IMF-良好監(jiān)督：實地經驗教訓 Good Supervision Lessons from the Field 2023

GoodSupervision:

LessonsfromtheField

TobiasAdrian,MarinaMoretti,AnaCarvalho,HeeKyongChon,

KatharineSeal,FabianaMelo,andJaySurti

WP/23/181

IMFWorkingPapersdescriberesearchinprogressbythe

author(s)andarepublishedtoelicitcommentsandto

encouragedebate.

TheviewsexpressedinIMFWorkingPapersarethoseofthe

author(s)anddonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheIMF,

itsExecutiveBoard,orIMFmanagement.

2023

SEP

?2023InternationalMonetaryFund

WP/23/181

IMFWorkingPaper

MonetaryandCapitalMarketsDepartment

GoodSupervision:LessonsfromtheField

PreparedbyTobiasAdrian,MarinaMoretti,AnaCarvalho,HeeKyongChon,FabianaMelo,

KatharineSeal,andJaySurti*

AuthorizedfordistributionbyTobiasAdrian

September2023

IMFWorkingPapersdescriberesearchinprogressbytheauthor(s)andarepublishedtoelicit

commentsandtoencouragedebate.TheviewsexpressedinIMFWorkingPapersarethoseofthe

author(s)anddonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheIMF,itsExecutiveBoard,orIMFmanagement.

ABSTRACT:Keepingbankssafeandsoundhingesongoodsupervision.ThebankfailuresofMarch2023

precipitatedquestionsabouttheeffectivenessofsupervision.Thispaperreflectsonlessonslearnedfromthisbankingturmoilandreviewsglobalprogressindeliveringeffectivesupervisionoverthepasttenyears.Itfindsprogressinareaslikeriskmonitoring,stresstesting,andbusinessmodelanalysis.Yet,progresshasalsobeenhamperedbydeficienciesinsupervisoryapproaches,techniques,tools,and(useof)correctiveandsanctioningpowers,aswellasbyunclearmandates,inadequatepowers,andlackofindependenceandresources.

Overcomingthesedeficienciesrequiressupervisorstoimprovetheirownperformanceandotherpolicymakerstocontributetoensuringvigilant,independentandaccountablesupervision.

JELClassificationNumbers:

G20,G28

Keywords:

Banks;supervision;prudentialstandards

Author’sE-MailAddress:

tadrian@;mmoretti@;jsurti@;fmelo@;acarvalho@;hchon@;kseal@

*TheauthorswouldliketothankIMFcolleaguesforconstructivefeedbackandAdityaNarainforhelpfuldiscussions.

WORKINGPAPERS

GoodSupervision:

LessonsfromtheField

PreparedbyTobiasAdrian,MarinaMoretti,AnaCarvalho,HeeKyongChon,FabianaMelo,KatharineSeal,andJaySurti

