在融資時(shí)，會(huì)優(yōu)先選擇成本最低的融資方式；而根據(jù)靜態(tài)權(quán)衡理論，企業(yè)在進(jìn)行融資時(shí)，各種資金來(lái)源的邊際成本都是相同的；再者，根據(jù)優(yōu)序融資理論，企業(yè)進(jìn)行融資時(shí)要結(jié)合企業(yè)自身具體情況，是考慮多重

45、因素下的優(yōu)序融資。在本文中，我們認(rèn)為，以上這些理論都忽略了一點(diǎn)，那就是邊際成本的確定主要依賴于融資資金的使用，以及資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表中資產(chǎn)方作為融資來(lái)源的重要影響作用。一個(gè)來(lái)自葡萄牙中小企業(yè)的數(shù)據(jù)分析證實(shí)，企業(yè)資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表資產(chǎn)方對(duì)于融資方式的選擇有著重要的影響，而這是靜態(tài)權(quán)衡理論和優(yōu)序融資理論所不能接受的。中小企業(yè)的融資主要來(lái)源于股權(quán)（內(nèi)部融資），商業(yè)信用，銀行信貸和其他債務(wù)。融資方式的選擇取決于資金成本，而資金成本又是由信息不對(duì)稱成本和基于無(wú)債務(wù)負(fù)擔(dān)情況下的預(yù)期成本決定的。信息不對(duì)稱成本主要是為了支持管理決策而收集和分析信息所產(chǎn)生的費(fèi)用，無(wú)債預(yù)期成本主要產(chǎn)生于企業(yè)為收回債務(wù)而收集和出售抵押品時(shí)的費(fèi)用。

46、由于中小企業(yè)的管理層和股東往往是同一個(gè)人，股權(quán)和內(nèi)部產(chǎn)生的資金沒有信息不對(duì)稱成本，因此股權(quán)融資是成本最低的融資渠道。2 中小企業(yè)資產(chǎn)融資理論在前面的論述中，我們?cè)ㄗh，葡萄牙的中小企業(yè)多采用內(nèi)部資金、廉價(jià)貿(mào)易信貸、中長(zhǎng)期銀行信貸、高價(jià)貿(mào)易信貸和其他貸款進(jìn)行融資。接下來(lái)，我們將對(duì)以上各種類型的融資動(dòng)機(jī)進(jìn)行討論。2.1 廉價(jià)貿(mào)易信貸首先，我們將討論的是貿(mào)易信貸。貿(mào)易信貸很有意思，因?yàn)樗鼈兇淼姆墙鹑谄髽I(yè)與金融中介機(jī)構(gòu)在提供金融服務(wù)方面的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。這一領(lǐng)域內(nèi)的早期研究關(guān)注于貿(mào)易信貸同的信貸渠道的作用（或所謂的“梅爾策”影響）之間的關(guān)系，以及同貨幣政策的效率之間的關(guān)系。其基本思想是，企業(yè)尤其是大型知名企業(yè)

47、，同的面臨財(cái)務(wù)困境小企業(yè)，直接在金融市場(chǎng)達(dá)成貿(mào)易信貸的交易。在最近的研究中，將對(duì)貿(mào)易信貸的利用分為戰(zhàn)略動(dòng)機(jī)和財(cái)務(wù)動(dòng)機(jī)。戰(zhàn)略動(dòng)機(jī)第一種理論是關(guān)于公司產(chǎn)品的信息不對(duì)稱。貿(mào)易信貸是由賣方提供，使買方可以在付款前確認(rèn)產(chǎn)品的數(shù)量和質(zhì)量。通過(guò)提供貿(mào)易融資，供應(yīng)商想證明的是，他們可以為買家提供優(yōu)質(zhì)的產(chǎn)品。由于中小企業(yè)在一般情況下信譽(yù)不高，因此這些企業(yè)迫于無(wú)奈，往往使用貿(mào)易信貸的方式以證明其產(chǎn)品質(zhì)量。由于產(chǎn)品的信息不對(duì)稱，買方對(duì)供應(yīng)商的資料很少，或者供應(yīng)商產(chǎn)品的情況復(fù)雜，質(zhì)量難以鑒定，因此貿(mào)易信貸被中小企業(yè)廣泛使用。第二個(gè)戰(zhàn)略動(dòng)機(jī)是定價(jià)。以優(yōu)惠條件提供貿(mào)易融資，其作用同商品降價(jià)類似。因此，企業(yè)可以利用貿(mào)易信貸

