Chatham House-法國、德國和英國的戰(zhàn)略議程（英文）-2021.4正式版

Research

Paper

EuropeProgrammeApril2021

TowardsastrategicagendafortheE3

OpportunitiesandrisksforFrance,GermanyandtheUK

AliceBillon-GallandandRichardG.Whitman

ChathamHouse,theRoyalInstituteofInternationalAffairs,isaworld-leadingpolicyinstitutebasedinLondon.Ourmissionistohelpgovernmentsandsocietiesbuildasustainablysecure,prosperousandjustworld.

TowardsastrategicagendafortheE3

OpportunitiesandrisksforFrance,GermanyandtheUK

Summary

—BeginningwiththeIrannucleardialogue,France,GermanyandtheUKhaveusedtheE3formatforeffectivetrilateralcooperationonagrowingrangeofissuesinrecentyears.Intoday’schallengingstrategicenvironment,therearepotentiallyfurtheropportunitiesforEurope’s‘bigthree’tocooperate.ButtheendoftheBrexittransitionperiodmeansthatthethreecountriesnowoperateinadifferentcontextinwhichtheirobjectives,prioritiesandconstraintsarelessaligned.ThismakesitchallengingtodevelopastrategicagendafortheE3.

—TheE3formatcannotresolvetheissueoftheUK’sstatusoutsidetheEUandthelackofanEU–UKagreementonforeignpolicy,securityanddefence.FranceandGermanyaremorecomfortableusingtheformattocooperatewiththeUKonissueswhereEUpolicyiseitherabsentorfragmentary,orwheretheyseetheUKasanindispensablepartner.WhileLondonislookingforflexiblewaysofengagingwithParisandBerlin,itisalsodevelopingnewavenues

foraddressinginternationalsecurityissues.

—AllthreecountrieswanttomaintaintheE3’scrisismanagementaspects,

aswellasthoserelatedtotheJointComprehensivePlanofAction(JCPOA)onIran’snuclearprogramme.ButallseerisksinfurtherbroadeninganddeepeningE3cooperation:ParisandBerlinworrythatitcouldundermineEUcohesion,LondonthatitcouldbringtheUKintoundesiredalignmentwiththeEU.

—Theformathasgreatestutilityasameansofcoordinatingpolicies,especiallyonemergenttopicsandevolvingcrises.ThereisparticularvalueintheE3functioningasakindof‘workingpractice’arrangementthatcanfacilitateconsultation,coordinationandaction.

—TheE3hasapotentiallyimportantroleindealingwithdiplomaticandsecurityissuesbeyondEurope,althoughitcouldstillbeusedforinformalconsultationsacrosstheboard.Butratherthanaimingatwiderpolicyalignment,France,GermanyandtheUKaremorelikelytobeabletodevelopasharedstrategicagendabyidentifyingspecificproblemswhichtheyneedtosolvetogether.

—AkeychallengefortheE3hasalwaysbeenhowtoincludeotherEUmemberstatesandtheEUitself.Thislegitimacyproblemhasbecomemoreacutepost-Brexit.Onewaytosolveitwouldbeto‘buildout’theE3onacase-by-casebasis.Moreover,theBidenadministration’sreinvigorationofEuro-Atlantic‘Quad’consultationsthatbringtogetherFrance,Germany,theUKandtheUSdemonstratesacentralandincreasingrolefortheE3intransatlanticsecuritydialogue.

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TowardsastrategicagendafortheE3

OpportunitiesandrisksforFrance,GermanyandtheUK

Introduction

TheE3formathasitsorigininthe2003initiativeofFrance,GermanyandtheUKtoembarkoncollectivenegotiationswithIranoveritsnuclearreprocessingandenrichmentactivities.TheE3subsequentlydevelopedtoaccommodatetheevolutionofdiplomacywithIrantohaltthecountry’sdevelopmentofanuclearweaponsprogramme.1From2004,theE3+EUformatextendedparticipationtotheEUhighrepresentativeforforeignaffairsandsecuritypolicy,connectingEUforeignpolicyandtheotherEUmemberstatestoIraniannucleardiplomacy.SinceJuly2015,theE3hasremainedintegraltoimplementationofthe2015JointComprehensivePlanofAction(JCPOA),agreedbetweentheP5+1(thepermanentmembersoftheUNSecurityCouncilplusGermany)andIran.

