公司治理和道德培訓(xùn)課件1

1、第篇: 戰(zhàn)略實(shí)施第10章公司治理和道德IRELAND | HOSKISSON | HITTTHE MANAGEMENT OF STRATEGYCONCEPTS AND CASES 10ETHE STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT PROCESS 戰(zhàn)略管理過程圖 1.1戰(zhàn)略管理過程KNOWLEDGE OBJECTIVES1. Corporate governance 2. Separation of ownership and managerial control. 3. Agency Relationship, Agency Problem4.Governance Mechanisms:

2、three internal governance mechanisms external corporate governance mechanism5. Corporate governance in international settings, especially in Germany, Japan, and China.學(xué)習(xí)目標(biāo)1、公司治理定義2、所有權(quán)與經(jīng)營權(quán)分離3、代理關(guān)系、代理問題4、治理機(jī)制：三種內(nèi)部機(jī)制 一種外部機(jī)制5、國際背景下各國公司治理的特點(diǎn)，以德國、日本和中國公司為例OPENING CASECORPORATE GOVERANCE: WHAT IS ALL THE

3、FUSS ABOUT? Corporate governance can destroy or create value for a firm. It is concerned with:1. strengthening the effectiveness of a companys board of directors2. verifying the transparency of a firms operations 3. enhancing accountability to shareholders4. incentivizing executives 5. maximizing va

4、lue-creation for stakeholders and shareholders OPENING CASE 公司治理：有什么可忙亂的？ 公司治理會創(chuàng)造或損害公司價(jià)值公司治理關(guān)注的活動主要包括：（1）加強(qiáng)公司董事會的有效性；（2）核查公司運(yùn)營的透明性；（3）提高對利益相關(guān)者的責(zé)任；（4）有效地激勵主管人員以及所有員工；（5）把公司為利益相關(guān)者，尤其是為股東創(chuàng)造價(jià)值的能力進(jìn)行最大化。 引導(dǎo)案例CORPORATE GOVERANCE: WHAT IS ALL THE FUSS ABOUT? Given recent criticisms, boards actions in nation

5、s throughout the world are being more carefully scrutinized and regulated. In the U.S., that after being fired by their firm, a number of CEOs still remain as members of other firms boards of directors, is drawing close attention. Corporate governance is weak in many Chinese firms and there is conce

6、rn about the validity and reliability of some auditors work and the quality of companies financial statements. OPENING CASE 公司治理：有什么可忙亂的？鑒于最近的金融危機(jī)，各個國家對董事的行動都進(jìn)行了嚴(yán)格的監(jiān)管和控制。 在美國，有許多CEO在被公司解雇后仍然保留著董事會成員的身份，這一事實(shí)引起了人們廣泛的關(guān)注。 許多中國公司的治理機(jī)制都很不完善，審計(jì)工作的有效性和可靠性以及公司財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)表的質(zhì)量也遭到質(zhì)疑。 引導(dǎo)案例CORPORATE GOVERANCE: WHAT IS AL

7、L THE FUSS ABOUT? The reason there is a “fuss” about corporate governance is that these activities are critical to globally signaling transparency coupled with strategic competitiveness. Corporate governance fundamentals:Corporate Directors should: Focus on creating long-term value for shareholders

8、Use performance-related pay to attract and retain senior management Exercise sound business judgment to evaluate opportunities and manage risk Communicate with key shareholders OPENING CASE 公司治理：有什么可忙亂的？公司治理機(jī)制之所以會出現(xiàn)一些“忙亂”，原因在于，這些活動都是非常重要的，它們有助于國家向全世界展示其商業(yè)基礎(chǔ)條件是符合有關(guān)透明度的國際標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，并且有助于證明公司在世界各國獲取戰(zhàn)略競爭力的能力。 公

9、司治理的根基:公司管理者應(yīng)該: 一直關(guān)注于為股東創(chuàng)造長期價(jià)值。 利用績效工資來吸引和留住中高層管理者。利用良好的商業(yè)判斷來評價(jià)各種機(jī)會以及風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理。 與股東進(jìn)行溝通。 引導(dǎo)案例 1、CORPORATE GOVERNANCECORPORATE GOVERNANCECorporate governance: a set of mechanisms used to manage the relationships among stakeholders, and to determine and control the strategic direction and performance of or

