關(guān)于2012年度正高級(jí)專業(yè)技術(shù)職務(wù)任職

1、Spacepowers Role in Addressing Earthly Security ChallengesPete Hays, SAICThe Future of Space Exploration: Solutions to Earthly Problems?Boston University12-14 April 20079/27/20221National Defense University Spacepower Theory StudyOriginated during 2005 QDRFeb 06 OSD Letter with TOR to NDUStudy Desig

2、nYearlong effort: due Summer 07Seminars, Workshops, ConferencesProduct: Two BooksVolume I: Concise Spacepower TheoryVolume II: Comprehensive Spacepower Theory9/27/20222Edited Volume: Comprehensive Spacepower TheoryVOLUME II CHAPTERS AND AUTHORSForeword: Implications of Spacepower for Geopolitics and

3、 Grand Strategy Section I: Introduction to Spacepower TheoryChapter 1: On the Nature of Theory: Harold R. WintonChapter 2: International Relations Theory and Spacepower: Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.Chapter 3: Landpower, Seapower, and Spacepower: Jon T. SumidaChapter 4: Airpower, Cyberpower, and Spacep

4、ower: Benjamin S. LambethSection II: Spacepower and GeopoliticsChapter 5: Orbital Terrain and Space Physics: Martin E.B. France & Jerry Jon SellersChapter 6: Space Law and Governance Structures: Joanne Irene GabrynowiczChapter 7: Building on Previous Spacepower Theory: Colin S. Gray & John B. Sheldo

5、nSection III: Commercial Space PerspectivesChapter 8: History of Commercial Space Activity and Spacepower: Henry R. HertzfeldChapter 9: Commercial Space Industry and Markets: Joseph Fuller, Jr.Chapter 10: Merchants and Guardians: Scott PaceChapter 11: Innovative Approaches to Commercial Space: Ivan

6、BekeySection IV: Civil Space PerspectivesChapter 12: History of Civil Space Activity and Spacepower: Roger D. LauniusChapter 13: Affordable and Responsive Space Systems: Sir Martin SweetingChapter 14: Space and Environmental Issues: Eligar SadehChapter 15: Competing Visions for Exploration: Klaus P.

7、 Heiss & Dennis R. Wingo; Robert Zubrin9/27/20223Edited Volume (cont.)Section V: Security Space PerspectivesChapter 16: History of Security Space Activity and Spacepower: James LewisChapter 17: Increasing the Military Uses of Space: Henry F. Cooper, Jr. & Everett C. DolmanChapter 18: Preserving Free

8、dom of Action in Space: Michael Krepon, Theresa Hitchens & Michael Katz-HymanChapter 19: Balancing Security Interests: Michael E. OHanlonSection VI: International PerspectivesChapter 20: Russia: James E. ObergChapter 21: China: Dean ChengChapter 22: Europe: Xavier PascoChapter 23: Emerging Actors: R

9、andall R. CorrellSection VII: Evolving Futures for SpacepowerChapter 24: Evolving U.S. Structures: John M. LogsdonChapter 25: Organizational Drivers for Spacepower: John M. CollinsChapter 26: Technological Drivers for Spacepower: Taylor DinermanChapter 27: Building Human Capital for Spacepower: S. P

10、eter WordenAfterword: The Future of Spacepower: AppendixesSpace Law: Outer Space Treaty, Registration Convention, Rescue and Return Agreement, Liability Convention, Moon Treaty, PAROS Proposals, IADCOrbits and Orbital MechanicsBasics of Space System DesignPossibly Bibliographic Essay, Annotated Bibl

11、iography (assembled from COP), and Comprehensive Bibliography9/27/20224Requirements for Concise Spacepower TheoryAccount for the structure of the field: the divergent world views of each sector and the dynamics of their interactions Define the boundary conditions of the theory:Cis-Lunar space as opp

12、osed to all of spaceInternational perceptions of spacepower and their effect on US policyAsk the key, fundamental questions regarding the uses and purposes of space to extract underlying principles. Question hypotheses and present conditions.Test counterfactualsConstruct a framework that integrates