Overtheyears,diplomaticcoordinationbetweenFrance,GermanyandtheUKintheE3formathasbroadenedbeyondtheJCPOAtoaddressotherinternationalsecurityissues.Thishasgenerallytakenplaceonanadhocbasisandthroughjointdeclarations.IssuesintheMiddleEasthavebeenanotableareaofE3collaboration(forexample,theconflictinSyria,theeventsintheGolanHeightsandthekillingoftheSaudijournalistJamalKhashoggi).2Otherissueshaveincludedfreedom

ofnavigationintheSouthChinaSeaandinstabilityintheSahel.3However,theUK’swithdrawalfromtheEUmeansthattheE3nowexistsin

adifferentcontextfromthatoftheearly2000s.ItnolongerbringstogethertheEU’s‘bigthree’players,nordoesitactasavanguardforforeignpolicyinitiativesthatcanbepresentedtotheothermemberstates.ThedecisionoftheBritishgovernmentnottopursueanagreementoncooperationonforeign,securityanddefencepolicywithintheDecember2020EU–UKTradeandCooperationAgreementalsomeansthatthereiscurrentlynoformalrelationshipinthisareabetweenLondonandBrussels.Consequently,alongsideNATO’sNorthAtlanticCouncilandbilateral/minilateralcooperation,theE3providesanimportantformatforregularforeignandsecuritypolicyconsultationsbetweenEurope’skeydiplomaticplayers.

ThisresearchpaperexplorestheopportunitiesandchallengesforcontinuingcooperationintheE3format,aswellastheprospectsforasharedstrategicagendaforFrance,GermanyandtheUKinthisnewcontext.4ItexamineswhethertheE3

1Forcomprehensiveexaminationsoftheoriginsof,andpost-Brexitissuesrelatingto,E3cooperation,seeBillon-Galland,A.,Raines,T.andWhitman,R.(2020),TheFutureoftheE3,ResearchPaper,London:RoyalInstituteofInternationalAffairs,

/2020/07/future-e3;

andBrattberg,E.(2020),TheE3,theEU,andthePost-BrexitDiplomaticLandscape,Washington,DC:CarnegieEndowmentforInternationalPeace,

/2020/06/18/e3-eu-and-post-brexit-diplomatic-landscape-pub-82095.

2SeeUKGovernment(2018),‘JamalKhashoggi’sdeath:jointstatementbyUK,FranceandGermanyforeignministers’,pressrelease,21October2018,

.uk/government/news/joint-uk-france-and-germany-

statement-on-jamal-khashoggis-death;

andUKGovernment(2021),‘AttackonAbhaInternationalAirport,SaudiArabia:E3statement’,pressrelease,11February2021,

.uk/government/news/e3-statement-

on-attack-on-abha-international-airport-saudi-arabia.

3UKGovernment(2019),‘E3jointstatementonthesituationintheSouthChinaSea’,pressrelease,

29August2019,

.uk/government/news/e3-joint-statement-on-the-situation-in-the-south-china-

sea;

andDeutscheWelle(2020),‘Germany,France,BritaintokeeptroopsinMalidespitecoup’,21August2020,

/en/germany-france-britain-to-keep-troops-in-mali-despite-coup/a-54652002.

4ThisresearchpaperisbasedonpriorworkontheE3conductedin2019–20bytheauthorsandaformercolleague,ThomasRaines.SeeBillon-Galland,RainesandWhitman(2020),TheFutureoftheE3.Itisalsobasedonfurtherresearchandaclosed-doorworkshopforBritish,FrenchandGermanpolicymakersandexpertsconvenedbyChathamHouse/theauthorson27January2021aspartofajointChathamHouse–IFRI–DGAPproject(see‘Aboutthisproject’)supportedbytheHannsSeidelFoundation.

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TowardsastrategicagendafortheE3

OpportunitiesandrisksforFrance,GermanyandtheUK

mightberepurposedinamannerthatboth(a)addressestheconcernsofFranceandGermanytoensurethatcooperationwiththeUKdoesnotunderminetheEU,and(b)keepsLondonconnectedtodecision-makingonsharedEuropeanforeignandsecurityconcernsandactionsinamutuallybeneficialway.Theauthorsarguethatapragmatic,issue-orientedapproachshouldbeadoptedtowardsfuture

E3cooperation.Thiswouldinvolvesettingambitiousyetrealisticobjectivesfortheextentofcollectiveactionbythethreecountries.Itwouldalsorecognizethepoliticallimitsoncooperationintheformat,aswellasthecrucialneedforcontinuedtrilateralengagement.

