2020年度中國入世承諾履行報告

1、TABLE OF CONTENTSFOREWORD 1EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2U.S. ASSESSMENT OF CHINAS WTO MEMBERSHIP . 4Chinas WTO Accession. 4Expectations of WTO Membership . 5Chinas Record in Terms of Complying With WTO Rules . 6Chinas Record in Terms of Transitioning to a Market Economy . 8U.S. STRATEGY FOR ADDRESSING TRADE D

2、ISTORTIONS CAUSED BY CHINA 13REVIEW OF TRADE MECHANISMS USED TO ENGAGE CHINA 21Bilateral Dialogues 21Multilateral Fora 22Enforcement 24U.S. Laws 24WTO Litigation 24KEY U.S. CONCERNS 27Non-tariff Measures 27Industrial Plans 27State-Owned Enterprises 29Industrial Subsidies 30Fisheries Subsidies 31Exce

3、ss Capacity 31Indigenous Innovation 32Technology Transfer 33Investment Restrictions 34Administrative Licensing 34Standards 35Secure and Controllable Policies 36Encryption 37Competition Policy 37Pharmaceuticals 38Medical Devices 40Cosmetics 40Export Restraints 42Value-added Tax Rebates and Related Po

4、licies 42Import Ban on Remanufactured Products 42Import Ban on Recyclable Materials 43TABLE OF CONTENTSNon-tariff Measures (contd) HYPERLINK l _TOC_250036 Trade Remedies 43 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250035 Government Procurement 44 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250034 Corporate Social Credit System 45 HYPERLINK l _TOC_25

5、0033 Other Non-tariff Measures 47 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250032 Intellectual Property Rights 47 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250031 Overview 47 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250030 Trade Secrets 48 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250029 Bad Faith Trademark Registration 49 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250028 Online Infringement 49 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250027 Co

6、unterfeit Goods 50 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250026 Agriculture 51 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250025 Overview 51 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250024 Agricultural Domestic Support 51 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250023 Tariff-rate Quota Administration 52 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250022 Agricultural Biotechnology Approvals 52 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250021 F

7、ood Safety Law 53 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250020 Poultry 54 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250019 Beef 54 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250018 Pork 54 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250017 Horticultural Products 55 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250016 Value-added Tax Rebates and Related Policies 55 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250015 Services 55 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250014 O

8、verview 55 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250013 Banking Services 56Securities, Asset Management, and Future Services 56 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250012 Insurance Services 56 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250011 Electronic Payment Services 57 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250010 Internet-enabled Payment Services 58 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250009 Telecom

9、munications Services 58 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250008 Internet Regulatory Regime 58 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250007 Voice-over-Internet Protocol Services 59 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250006 Cloud Computing Services 59 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250005 Audio-visual and Related Services 59 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250004 Theatrical Films 60

10、HYPERLINK l _TOC_250003 Online Video and Entertainment Software Services 60 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250002 Legal Services 60 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250001 Express Delivery Services 61 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250000 Data Restrictions 61TABLE OF CONTENTSTransparency 61Overview 61Publication of Trade-related Measures 61No

11、tice-and-comment Procedures 61Translations 62ABBREVIATIONSACFTUAll China Federation of Trade UnionsAPECAsia-Pacific Economic CooperationAQSIQState Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection, and QuarantineBOFTBureau of Fair Trade for Imports and ExportsCACCyberspace Administration of ChinaCBI

12、RCChina Banking and Insurance Regulatory CommissionCFDAChina Food and Drug AdministrationCNCANational Certification and Accreditation AdministrationCNIPAChinas National Intellectual Property AdministrationGACCGeneral Administration of Customs of ChinaGAPPGeneral Administration of Press and Publicati

13、onISOInternational Organization for StandardizationJCCTU.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce and TradeMIITMinistry of Industry and Information TechnologyMOAMinistry of AgricultureMARAMinistry of Agriculture and Rural AffairsMOFMinistry of FinanceMOFCOMMinistry of CommerceMOHMinistry of HealthMOSTM

14、inistry of Science and TechnologyNDRCNational Development and Reform CommissionNPCNational Peoples CongressOIEWorld Organization for Animal HealthPBOCPeoples Bank of ChinaSACStandardization Administration of ChinaSAICState Administration for Industry and CommerceSAMRState Administration for Market R

15、egulationSAPPRFTState Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film, and TelevisionSARFTState Administration of Radio, Film and TelevisionSASACState-owned Assets Supervision and Administration CommissionSATState Administration of TaxationSCLAOState Councils Legislative Affairs OfficeS&EDU.S.-Chi

16、na Strategic and Economic DialogueSPBState Postal BureauSPCSupreme Peoples CourtWTOWorld Trade OrganizationFOREWORDThis is the 19th report prepared pursuant to section 421 of the U.S.-China Relations Act of 2000 (P.L. 106- 286), 22 U.S.C. 6951 (the Act), which requires the United States Trade Repres

17、entative (USTR) to report annually to Congress on compliance by the Peoples Republic of China (China) with commitments made in connection with its accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), including both multilateral commitments and any bilateral commitments made to the United States. The rep

18、ort covers calendar year 2020. It also incorporates the findings of the Overseas Compliance Program, as required by section 413(b)(2) of the Act, 22 U.S.C. 6943(b)(2).In preparing this report, USTR drew on its experience in overseeing the U.S. Governments monitoring of Chinas WTO compliance efforts.