13、divergent points of view and takes into account potential future scenarios. Roles of Theory: Define Construct Explain Connect Anticipate9/27/20225Upcoming ConferenceCapstone Symposium: 25-26 April 07, National Defense University, Washington, D.C.Initial presentation of Concise Spacepower TheoryFor m

14、ore info or to sign up: ; Community of Practice Website: :/groups-/group/spacepower-theory9/27/20226RORSATEORSATDS-P1-M Target SatelliteSoviet Space Systems and Co-Orbital ASATEnergia carrying Skif DM (Polus) prototype “battle stationCo-Orbital ASAT9/27/20227Soviet Space Systems and Co-Orbital ASATM

15、any details about this system remain classified or are lost to history. The system used two types of satellites: co-orbital active killers (Istrebitel or killer) and passive targetsThe first tests, Polyot-1 and Polyot-2, were conducted in 1963 and 1964. There were subsequently 19 target satellite te

16、sts and 22 killer satellite tests. The system reached full operational capability in 1972. The last test was on 18 Jun 1982Killer satellites tested in the 1970s were ready for launch within 90 minutes (using a Tsiklon booster) and could close within less than one kilometer of target satellites withi

17、n 40-50 minutesOn 23 Mar 1983 Yuri Andropov announced a moratorium on design, construction, and testing of the system; the moratorium ended in Sep 1986In May 1987 Michael Gorbachev visited Baikonur and saw the co-orbital killer satellite and the prototype of the anti-satellite and anti-missile platf

18、orm called Narvad (Guard). General Zavalishin, who escorted Gorbachev, used the opportunity to advocate resumption of testing. Zavalishin pointed at similar developments in the US and promised to cover up ASAT launches so no one would suspect tests were taking place. As Zavalishin recalls, “.Gorbach

19、ev issued incoherent and wordy explanations, which concluded with a polite, but resolute refusal.Ironically, only few days after this conversation, on 15 May 1987, the first heavy-lift Energia rocket blasted off from Baikonur, carrying Skif DM (Polus) spacecraft, which was later described as a proto

20、type “battle station in space. Due to a software glitch, the 90-ton-class spacecraft never made it into orbit9/27/20228US ASAT Systems and Residual Capabilities9/27/20229US ASAT Testing and SystemsBold Orion air-launched, nuclear-tipped ASAT tested in late 1950s; worlds first known test 19 Oct 1959P

21、rograms 505 and 437 ground-launched, nuclear-tipped ASATs operationally deployed 1963-70NSDM 345 in Jan 77 called for development of air-launched KEW ASATMHV ASAT successfully tested on 13 Sep 1985; Congressional restrictions led to cancellation in 1989; KEASAT was follow-on systemMIRACL tests in Oc

22、t 1997; highlighted satellite vulnerability to DEW ASAT potential of BMD systems: BP and ABL 9/27/202210ASAT Arms Control EffortsDevelopment and testing of ASAT capabilities not covered by OST or other space agreementsTwo-Track Diplomacy with three rounds of US-USSR ASAT negotiations 1978-79USSR tes

23、ting moratorium 1982-86; Congressional restrictions on MHV ASAT testingDST was only “bucket of AC that did not lead to agreements during 1980s-90sPAROS efforts at CD and UNGA Resolutions9/27/2022119/27/202212Growth in SATCOM Demand9/27/202213Military Satellite Communications Grids9/27/2022149/27/202

24、215EnvironmentalMonitoringCommunicationsPosition, Navigation,and TimeIntegratedTactical Warning and Attack AssessmentIntelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance(ISR)Polar LEOGeostationary Orbit (GSO)Semi-synchronous OrbitGSO and LEOVariousDefense Meteorological Support Program (DMSP)-National Pol

25、ar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS)Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) II, DSCS III, Ultra-High Frequency Follow-on (UFO), Milstar, Global Broadcast System (GBS), Iridium, commercial systems-Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF), Wideband Gapfiller System (W

26、GS), Mobile User Objective System (MUOS), Polar Military Satellite Communications System, Transformational Communications System (TSAT)Global Positioning System (GPS)GPS IIGPS IIRGPS IIR-M-GPS IIFGPS IIIDefense Support Program (DSP), GPS-Space-Based Infra-Red System (SBIRS) High,Space Tracking and S

