兩個(gè)英文原版案例

Whitakerv.Whitaker,52N.Y.368;MatterofWilburv.EstateofWarren,104N.Y.192;1Clark,NewYorkLawofContracts,p.517,n.46).Itappearsdehors（在…之外）thepleadings（答辯狀）,thattheintiffisnotaresidentofNewYork,butofPennsylvaniaAnyrightswhichshemighthavehad,ifshehadbeenaresident,undersection101oftheSocialWelfareLawarethereforenotgermanetoaconsiderationofthiscase(also,cf.MatterofSalm,171Misc.367,371).Asintiffdoesnot,uponanysuggestedtheory,haveagoodcauseofactionagainstthedefendant,thecomintshouldbedismissedwithoutleavetopleadover.“愛和慈愛”為什么不能成為對(duì)價(jià)？列舉了哪些例外Calboun在Calboun案中，說：“愛和慈愛本身或道德上的義務(wù)即構(gòu)成足夠的對(duì)本案為什么不能依紐約州的社會(huì)福利法主張其權(quán)利。，在Hammerv.Sindway，124N.Y.538（1891）案中，的叔叔在年滿15歲時(shí)對(duì)他說，如果在年滿21歲之前不喝酒、不抽煙、不．也不賭博，就可以從他叔叔那里得到5000。后來，果真按他叔叔的要求去做了對(duì)其行為的克制構(gòu)成了叔叔諾言的對(duì)價(jià)。你認(rèn)為本案與Hamer案的有嗎？。，Schoenungv.206Wis.52,238N.W.852Wis.ActionbyLeoSchoenung,byhisguardianadlitem,againstHelenGallet,asadministratrixoftheestateofRobertH.Hippe,deceased.Judgmentfordefendant,andintiffappeals.Reversedandremanded,withdirections.該案例來自、《國際商法教學(xué)案例（英文）選編，法律2007版，第313頁intiff,whileaminor,commencedthisactiononMarch13,1930,torecoverpossessionofanautoandhispromissorynotefor$250,whichhehaddeliveredtodefendantinexchangeforanotherauto ,iffappealedfromajudgmententeredMarch6,1931,dismissinghisOnApril15,1929,intiff,aminor,nineteenyearsofage,purchasedfromdefendantanautofor$300,forwhichhegavehisjudgmentnotefor$250andanauto,whichdefendantacceptedintradeatavaluationof$50.Atthattimeintiffwasanemancipated（脫離監(jiān)護(hù)的）minorlivingwithhisparentsonafarm,whichwasthree fromthecitywherehewasemployedat$75permonthinanimplementbusiness.Hisbrotherwasapartownerofthatbusiness,andintiffusuallydrovewithhimtoandfromwork.Hehadbeenworkingforseveralyears,andhadbeenpermittedtokeephisearnings,whichhehadusedtoprovidehisnecessariesandtopayfortwocheaperautos.UptoJune6,1929,hehaddriventheauto,whichhehadpurchasedonApril15,1929,fromsixhundredtoonethousandonpleasuretrips,andhaduseditoccasionallyingoingtoorfromhiswork.Onseveraloccasionshehadleftitatdefendant'sgarageforadjustmentsandrepairsforwhichnochargesweremade.OnJune6,1929,herestoredtheautotodefendantbyleavingitatdefendant'sgarage,andhedemandedthereturnofhisnoteandhisformerauto.Defendantrefusedtoacceptthereturnedautoandtheoftitlethereto,andalsorefusedtoreturnintiff'snoteandhisformerauto,whichdefendanthadsoldandwhichhadbeenwrecked.Later,onJune6,defendantremovedtheauto,whichintiffhadreturned,fromdefendant'sgaragetothepublicstreetinfrontofintiff'sceofemployment.Atrafficofficerorderedintifftoremoveitfromthestreet,andintiffthentookittohisfather'sfarm,whereithasremained.Sincethenintiffofferedittodefendantseveraltimes,butdefendantrefusedtoacceptit.Thetermsofthepurchasewerefairandreasonable,andtherewasnothingwrongwiththeautowhenintiffreturneditonJune6.Thelowercourtconcludedthattheautowasnecessarytointifftocarryonhisbusinessandemployment;thathewasanemancipatedminorandliableonhiscontract;andthathewasnotentitledtorescissionandtorecoverhisnoteandformerFRITZ,Thatintiffwasanemancipatedminorwasimmaterialasamatteroflawinthisaction.Emancipationdoesnotremoveoraffectaminor'sincapacitytosubjecthimselftocontractualliabilityforthingswhicharenotnecessaries.Consequently,intifflackedcapacitytocontractforthepurchaseofthisauto,unlessitwasanecessaryforhimundertheparticularfactsandcircumstancesofthiscase.In31C.J.1077,§175,itissaid:“Theterm‘necessaries,’asusedinthelawrelatingtotheliabilityofinfantstherefor,isarelativeterm,somewhatflexible,exceptwhenappliedtosuchthingsasareobviouslyrequisiteforthemaintenanceofexistence,anddependsonthesocialpositionandsituationinlifeoftheinfant,aswellasuponhisownfortuneandthatofhisparents.Theparticularinfantmusthaveanactualneedforthearticlesfurnished;notformereornament（裝飾）orpleasure.Thearticlesmustbeusefulandsuitable,buttheyarenotnecessariesmerelybecauseusefulorbeneficial.Concerningthegeneralcharacterofthethingsfurnished,tobenecessariesthearticlesmustsupplytheinfant's