新興市場經(jīng)濟體的央行數(shù)字貨幣

BISPapersNo231CBDCsinemergingmarketeconomiesSallyChen,TirupamGoel,HanQiuandIlhyockShimInrecentyears,inbothadvanced(AEs)andemergingmarketeconomies(EMEs),centralbankshavebecomeincreasinglyengagedinprojectsrelatedtocentralbankdigitalcurrencies(CBDCs)–iedigitalmoneythatisdenominatedinthenationalunitofaccountandisaliabilityofthecentralbank(BIS(2021)).However,thestageofengagement–research,pilotorlaunch–variesaccordingtothecountry.All26centralbanksparticipatinginthismeeting(AnnexTableA1)areactiveinCBDCresearch.Severalhaveprogressedtothepilotorproof-of-conceptstage(egHongKongSAR,SaudiArabia,Thailand,theUnitedArabEmiratis(UAE)).Afewareclosetolaunching(egChina’seCNY),whilesomedonotseeapressingneedforaCBDCinthenearfuture(egPoland,Singapore).ThispaperbeginsbydiscussingthemainmotivationsofEMEcentralbanksforCBDCengagement,focusingprimarilyontherationaleforretailCBDCs.Asecondsectionreviewscentralbanks’mainconcernsregardingretailCBDCs,includingdataprivacyanddatagovernance.ThethirdsectiondiscussesdesignchoicesforretailCBDCsthatpromotecentralbankobjectiveswhileaddressingpossibleconcerns.Thefourthsectiondiscussestheimplicationsofcross-borderuseofCBDCsandrelateddesignconsiderations.Thepaperconcludeswithhigh-leveltakeaways.Throughout,thepaperdrawsonsurveyresponsesandbackgroundpapersfromthecentralbanksparticipatinginthemeeting.suanceThetopmotivationsforCBDCissuancevaryacrossEMEs,withnosinglefactordominating,asthesurveyshows(Graph1).Providingacash-likedigitalmeansofpayment,inlightofreducedcashusageandanincreaseinprivatedigitalpaymentservices,isthemostcommonconsideration.Boostingfinancialinclusionalsorankshigh.Othersignificantconsiderationsincludestrengtheningcompetitionamongpaymentsserviceproviders(PSPs),increasingefficiencyandreducingthecostsoffinancialservices.Backgroundpaperssuggestthatthesemotivationsarenotmutuallyexclusive.Indeed,amajorityofcentralbanksconsidermanyofthesemotivationsasjointlyimportant(AnnexTableA2oncentralbanksurveyresponses).lformThedigitalrevolutionischangingthepaymentslandscape.Asbigtechsandfintechfirmsmoveintofinancialservices,paymentsarenolongeracommercialbankmonopoly.Newformsofdigitalassetsuchascryptocurrenciesandstablecoinsarealsoemergingasapotentialmeansofpayment.InmanyEMEs–includingIndia,Pakistan,KenyaandTanzania–digitalpaymentsviamobilephonehavegainedground.Meanwhile,thecash-to-GDPratio–aproxyfortheuseofcashinpayments2BISPapersNo123–hasdeclinedinanumberofEMEs(CPMI(2021)).InChina,forexample,cashcouldloseitscentralroleinthenot-too-distantfuture.issuingCBDCbanksEachbarindicatesthenumberofcentralbanksthatchooseagivenmotivationasoneofitstopthreemotivations.SourceBISEMDGsurvey2.Againstthisbackdrop,aCBDCcouldserveasatangiblemarkerofthetrustinmoney,justascashdoestoday(BIS(2021)).Inthesamevein,centralbanksinChileandIndonesianotedthatCBDCscouldalsohelpcentralbanksmaintaintheirroleastheissueroftheunitofaccountandastheanchorofthemonetarysystem.TheReserveBankofIndianotedanotherpossiblemotivationforissuingaCBDC–potentialsavingsfromreducingcashincirculation.Savingscouldstemfromlowercostsrelatedtoprinting,transportingandstoringbanknotesandcoins.Thepotentialforsavingsisgreaterineconomieswherecashcirculationremainshigh.ionPromotingfinancialinclusionisanothercommonmotivation.ItisatopconsiderationforPeru,MexicoandSouthAfricaandoneofthemainconsiderationsformorethanhalfofallcentralbanks(Graph1).Financialinclusion,broadlydefined,meansthatindividualsandbusinessescanaccessandusefinancialservicesatalowcost.InclusionacrossEMEshasimprovedovertimebutisstilllowinsomeregions