48、，間接的降低產(chǎn)品價(jià)格或作為不同買家之間的價(jià)格歧視工具，以促進(jìn)銷售。相比于風(fēng)險(xiǎn)借款而言，貿(mào)易信貸是有利的，因?yàn)檫@種替代性融資的有著一個(gè)更為優(yōu)惠的融資利率。因此，貿(mào)易信貸可以被用來(lái)作為直接的價(jià)格歧視的工具，或者作為低信譽(yù)借款人的間接工具（如果所有的買家提供相同的條件）。貿(mào)易信貸也可以幫助供應(yīng)商發(fā)展與買家的長(zhǎng)期合作關(guān)系。這往往體現(xiàn)在買方出現(xiàn)暫時(shí)財(cái)務(wù)困難的情況下，供應(yīng)商要允許其延長(zhǎng)付款期。同金融機(jī)構(gòu)相比，供應(yīng)商具有更好的的行業(yè)知識(shí)，因此能夠更好地判斷買方是面臨暫時(shí)的困難還是存在一個(gè)長(zhǎng)期性的問(wèn)題。沒有嚴(yán)格意義上的戰(zhàn)略動(dòng)機(jī)，最終動(dòng)機(jī)都是基于交易成本。貿(mào)易信貸作為進(jìn)行交易有效方式，可以明確地區(qū)分貨物交割和帳

49、款支付。從最基本的方面講，卡車司機(jī)運(yùn)送貨物，不必再四處找相關(guān)負(fù)責(zé)人支付帳單，買方還可以節(jié)約交易成本所需的現(xiàn)金。融資動(dòng)機(jī)這種觀點(diǎn)的基本內(nèi)容是，企業(yè)與金融機(jī)構(gòu)在為其他公司提供信貸業(yè)務(wù)上進(jìn)行競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。金融機(jī)構(gòu)的傳統(tǒng)觀點(diǎn)是，他們?cè)谙蚱髽I(yè)提供信用時(shí)的主要問(wèn)題是信息不對(duì)稱。金融機(jī)構(gòu)在收集和分析來(lái)自企業(yè)，特別是受制與信息不對(duì)稱影響的中小型企業(yè)的信息時(shí)，具有一定優(yōu)勢(shì)。這種優(yōu)勢(shì)的確立，關(guān)鍵在于銀行與目標(biāo)企業(yè)之間存在支付功能的密切關(guān)系，金融機(jī)構(gòu)可以通過(guò)監(jiān)測(cè)目標(biāo)企業(yè)的帳目現(xiàn)金流入和流出來(lái)獲取相關(guān)信息。但隨著貿(mào)易信貸逐漸流行，非金融企業(yè)同金融機(jī)構(gòu)在解決這些問(wèn)題及拓展信貸渠道方面，展開了激烈的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。非金融機(jī)構(gòu)如何能夠在這個(gè)市場(chǎng)進(jìn)行競(jìng)爭(zhēng)？彼得森和拉詹（1997）就此簡(jiǎn)要討論幾種方式，并提出供應(yīng)商對(duì)金融機(jī)構(gòu)可能存在的優(yōu)勢(shì)。相比于金融機(jī)構(gòu)，供應(yīng)商同借款人之間有著更加密切的工作關(guān)系和更加頻繁的溝通交流。供應(yīng)商和貸款人之間所達(dá)成訂單的時(shí)間及規(guī)模，提供借款人有關(guān)業(yè)務(wù)情況的信息，需要注意的是，此信息是先提供給供應(yīng)商的，金融機(jī)構(gòu)必須等待與訂單相關(guān)的現(xiàn)金流產(chǎn)生后，才能獲取相關(guān)的業(yè)務(wù)信息。還有早期付款折扣的提供，使供應(yīng)商及早的同借款人達(dá)成了一種信用關(guān)系，因此供應(yīng)商能夠比金融機(jī)構(gòu)更快，更方便地取得相關(guān)業(yè)務(wù)信息供應(yīng)商在收款方面也存在