中國的氫經(jīng)濟(jì)即將到來（英）

1、REPOR TJ U LY 2020 ENVIR ONMENT AND NATUR AL RE S OUR CE S PR OGR AM Is Chinas Hydrogen Economy Coming?A Game-Changing OpportunityNicola De Blasio Fridolin PflugmannAbout the Program:The Environment and Natural Resources Programs mandate is to conduct policy-relevant research at the regional, nation

2、al, international, and global level, and through its outreach initiatives to make its products available to decision-makers, scholars, and interested citizens.Over the past 30 years environmental policy has changed dramatically. Today it is an integral part of energy policy, economic development, an

3、d security. Security means not only protection from military aggression, but also maintenance of adequate supplies of food and water, and the pro- tection of public health. These problems cannot be addressed from onediscipline or from the perspective of one issue or one country. The world of the fut

4、ure will demand the integration of multiple needs and values across both disciplinary and geographic boundaries.For more, visit /ENRP.Acknowledgements:The authors are thankful to Henry Lee, John Holdren, Venky Narayana- murti, Pingbo Jiang, Alejandro Nunez-Jimenez, Amanda Sardonis, and Isabel Feinst

5、ein for their insights and contributions.About the Authors:Dr. Nicola De Blasio is a Senior Fellow at the Belfer Center, leading research on energy technology innovation and the transition to a low-car- bon economy. With more than 25 years of global experience in the energy sector, Dr. De Blasio is

6、an expert in navigating the challenges of strategic development and technology innovation toward sustainable commercial success, at scale. This coupled with his insight on the impact of an insti- tutions development and innovation activities on other facets of business strategy, such as environmenta

7、l, social, operational, geopolitical, and gov- ernmental factors. Dr. De Blasio spent 17 years at Eni, one of the worlds leading energy companies, most recently as Vice President and Head of R&D International Development. Prior to joining Harvard, Dr. De Blasio was Senior Research Scholar in the fac

8、ulty of SIPA at Columbia University and Program Director Technology and Innovation at the Center on Global Energy Policy, where he was also Director of Strategic Partnerships. Dr.De Blasio holds a degree in Chemical Engineering from the Politecnico of Milan University with a thesis in industrial cat

9、alysis. He specialized at St. Andrews University, Scotland and then at Eni Corporate University, where he focused on energy economics. He is co-author of the book Value of Innovation, and has extensively published and lectured on energy, innova- tion, project evaluation and catalysis.Fridolin Pflugm

10、ann is a Fall 2019 pre-doctoral research fellow at the Belfer Centers Environment and Natural Resources Program. He is a PhD candidate at the Technical University of Munich, Germany. He received his Masters degree in International Management from the ESADE Busi- ness School in Barcelona, Spain. His

11、research explores challenges of the transition to low-carbon energy systems, focusing on security of supply and geopolitical risks in highly renewable energy systems. He previously worked as a management consultant serving clients in the global energy sector.GlossaryTermsBEVBattery electric vehicleB

12、RIBelt and Road InitiativeCCUSCarbon capture utilization and storageEVElectric vehicleFCEVFuel cell electric vehicleNEVNew energy vehicleRESRenewable energy sourcesUnitsEJExajoule (1018 Joule)MtMillion tonsPWhPetawatt hour (1015 Watt hours)Table of Contents HYPERLINK l _TOC_250015 Executive Summary

13、1 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250014 Introduction 3 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250013 Government Support 5 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250012 Production pathways, market potential and costs 9 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250011 Market potential 10 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250010 Production costs 11 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250009 CO2 Intensity 12 HYPERLINK l

14、 _TOC_250008 Technology focus: hydrogen fuel cells 14What is a fuel cell? 14Fuel Cell Electric Vehicles (FCEVs) and Renewable Hydrogen 16Outlook 17 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250007 The geopolitical and market map for renewable hydrogen 19 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250006 Renewable energy resources (RES) endowment 19

15、HYPERLINK l _TOC_250005 Renewable freshwater resources endowment 21 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250004 Infrastructure potential 24 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250003 Potential role of renewable hydrogen in Chinas transition to a low carbon economy 27 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250002 Policy and commercial options 31 HYPERLINK l _T