IMFWORKINGPAPERSGoodSupervisionRevisited:LessonsfromtheField

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Contents

Glossary

3

ExecutiveSummary

4

Introduction

5

TheMarch2023BankFailures

8

HowCountriesFareAgainstSupervisoryStandards

11

SupervisoryStrengths,Weaknesses,andChallenges

18

Progress—Forward-LookingSupervisoryApproaches

18

MonitoringFrameworks

18

StressTestingandPillar2

19

BusinessModelAnalysisandCorporateGovernance

20

Gaps

21

Standardsaremeanttobeminimumnotmaximum

21

BanksLargeandSmall:ProportionalityandSystemicRisk

21

Challenges

22

DelayorHesitationinActingversusEscalationPractices

22

Accountability

24

Resources

24

StructuralTransformationsandGrowingPrudentialMandates

25

AdvancingtheSupervisoryAgenda

26

PrioritiesforSupervision

26

SupervisoryJudgment

27

DifferentResponsibilities:Banks,Supervisors,andGovernments

27

Conclusion

28

References

29

BOXES

1.TheMakingofGoodSupervision

7

FIGURES

1.LimitationsinCompliancewithIndividualBaselCorePrinciples—2012–2023H1

13

2.BaselCorePrinciplesThematicGroups—2012–2023H1

14

3.WeaknessinInstitutionalSettingforBankSupervision—2012–2023H1

15

4.Supervision—2012–2023H1

16

5.RegulatoryStandards—2012–2023H1

17

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Glossary

AEAdvancedEconomies

AIArtificialIntelligence

BCBS

BaselCommitteeonBankingSupervision

BCP

BaselCorePrinciplesforEffectiveSupervision

D-SIB

DomesticSystemicallyImportantBank

EMDE

EmergingMarketandDevelopingEconomies

EU

EuropeanUnion

FSAP

FinancialSectorAssessmentProgram

GDP

GrossDomesticProduct

GFCGlobalFinancialCrisis

G-SIB

GlobalSystemicallyImportantBanks

ICAAP

InternalCapitalAdequacyAssessmentProcess

IMFInternationalMonetaryFund

LCRLiquidityCoverageRatio

MLMachineLearning

MNCMateriallynon-compliant

NC

Non-compliant

RWA

Risk-weightedasset

SNB

SwissNationalBank

SVBSiliconValleyBank

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ExecutiveSummary

ThebankturbulenceintheSpringof2023precipitatedquestions,hearings,andactionplansdirectedat

supervisoryauthorities.DoubtswereraisedbysomeastowhethertheinternationalreformagendafollowingtheGlobalFinancialCrisis(GFC)hadbeenappropriatelytargetedandcalibrated,andeffectivelyimplemented.The

lasttimequestionswereraisedregardingdeficienciesinprudentialregulationandsupervisionofbanks,aftertheGFC,theInternationalMonetaryFund(IMF)hademphasizedthatstrengtheningregulation,whilenecessary,

wouldbeinsufficient,andthatreinvigoratingsupervisionwasjustasimportant.The2010StaffPositionNoteon

“TheMakingofGoodSupervision:LearningtoSay‘No’”emphasizedtheimportanceofthewillandabilitytoactascentraltogoodsupervision,andhence,tosafeguardingthesoundnessofbanksandstabilityofthesystem.

ThispapertakestherecentbankingturbulenceasatimelyopportunitytoreviewthecaseforgoodsupervisionwhichwasspotlightedbytheeventsinMarch.Itreviewsprogressmadeindeliveringeffectivesupervision,seekstoconsiderpracticalexamplesofsupervisioninaction,andexamineswhetherthetestofgoodsupervisionhasevolvedintheinterveningperiod.

Effectivesupervisionhaslongrequiredacombinationofskills—judgment,analysis,andagoodsenseoftemporalandjurisdictionalcontext.Thenumberanddepthofstructuraltransformationsunderway—nonbankfinancial

intermediation,digitalization,andclimatechange—havesignificantlyraisedthebarintermsofdesiredskillsets.

Andtheyunderscoretheimportanceofenhancingsupervisoryfocusoncorporategovernanceandbusinessmodelsinassessingwhetherriskmanagementandriskbuffersarefit-for-purpose,andofusingPillar2

supervisoryreviewpowersandallavailablecorrectivetoolstoensurethisisso.

Thepaperarguesthatthewillandtheabilitytoactremaincentraltoeffectivesupervisionandtheyaresustainedbythesamefundamentalattributesasbefore.Keyamongtheseare:strongoperationalindependenceand

accountability;clarityregardingtheprimacyofsupervisors’safetyandsoundnessmandate,shouldtheirwork

programsbetaskedwithservingothergoals;adequateandtimelyresources,includingaccesstoqualifiedand

experiencedsupervisorystaff;andlegalprotectionforsupervisorsinthepursuitofduty.Impedimentstothewill

andabilitytoactoftenstemfromalackofkeyprerequisitesforgoodsupervision,includingsoundmacroeconomicpoliciesandlegislativefoundationsforeffectivesupervision,amongothers.

Thismeansthatwhilesomeofthenecessaryactiontomeetheightenedexpectationsofsupervisorswillneedtobetheirown—suchasenhancingtheirinternalprocessesforreviewandescalationofaction—otherauthorities,includingthelegislature,willalsoneedtostepup.Attentionpaidbyotherresponsibleauthoritiestosupervisoryresources,independence,andlegalpowerswillpaydividends.

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Introduction

AftertheGFC,whentheworld’sattentionwasfocusedonstrengtheningbankingregulation,theIMF

arguedthatanchoringfinancialstabilityrequired,inparallel,achievingthetaskofensuringbetter

resourced,andmoreindependent,intrusive,andconclusivesupervision.1TheIMF’scallforgood

supervisionrecognizedthatinstitutionalresilienceandfinancialstabilityreflectsnotonlystrong,fit-for-purposeregulation,butequally,strengthenedriskmanagementandgovernancebybanksanditsintensivesupervisoryoversight.

