會計外文翻譯

原文FinancialManagementofR&DFinancialthinkingaboutR&Dhasevolvedwellbeyondbasicdiscountedcashflowmodels.Bettertoolshavebeendevelopedtovalueintellectualcapital,includingthequantitativeassessmentofthevalueaddedbyR&D.ThedissectionoftheelementsofriskandtheapplicationofrealoptionstheoryarenewfeaturesoftheR&Dlandscape.Financingvehicleshavealsochangedwithanenormoussurgeofventurecapitalandprivateequityfunds.Theanalysestoolboxhasbeenenhancedbyelectronicspreadsheets,on-linedatabases,MonteCarlosoftware,theInternet,andtheubiquitouspersonalcomputer.IndustrialR&Discharacteristicallyahigh-riskinvestmentwithadeferredpayoff.Itsimportancetoindustrialsocieties,andtoindividualfirmswithintheseeconomies,isparamountLauhasestimatedthatmorethan50%ofthewealthcreationindevelopedcountriesoriginatesfromtechnology,whichistypicallyaproductofR&D.However,R&Dcomesatacost,anditisascapableofdestroyingvalueascreatingit.Knowingthedifferenceiscrucial;thepenaltiesforunderinvestmentcanbeadeterioratingcompetitivepositionandlostopportunity;foroverinvestmentitwillbeaslowerosionofthefirm‘scapitalbase.Butmeasuringthedifferencebetweenvaluecreationandvaluedestructionisnoteasy.OnesourceofconfusionisthataccountingconventionstreatR&Dasanexpense,notaninvestment.Anevenmorefundamentalissueisthatpastperformanceisnotareliableguidetofutureperformance.Facedbyameasurementproblemthatisbothdifficultandimportant,thebusinessfinancialandacademiccommunitieshavecontinuedimprovingtheirtools.Asaresult,R&Danalysisandmanagementhasevolveddramaticallyinthepastfiftyyears(3),andthatevolutionisfarfromover.Initsfirstpostwarphase,industrialR&DwasviewedasacreativeenterpriseandIts‘managementwaslefttotheR&Ddirectors.Theirmainfinancialmetricwasanannualbudget(atoolbasicallyinadequatetoevaluateaninvestment).Thebudgetwasinpartdeterminedbyindustrybenchmarks,suchasR&Dexpenseasapercentageofrevenues.Accordingly,thefinancialskillsofR&Dexecutiveswerelargelyfocusedoncostaccountingandcostcontrol(4).Inmanycompanies,topmanagement(oftenlackingpersonalexperienceinR&D)didn‘thaveaclueabouttherelationshipofvaluetocost,andattemptedtomanagethefunctionbyaprocessthathasbeenpithilydescribed(5)as''managingthemanager".Inotherwords,poorR&Dreturnswereviewedmoreasaproductofpoormanagementthanaconsequenceofafirm'sstrategy.Thesolutionwasoftentohirea'newboy."Thesecondphase,inthe1970s,wastheintroductionofincreasinglypowerfultoolsforevaluatinginvestmentsunderriskbeingadoptedbyfinancialanalyststoR&D,leadingtoacircumstanceIwoulddescribeas'theapparenttriumphofDCF(DiscountedCashFlow)."TheuseofDCFinevaluatinginvestmentswasanimportantstepforwardinthatitintroducedthedisciplineofbusinessplans,factoredintheconceptofrisk,andhelpedbridgethecommunicationsgapbetweentechnicalandnon-technicalexecutives.TheDCFtoolkitincludednetpresentvalue(NPV)internalrateofreturn(IRR)andriskweightedcostofcapital."Butasitwasappliedinpractice,theuseofexcessivediscountratesandoverlyconservativeterminalvaluescombinedtocondemnalmostanylong-termR&D.project.Thisresultcontradictedindustry'scommonexperiencethatmanyofthemostprofitableinnovationshadlonggestationperiods.Thewordvaluehasbecomeafixtureofthebusinesslexiconduringthepasttwodecades.Unfortunately,thisomnipresentwordisbeingusedintwoverydifferentcontexts:economicvalueandmarketvalue.Thetwoformsofvaluearenotatallthesame.ThedistinctionisprofoundforR&D,becauseinnovationinitiallycomesatacostioneconomicvalue,butisequallyoftenadriverformarketvalue!EconomicValueThetermEconomicValueisinvokedinmuchcurrentbusinessjargon,explicitlyInsuchconceptsasEconomicValueAdded(EVA),andimplicitlyindiscussionsof'valuechains,"and'valuepropositions."Theeconomicvalueofanenterpriseisdeterminedbytheprojectedsumofitsfreecashflows,discountedbyitscostofcapital.TheEVAconcept,althoughtraceabletoAlbertP.Sloan,thelegendaryCEOofGeneralMotors,wasreintroducedtothecorporatecommunitybythefirmSternStewartinthe1990s,withconsiderableimpact.EVAisdefinedasnetoperatingprofitminusanappropriatechargefortheopportunitycostofallcapitalinvestedintheEnterprise.(TherelationshipbetweenEVAandEconomicValueissimple:EconomicValueisjustthesumoftheEVA,saddedbytheenterpriseineachsuccessiveyear.)EVAisanestimateoftrue''economicprofit,"ortheamountbywhichearningsexceedorfallshortoftherequiredminimumrateofreturnthatshareholdersandlendersmightearnbyinvestinginalternativesecuritiesofcomparablerisk.TheCrisisinValuation;WhenMarketValueDidn,tTrackMarketValueForprofessionalinvestorsinsecurities,thebottomlineisnoteconomicreturn,itistotalshareholderreturn(TSR),definedastheappreciationofthestockpriceplusdividendpayments.Thisis'cashisking"reasoning,sinceliquidsecuritiesandcashdividendsmeancashtoaninvestor.Tomoneymanagers,totalreturnisalsotheirreportcard.Insuchaworld,theMarketValueofastockisthefinalmetric,andEconomicValueisbutonecomponentofit.Investorsalsogaugeeachfirm'sstrategicposition,plusotherfactorscontributingtoMarketValuesuchasinvestorsentimentandmacroeconomictrends.Shareholdervaluehaslargelycometobesynonymouswithcurrentmarketvalue-stockprice-andexecutivesordirectorswhoignorethisrealitydosoatconsiderableperil.EconomicValueApartofthecrisisinvaluationarosefromthegrowingdifferencesbetweenmarketvalueandtheaccountant'sperspectiveofvaluationbasedonhistoricalcost.Whilethiscircumstancecould,inprinciple,haveresultedfromsmartmanagementdeliveringsuperiorcashflows,thisexplanationdidnotholdupwhentheactualcashflowprojectionsofthecompanieswereconsidered.Youngisbasedoncashflowanticipatedinthenextfiveyears-theouterlimitoftheproverbial"short-term".Thus,morethan75percentofthevaluationofthetotalstockmarketmustberelatedtosomethingotherthanshort-termeconomicvalue.Inthisscenario,aslongasperceptionsofopportunitygrewfasterthaneconomiccapital,thegrowthsectorwouldoutperformthe"value"sector,andhencewouldattractmoreinvestment.Thiscascadeeffectwouldresultinhigherprice-earningsratios,sincetheprice-to-earningsmetricistiedtocurrenteconomicperformance.Thatiswhatoccurredinthemarketplaceduringthedecadeofthe1990s.Investorsineffectequatedinvestmentin"value"stocksasinvestmentinstockswithlimitedopportunities,andfavoredthe"growth"sector.Duringthe1990s,asthevaluationgapwasgrowing,ahostofarticlesbegantoextendthevenerableconceptofintellectualpropertytotheconceptofintellectualorKnowledgecapital,whichaddedanimportantnewdimensiontointangibleassets.Somewritersevenchoosetodefineintellectualcapitalasthedifferencebetweenmarketvalueandthevalueofthetangibleassets.Thisapproachisexemplifiedbythisquotation:Thegreatestchallengefacinganyorganizationtodayisinunderstandingthehugedifferentialbetweenitsbalancesheetandmarketvaluation.Thisgaprepresentsthecorevalueofthecompany—itsIntellectualCapital.Fromthistraditionalbase,theconceptwasnowextendedtoincludetheknowledgeoftheorganizationanditsemployees,anditsabilitytolearn.Itthuswentfarbeyondthemorelimitedconceptsofknow-howandtradesecrets.Mostimportantly,therewasrecognitionthatintellectualandhumancapitalcouldfaroutweightangiblecapitalforvaluationpurposes.Thisinsightwasimportant,butyetnotverydefinitive."Buttheideaofintellectualcapitalisanewone,"wroteP.H.Sullivan,"itbringstotheforegroundthebrainpowerassetsoftheorganization,recognizingthemashavingadegreeofimportancecomparabletothetraditionalland,labor,andtangibleassets.Ifasurveywereconducted,therewouldbeagreementthatmanymoderncompaniesarefilledwithintellectualcapital:lawfirms,consultingfirms,softwarecompanies,computercompaniestonamebutafew.Butifthesurveywentontoaskpeopletodefinewhatintellectualcapitalis,therewouldbeawiderangeofanswers.Theseanswerswouldnotconvergeontoonestraightforwarddefinitionofintellectualcapital,butratheronmany.Therangeofviewsandthenumberoftermsusedtodescribeanddefineintellectualcapitalarebroad,withoutaclearfocus,andoftenconfusing