10、ganizations. 公司治理機(jī)制：是指用來管理利益相關(guān)者之間的關(guān)系（以及利益沖突），決定并控制組織戰(zhàn)略方向以及組織業(yè)績的一套機(jī)制。公司治理公司治理的目標(biāo)是: 確保高層管理者的利益與公司利益相關(guān)者(尤其是股東)的利益相一致.When CEOs are motivated to act in the best interests of the firmparticularly, the shareholdersthe companys value should increase.如果CEO以公司特別是股東利益最大化來采取行動，那么公司的價(jià)值就會有所增長。CORPORATE GOVERNANC

11、E公司治理的核心：尋找各種方法、機(jī)制來確保決策（特別是戰(zhàn)略決策）的有效制定，并促使公司獲得戰(zhàn)略競爭力。治理機(jī)制：三個內(nèi)部機(jī)制，一個外部機(jī)制Theoretical basis for Corporate governance 2、SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND MANAGERIAL CONTROLSEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND MANAGERIAL CONTROLBackround:Historically, firms managed by founder-owners and descendants.歷史上，美國的公司一直是由創(chuàng)立者兼所有者以及

12、他們的繼任者來管理的。Small firms managers are high percentage owners, which implies less separation between ownership and management control.小公司的管理者往往持有公司一大部分的所有權(quán)，因此，小公司的所有權(quán)和經(jīng)營權(quán)分離的程度就比較低。 SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND MANAGERIAL CONTROLwhy separate?As Family-owned businesses grow, they may not have access to al

13、l needed skills to manage the growing firm and maximize its returns, so may need outsiders to improve management.They may need to seek outside capital (whereby they give up some ownership control).所有權(quán)和經(jīng)營權(quán)的分離為什么會分離：隨著家族公司不斷發(fā)展壯大，這些家族成員在有效管理公司并使家族回報(bào)最大化方面的技能會出現(xiàn)欠缺。 隨著公司的發(fā)展，由于需要尋求外部資本，因而必須放棄一部分所有權(quán)。 SEPARA

14、TION OF OWNERSHIP AND MANAGERIAL CONTROLSeparation of ownership and managerial control allows each group to focus on what it does best: Shareholders bear risk Managers formulate and implement strategy 所有權(quán)和經(jīng)營權(quán)的分離 所有權(quán)與經(jīng)營權(quán)的分離使得： 股東承擔(dān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理者制定和實(shí)施戰(zhàn)略SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND MANAGERIAL CONTROLBasis of the

15、 modern corporation:We can be shareholders purchase stock, becoming residual claimants.Shareholder value reflected in price of stock.Professional managers are contracted to provide decision making.所有權(quán)和經(jīng)營權(quán)的分離現(xiàn)代公司的基礎(chǔ):我們有機(jī)會成為股東，購買股票而成為剩余價(jià)值索取者。股票價(jià)格反映了股東價(jià)值。職業(yè)經(jīng)理人通過簽訂合同來提供決策的制定。 SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND

16、 MANAGERIAL CONTROLShareholders purchase stockEntitled to income Risk bearing by shareholdersfirms expenses may exceed revenuesInvestment risk is managed through a diversified investment portfolioSHAREHOLDERSProfessional managers contracted to provide decision makingStrategy development and decision

17、 making by managers MANAGERS所有權(quán)和經(jīng)營權(quán)的分離股東管理者股東購買股票有權(quán)獲得收入股東承擔(dān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)公司的支出可 能會超過收入通過多元化來管理投資風(fēng)險(xiǎn)職業(yè)經(jīng)理人通過簽訂合同來提供決策制定制定戰(zhàn)略和決策思考：所有權(quán)和經(jīng)營權(quán)的分離會產(chǎn)生什么問題？所有權(quán)和經(jīng)營權(quán)的分離產(chǎn)生兩個問題：1、代理關(guān)系和代理問題2、代理成本和治理機(jī)制An Agency RelationshipCORPORATE GOVERNANCECorporate governance: a set of mechanisms used to manage the relationships among stakeh

18、olders, and to determine and control the strategic direction and performance of organizations. 公司治理機(jī)制：是指用來管理利益相關(guān)者之間的關(guān)系（以及利益沖突），決定并控制組織戰(zhàn)略方向以及組織業(yè)績的一套機(jī)制。 SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND MANAGERIAL CONTROLFIGURE 10.1 An Agency Relationship 所有權(quán)和經(jīng)營權(quán)的分離圖10.1 代理關(guān)系A(chǔ)GENCY RELATIONSHIPSManagerial opportunism: seek