AnewcontextforE3cooperation

E3cooperationonIrangainedacceptancefromotherEUmemberstatesthankstoitssuccessfulcontributiontothedevelopmentofacollectiveEUpositiononanissueofcommonconcerntobothEuropeansandAmericans.ThisnucleardiplomacyallowedforasharedsenseofpurposetobemaintainedeveninthedifficulttransatlanticpoliticalcontextduringthepresidencyofDonaldTrumpintheUS,andduringthenegotiationsontheUK’swithdrawalfromtheEU.

However,thesharedapproachtoworkingtogetherintheE3topreservetheJCPOAinthefaceofthechallengeposedbytheTrumpadministrationdidnotalterthefactthattherelationshipbetweenFrance,GermanyandtheUKhadfundamentallychangedbecauseofBrexit.WithallitsunresolvedpointsoftensionaspartoftheambiguousnewEU–UKrelationship,Brexitcontinuestocontributetoadrasticallychangingpoliticalandstrategicenvironment.ItalsoraisesthepossibilityofEU–UKdisputesspillingoverintotheE3relationship.

Paradoxically,theUK’sexitfromtheEUmakesE3cooperationsimultaneouslymorenecessaryandmoredifficult.

Intheabsenceofprovisionsforforeign,securityanddefencepolicycooperationintheEU–UKTradeandCooperationAgreement,theE3providesanobviouswayforFranceandGermanytoworkwiththeUK.YetafearthatthismightunderminetheEUalsolimitsFranco-GermanwillingnesstousetheE3,andcircumscribestheagendaoftopicsfordiscussionwithintheformat.Paradoxically,theUK’sexitfromtheEUmakesE3cooperationsimultaneouslymorenecessaryandmoredifficult.5

Meanwhile,theEUhasbecomemorecommittedtodevelopinggreatercollectivecapacityforactionthroughtheagendafor‘Europeansovereignty’or‘strategicautonomy’.AlreadyunderthepreviousEuropeanCommission(2014–19)therewasanambitionfortheEUtobecomeastrongeractorinforeignandsecuritypolicy.ThishasbeenreinforcedbytheobjectiveofPresidentUrsulavonderLeyen

5Billon-Galland,A.andWhitman,R.(2020),‘E3CooperationBeyondBrexit:ChallengingbutNecessary’,ChathamHouseExpertComment,2September2020,

/2020/09/e3-

cooperation-beyond-brexit-challenging-necessary.

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TowardsastrategicagendafortheE3

OpportunitiesandrisksforFrance,GermanyandtheUK

tomaketheEuropeanCommissionmore‘geopolitical’,withitsfocusincreasinglyextendingtotopicsrelatedtocriticalinfrastructureandsupplychaindependenciessincethestartoftheCOVID-19pandemic.6Thedevelopmentofanenhanced

EUforeign,securityanddefencepolicyisnot,however,aforegoneconclusion.Consensusanddecision-makingarestilldifficult,ashighlightedbytherecentdebatesontheneedforqualifiedmajorityvoting.TherehasalsobeencriticismoftheEU’sforeignpolicyperformanceinrecentmonthsunderHighRepresentative/Vice-PresidentJosepBorrell,andthishasledtosomefurtherdisenchantmentwiththeEU’scollectivediplomacyinParis,Berlinandbeyond.7

TheJoeBidenadministrationhasalreadyreinvigoratedtheUSrelationshipwiththeE3throughanincreasednumberofmeetingsoftheEuro-Atlantic‘Quad’–whichbringstogetherFrance,Germany,theUKandtheUS.Thesemeetingshavecoveredarangeofissues,buthaveespeciallyfocusedonchangingthetoneofengagementontheIrannuclearissue.8TheQuadformathasexistedforyearsasameansofconsultingondifficultdefenceissueswithinabroaderNATOcontext.AfterapauseduringtheTrumpadministration,thereisnowarenewedrationaleanddesireforQuaddiscussionsonissuesrelatingtotransatlanticsecurity,aswellasontopicsforwhichtheUSisakeypartnerforEurope,suchasarmscontrol,China,UkraineandRussia.9This‘newtransatlanticism’hasbeenwelcomedinFrance,GermanyandtheUK.10YetuseoftheQuadhasalreadycreatedanewclimatewhichwilllikelyimpactthebroaderE3agenda,andwhichmayweakentheE3’saddedvalueincertaincases,asdiscussedinmoredetailbelow(see‘?‘Buildingout’E3cooperation’).