19、 USTR chairs the Trade Policy Staff Committee (TPSC) Subcommittee on China, an inter-agency body whose mandate is, inter alia, to assess Chinas efforts to comply with its WTO commitments. This TPSC subcommittee is composed of experts from USTR, the Departments of Commerce, State, Agriculture and Tre

20、asury, and theU.S. Patent and Trademark Office, among other agencies. Members of the TPSC subcommittee work closely with State Department economic officers, Foreign Commercial Service officers, Enforcement and Compliance officers and Intellectual Property Attachs from the Commerce Department, Foreig

21、n Agricultural Service officers, Customs and Border Protection attachs and Immigration and Customs Enforcement attachs at the U.S. Embassy and Consulates General in China, who are active in gathering and analyzing information, maintaining regular contacts with U.S. industries operating in China and

22、maintaining a regular dialogue with Chinese government officials at key ministries and agencies. The TPSC subcommittee meets in order to evaluate and coordinate U.S. engagement with China in the trade context.To aid in its preparation of this report, USTR published a notice in the Federal Register o

23、n August 18, 2020. The notice asked interested parties to submit written comments. A number of written submissions were received from interested parties. The TPSC forwarded written questions to certain of the interested parties, and those interested parties responded to the written questions in writ

24、ing. 1EXECUTIVE SUMMARYIn prior reports, we provided this Administrations assessment of Chinas WTO membership, the unique and very serious challenges that Chinas non-market policies and practices pose for the multilateral trading system and the effectiveness of the strategies that had been pursued t

25、o address the China problem over the years. We identified the critical need for new and more effective strategies including taking actions outside the WTO where necessary to address the challenges presented by Chinas state-led, mercantilist approach to the economy and trade. We also described the po

26、sitive outcomes to date of the Administrations strategy for engaging China, which led to the signing of an historic trade agreement with China in January 2020. In this years report, we review and assess Chinas progress in implementing that agreement to date, and we highlight the important issues tha

27、t remain to be addressed in our trade relationship with China.As we previously documented, and as remains true today, Chinas record of compliance with the terms of its WTO membership has been poor. China has continued to embrace a state-led, non-market and mercantilist approach to the economy and tr

28、ade, despite WTO members expectations and Chinas own representations that China would transform its economy and pursue the open, market-oriented policies endorsed by the WTO.At the same time, Chinas non-market approach has imposed, and continues to impose, substantial costs on WTO members. In our pr

29、ior reports, we identified and explained the numerous policies and practices pursued by China that harm and disadvantage U.S. companies and workers, often severely. It is clear that the costs associated with Chinas unfair and distortive policies and practices have been substantial. For example, Chin

30、as non- market economic system and the industrial policies that flow from it have systematically distorted critical sectors of the global economy such as steel, aluminum, solar and fisheries, devastating marketsin the United States and other countries. China also continues to block valuable sectors

31、of its economy from foreign competition, particularly services sectors. At the same time, Chinas industrial policies are increasingly responsible for displacing companies in new, emerging sectors of the global economy, as the Chinese government and the Chinese Communist Party powerfully intervene on

32、 behalf of Chinas domestic industries. Companies in economies disciplined by the market cannot effectively compete with both Chinese companies and the Chinese state.For nearly two decades, a variety of bilateral and multilateral efforts were pursued by the United States and other WTO members to addr

33、ess the unique challenges presented by Chinas WTO membership. However, even though these efforts were persistent, they did not result in meaningful changes in Chinas approach to the economy and trade. We previously catalogued the United States persistent yet unsuccessful efforts to resolve the many

34、concerns that have arisen in our trade relationship with China. We found that a consistent pattern existed where the United States raised a particular concern, China specifically promised to address that concern, and Chinas promise was not fulfilled.Faced with these realities, in the 2017 USTR Repor

35、t to Congress on Chinas WTO Compliance, this Administration announced that it would be pursuing a new, more aggressive approach to the United States engagement of China. We explained that the Administration would defend U.S. companies and workers from Chinas unfair trading practices and would seek t

36、o restore balance to the trade relationship between the United States and China. As part of these efforts, the United States would take all appropriate actions to ensure that the costs of Chinas non-market economic system are borne by China, not by the United States. The United States also would con

37、tinue to encourage China to make fundamental structural changes to its approach to the economy and trade consistent with the open, market-oriented approach pursued by2other WTO members, which is rooted in the principles of non-discrimination, market access, reciprocity, fairness and transparency. If

38、 undertaken by China, these changes would do more than simply ease the growing trade tensions with its trading partners. These changes would also benefit China, by placing its economy on a more sustainable path, and would contribute to the growth of the U.S. economy and the global economy.The Admini