19、ing self-interest with guile (i.e., cunning or deceit)管理機(jī)會主義是指通過欺詐（例如狡詐和欺騙）來謀求個人利益。Decisions in managers best interests, contrary to shareholders best interests做出的決策是追求管理者利益最大化而不是股東利益最大化。 Agency ProblemsAGENCY PROBLEM當(dāng)管理者（代理人）作出的決策與股東（委托人）利益不一致時(shí)，就產(chǎn)生了代理問題（AGENCY PROBLEM）。EXAMPLEs：OVER DIVERSIFICATION

20、 AS AN EXAMPLE OF AN AGENCY PROBLEMFREE CASH FLOW AS AN EXAMPLE OF AN AGENCY PROBLEM OVER DIVERSIFICATION AS AN EXAMPLE OF AN AGENCY PROBLEMTwo benefits that accrue to top-level managers and not to shareholders: 1. Increase in firm size: product diversification usually increases the size of a firm;

21、that size is positively related to executive compensation 2. Firm portfolio diversification, which can reduce top executives employment risk. Diversification reduces these risks because a firm and its managers are less vulnerable to reductions in demand associated with a single/limited number of bus

22、inesses. 代理問題的一個例子過度多元化多元化可以為高層管理者帶來兩個股東享受不到的好處： 1. 擴(kuò)大公司規(guī)模：產(chǎn)品多元化可以擴(kuò)大公司的規(guī)模，而規(guī)模的擴(kuò)大又可以為高層管理者帶來積極的報(bào)酬。 2. 降低職業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)：產(chǎn)品多元化可以降低管理者的職業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。如：隨著產(chǎn)品不斷多元化，一個或幾個產(chǎn)品線上的產(chǎn)品或業(yè)務(wù)的需求下降，不會給公司造成太大的影響，因而也就降低了高層管理者的職業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。 MANAGER AND SHAREHOLDER RISK AND DIVERSIFICATIONFIGURE 10.2 Manager and Shareholder Risk and Diversification

23、管理者與股東的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和多元化圖 10.2 管理者與股東的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和多元化 管理者與股東的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和多元化 多元化股東傾向于更集中的多元化 管理者會更傾向于能夠使公司的規(guī)模和他們的薪酬都能得到最大化，同時(shí)也能降低職業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的更高水平的多元化一般來講，管理者所追求的公司多元化不會達(dá)到增加職業(yè)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和降低雇用機(jī)會的水平 FREE CASH FLOW AS AN EXAMPLE OF AN AGENCY PROBLEMFree cash flow: resources remaining after the firm has invested in all projects within its current b

24、usinesses.Use of Free Cash Flows Managers inclination to over-diversify and invest these funds in additional product diversification. Shareholders prefer distribution as dividends, so they can control how the cash is invested. 代理問題的另一個例子自由現(xiàn)金流自由現(xiàn)金流：公司投資于目前業(yè)務(wù)中所有的項(xiàng)目之后剩余的現(xiàn)金。 自由現(xiàn)金流的使用產(chǎn)生代理問題：高層管理者會將自由現(xiàn)金流投

25、資于與公司當(dāng)前業(yè)務(wù)不相關(guān)的產(chǎn)品線，以此來提高多元化的水平。 股東則更愿意將自由現(xiàn)金流以紅利的形式進(jìn)行分配，這樣他們就可以自己控制現(xiàn)金的投資方向。 AGENCY COSTS AND GOVERNANCE MECHANISMSAGENCY COSTS AND GOVERNANCE MECHANISMSAGENCY COSTS: the sum of incentive costs, monitoring costs, enforcement costs, and individual financial losses incurred by principals, because governan

26、ce mechanisms cannot guarantee total compliance by the agent代理成本:是激勵成本、監(jiān)督成本、實(shí)施成本，以及由于治理機(jī)制無法保證代理人會完全“聽命”而導(dǎo)致委托人遭受的財(cái)物損失的總和。In response, U.S. Congress enacted:Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act in 2002 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) in mid-2010 為了應(yīng)對，美國國會頒布： 薩班斯奧克斯利（SOX）法案 （