27、urveillance System (STSS)Imaging (IMINT) Satellites, Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Satellites, commercial systems-Future Imagery Architecture (FIA), Integrated Overhead SIGINT Architecture (IOSA), Space Radar9/27/202216Major Military Space Program Investments (Millions of 2006 dollars)9/27/202217Gai

28、n or MaintainSpace ControlProvide Freedom ofAction in Space for Friendly ForcesDeny Freedom of Action in Space to Enemy ForcesPROTECTIONEmploy active andPassive defensivemeasures to ensure US and friendly space systems operate as PlannedSURVEILLANCEDetect, identify, assess, and track space objects a

29、nd eventsPREVENTIONEmploy measures to prevent adversary use of data or services from US and friendly space systems for purposes hostile to the USNEGATIONDisrupt, deny, degrade, deceive, or destroy adversary space capabilities9/27/2022189/27/2022199/27/2022209/27/2022219/27/202222Attributes of Milita

30、ry Space Doctrines Primary Value and Functions of MilitarySpace Forces Space System Characteristics and Employment Strategies Conflict Missions of Space Forces Appropriate Military Organization for Operations and Advocacy Sanctuary Enhance Strategic Stability Facilitate Arms Control Limited Numbers

31、Fragile Systems Vulnerable Orbits Optimize for NTMV Limited NRO Survivability Above functions plus: Force Enhancement Force Enhancement Degrade Gracefully Major Command or Unified Command Control Control Space Significant Force Enhancement Control Space Significant Force Enhancement Surveillance, Of

32、fensive, and Defensive Counterspace Unified Command or Space Force High Ground Above functions plus: Decisive Impact on Terrestrial Conflict BMD Terrestrial Backups Distributed Architectures Autonomous Control Hardening Redundancy On-Orbit Spares Crosslinks Maneuver Less Vulnerable Orbits Stealth At

33、tack Warning Sensors 5 Ds: Deception, Disruption, Denial, Degradation, Destruction Reconstitution Capability Defense Convoy Above functions plus: Decisive Space-to-Space and Space-to-Earth Force Application BMD Space Force 9/27/2022239/27/2022249/27/2022259/27/2022269/27/2022279/27/2022289/27/202229

34、9/27/2022309/27/2022319/27/2022329/27/2022339/27/202234Backup Slides9/27/202235Missile Defense Share of Total DoD Budget and R&D Budget9/27/202236Three Major Objectives of Current U.S. Missile Defense Program1) “Maintain and sustain an initial capability to defend the U.S., allies, and our deployed

35、forces against rogue attacks. MDA plans by 2021 to:Complete fielding of Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI) in Alaska and CaliforniaEnhance Early Warning Radars in Alaska, California, and United KingdomField Sea-Based X-Band Radar in the PacificField a forward-transportable radar in JapanExpand command

36、and control, battle management, and communications capabilitiesAugment GBI midcourse defense capability by deploying Aegis BMD interceptors and engagement ships2) “close the gaps and improve this initial capability; MDA plans by 2021 to:Add more Aegis BMD sea-based interceptorsField four transportab

37、le Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) unitsIntroduce land and sea variants of the Multiple Kill Vehicle programUpgrade the early warning radar in GreenlandEstablish a GBI site and corresponding radar capability in Europe3) “develop options for the future; MDA plans to:Continue development o

38、f the Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS)Maintain two programs, the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) and the Airborne Laser (ABL), one of which is to be selected as the boost-phase missile defense element by 2021Develop a Space Test Bed to examine space-based options for expanding the cove

39、rage and effectiveness for future BMD systems9/27/202237U.S. Missile DefenseProgrammatic Issues and ChallengesEuropean third site for GBI and associated radar$206M requested for FY08 but Congress cut funding last year; political issues in host nations; objections raised by RussiansAirborne LaserFully funded at $632M in FY07; FY08 request is $549M. Initial airborne attempt to intercept boosting missile pushed back to last quarter of FY09Kinetic Energy InterceptorCongr