Finally,acertaindesynchronizationofthepoliticalagendaintheE3countriescouldprovechallenging.WhiletheUKhasendeditsBrexittransitionperiod,haspublisheditsIntegratedReviewofSecurity,Defence,DevelopmentandForeignPolicy,11andiseagertolookoutwards,attentioninBerlinandPariswillincreasinglyturninwardsoverthecomingmonthsasGermanygetsreadyforfederalelections(andtheendoftheAngelaMerkelera)laterthisyearandasFrancepreparesforapresidentialelection–andforitsstintinthePresidencyoftheCounciloftheEU–in2022.

6Tamma,P.(2020),‘Europewants‘strategicautonomy’-itjusthastodecidewhatthatmeans’,Politico,

15October2020,

https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-trade-wants-strategic-autonomy-decide-what-means.

7Karnitschnig,M.(2021),‘EUforeignpolicyRIP’,Politico,13February2021,

https://www.politico.eu/article/

eu-foreign-policy-rip.

8UKGovernment(2021),‘Iranandotherinternationalissues:statementfromE3andtheUnitedStates,February2021’,pressrelease,18February2021,

‘.uk/government/news/statement-by-the-foreign-

ministers-of-france-germany-the-united-kingdom-and-the-united-states-of-america.

9SeeWhiteHouse(2021),‘StatementbyNSCSpokespersonEmilyThorneonNationalSecurityAdvisorJakeSullivan’sCallwithCounterpartsfromFrance,Germany,andtheUnitedKingdom’,pressrelease,

16March2021,

/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/16/statement-

by-nsc-spokesperson-emily-horne-on-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivans-call-with-counterparts-from-

france-germany-and-the-united-kingdom;

andAusw?rtigesAmt(2021),‘WorkmeetingofFrance,UK,USandGermanyonthevergeoftoday’sNATOmeeting’,Tweet,23March2021,

/AuswaertigesAmt/

status/1374461807394316289.

10Billon-Galland,RainesandWhitman(2020),TheFutureoftheE3,p.11.

11UKGovernment(2021),GlobalBritaininacompetitiveage:TheIntegratedReviewofSecurity,Defence,DevelopmentandForeignPolicy,policypaper,

.uk/government/publications/global-britain-

in-a-competitive-age-the-integrated-review-of-security-defence-development-and-foreign-policy.

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OpportunitiesandrisksforFrance,GermanyandtheUK

PerspectivesfromBerlin,ParisandLondon

ThelogicforE3cooperationoninternationalsecurityisbasedonbringingtogetherEurope’sstrongestdiplomaticandmostmilitary-capablestates.However,thepoliticalrationaleandambitionsofeachofthethreecountriesaredistinctive,andtheirrespectivebilateralrelationshipsonsecurityanddefencedifferinscale,scopeandambition.

Overall,FranceandGermanyarecloselyalignedintheirassessmentthatthecurrentstateofEU–UKrelationslimitstheagendaforjointactionandimpedesahigherprofilefortheE3.Despitedifferencesofinterpretationofconceptssuchas‘Europeanstrategicautonomy’,bothcountrieswanttoseeastrongerEUintheworld.FranceandGermanyalsowantandneedtokeepacloseworkingrelationshipwiththeUK,buttheycannotaffordtodosoatthecostofEUunity.LondonsimilarlyacknowledgesthatitsinterestliesinmaintainingclosechannelsofcooperationwithitstwokeyEuropeanpartners.However,italsorecognizesthatotherEuropeaninterlocutors(forexample,ItalyandPoland)arereticentabouttheuseoftheE3formatbeyondJCPOAdiplomacyandcrisismanagement.ThisimpactstheUKgovernment’swillingnesstousetheformat,astheUKalsoneedstomanageitsrelationshipswithotherEUcountriesbeyondtheE3.