27、2002年） 多德-弗蘭克華爾街改革和消費(fèi)者保護(hù)法（Dodd-Frank）（2010年）小知識：薩班斯奧克斯利法案是美國立法機(jī)構(gòu)根據(jù)安然有限公司、世界通訊公司等財(cái)務(wù)欺詐事件破產(chǎn)暴露出來的公司和證券監(jiān)管問題所立的監(jiān)管法規(guī)，簡稱SOX法案。 薩班斯奧克斯利法案全稱2002年公眾公司會計(jì)改革和投資者保護(hù)法案由參議院銀行委員會主席薩班斯（Paul Sarbanes）和眾議院金融服務(wù)委員會（Committee on Financial Services）主席奧克斯利（Mike Oxley）聯(lián)合提出。對薩班斯-奧克斯利法案的批評，主要來自某些企業(yè)與美國金融業(yè)者。他們認(rèn)為該法案的一些規(guī)定過于嚴(yán)格，增大了企業(yè)

28、（特別是小型企業(yè)）的審計(jì)成本，降低了其它國家企業(yè)到美國金融市場上市籌資的興趣。薩班斯奧克斯利（SOX）法案 的影響:在美國股票交易所的上市的外國公司在減少，而同時(shí)，在國外上市的美國公司卻在增加。改善了對公司財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告中內(nèi)部審計(jì)的監(jiān)管，從而增加了可信度。 AGENCY PROBLEMS GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS GOVERNANCE MECHANISMSAGENCY PROBLEMSAGENCY RELATIONSHIPS 代理問題 治理機(jī)制 治理機(jī)制代理問題代理關(guān)系4、GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS GOVERNANCE MECHANISMSThree intern

29、al governance mechanisms and a single external one are used in the modern corporation. The three internal governance mechanisms are:1. Ownership Concentration, represented by types of shareholders and their different incentives to monitor managers 2. Board of Directors 3. Executive CompensationThe e

30、xternal corporate governance mechanism is:4. Market for Corporate ControlThis market is a set of potential owners seeking to acquire undervalued firms and earn above-average returns on their investments by replacing ineffective top-level management teams. 治理機(jī)制 現(xiàn)代公司使用三種內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制和一種外部治理機(jī)制內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制:1. 所有權(quán)集中2

31、. 董事會3. 管理者報(bào)酬外部治理機(jī)制：4. 公司控制權(quán)市場 這是一個由潛在的所有者組成的市場，他們購買價(jià)值被低估的公司，替換無效的高層管理者，從而獲得投資的超額回報(bào)內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制所有權(quán)集中有大量股票被個人投資者和機(jī)構(gòu)投資者所有。董事會由代表公司股東對高層管理者的戰(zhàn)略決策進(jìn)行監(jiān)督的人組成。管理者報(bào)酬通過工資、獎金和長期激勵，來使管理者和所有者的利益相一致。OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATIONOwnershipConcentrationGovernance mechanism defined by both the number of la

32、rge-block shareholders and the total percentage of shares ownedLarge block shareholders: shareholders owning a concentration of at least 5 percent of a corporations issued sharesLarge block shareholders have a strong incentive to monitor management closely 所有權(quán)集中所有權(quán)集中治理機(jī)制由公司大股東的數(shù)量以及他們持有的公司股票的整體比例所決定。

33、大股東是指持有的公司股票在5%以上的股東。 大股東有強(qiáng)烈的監(jiān)督管理者的意識。 OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATIONOwnershipConcentrationInstitutional owners: financial institutions such as stock mutual funds and pension funds that control large block shareholder positions。 The growing influence of institutional owners。EXAMPLE：CalPERS 所有權(quán)集中所有權(quán)集中機(jī)構(gòu)所有者是

34、指擁有公司大量股權(quán)的金融機(jī)構(gòu)，如共同基金和養(yǎng)老基金。 機(jī)構(gòu)所有者的影響力越來越大。例如：加利福尼亞公職人員養(yǎng)老金案例。機(jī)構(gòu)投資者的影響日益擴(kuò)大：CalPERS case 加利福尼亞公職人員養(yǎng)老金案例Page 270思考：請判斷：1、所有權(quán)的集中度越高，管理者的決策就越有可能實(shí)現(xiàn)股東價(jià)值最大化。2、所有權(quán)的集中度越高，越容易產(chǎn)生代理問題。BOARD OF DIRECTORS BOARD OF DIRECTORSOwnershipConcentrationBoard of DirectorsGroup of shareholder-elected individuals (usually call