TheMarch2023bankingturmoilhasagainshowntheworldthatwhensupervisionfails,poorrisk

managementpracticeswillfester,andproblemswilleventuallyensue.Thisisdespiteauthoritiesandbankshavingworkedhardonimplementingfar-reaching,complexenhancementstostrengthenresiliencefromthe

capitaladequacy,liquidity,recovery,andresolutionperspectives.Recenteventsprovideanopportunitytoreflectontheroleofsupervisionmorebroadly,combininglessonsfromthesebankfailureswithinsightsdrawnfromthelastdecadeofFinancialSectorAssessmentProgram(FSAP)reviewsacrosstheIMFmembership.

TheIMFStaffPositionPaperon“TheMakingofGoodSupervision”remainshighlypertinent(Box1).Akeymessagefrom2010wasthatsupervisionneededtobeassertiveandintrusive,i.e.,supervisorsneededthewill

andabilitytoact,andthatpaperexploredthesedimensions.Sincethen,theapplicablestandardsforbanking

supervision—theBaselCorePrinciplesforEffectiveBankingSupervision(BCP)—havebeenupdated.2The

standardsbroughttotheforetheimportanceofriskmanagementandrequiredsupervisorstoassesstherisk

profileofbanksintermsnotonlyoftheriskstheyrunandtheefficacyoftheirriskmanagement,butalsooftheriskstheyposetothebankingandfinancialsystemasawhole.Inaddition,supervisorsneedtoconsiderhowthemacroeconomicenvironment,businesstrends,andthebuild-upandconcentrationofriskinsideandoutsidethebankingsectormayaffecttherisktowhichindividualbanksareexposed.

Workingwithinthecontextofthepost-GFCregulatoryframework,andtheexperienceoftenyearsofthe

revisedBCPstandards,thispaperaimstostepbackandlookattheprogressmade,weaknessesexposed,andchallengesfacedbysupervisorsoverthepastdecade.Itseekstoconsiderwhethersupervisorshave

indeedpossessedtheabilityandexpressedthewilltoactbasedonevidenceprovidedbytheIMF’sengagementwithsupervisoryauthoritiesinthecontextoftheFSAPandtechnicalassistance.Itofferssomehigh-level

conclusionsonareaswheregreatereffortappearstobeneededtoensureeffectivesupervision.

Overall,progresshasbeenmadeinriskmonitoring,stresstesting,andbusinessmodelanalysis.

Supervisorsinadvanced,emerging,anddevelopingeconomiesareincorporatingforwardlookingsupervisory

approaches,insomecasesbyharnessingdata-intensiveandtechnology-driventools(Suptech).WideradoptionofstresstestsasasupervisorytoolrepresentsagreatadvanceinriskmanagementandoversightsincetheGFC,

broadeningsupervisors’viewsofthreatstoindividualbanksandthesectorbeyondhistoricaldataandpast

experiences.3Businessmodelanalysishasbecomeintegraltosupervisoryframeworksinmanyjurisdictions,

aidingearlyidentificationofvulnerabilitiesandsupportingthesupervisorydialogueonthesustainabilityofbanks.

1SeeVi?alsandothers(2010).TheIMF’sviewswereechoedbytheFinancialStabilityBoard:

/wp

-

content/uploads/r_101101.pdf,whichdevelopedtheseideasfurtherthroughguidanceonsupervisoryinteractionwithbanksonrisk

culture(

/wp-content/uploads/140407.pdf

)andmonitoredprogressonenhancedsupervision(

/wp

-content/uploads/r_140407.pdf?page_moved=1).

2Originallypublishedin1996,theBaselCorePrinciples[

/publ/bcbs230.htm

]havebeenperiodicallyupdated.Thispaperhasbeenwrittenatatimewhenaconsultationonrevisionstothe2012standardisongoing.

3SeeAdrianandothers(2020):

/en/Publications/Departmental-Papers-Policy-Papers/Issues/2020/01/31/Stress

-Testing-at-the-IMF-48825.