GermanyisparticularlyconsciousofthedangerofunderminingtheEU.ItseesitsroleasbeingadefenderofsmallmemberstatesandguarantorofEUunity,anditthereforefavoursinstitutionalizedmultilateralismoverlooseintergovernmentalism.However,BerlindemonstratesrealismbyusingformatssuchastheE3incaseswhenrelyingontheEUwouldleadeithertoinactionortoGermanybeingsidelinedfromimportantFranco-Britishdiscussions,particularlyastheGermany–UKrelationshipiscurrentlytheleastdevelopedsideofthetriangle.Germany’sshort-tomedium-termgoalremainstoachievestructuralcooperationbetweentheUKandtheEUasawholeonforeignandsecurityissues.ThevalueofwiderE3cooperationforBerlinisasawaytokeepopenanimportantlineofcommunicationwithLondonforurgentmatters;however,GermanydoesnotwanttheformattobecomeameansfortheUKtobypasstheEU.

InFrance,theE3isviewedaspartofabroadersetofflexibleintergovernmentalarrangementsthathavealowlevelofinstitutionalization.TheseincludetheEuropeanInterventionInitiative(E2I),aFrench-leddefencecooperationframeworkthatbringstogetheradozen‘willingandable’Europeancountries(includingGermanyandtheUK).12Suchsmallgroupsandintergovernmentalcooperationareconsideredascatalystsforstrengtheningresult-orientedmultilateralism.ThereisthusapragmaticapproachtoE3cooperation,whichprovidesFrancewithanothertoolforagilepolicymakingandefficientdecision-making.TheE3alsoaddstothestrongbilateralrelationshipsthatFrancehaswithGermanyandtheUKrespectively.Nevertheless,justasinBerlin,theviewinParisisthattherearelimitstowhatcanbeachievedinanon-institutionalizedformat.FrancethereforedrawsaclearlinebetweenE3cooperationandEU

12FrenchMinistryoftheArmedForces(2020),‘EuropeanInterventionInitiative’,17April2021,

https://www.defense.gouv.fr/english/dgris/international-action/l-iei/l-initiative-europeenne-d-intervention.

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OpportunitiesandrisksforFrance,GermanyandtheUK

foreign,securityanddefencepolicymaking,arguingthattheformershouldnotaimtoestablishjointpositionsoradistinctapproachontopicsonwhichthereisanexistingEUpolicypositionoraFrenchambitiontoreachone.

TheUK’sperspectiveissomewhatsimilartoFrance’s.Thegovernmenthasaclearappetiteforflexible,strategiccooperationwithFranceandGermany–particularlyinthepost-Brexitcontext–butwithinaspecificsetofconstraints(thoughthesearedistinctfromthoseaffectingGermanyandFrance).TheIntegratedReviewmakesonlyonereferencetotheE3,intheparagraphonGermany,whichindicatesthatLondonperceivestheformatasapossiblevehicleforstrengtheningthebilateralrelationshiptoo.TheE3isnotcurrentlypushedpubliclyinanyofthecapitalsasamajorvehicleforpursuingEuropeanforeignandsecuritypolicypositions,althoughthereisclearinterestinexploringitspotential.FromLondon’sperspective,theE3shouldnotoperateasamechanismforbringingtheUKintoalignmentwithEUforeignandsecuritypolicies,norasacaucusfordeveloping

aEuropeanperspectivewhichcouldbepresentedtotheUSorleveragedtobypassAmericanpolicy.ForgingaEuropeancapacityisseenashavingvaluemostlyifthisprovidesutilitytothetransatlanticrelationship.WiththeBidenadministrationeagertorevitalizetransatlanticrelations,theUKhasexpressedaclearinterestin–andapreferencefor–workingintheQuadformat,asPrimeMinisterBorisJohnsonmadeclearinhisspeechattheMunichSecurityConferenceinFebruary2021.13