.Asof2017,almostathirdofadultsintheworldhadnobankaccount;thisnumberexceededahalfinAfricaandwascloseto40%inLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean.Financialexclusioncanstemfromfinancialmarketfeaturesaswellasbroaderstructuralfactors(Graph2,left-handpanel).Marketfeaturesincludelackofaccesspoints,insufficientICTinfrastructure,highcostsandtheprivatesector’sunwillingnesstoservesomesegmentsofthesociety(eginruralareas).Peru,forexample,stressedlimitedaccesstodigitalinfrastructureasabarriertoinclusion.Broaderstructuralfactorsincludefinancialordigitalilliteracy,lackoffundsandlimitedtrustinserviceproviders(Demirgü?-Kunt(2018)).Financialilliteracyisahurdleespeciallyinlow-BISPapersNo1233incomecountries(centrepanel)whileHungarystresseddigitalilliteracyasacriticalissueforfinancialinclusioninanincreasinglydigitalworld.Relatedly,thereare“digitaldivides”acrossincome,educationandagegroups,eitherbecauseoflackofaccessordifferencesinpreferenceforuseofdigitalproducts.Forexample,inPeru,thoseintheinformalsector–roughly70%oftheworkforce–prefertheanonymityofcash.Theuseofdigitalpaymentsbytheelderlyrelativetotheyoungisalsolowdespitefinancialaccountownershipthatiscomparablewiththatoftheyoung(right-handpanel).WhileCBDCsmightnotbeabletodirectlyovercomestructuralbarrierstoinclusion,theycanmitigatesomeofthemarketimperfectionsinhibitinginclusion.Forinstance,CBDCissuancecanprovideanopeninfrastructurethatlaysdown“rulesofthegame”forpaymentserviceproviders.Inturn,thiscouldpromoteeffectivecompetitionthroughinteroperabilityanddeliverbenefitstoconsumers(egUPIinIndia).PrivateplayerscoulddevelopserviceswithgreateraddedvaluethroughCBDCs.Inaddition,asapubliclyprovideddigitalpaymentservice,aCBDCcouldinspiregreatertrustandstrengthenfinancialengagement,especiallyamongthosereluctanttouseprivatedigitalpaymentservices.Moreover,CBDCscouldhelpcutthecostofpaymentservices(egalow-feestructure,suchasthatenvisionedbytheBankofRussiaforitsdigitalruble).Finally,CBDCscanfacilitatefiscalpolicyimplementation,suchastargeteddirecttransferstohouseholds.Thatsaid,CBDCs,bythemselves,mightnotdomuchtoincreasedepositsorencouragecreditprovision.efficiencyofdomesticpaymentsThepotentialofCBDCsasanewmeansofpaymentandtheattendantincreaseindiversityandcompetitioninpaymentservicesareatopmotivationforanumberofcentralbanks.TheCentralBankofBrazil,forexample,noteditsfocusontechnologytofosterinnovationandenhancefinancialmarketsefficiency.TheBankofRussiaandtheBankofThailand,meanwhile,indicatedCBDC’spotentialtobetterservecustomerneedsasakeyfactor.Paymentservicemarketsareoftenmarkedbyoligopoly.Thisisbecauseafewpaymentserviceproviders(PSPs)cangainandmaintainasubstantialmarketshareduetonetworkeffects(GowrisankaranandStavins(2004)).Concentratedmarketpowerhasseveralundesirableimplications.Oneisthehighcostofservices,asinthecaseofcreditcardnetworkproviders(egVisa,MasterCard,Amex);evenifcostsremainlowinitially(sayduetopredatorypricing),oligopolistsmayseekrentslateron.Anotherconcernisinformation-hoardinginanincreasinglydigitalisedworld,akinto“walledgardens”whereonlyafewplayershaveaccesstodetailedusertransactiondata(egAliPayandWeChatPayinChina,KakaoPayinKorea).TheintroductionofaCBDCasanalternativemeansofpaymentcanaffectthecompetitivestructureoftheunderlyingpaymentsystem.Dependingondesign,itcouldimprovecompetitionandreducecosts;itcouldalsohelpprevent“walledgardens”(BoxA).TheCentralBankofIsraelraisedonespecificpossibility–ineconomieswhereafunctioningpaymentecosystemalreadyexists,aCBDCcouldbenefitfromtheso-calledlate-moveradvantageandbuilduponthelatestinnovationswhileaddressingtheweaknessesofexistingservices.CBDCissuancecouldalsosupportnewdigitaltechnologiesandtheirintegrationwiththebroadereconomysuchasintegratedpaymentofelectricityandphonebillsviatheCBDCwallet.InBrazil,forexample,theDigitalRealprojectisshapingupasthemainelement4BISPapersNo123ofaplatformfor“smartpayments”wheretheDigitalRealsystemwouldconnectcurrentsourcesofliquiditytodigitalassetecosystems.ngcialinclusiononiteracyinlesscountriescountownershiptalpaymentsusagefallswithage1Lackofcreditcontractsandproceduressuitableforindividualsand/orfirmswitherraticand/orundocumentedcashflows.2FinancialEToolkitforMeasuringFinancialLiteracyandFinancialInclusionandthedataarefrom26economies.Sources:BISEMDG2022survey.OECD/INFE2020InternationalSurveyofAdultFinancialLiteracy.WorldBankGlobalFindexSurveys2011,2014,and2017;ADemirgü?-Kunt,LKlapper,DSinger,SAnsarandJHess.TheGlobalFindexDatabase2017:MeasuringfinancialinclusionandtheFintechrevolution,WorldBank,2018.SDoerr,JFrost,LGambacorta,HQiu,“Populationageingandthedigitaldivide”,SUERFPolicyNote22.BISPapersNo1235ernanceDatacollectedaspartoftheCBDCsystemandhowtheyaremanagedcanaffectconsumerprivacyaswellasthecompetitivenessofthenewdigitallandscape.SomelevelofidentificationiscrucialforCBDCdesign(BIS(2021)).Currentlypaymentsystemsrelyoneffectiveidentificationofusersforaccessandsystemintegrity;CBDCsarenodifferent.1supporttheformaleconomyandhelpimprovefinancialinclusion.SeveralcountrieshaveintroduceddigitalIDschemes,withspecificdesignsanddifferentrolesforthepublicandprivatesectors.InthePhilippines,forexample,thePhilippineIdentificationSystem(PhiSys)ActinAugust2018providesconsumerswithanationalIDandthusthemeanstoestablishaverifiabledigitalidentitythatenablesthemtoopenaccountsandparticipateinthefinancialsystemmoreeasily.OtherhavedifferentsetupsforeffectiveIDverification:inSweden,forexample,aconsortiumofbanksdevelopedtheBankIDSolutionunderapublic-privatepartnership.RegardlessofthestructureandtherelativeroleofthepublicandprivatesectorsinthedigitalIDsystem,akeyquestionistheprotectionofconsumerdata.Indeed,paymentsdata–egfromcreditcardusage,CBDCsorretailfastpaymentsystems(FPS)–arerevealingaboutconsumerbehaviourandpreferences.Consumerprivacyanddatagovernanceare,therefore,astheReserveBankofIndianoted,of“primeimportance”forthesuccessofaCDBC.CredibleprivacyanddatagovernanceframeworkscanengendergreatertrustinaCBDCandencourageitsparticipants,includingconsumers,financialserviceproviders,dataserviceprovidersandgovernmententities.Datamanagementwouldthusneedtobeinteroperableacrosstheseparticipants.Moreover,rulesrelatedtostorage,ownershipandsharing,aswellasthegovernancesystemwouldneedtobedefinedandestablished(TiwarietalGlobally,manycountrieshaveprivacylawsthatrecogniseanddefinetherightsindividualshaveovertheirdata.dataportabilityProtectionRegulationintroducedin2018).Moreconcretely,CBDCdesignscanallowforprivacybyseparatingpaymentservicesfromcontroloverthescouldallowanonymitywithrespecttospecificpartiessuchasPSPsbusinessesorpublicagencies.LikesomeFPS,CBDCscouldgiveuserscontrolovertheirpaymentsdata,whichtheyneedonlysharewithPSPsorthirdpartiesastheydecide(BIS(2021)).Forexample,withUPI,dataownershipandcontrolovertheircredentialsareaddressedthroughapplicationprogramminginterfaces(APIs)thatusepublickeycryptography.Foracrucial.Thus,dataandprivacymanagementchallengesunderCBDCsarenotnew.rnsrelatedtoCBDCissuanceAnumberofmacroeconomic,financialandoperationalconcernsareraisedbycentralbanksurveyrespondents(Graph3,left-handpanel).Akeyconcernrelatestogreateroperationalburdens–includingmaintainingsystemstabilityandcybersecurity,particularlyinanincreasinglydigitalisedsystemthatcallsfornewregulatoryandsupervisoryinitiativesforprivacyprotectionanddatamanagement(BoxA).AmajorityofsurveyrespondentsarealsoconcernedaboutthepossibilityofCBDCsstandardssuchasAPIsthatensuredataprivacy.6BISPapersNo123disintermediatingbanksandtheattendantimpactonfinancialstability;theseconcernsarerelevantespeciallyifthetake-upofCBDCsislarge.Atthesametime,centralbanksarealsoconcernedaboutpossiblelowuseradoption,suggestingsomedebateregardingthevalueaddedbyCBDCstoconsumersandbusinesses.ncernsrelatedtoCBDCissuancebanksConcernsrelatedtoCBDCissuance1nnelsandconsequencesofbankdisintermediation1Eachbarindicatesthenumberofcentralbanksthatchooseagivendownsideasoneofitstopthreeconcerns.2Eachbarindicatesthenumberofcentralbanksthatchooseagivenitemasoneofitstopfivelikelychannelsandimplicationsofpotentialbankdisintermediation.Sources:BISEMDG2022Survey;authors’calculations.alconcernsACBDCsystemmustbestable,robustandabletorecoverfromoperationaldisruptions.Itisequallyimportanttomitigateanyassociatedcreditandliquidityrisks.Suchdisruptionscouldalsohavereputationalcosts.LimitingtheseoperationalrisksisadominantconsiderationforEMEcentralbanks(Graph3,left-handpanel).Forinstance,theserisksmaterialisedon17January2022fortheEasternCaribbeanCentralBank(ECCB)whentransactionsusingDCash–thedigitalcurrencypilotschemefortheECCBlaunchedinMarch2021–wereinterruptedbyanoutageattheserviceprovider.Akeyoperationalchallengeistacklingcyberrisk.Cashhassophisticatedanti-counterfeitingfeaturesandhaslimitedexposuretolarge-scaleoperationalbreakdowns.Bycontrast,asuccessfulcyberattackonCBDCscouldcausewidespreadandseriousdamage.Attacksonthefinancialsystem,suchashacksintocreditcardsystemsordatabasescontainingconsumercreditprofiles,offeraglimpseofthethreatsinvolved.Defendingagainstsuchattacksisfarmoredifficultgiventhemultiplicityoflinkageswiththebroaderfinancialanddigitalecosystem.AnotherchallengeforcentralbanksistheoperationalburdenofmaintainingaCBDC.Thecentralbankssurveyedhighlightedseveralkeyissues,includingnetworkBISPapersNo237resilience,thesafety,costandavailabilityoftechnologiesaswellasthescalabilityandfunctionalityoftechnologiesconsidered(GraphA2,left-handpanel).Theoperationalcostofasystemwithsuchcomplexityishigh.Comparedwithadirectsystemwherecostsassociatedwithuser-facingactivitiesrestsquarelyonthecentralbank,atwo-tiersystem(seeBoxB)wouldreducetheoperationburdenoncentralbanksandthus,thecosttotheusers(BIS(2021)).TheHongKongMonetaryAuthority,forexample,hasnotedconsiderationsforthedivisionoflabourbetweenthecentralbankandprivatesectorintermediariesinitsCBDCdesign.sRoughlyhalfofsurveyrespondentsindicatedconcernsforbankdisintermediationundertranquilconditionsorduringcrisistimes.Thespecificdriversbehindbankdisintermediationdifferbetweentranquilandcrisistimes.Duringtranquiltimes,considerationssuchasrenumerationofCBDCs,andpossiblysafety,coulddrivebankdisintermediation.Thesafetyofanaccountatthecentralbankmightbeattractive,atleastforbalancesatcommercialbanksabovethedepositinsurancethreshold.EveniftherewerelimitsonindividualCBDCholdings,somereductionincommercialbankdepositscouldstillensue.Aninterest-bearingCBDCcouldreinforcesucheffects(egFernández-Villaverdeetal(2021),Aguretal(2021)).Anydisintermediationeffectislikelytobemoremarkedandabruptinacrisis,givenCBDCs’statusasasafehaven.Argentinahighlightedthisconcern.Specifically,CBDCscouldexacerbatearunonweakprivatebanks,asconsumersmovedepositstoCBDCsortostrongerbanks.2ThiseffectcouldbestrongerinEMEswithlessdevelopedbankingsectorsorwhereprivateinstitutionshaveaweakerreputationthanpublicones.3Thus,theconditions–tranquilorcrisistimes–underwhichCBDCsdisintermediatebankspresentdifficultpolicytrade-offsforcentralbank.4ACBDCcouldhastendisintermediationinacrisis,amplifyingtheliquiditystressonweakerbanks.Yet,constrainingCBDCs’convertibilitytocontrolvolatileflowsrunscountertothegoalofprovingasafemeansofpaymentpreciselywhenthatsafetyisvaluedmost.Ingeneral,depositdisintermediation,fromCBDC,stablecoinsorbigtechsinfinancialservices,forexample,caninduceaffectedbankstorelyonlessstablefundingsources,suchaswholesaleormoneymarkets.This,inturn,couldpotentiallyreducecreditprovisionfromaffectedbanksandraiseloanrates(Graph3,right-handpanel).Indeed,banks’fundingcosts–includingtheiraccesstodeposits–andtheirloanratesarehighlycorrelated.Notsurprisingly,amajorityofsurveyrespondentsindicatedconcernsabouttheimpactoncreditprovision(Graph4,left-handpanel).2Monnetetal(2021)useahistoricalFrenchepisodetoillustratetheroleofcentralbankmoneyinexacerbatingbankruns.3Theliterature’sverdictonthispossibility,however,isnotunanimous.Chiuetal(2019),forexample,arguethataCBDCcouldinjectgreaterdisciplineintobanksintheimperfectlycompetitivedepositmarket,andnotnecessarilydisintermediatebanks.Rather,banksmaycompeteawaytherents.IndeedasTablesuggestsroughlyhalfofcentralbankssurveyedareundecidedonCBDCrenumerationandamajorityareundecidedonthematterofimposinglimits.8BISPapersNo123Bankdisintermediation,ifsufficientlylargeandbroad-based,canaffectcentralbanks’balancesheetsandtheimplementationofmonetarypolicy.Infact,mostcentralbankrespondentsexpectCBDCstohavesomeimpactonmonetarypolicy(Graph4,right-handpanel).OnepossibilityisthatdepositflightstoCBDCsmightexpandcentralbankbalancesheets.Theseincreaseswouldraisethequestionofhowcapitalshouldflowbacktotherealeconomy–directlybythecentralbank,orviapublicsectororinvestmentbanks.TheBankofRussiaindicatedthatitcouldoffsetthepotentialliquiditydrainonthesystemviaadditionalrepooperations.MonetarypolicyimplicationswouldbegreaterifthecentralbankweretouseinterestratesontheCBDCasanotherpolicylever(egadualinterestratepolicyasdiscussedinLonerganandGreene(2020)).ArgentinaandThailandnotedthattyingretailCBDCremunerationtothecentralbank’spolicyratemightimprovetransmissiontotheinterestratesoffinancialinstitutions.Thatsaid,acrosscentralbanksrespondents,theappetiteforrenumeratedCBDCislow(Table1).ExpectedimpactoncreditcreationandmonetarypolicyGraph4toncreditprovisionentralbanksSourceBISEMDGsurvey2.tonmonetarypolicyentralbanksCBDCadoptionisdrivenbyitsusefulnesstoconsumersandmerchants.LowCBDCadoptioncouldhinderthepolicyobjectivescentralbankshopetoachieve.Inparticular,CBDCswouldneedtosatisfyunmetuserneedsforbroadadoption;thiswoulddependoncountry-specificconditions(GroupofCentralbanks(2021a)).Formanycentralbanks,CBDCsdonotoffersignificantadvantagesoverFPSintermsofboostingfinancialinclusion(GraphA2,right-handpanel);systemssuchasUPIorPIXcanconfermoreimmediateimprovements.InBrazil,forexample,45millionpeoplemadetheirfirsteverdigitaltransferviaPIXinitsfirstyearofoperation.Wheretherearesuccessfulimplementationsofnewpaymentservices–egM-PesainKenyaorSwishinSwitzerland–broadadoptioncamefromreducingfrictionsandprovidingincentivestailoredtothetargetedusers.M-Pesa,forexample,providedtheunbankedpopulationwithaccesstobasicbanking-likefacilitiesviaSMSservicesandiscurrentlyusedby95%ofthepopulation.BISPapersNo239Formerchantsandbanks,thegainsfromCBDCscouldcomefromamoreefficientpaymentsystem.Forexample,aCBDCcouldlaythegroundforaninternationalsystemofCBDCs,suchasthemultiplecurrencyCBDCbridge(“mCBDC”)thatcouldhelpbroadenabankoramerchant’sreach.SouthAfrica,forexample,isexploringamulticurrencyregionalsettlementsysteminamultilateral,multicurrencyCBDCarrangement.BoxBelementsAsinthecaseofcash(aphysicalliability)andreserves(adigitalliability),thedesignofCBDCsentailsseveralchoices.TherearetwotypesofCBDC:oneisuniversallyaccessibletothegeneralpublic(likecash)–iearetailorgeneralpurposeCBDC;theotherisavailableonlytoselectinstitutions(likereserves)–ieawholesaleCBDC(seeGraphA,lefthandpanelReserveshavebeendigitalforalongtime–awholesaleCBDCdiffersinthatitmaybeaccessibletoawidersetofcounterpartiesthanreserves,beinteroperablewithforeignsystems,orfeature“smartcontracts”(egyamajorityofEMEsareinvestigatingbothretailandwholesaleCBDCs,whileaboutathirdarefocusingonlyontheretailversion(right-handpanel).AbigquestiononCBDCs:retail,wholesale,orboth?GraphAtalcentralbankmoneySourcesBISAnnualEconomicReport2021,Chapter3;BISEMDG2022AmajorityofcentralbanksenvisionbothretailandsaleCBDCsentralbankssurvey.ThedesignofaretailorwholesaleCBDChasmanyfacets.Centralbanks’surveyresponsesandbackgroundresasbeingthemoreimportantonesinnoparticularorderFirstisthedegreeofinteroperabilitywiththedomesticpaymentsystemorwithcross-borderones.Asecondchoiceistheiswhetherthereareconstraintsonthetransactionamount,ontheoutstandingbalance,onforeignusers,orusageusesadistributedledgertechnologyDLT),whichcanbepermissionlessorpermissioned,oracentralledgertechnology(CLT).BISPapersNo123concernstoCBDCdesignCentralbanksfacetrade-offsinCBDCdesign.Asdiscussedabove,CBDCissuancecanadvancepolicyobjectivesbutalsohaveundesirableeffects.Atthesametime,howtheseeffectscanplayoutremainsuncertain–due,forexample,totheemergenceofnewtechnologies,novelusecasesandbroaderrisks–makingtheirdesignanalogoustoa“moonlanding”,accordingtoMagyarNemzetiBank(Hungary).andconcernstoictionfordesignfeaturesferencesTable1Two-pecificlericyCLTWholesample0.900.900.790.270.620.440.77TopthreemotivationsTopthreeconcernsationationalconcernsn1Foreachcentralbankanddesignfeature,a”yes”issetto1,a”no”issetto0,and”notsure”or“noanswer”issetto0.5.TheeofadesignisthencalculatedastheaveragechoiceacrosscentralbanksThescoreislabelledwithdifferentcoloursred0.34)meanscentralbanksareonaverage“against”thedesignfeature,yellow(0.34-0.67)meanstheyare“uncertain”,andgreennksrowstwotosevenshowncentralbankstopmotivationorconcernOperationalconcernsincludeoperationalburdenaswellascyberrisks.Sources:BISEMDGsurvey2022;authors’calculations.Centralbanksurveyresponsesandbackgroundpapersshedlightonthesixmaindesignfeatures(BoxB)thatcanhelpsatisfyCBDCissuancemotivationswhilemitigatingtheattendantconcerns.InTable1,wereportcentralbanks’stanceonthesedesignfeatures.Thestanceofcentralbanksregardingeachdesignfeatureisobtainedusinganintuitivescoringsystemthatgoesfrom0to1.Alowvalue(red)meansthatcentralbanksareonaverage“against”thedesignfeature;anintermediateone(yellow)meanstheyare“uncertain”;andahighvaluecloseto1(green)shows“support”forthedesign.Forexample,avalueof0.27inthefirstrowthirdcolumnmeansthatcentralbanksaregenerallyagainstaCBDCthat“bearsinterest”.Avalueof0.44inthefirstrowofthesecond-to-lastcolumnmeansthatcentralbanksareuncertainregardinga“CBDC-specificdatapolicy”.Bycontrast,avalueof0.77inthefirstrowofthelastcolumnsuggeststhatcentralbanksare,onaverage,interestedinbothDLTandCLTarchitectures.TherowsinTable1areorganisedasfollows.Thefirstrowshowstheaveragestanceacrossallparticipatingcentralbanks.Thenextthreerowsrespectivelyshowthestancewithinthethr