16、OC_250001 Conclusion 34 HYPERLINK l _TOC_250000 References 36Chengdu, Sichuan, China.Unsplash user Li LinExecutive SummaryTo accelerate the global transition to a low-carbon economy, all energy systems and sectors must be actively decarbonized. While hydrogen has been a staple in the energy and chem

17、ical industries for decades, renewable hydrogen is drawing increased attention today as a versatile and sustainable energy carrier with the potential to play an important role in the carbon-free energy puzzle.Our recent article, “The Geopolitics of Renewable Hydrogen in Low-Carbon Energy Markets” ex

18、plores the global implications ofrenewable hydrogen adoption at scale and shows that the role coun- tries will likely assume in global renewable hydrogen markets depends on their renewable energy resource and freshwater endowments as well as their ability to deploy enabling infrastructure.Using the

19、same analytical framework, this paper focuses on China and the potential role of renewable hydrogen in accelerating its transition to a low-carbon economy. Our research goal is to provide policymak- ers and other stakeholders the means to make informed decisions on technology innovation, policy inst

20、ruments, and long-term invest- ments in enabling infrastructure.Renewable hydrogen offers significant advantages for China. It can help Beijing meet its climate and pollution goals at a time when coal continues to dominate while avoiding increased reliance on imported fuels. As a readily dispatchabl

21、e means of storing energy, hydrogen can also help to address intermittency and curtailment issues as renewable energy increases its share of Chinas energy mix. Furthermore, hydrogen can open new avenues for developing clean technology manufactured goods for both internal and export markets.If water

22、scarcity issues are addressed, China could become a renewable hydrogen export champion, supplying international markets mainlyin Southeast Asia. At a national level, our analysis clearly shows how renewable hydrogen could be most efficiently and effectively produced in the Southwestern region. A reg

23、ion where rich renewable resourcesare available and water resources are less constrained, but far away from Chinas economic heartland, thus requiring significant infrastructure investments to connect supply with demand, potentially making regional imports more attractive.From a geopolitical perspect

24、ive, renewable hydrogen could become a key part of the Belt and Road Initiative, symbolizing Chinas technological prowess while increasing export opportunities and potentially enhancing Beijings status as a leader in the global fight against climate change.Making renewable hydrogen a significant par

25、t of Chinas future energy mix will require developing national and international policies and appropriate market structures aimed at spurring innovation along the value chains; scaling technologies while significantly reducing costs; and deploying enabling infrastructure.Today, production from coal

26、remains the lowest-cost option, about 30% cheaper than hydrogen from natural gas. Hence reducing the carbon foot- print of coal-based hydrogen will be a critical factor in its viability in a low-carbon scenario, coal-based hydrogen with Carbon Capture Utiliza-tion and Storage (CCUS) is likely to rem

27、ain the lowest-cost clean hydrogen production route for the middle-term.China is piloting several new projects and policies, mainly in the mobil- ity sector, but still has a long way to go before a hydrogen society reaches fruition. Yet if Beijing were to put its full manufacturing and policy might

28、behind hydrogens value chain, it would be a true game changer with cas- cading effects for the entire world.IntroductionHydrogen is gathering unprecedented momentum around the world. As governments become more serious about reducing emissions and address- ing climate change, the spotlight has moved

29、to the deep decarbonization of energy-intensive sectors. Especially those where electricity is not the pre- ferred energy carrier and emissions are hard to abate, such as iron and steel production, high-temperature industrial heat, aviation, shipping, long dis- tance road transportation and heat for

30、 buildings. Areas where the required dual transition shifting to electricity as the preferred energy delivery system, while decarbonizing electricity production may not work. Due to its versatility, hydrogen could play this role and serve as a “l(fā)ink between emitting sectors.Today, most of Chinas hyd

31、rogen is produced from coal via 1,000 gasifiers, accounting for 5% of the countrys total coal consumption. While hydrogen burns cleanly at the point of use, in order to harness its full environmental benefit, it needs to be produced from zero-carbon electricity; otherwise the net result would only b