Atthemoment,FranceandGermanyagreeontheneedtofindabalancebetweentherisksandopportunitiesassociatedwithworkingwiththeUKintheE3format,whilekeepinganeyeontheextenttowhichtheUKmaywishtoprivilegeworkingthroughothergroupings,suchastheFiveEyeswithAustralia,Canada,NewZealandandtheUS.FranceandGermanyarealsowaitingfortheUKtosettleintoanew,post-BrexitforeignpolicyandtomakeitsEuropepolicyclearer.TheIntegratedReviewdoesnotprovideafull-fledgedEuropeanstrategyfortheUKbeyondthecommitmenttoEuropeansecurityviaNATOandsomekeybilateralrelationships.14Thereviewrecognizes‘theimportantroleplayedbytheEUinthepeaceandprosperityofEurope’butiscautioustowardscooperationwiththeEUasaninstitution,notingthattheUKwillworkwiththeEU‘whereourinterestscoincide–forexample,insupportingthestabilityandsecurityoftheEuropeancontinent’.AnEU–UKagreement(orsetofagreements)onforeign,securityanddefencepolicywouldbeconsideredapositivesignalbytherestofEurope.However,theextenttowhichthiswouldcreatemorespaceforalong-termjointapproach(andpossiblyanactiveE3)isuncertain.TherearelimitstowhatcanbeachievedintheE3formatinanycase:anagreementwouldnotchangethefactthattheUKisoutsidetheEU,andthattheE3formatexcludesotherEuropeanpartnersandismostlyusefulforcreatingmomentumtomoveforwardoncertainissues.

DespitedivergencesoverthenextstepsfortheE3format,France,GermanyandtheUKhavecontinuedtostresstheimportanceandutilityoftheirstrategiccooperation.Thisisbasedontheunderstandingthatinformalgroupingscanhelp

13UKGovernment(2021),‘PrimeMinister’sspeechattheMunichSecurityConference:19February2021’,speech,19February2021,

.uk/government/speeches/prime-ministers-speech-at-the-munich-

security-conference-19-february-2021.

14Whitman,R.(2021),‘UK’svisionisconfident,butsuccessisalongwayoff’,ChathamHouseExpertComment,

16March2021,

/2021/03/uks-vision-confident-success-long-way.

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TowardsastrategicagendafortheE3

OpportunitiesandrisksforFrance,GermanyandtheUK

plugpolicygapsonsomeissues,andcanpotentiallyactascatalystsforactioninbiggermultilateralforums.However,theneedfortrustamongparticipantsisatthecoreoftheE3’sworkingpractice;thattrustissusceptibleto,andalreadybeingerodedby,frictionintheEU–UKrelationship.EpisodessuchastherecenttensionsaroundthediplomaticstatusoftheEUdelegationtotheUKwillfurthercomplicatetheacceptabilityofE3cooperationforParisandBerlin.15So,too,willthedisputesontheNorthernIrelandProtocolandtheCOVID-19vaccinesupply.16

Despitedivergencesoverthenextstepsfor

theE3format,France,GermanyandtheUKhavecontinuedtostresstheimportanceandutilityoftheirstrategiccooperation.

MaintainingaroutineofcloseconsultationsandthereflexofworkingtogetheristhereforecrucialtocompensateforpoliticaltensionsandtheUK’slossofstructuredcontactandconsultationswiththeEU.AlthoughthereisareluctanceonthepartofallthreecountriestoformalizetheE3toomuch,theremaybeanargumentinfavourofamoretimetabledcycleofconsultations,atleastattheworkinglevel,

tomaintainthefrequencyofcontacts,closenetworksandfamiliarityneededtounderpintrustbetweenthethreegovernments.ThisisparticularlycrucialfortheUKinthelongterm,asFranco-GermandialogueonvirtuallyallpolicytopicswillremainhighlyintensivebilaterallyandthroughtheEU.MaintainingtheE3willrequireactiveformalandinformalengagementfromUKofficialsinBrussels(includingatNATO)andEUcapitals.However,itwillbeforboththeUKandtheEUtodecidethedegreetowhichtheywishtoadoptapragmaticapproachtocase-by-casecooperation,intheabsenceofaformalagreementonforeignandsecuritypolicycooperation.Inthemeantime,theE3formatcanhelpensurethatUKandEUpoliciesandstatementsaremutuallyreinforcing,evenifthesearenegotiatedbehindcloseddoors,andeveniftherearenowdifferentpolicydeliverymechanismsfortheU