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Yet,thebarforsupervisorsishigheraftertheGFC,andongoingstructuraltransformations—includingnonbankfinancialintermediation,digitalization,andclimatechange—havemadefulfillingsupervisorymandatesmore

challenging.Countriesareperformingbetteragainsthigherbenchmarksoncapitalandliquidityregulationbut

progressonsupervisionhasbeenmarkedlyslower.Despiteastrongassociationbetweentheinstitutionalsettingforsupervisionandbanksoundnessandstability,FSAPassessmentsduring2012–23havefoundmany

advanced,emerginganddevelopingeconomieslackingindependentbanksupervisorswithclearsafetyand

soundnessmandates,adequatepowers,andlegalprotectionintheconductoftheirduty.Deficienciesin

supervisoryapproach,techniques,tools,andespeciallycorrectiveandsanctioningpowersarealsowidespread.

Areasthatneedtobesystematicallyaddressedtoenhancesupervisoryeffectivenessincludemore

consistentlyrequiringbankstogobeyondquantitativeregulatorythresholdsandprudentialruleswhenbusinessandmacro-financialrisksareelevated.Inthisregard,thetendencyfornationalauthoritiestotreatBaselIIIstandardsasmaximum—insteadoftheminimumstandardsthattheyare—reflectsanundesirable

inhibitionofuseofsupervisoryjudgementanddiscretion,whichoftenhasitsrootsinlackofoperational

independenceandlackofclearsafetyandsoundnessmandates.Asecondimportantconcerninsomecountriesisthetendencyforsupervisorstounder-allocateresourcesandattentiontoinstitutionsthatmaynotqualifyas

systemicallyimportantonthebasisofbalance-sheetsizealone.Thiscanbeproblematicif,givenunfavorablemacrofinancialdevelopments,suchbankscanhaveanadversesystemicimpactduetobusinessmodel

vulnerabilities,concentrationrisk,andweaknessesinriskmanagement,withconcernsmoreeasilyamplifiedandpropagatedinadigitalworld.TherecentbankfailuresintheUnitedStatesandSwitzerlandillustratethese

concerns.

Moregenerally,afewimportantfactorshavehinderedthewillandabilityofsupervisorstoact.Hesitation

toactcanstemfromperceivedoractualvulnerabilitytoinfluencebygovernmentorindustryandlackoflegal

protection.Delaysintaking,andescalating,actionarealsofrequentlyaresultoftheabsenceofclearmandates,deficienciesinsupervisorycapabilitiesandresources,andpoorinternaldecision-makingprocess.Often,

impedimentstothewillandabilitytoactstemfromlackofkeyprerequisitesforgoodsupervision,includingsoundmacroeconomicpoliciesandlegislativefoundationsforeffectivesupervision,amongothers.

Consequently,keyprioritiesinpromotingthecauseofgoodsupervision—thatis,enhancingtheabilityandwillofsupervisorstoact—includeacombinationofactions:strengtheningoperationalindependence;enhancingclarityregardingprimacyofthesafetyandsoundnessmandate;providinglegalprotectionfor

supervisorsinthepursuitofduty;ensuringavailabilityoftrainedandexperiencedsupervisors;enhancing

supervisoryfocusoncorporategovernanceandriskmanagementatsupervisedentities;andpromotingtheuseofPillar2powerstoensurethatsupervisedentities’businessactivitiesandriskbuffersarefit-for-purposeandnot

merelymeetingminimumregulatorythresholds.

AnoverarchingpurposeofthispaperistotaketheopportunityaffordedbytherecentbankingturmoilandtheongoingrevisionoftheBCPtodiscussthestateofplayregardingsupervisoryeffectivenessandwaysinwhichitcouldbefruitfullyenhanced.Acombinationofrobust,capable,andintrusivesupervision,andstrongandcomprehensiveregulation,isessentialtopromotebankingsoundnessandfinancialstability.Goodregulationandgoodsupervisiondependuponeachother,andeacharticulatesthepreceptsthattheotherseekstoachieve.Wedonotaimtodownplaythevalueandsignificanceofregulation,albeitsinceregulationattractsfarmore

attentionandcommentarythansupervision,thispapertriestoredressthatbalance.

Therestofthispaperisorganizedasfollows.Section2discussestherecentbankingturmoil;section3

providesanoverviewoffindingsonsupervisorypracticedrawnfromBCPassessmentssince2012;section4offersadiscussionofstrengths,weaknessesandchallengesfacedbysupervisors;section5discusseshowthesupervisoryagendacouldbesupportedandadvanced;section6concludes.