35、ed directors) whose primary responsibility is to act in the owners interests by formally monitoring and controlling the corporations top-level executives 董事會所有權(quán)集中董事會董事會是指由股東選舉出的一些人組成的集體，他們的主要責(zé)任是通過正式地監(jiān)督和控制高層管理者來實(shí)現(xiàn)股東利益最大化BOARD OF DIRECTORSAs stewards of an organizations resources, an effective and wel

36、l-structured board of directors can influence the performance of a firm: Oversee managers to ensure the company is operated in ways to maximize shareholder wealth Punish and reward managers Protect shareholders rights and interests Protect owners from managerial opportunism董事會的作用作為組織資源的支配者，一個有效的、結(jié)構(gòu)合

37、理的董事會會影響公司的業(yè)績: 監(jiān)督管理者，以保證公司的運(yùn)營能夠使股東財(cái)富最大化。 對管理進(jìn)行懲罰和獎勵。保護(hù)股東的權(quán)利和利益。 避免管理機(jī)會主義。 BOARD OF DIRECTORSOwnershipConcentrationBoard of DirectorsThree director classifications: Insider, related outsider, and outsider:Insiders: the firms CEO and other top-level managersRelated outsiders: individuals uninvolved wi

38、th day-to-day operations, but who have a relationship with the firmOutsiders: individuals who are independent of the firms day-to-day operations and other relationships 董事會的組成所有權(quán)集中董事會董事會成員的三種類型：內(nèi)部董事: 公司的CEO和其他高層管理者 相關(guān)獨(dú)立董事：不參與公司的日常經(jīng)營活動，但是與公司存在著某種關(guān)系獨(dú)立董事：既不參與公司的日常經(jīng)營活動，與公司也沒有任何關(guān)系 董事會新進(jìn)展所有權(quán)集中董事會 一直以來都是內(nèi)部

39、董事主導(dǎo)著董事會：管理者有時(shí)會利用權(quán)力來選擇和獎勵主管 證券交易委員會提議，要求由獨(dú)立董事來組成審計(jì)委員會薩班斯奧克斯利法案 的通過導(dǎo)致了董事會的改變董事會機(jī)制的調(diào)整使公司治理機(jī)制更嚴(yán)格董事會丑聞使得CEO和董事會主席的角色開始分離Enhancing the effectiveness of the Board of Directors: Increase the diversity of the backgrounds of board members (e.g., public service, academic, scientific; ethnic minorities and wom

40、en; different countries) Strengthen internal management and accounting control systems Establish and consistently use formal processes to evaluate the boards performance提高董事會的有效性: 1、增加董事會成員背景的多樣性（例如，在美國公司的董事會中，有更多的董事來自公共服務(wù)業(yè)、學(xué)術(shù)界和科研機(jī)構(gòu)；有更多的少數(shù)民族和女性董事，以及來自不同國家的董事）。2、加強(qiáng)內(nèi)部管理和財(cái)務(wù)控制系統(tǒng)。3、建立并持續(xù)使用正式的流程來評估董事會的表現(xiàn)。

41、4、設(shè)立“領(lǐng)導(dǎo)董事”職位該職位在制定董事會日程和監(jiān)督非管理者董事會成員方面擁有很大的權(quán)力 5、要求獨(dú)立董事?lián)碛邢喈?dāng)比例的所有權(quán)，從而能夠更關(guān)注股東利益EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION EXECUTIVE COMPENSATIONOwnershipConcentrationBoard of DirectorsExecutiveCompensationGovernance mechanism that seeks to align the interests of top managers and owners through salaries, bonuses, and long-t

42、erm incentive compensation, such as stock awards and stock options 管理者報(bào)酬所有權(quán)集中董事會管理者報(bào)酬是一種尋求通過工資、獎金和長期激勵，如股票和期權(quán)，來使管理者和所有者的利益相一致的公司治理機(jī)制。 管理者報(bào)酬管理者報(bào)酬的形式：工資獎金長期激勵（股票獎勵，股票期權(quán)）EXECUTIVE COMPENSATIONFactors complicating executive compensation:Strategic decisions by top-level managers are complex, non-routine