39、stration based this new approach on several assessments. First, WTO membership comes with expectations that an acceding member not only will strictly adhere to WTO rules, but also will support and pursue open, market-oriented policies. Second, China has failed to comply with these expectations. Thir

40、d, in recent years, China has moved further away from open, market-oriented policies and has more fully embraced a state-led, mercantilist approach to the economy and trade. Finally, Chinas market-distorting policies and practices harm and disadvantage its fellow WTO members, even as China reaps eno

41、rmous benefits from its WTO membership.Consistent with this Administrations more aggressive approach to China, we have been using all available tools including domestic trade remedies, bilateral negotiations, WTO litigation, and strategic engagement with like-minded trading partners to respond to th

42、e unique and very serious challenges presented by China. But, the goal for the United States remains the same. The United States seeks a trade relationship with China that is fair, reciprocal and balanced.Beginning in January 2020, the United States new approach to China began to demonstrate key pro

43、gress with the signing of an historic trade agreement, known as the Phase One Agreement. This agreement requires structural reforms and other changes to Chinas economic and trade regime in the areas of intellectual property, technology transfer, agriculture, financial services, and currency and fore

44、ign exchange. The agreement also includesa commitment by China that it will make substantial additional purchases of U.S. goods and services in the coming years. Importantly, the agreement establishes a strong dispute resolution system that ensures prompt and effective implementation and enforcement

45、.The United States has been closely monitoring Chinas progress in implementing its numerous commitments under the Phase One Agreement and has regularly engaged China using the extensive consultation processes established by the agreement to discuss Chinas implementation progress and any concerns as

46、they arise. Currently, the evidence indicates that China has been moving forward in good faith with the implementation of its commitments, making substantial progress in many areas.Because the Phase One Agreement does not cover all of the United States concerns, the United States will need to turn t

47、o Phase Two of its trade negotiations with China in order to secure resolutions to important outstanding issues. These discussions should focus on critical issues in areas such as subsidies, excess capacity, state-owned enterprises, state-sponsored cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, stand

48、ards, cybersecurity, data localization requirements, restrictions on cross- border data transfers, competition policy and regulatory transparency as well as certain issues in the areas of intellectual property, technology transfer and services market access that were not addressed in the Phase One A

49、greement.Going forward, it is the Administrations hope that China will continue to take the United States concerns seriously and engage with the United States on a productive basis. If China does so and the two sides are able to finalize and implement a comprehensive Phase Two Agreement, it will ben

50、efit not only the United States, but also China itself and the rest of the WTO membership. It may also generate a willingness on the part of China to take on similar new disciplines at the WTO. 3U.S. ASSESSMENT OF CHINAS WTO MEMBERSHIPCHINAS WTO ACCESSIONIn July of 1986, China applied for admission

51、to the WTOs predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The GATT formed a Working Party in March of 1987, composed of all interested GATT contracting parties, to examine Chinas application and negotiate terms for Chinas accession. For the next eight years, negotiations were condu

52、cted under the auspices of the GATT Working Party. Following the formation of the WTO on January 1, 1995, pursuant to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement), a successor WTO Working Party, composed of all interested WTO members, took over the negotiations.L

53、ike all WTO accession negotiations, the negotiations with China had three basic aspects. First, China provided information to the Working Party regarding its trade regime. China also updated this information periodically during the 15 years of negotiations to reflect changes in its trade regime. Sec

54、ond, each interested WTO member negotiated bilaterally with China regarding market access concessions and commitments in the goods and services areas, including, for example, the tariffs that would apply on industrial and agricultural goods and the commitments that China would make to open up its ma

55、rket to foreign services suppliers. The most trade liberalizing of the concessions and commitments obtained through these bilateral negotiations were consolidated into Chinas Goods and Services Schedules and apply to all WTO members. Third, overlapping in time with these bilateral negotiations, Chin

56、a engaged in multilateral negotiations with Working Party members on the rules that would govern trade with China. Throughout these multilateral negotiations, U.S.leadership in working with China was critical to removing obstacles to Chinas WTO accession and achieving a consensus on appropriate rule

57、s commitments. These commitments are set forth in Chinas Protocol of Accession and an accompanying Report of the Working Party.WTO members formally approved an agreement on the terms of accession for China on November 10, 2001, at the WTOs Fourth Ministerial Conference, held in Doha, Qatar. One day

58、later, China signed the agreement and deposited its instrument of ratification with the Director-General of the WTO. China became the 143rd member of the WTO on December 11, 2001.Chinas Protocol of Accession, accompanying Working Party Report, and Goods and Services Schedules are available on the WT

59、Os website ().To accede to the WTO, China agreed to take concrete steps to remove trade barriers and open its markets to foreign companies and their exports from the first day of accession in virtually every product sector and for a wide range of services. Supporting these steps, China also agreed t

60、o undertake important changes to its legal framework, designed to add transparency and predictability to business dealings.Like all acceding WTO members, China also agreed to assume the obligations of more than 20 existing multilateral WTO agreements. Areas of principal concern to the United States