32、e to relocate emissions from one area to another.Renewable hydrogen can be used for both stationary applications and mobility. As a readily-dispatchable means of storing energy, hydrogen technologies could help address power intermittency and curtailment1 issues that will inevitably rise as renewabl

33、e energy continues to alter Chi- nas energy mix. China could use hydrogen to store utility-scale quantities of renewable resources. Hydrogen could also facilitate to store renewable energy at utility scale and serve as a fuel in stationary fuel cell systems for buildings, backup power, or distribute

34、d generation. As a sustainable mobil- ity energy carrier, hydrogen could power fuel cell electric vehicles (FCEVs) and be the base for synthetic fuels. As a sustainable mobile energy carrier, hydrogen could power fuel cell electric vehicles (FCEVs) and form the base for synthetic fuels.Hydrogens sta

35、tionary applications have generally been more attractive than mobility applications; due to lack of enabling infrastructure and1 “Curtailment” refers to a situation in which a renewable energy plant is unable to operate at full capacity because of either oversupply or insufficient transmission capac

36、ity.steadfast government support, but also to higher total ownership costs, and competition with electric vehicles (EVs). But in March 2019, the Chinese government took a step forward by announcing measures promoting the construction of hydrogen facilities for new energy vehicles (NEVs). Wan Gang, w

37、ho is known as Chinas “father of electric cars”, called for China to “l(fā)ook into establishing a hydrogen society” and “move further toward fuel cells.”2Given that Gang made a similar call two decades ago on vehicle electrifi- cation, which played a key role in Chinas current EV market dominance, clos

38、e attention is warranted. If China were to replicate this success for hydrogen, it could be a game changer for the entire world, but innovation will be key to remove obstacles and accelerate adoption at scale.The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines the measures intro

39、duced by the Chinese government to support the devel- opment of a hydrogen economy. Section 3 reviews hydrogen production pathways, costs, and market potential. Section 4 provides an overviewof hydrogen fuel cell technology. Section 5 outlines the geopolitical and market map for renewably hydrogen i

40、n China. Section 6 analyzes the potential role of renewable hydrogen in Chinas transition to a low-carbon economy. Section 7 addresses policy and commercial options while section 8 provides an overall conclusion.2 Bloomberg (2019), “Wan Gang, Chinas father of electric cars, thinks hydrogen is the fu

41、ture” https:/www.bloomberg. com/news/articles/20190612/chinasfatherofelectriccarsthinkshydrogenisthefuture, accessed April 7, 2020.Government SupportIn March 2019, the Chinese government announced some revisions to the annual Report on the Work of the Government3, which included mea- sures promoting

42、 the construction of renewable hydrogen facilities for new energy vehicles (NEVs). During the summer, the Vice Chairman of Chinas policymaking board, Wan Gang, called for China to “l(fā)ook into establishing a hydrogen society” and “move further toward fuel cells.”Is China putting its manufacturing and

43、policy might be- hind hydrogen and fuel cells, just as it has with battery electric vehicles (BEVs)?Over less than a decade, the Chinese government has used subsidies and other policies to forge the worlds largest market for battery electric vehicles (BEVs). In 2018, 1.26 million EVs were sold in Ch

44、ina, accounting for 60% of the worlds total4. But in March 2019, to spur more competitive innova- tion in the sector, the government also announced that it would drastically reduce subsidies on NEVs by July 2019 and discontinue them by 2020.5In July 2019, Chinas electric vehicle sales saw their firs

45、t monthly decline of 4.7% from a year earlier, in August and September declines steepened,dropping by 16% and 34% to 85,000 and 80,000 units respectively6 (Figure1).National Peoples Congress of the Peoples Republic of China (2019). “Report on the Work of the Government” http:/ english. HYPERLINK /pr

46、emier/speeches/2019/03/16/content_281476565265580.htm /premier/speeches/2019/03/16/content_281476565265580.htm, accessed November 15, 2019.Centre for Solar Energy and Hydrogen Research Baden-Wrttemberg (2020), https:/ HYPERLINK http:/www.zsw-bw.de/en/media-cen- www.zsw-bw.de/en/media-cen- ter/data-s