43、and affect the firm over an extended period, making it difficult to assess the current decision effectivenessOther intervening variables affect the firms performance over timeEXECUTIVE COMPENSATION管理者報(bào)酬復(fù)雜化的原因:高層管理者制定的戰(zhàn)略決策通常是復(fù)雜的、非常規(guī)的 ，影響時(shí)間更長，因此很難評估當(dāng)前決策的有效性。有很多其他因素也會對公司的業(yè)績產(chǎn)生影響。使報(bào)酬與績效相一致不容易。管理者報(bào)酬存在的問題戰(zhàn)

44、略聚焦：管理者報(bào)酬：存在的問題是什么，未來的前景如何？ EXECUTIVE COMPENSATIONThe effectiveness of executive compensation: Performance-based compensation used to motivate decisions that best serve shareholder interest are imperfect in their ability to monitor and control managersIncentive-based compensation plans intended to i

45、ncrease firm value, in line with shareholder expectations, subject to managerial manipulation to maximize managerial interests管理者報(bào)酬的有效性: 以公司業(yè)績?yōu)榛A(chǔ)的報(bào)酬能夠激勵管理者做出有利于股東利益的決策，但是卻無法有效地對管理者進(jìn)行監(jiān)督和控制。以獎勵為基礎(chǔ)的報(bào)酬計(jì)劃能夠增加公司價(jià)值，符合股東的期望,，但卻容易被管理者控制以實(shí)現(xiàn)其利益最大化。作業(yè)：1、預(yù)習(xí)下次課的案例。2、用實(shí)際案例說明所有權(quán)集中、董事會和管理者報(bào)酬治理機(jī)制各自的優(yōu)缺點(diǎn)。MARKET FOR COR

46、PORATE CONTROL MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROLOwnershipConcentrationBoard of DirectorsExecutiveCompensationMarket forCorporate Control External governance: a mechanism consisting of a set of potential owners seeking to acquire undervalued firms and earn above-average returns on their investmentsBecomes

47、 active only when internal controls have failed 控制權(quán)市場所有權(quán)集中董事會管理者報(bào)酬控制權(quán)市場外部控制權(quán)市場：由潛在的所有者組成的市場，他們購買價(jià)值被低估的公司，并從投資中獲得超額回報(bào)只是在公司的內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制失敗時(shí)才發(fā)揮作用。Need for external mechanisms exists to: Address weak internal corporate governanceDiscipline ineffective or opportunistic managersThreat of takeover may lead firm

48、to operate more efficientlyIneffective managers are usually replaced in such takeovers需要外部機(jī)制存在的原因: 完善薄弱的內(nèi)部治理機(jī)制 約束管理者的無效行為或機(jī)會主義行為無效的管理者通常被替換注意： 在絕大多數(shù)情況下，惡意接管是公司控制權(quán)市場采取行動的主要手段！Managerial defense tactics管理者的防范策略 管理者的防范策略可以增加接管的成本。P278 Table 10.2 HOSTILE TAKEOVER DEFENSE STRATEGIESTABLE 10.2 Hostile Tak

49、eover Defense Strategies 惡意接管的防范策略表 10.2 惡意接管的防范策略 HOSTILE TAKEOVER DEFENSE STRATEGIESTABLE 10.2 Hostile Takeover Defense Strategies(Contd) 惡意接管的防范策略表 10.2 惡意接管的防范策略（續(xù)）5、INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCECorporate Governance in Germany Concentration of ownership is strongIn many private German firms

50、, the owner and manager may be the same individual In these instances, agency problems are not present. In publicly traded German corporations, a single shareholder is often dominant, frequently a bankThe concentration of ownership is an important means of corporate governance in Germany, as it is i

51、n the U.S.德國的公司治理 1、強(qiáng)調(diào)所有權(quán)的集中。2、在許多德國的私人公司里，所有者和經(jīng)營者可能是同一個人。在這種情況下，就不存在代理問題 。3、在德國的上市公司中，常常是由銀行這一個股東占主導(dǎo)地位。 4、和美國一樣，所有權(quán)集中在德國也是一個重要的公司治理機(jī)制 。Corporate Governance in Germany Banks exercise significant power as a source of financing for firms.Two-tiered board structures, required for larger employers (more