alneeds,eitherthoseofhisbody,orthoseofhismind.However,theterm‘necessaries'isnotconfinedtomerelysuchthingsasarerequiredforabaresubsistence（最低限度生活費(fèi)）.Thereisnopositiverulebymeansofwhichitmaybedeterminedwhatareorwhatarenotnecessaries,forwhatmaybeconsiderednecessaryforoneinfantmaynotbenecessariesforanotherinfantwhosestateisdifferentastorank,socialposition,fortune,health,orothercircumstances,thequestionbeingonetobedeterminedfromtheparticularfactsandcircumstancesofeachcase.”InCovaultv.Nevitt,157Wis.113,146N.W.1115,1117,51L.R.A.(N.S.)Ann.Cas.1916A,959,thequestionaroseastowhetheraminorwhoownedrealestatecouldcontractfortheemploymentofajanitor.Thiscourtsaid:“Itisclearthatintheinstantcasetheallegedcontractcouldonlybesustained,ifatall,uponthegroundthatitwasacontractfornecessaries;anditisequallyclearthatsuchacontractisnotacontractfornecessaries.22Cyc.584,585;HollingsworthonContracts,p.31;16Am.&Eng.Ency.ofLaw(2dEd.)276.Thegeneralrulerespectingnecessariesisthattheymustbesuchastosupplythe alneedsoftheinfant.Manifestlythecontractinthiscaseisnotacontractfornecessariesunderwhichaliabilitycouldbeendnorforthebenefitoftheinfant.”InWallacev.NewdaleFurnitureCo.,188Wis.205,205N.W.819,820,aminorsoughttorecovermoneywhichshehadpaidaspartofthepurchasepriceforwhichsheusedforkeeroomers,andthenreturnedduringherminoritytothedefendant.Thiscourtsaid:“Ithasnotbeencontendedbycounselfortheappellantthatthearticlespurchasedbytheintiffwerenecessaries,andthatshecouldnotrescindforthatreason,norwouldtheargumentbesoundifmade.Thefactthataminorengagesinbusinessdoesnotremovetheincapacitytomakegeneralcontracts,and,intheabsenceofstatutes,purchasesmadeintradecannotberegardedasnecessaries.”Althoughconditionsandcircumstancesmayexistbecauseofwhichanautomaybeconsideredanecessaryforaminor,ithasthusfarbeenheldthatamotorvehicleisnotanecessaryandthathiscontractforthepurchasethereofisvoidable.Inthecaseatbaranautowasnotnecessaryforthe aluseorsupportofintiff.Themerefactthathisceofemploymentwasthree fromthehomeofhisparents,withwhomheresided,didnotnecessitatehisownershipofanauto.Thatisparticularlytrueinthiscase,becausehisbrother'sauto wasavailableforintifftotraveltoandfromhisceofemployment.Likewise,inasmuchashelackedcapacitytocontractforanautoforuseinabusinessofhisown,hewasalsothusincapacitatedtocontractforanautowhichhemightoccasionallyhaveuseforinperforminghisworkforhisemployer.Itfollowsthatwhenintiff,duringhisminority,restoredthatautoandtheoftitletothedefendant,hewasentitledtothereturnofhisnoteandhisformerauto,orthevaluethereof.Judgmentreversed,andcauseremanded,withdirectionstoenterjudgmentfortherecoverybyintiffofthesumof$50,withinterestfromJune6,1929,andthesurrenderforcancellationofintiff'snotefor$250,datedApril15,1929.未成年人為什么要就生活必需品的合同承擔(dān)責(zé)任？中國法律中有沒有類似的規(guī)定？《民法通則》第12條規(guī)定：“不能完全辨認(rèn)自己行為的精神在Covault案《選編（英文》p.315，段1）中，為什么認(rèn)為，未成年雇用一個(gè)“看門人”不是為了獲得生活必需品？（說：Thegeneralrulerespectingnecessariesisthattheymustbesuchastosupply alneedsofinfant.即，生活必需品僅限于個(gè)人使用ofthepurchasepriceforfurniture,whichsheusedforkeeroomers）中《選編（英文》p.315，段2）中，為什么認(rèn)為，該未成年人的家具不是生活必需品？（Thefactthataminorengagesinbusinessdoesnotremovetheincapacitytomakegeneralcontracts,and,intheabsenceofstatutes,purchases