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Box1.TheMakingofGoodSupervision

WhatIsGoodSupervision

In“TheMakingofGoodSupervision:LearningtoSay‘No’”staffdrewonfindingsfromtheGFCtodistillthekeycomponentsofaneffectivesupervisoryframework.Staffnotedthattheirinsightswerealreadyembeddedin

internationalsupervisorystandards.Infact,the2012revisionoftheBCPsupportedtheviewofsupervision

articulatedinthatpaper,asdoestheongoingworkontherevisionoftheBCPin2023.Theconceptsarerobustandevergreen.Thechallengeistooperationalizetheconceptsandtomaintainthefocusandenergythatis

requiredtoensureconsistentimplementation.

TheseinsightsareparticularlyusefulinthelightoftheexperiencesincetherevisionoftheBCPin2012and

thecurrentfocusonsupervisoryissues:“goodsupervisionis:skepticalbutproactive,itiscomprehensive,itisadaptive,anditisconclusive”.Staffarticulatedthesepreceptsmorefully,explainingthateffectivesupervisiontookanactivestance,basedonsoundandcompleteknowledgeoftheinstitution,challengingandprobingboththesystemsandtheriskdecisionsthatituncovered.First,tounderstandtherisksandbusinessmodelsand

challengeabank’scoursesofaction,wherenecessary,thesupervisormust,likethebanks,adapttoanever-evolvingenvironment.Andsecond,supervisionisonlyeffectiveifitiscapableandwillingtomovefrommakingfindingsandnotificationsofissues,ontoensuringthatsupervisoryconcernshavebeenresolvedsatisfactorilyandconclusivelyintimelyfashion.These2010insightsnowlookparticularlypremonitoryinsayingthat“an

institutioncanneverhaveenoughcapitalorliquidityiftherearematerialflawsinitsriskmanagementpractices.Astherulebookbecomesmoredetailedandcomplex,thesupervisoryapproachesandskillsrequiredto

implementtheruleswillbecomemorechallenging.”

BringingaboutGoodSupervision—itisnotallaboutsupervisors

Goodsupervisioncanonlybeachievedifthefoundationsunderlyingthesupervisor’sabilityandwilltoactareinplace.Staffnotedthattheabilitytoactwasbasedon,andcouldbeunderminedbythelackof,severalkeyfactors,suchas:legalauthority;adequateresources;clearstrategy;robustinternalorganization;andeffectiveworkingrelationshipswithotherauthorities.Thewilltoactwasfoundedon,andcouldbeconfoundedbytheabsenceof,otherkeyfactors,suchas:clarityofmandate;operationalindependence;accountability;skilled

staff(alsoarequisiteforabilitytoact);healthyrelationshipwithindustry;andeffectivepartnershipwithbankboards.

Goodsupervisionrequiresanumberofessentialsupportingpreconditions.IntheBCP,theconceptsofwillandabilitytoactarecapturedunderthefirsttwo,foundational,principles.Principle1,onResponsibilities,

ObjectivesandPowers;andPrinciple2,onIndependence,Accountability,Resourcing,andLegalProtectionforSupervisors.ThetextoftheBCPrecognizesthatwhilesupervisorsshouldbechallengedontheirwilland

abilitytoact,theyworkwithinawidercontext.Thepreconditionsincludetheexistenceandstateof

developmentofmacroeconomicpolicies,financialstabilitypolicyframeworks,publicinfrastructures,market

discipline,optionstoresolveproblembanksinanorderlymanner,andmechanismsforsystemicprotection.

Mostofall,supervisoryauthoritiescannotwritetheirownlawsandmandates,frequentlyhaveconstrained

influenceovertheirresourceenvelope,donotdesigntheframeworkwithinwhichtheyareheldaccountable,ortowhichtheycanturnforlegalprotection.Therefore,someoftherecommendationsandconclusions—then

andnow—aretobeimplementedbyauthoritiesotherthansupervisors.