52、 than 2,000 employees), place responsibility for monitoring and controlling managerial decisions and actions with separate groups.Power sharing includes representation from the community as well as unions. INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE德國的公司治理 5、銀行作為公司的資金來源，對公司有非常重要的影響力。6、員工人數(shù)超過2000的公司必須具有雙線的董事結(jié)

53、構(gòu)，從而將監(jiān)督和控制管理決策和行動的責(zé)任交給兩個不同的集體。 Corporate Governance in Germany Germany: Two-tiered BoardVorstandAufsichtsratEmployeesUnion Members ShareholdersThe management board is responsible for all the functions of strategy and management Responsible for appointing members to the Vorstand Responsible for appoi

54、nting members to the Aufsichtsrat 德國的公司治理德國: 雙線董事結(jié)構(gòu)管理董事會監(jiān)事會員工工會成員股東管理董事會對所有的戰(zhàn)略和管理職能負(fù)責(zé)任命管理董事會的成員任命監(jiān)事會成員德國的公司治理 支持德國結(jié)構(gòu)的人認(rèn)為，該結(jié)構(gòu)有利于減少公司的錯誤行為和“獨(dú)裁CEO”的倉促決策。 批評者卻認(rèn)為，它減緩了決策的制定速度并且限制住了CEO的手腳。 特殊的公司治理機(jī)制使德國公司很難像美國公司那樣快速進(jìn)行重組。 由于銀行在德國公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)中的影響力，私人股東很少能在公司中占有主要所有權(quán)。 Corporate Governance in Germany Less emphasis o

55、n shareholder value This traditional system produced agency costs because of a lack of external ownership power Changes - German firms with listings on U.S. stock exchanges have increasingly adopted executive stock option compensation as a long-term incentive pay policy 德國的公司治理 很少強(qiáng)調(diào)股東價(jià)值。 這種傳統(tǒng)體制由于缺乏外

56、部所有權(quán)力量也產(chǎn)生了代理成本。 變化 -越來越多的在美國上市的德國公司，開始采用管理者股票期權(quán)作為長期報(bào)酬激勵政策 Corporate Governance in Japan Cultural concepts of obligation, family, and consensus affect attitudes toward governance Close relationships between stakeholders and a company are manifested in cross-shareholding, and can negatively impact eff

57、icienciesKeiretsus: strongly interrelated groups of firms tied together by cross-shareholdings Banks (especially “main bank”) are highly influential with firms managers 日本的公司治理 責(zé)任、家庭和認(rèn)同等觀念影響著人們對公司治理機(jī)制的態(tài)度 交叉持股可以顯示出利益相關(guān)者和公司間的親密關(guān)系，并且給效率造了成負(fù)面影響企業(yè)系列 ：通過交叉持股而聯(lián)系在一起的公司集團(tuán) 銀行（尤其是“主銀行”）對公司管理者有著重要的影響Corporate G

58、overnance in Japan Japan has a bank-based financial and corporate governance structure whereas the United States has a market-based financial and governance structure Banks play an important role in financing and monitoring large public firms Powerful government intervention Despite the counter-cult

59、ural nature of corporate takeovers, changes in corporate governance have introduced this practice 日本的公司治理 日本的財(cái)務(wù)和公司治理結(jié)構(gòu)是以銀行為基礎(chǔ)，而美國則是以市場為基礎(chǔ) 日本的銀行在對大型上市公司的融資和監(jiān)控中發(fā)揮了重要的作用強(qiáng)有力的政府干預(yù)盡管接管行為不符合日本文化，但公司治理機(jī)制的變化使得接管開始出現(xiàn) 國際公司治理日本的公司治理 變化: 金融部門管制的取消降低了發(fā)動惡意接管的成本，促使日本的控制權(quán)市場出現(xiàn)了前所未有的活躍。 由于日本的銀行逐漸發(fā)展成為經(jīng)濟(jì)組織，因此，銀行在監(jiān)管和控制管理

60、者行為和公司業(yè)績方面的重要作用已經(jīng)遠(yuǎn)不如從前。 不管是上市公司還是私有公司的CEO得到的報(bào)酬幾乎都是相同的，并且他們的報(bào)酬都是與看得見的公司業(yè)績目標(biāo)捆綁在一起。Corporate Governance in China Changes: Major changes over the past decadePrivatization of business and the development and integrity of equity market The stock markets in China remain young and underdeveloped; in their e