47、ervice.html#c6700, accessed April 3, 2020.The Chinese government has been steadily reducing subsidies to progressively shift costs to its EV makers since 2016. The March 2019 measures saw government subsidies being totally removed for EVs with a range below 155 miles (250 km) while vehicles with hig

48、her ranges saw the incentives slashed by as much as 60%.China Association of Automobile Manufacturers (2020), HYPERLINK /chn/21/cate_463/list_1.html /chn/21/cate_463/list_1.html, ac- cessed April 3, 2020.Figure 1. Chinas NEVs Production and Sales in 2019 (China Association of Automobile Manufacturer

49、s)On the other hand, the month of June 2019 saw a jump in sales as con- sumers made purchases before possible price increases came into effect, as a result of the governments announcement. This even if EV makers will probably continue to prioritize volumes and market share over profitability, hence

50、retail prices will likely remain at a similar level.The Chinese government began introducing subsidies promoting vehicle electrification in 2010, driven largely by the need to reduce air pollution in the countrys urban centers. This was only partly successful because the full environmental benefit o

51、f electrification can only be harnessed if elec-tricity is produced from carbon-free sources and not from fossil fuel-based generation. In which case emissions simply transfer from vehicle combus- tion engines to coal plants, with insufficient or even negative impact on emissions.Chinas new energy v

52、ehicle industry also benefitted from other policies aimed at shifting consumers away from internal combustion vehicles. For example, securing a license plate for new vehicles could take up to a year in many Chinese cities; while if purchasing an EV, license plates are issued along with the vehicle.7

53、MacDuffie, J. (2019), “Chinas Electric Vehicle Market: A Storm of Competition Is Coming” Wharton School of Manage- ment /article/chinas-ev-market/, accessed March 4, 2020.The Chinese government has also set aggressive goals for the deployment of FCEVs and the associated enabling infrastructure: hydr

54、ogen fueling stations. In 2017, China had approximately 1,200 FCEVs and less than 20 hydrogen fueling stations, ranking behind the United States, Japan, Ger- many and South Korea.8 The government now aims to have 5,000 FCEVs on the road by 2020; 50,000 by 2025; and one million by 2030. Guided by the

55、 target of one fueling station for every 1,000 vehicles, China plans to have 100 stations by 2020; 300 by 2025; and 1000 by 20309 (see Figure 2). In comparison in the United States there are currently 41 fueling stations with 36 more being built, mainly in the state of California.10 11Figure 2. Chin

56、as FCEVs and Infrastructure Development Plan (DOE 2018)Hydrogen Fuel Cell Association (2020) “Transportation” HYPERLINK /transportation /transportation, accessed March 4, 2020.U.S. Department of Energy (2020), “Hydrogen and Fuel Cells Update” https:/ HYPERLINK /sites/prod/ /sites/prod/ files/2018/02

57、/f49/fcto_h2_fc_update_satyapal_transp_research_board_2018.pdf, accessed March 4, 2020.U.S. Department of Energy (2020), “Hydrogen Fueling Infrastructure Development” /fuels/ hydrogen_infrastructure.html, March 4, 2020.California Air Resources Board (2019), “2019 Annual Evaluation of Fuel Cell Elect

58、ric Vehicle Deployment & Hydrogen Fuel Station Network Development”In response to these government measures, Chinese automobile compa- nies are making FCEVs a new focus for their business. Bloomberg NEF tracked more than $17 billion worth of investments announced across the industry through 202312;

59、several examples are listed below. China National Heavy-Duty Truck Groups plans to invest $7.6 billion to build FCEVs in Shandong province.Mingtian (Tomorrows) Hydrogen, which is backed by the Chinese Academy of Sciences, plans to invest $363 million in Anhui prov- ince to manufacture fuel-cell stac

60、ks and components. The company aims at a manufacturing capacity of 100,000 fuel-cell stacks by 2022 and 300,000 stacks by 2028.Great Wall Motor, one of the countrys largest SUV and pickup manufacturers, has invested over $149 million in research and development of hydrogen energy and FCEVs.13Bloombe