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TheMarch2023BankFailures

Measuredbythenumberofmajorinstitutionalfailuresand(perceived)threattoglobalbankingstability,

March2023wasnotableforbeingthemostunstableperiodinbankingsincetheGFC.Thispapertakes

thesebankingstresseventsasatouchpointtodiscusstheroleofsupervision—whetherithaschangedsincetheGFC,whethernewchallengeshaveemerged,andwhethersupervisorshavebeenequaltosuchchallenges.

DespitethefailureofsomebanksintheUnitedStates(U.S.)andthegovernment-supportedmergerofaglobal

systemicallyimportantbank(G-SIB)inEurope,theturbulencewasshort-livedanddidnotevolveintoanationalorglobalsystemicevent.Thepaperisnotanin-depthinvestigationintotheeventsoftheturmoilandtheinstitutionswhowereinvolved.Thispermitsareflectionofbroaderconsiderationsaffectingsupervisoryauthoritiesonaglobalbasis.

Supervisoryapproachcanhavelongtermconsequences

TheU.S.authoritieshavealreadypublishedinitialreportsonthebankfailures.4Thesereportsconcludethatthemanagementandboardofdirectorsofthefailedbankspursuedriskybusinessstrategiescompounded,

problematically,byweakliquidityandinadequateriskmanagement.Thereportsnotethatthesupervisorshadin

factidentifiedseveraloftherelevantvulnerabilitiesbuthadnotbeenquickenoughtoescalatetheirsupervisory

actions,nortoinsistorrequirethebankstorespondmoreprudentlywhiletherewasstilltimetodoso.The

Board’sreportalsoidentifiedrecentregulatorychangesthatreducedstandardsasimpedingeffectivesupervision.Despiteidentifyingtheissues,supervisorsfailedtobeassertive,timely,andconclusiveintheirresponse.Inat

leastonecase,thereportsidentifyresourcechallengesashavingadverselyimpactedthetimelinessandqualityofexaminations,slowingidentificationandreportingofweaknesses.Evenwherequestionableriskdecisions,and

fundamentalweaknessesinriskmanagementwerepointedout,thesewerelargelylefttotheinstitution’s

discretiontoresolve.Whenrecommendationsandfeedbackwereignoredbythebanks,thematterwasnot

consistentlyandvigorouslypursuedbythesupervisors,includingimportantly,throughanescalationprocess.Thesupervisorshouldhaveinsistedupontimelyremediationofdeficiencies.5Whilewellmanagedbanksarelikelytoberesponsivetosupervisoryrequirements,failuretomeetsupervisoryexpectationsinareasonabletimemay

suggestthatthebanklacksthemeansorabilitytomanageitsrisks,andclosersupervisoryoversightandagreaterdegreeofcoercivenessarecalledfor.

NoequivalentreportshavebeenpublishedbytheSwisssupervisoryauthoritiessofar,butinitsmost

recentFinancialStabilityReport,theSwissNationalBank(SNB)hascommentedonthebusinessrisks,profile,andreputationofCreditSuisse.TheseremarksechothefindingsintheUnitedStatesinthatthey

portrayabankwherebusinessjudgmentsandmanagementofriskswereincreasinglyquestionable.Although

CreditSuisseitselfhadalreadyrecognizedtheneedfor,andhadembarkedupon,reformefforts,alongstandingtrailofreputationaldamagerenderedthebankvulnerabletolossofmarketconfidence.Whenatriggerevent

occurred,thebank’sstrongcapitalandliquidityreserveswereinsufficienttokeepitafloat.AstheSNBpointsoutinitsdescriptionofevents,“ThecrisisatCreditSuissehasshownthatmeetingcapitalrequirementsisnecessary

4TheseincludethereviewsfromtheBoardofGovernorsoftheFederalReserveSystemonitssupervisionandregulationofSilicon

ValleyBank(

/publications/files/svb-review-20230428.pdf

);theFederalDepositInsuranceCorporation’sreportonitssupervisionofSignatureBank(

/news/press-releases/2023/pr23033a.pdf

);andUSGovernment

AccountabilityOffice’spreliminaryreviewoffederalagencyactionsrelatedtotheMarch2023bankfailures

(

/assets/gao-23-106736.pdf

).

5Availabletoolstoaddressconcernsdifferfromcountrytocountry.Forexample,theFRBreviewnotedafewactionsthatcouldhavebeentakenbysupervisors:“Giventheseverityofissues,supervisorscouldhaverecommendedanenforcementactionthatrequiredcompensatingcontrolswhilethefirm