TechnologyappraisalApracticalapplicationoftheeconomicvalueapproachtointellectualpropertydevelopedconsiderablyduringthe1990s.Ithasbeentermedtechnologyappraisal.TheapproachisbasicallyaDCFvaluationofaproformabusinessplanincorporatingthetechnologybeingappraised.Technologyappraisalhasbeenusedprimarilyfortaxpurposes:forexample,thevaluationofpatentsdonatedtouniversitiesbycompaniessuchasDowChemicalorthevaluationofin-processR&Dinmergersandacquisitions.DuPontpublishedadetaileddescriptionoftypicaltechnologyappraisalmethodologyinconnectionwiththecompletionofitsacquisitionsofPioneerInternationalandDuPontMerck.Anumberofconsultantsandaccountingfirmsnowoffertechnologyappraisalservices.Newtrendsincorporatefinance,andanewtoolkit,arenaturallytobeexpectedtocausestructuralchangesinindustrialR&D.Infact,thechangesthathavetakenplaceinthepasttwodecadeshavebeenremarkablyfar-reaching.TheImpactofLeveragedBuyouts(LBO,s)The1980smarkedtheadventoftheleveragedbuyouteraanditssibling,thehigh-yieldor'—junk"bond.TheeraculminatedspectacularlyintheRJRbiddingwar,depictedinthebookandsubsequentmovie,BarbariansatTheGate(38),thebook,ThePredator,sBall(39),andtheimprisonmentofprominentparticipantsforinsidertradingandsecuritiesviolations.About$400billionofLBO,swerefinancedinthedecadeofthe1980s.Excessivebids,suchasforRJR,causedabroadcollapseofthefirstjunkbondmarket,butthetechniqueisaliveandwellasamoresophisticatedgenerationofLBOfirms,backedbyinstitutionalfunds,trawlstheindustrialmarketplacefornewbuyoutopportunities.LBO,sweregenerallyfinancedwith10percentorlessequityputupbylimitedpartnersand90percentbybankloansandsubordinateddebt,typicallyintheformofHighyieldbondsfloatedbyDrexelBurnhamLambertandothers.AnLBObecomesaPossibilitywhenthesharepriceofthetargetcompanyhasfallentoalevelwheretherequireddebttopurchasethecompanycanbepaiddownquicklybyacombinationofassetsalesandcashflowfromoperations.Ideally,thecompanyispurchasedwithitsownassets,leavingtheinvestorswithalargeprofitafterthedebtburdeniseliminated.TheLBOstrategyisnotoneofmaximizingvalue;itisoneofmaximizingcashflow.Thetargetcompanymaybesubstantiallydepletedofphysicalandintellectualcapitalattheendofthegame.Ironically,however,anLBOcomesintoplaywhenmanagementseffortstoenhancevaluehaveeitherfailed,orareperceivedbythemarketplacetobefailing.Therewerelastingeffectsfromthistraumaticperiod,somebeneficialandsomelessso.Managementsrapidlybecamemoredisciplinedaboutvaluecreationwhenitbecameapparentthattheywerevulnerabletoaraid,orweremissingopportunitiestoenhanceshareholdervalue.Thenotionwasthatifshareholderscouldbenefitfromstreamlining,downsizing,etc.managementwoulddoitbeforetheraidersarrivedtodoitforthem.Corporationsshedexpensivefrills,suchascostlyheadquarters,unprofitabledivisions,andpetprojects,tofocusoncoreoperations,andtoscrutinizenewacquisitionsandcapitalinvestmentsfromaneconomicvalueviewpoint.Thewell-publicizedreignofJackWelchatGeneralElectricsymbolizedmanyoftheelementsofthisapproach.TheeffectsonR&Dfinanceweresignificant:long-termR&D,andR&Dnottargetedtoexistingbusinesses,wasoftencurtailedtoshoreupshort-termcashflow.ThisprocesstookplacenotonlywithincompaniesthatwereinLBOmode,butalsoincompaniesthatconsideredthemselvesLBOtargets.Manylargecentralresearchcentersweredownsizedoreliminated,andthosethatremainedweretieddirectlytostrategicbusinessunits(Sub‘s),whichhadnowbecomethefocusofvaluecreation.Inaddition,atypicalcorporatereactiontoexternalthreatswastomergewithothersintheindustry,andcreatevaluebyeliminatingduplicateheadquarters,salesorganizations,andR&Doperations.Theeliminationofthesecostsclearlygeneratedeconomicvalue;theissuewouldbehowmuchofitcameatacostinstrategicvalue.Source:F.PeterBoer.FinancialManagementofR&D.ResearchTechnologyManagement,2002,pp1-28譯文:研發(fā)財務管理研發(fā)財務管理的思想演變發(fā)展遠遠超過基本的現(xiàn)金貼現(xiàn)現(xiàn)金流模型，財務的研發(fā)工具中已經(jīng)發(fā)展到了智力資本的價值，其中包括定量價值的評估。解剖風險要素和實物期權理論的應用是財務研發(fā)新的特點，同時融資工具也在發(fā)生變化，風險資本和私人股本資金大量激增。分析師的工具箱已經(jīng)被提高到了電子表格，網(wǎng)上數(shù)據(jù)庫，蒙特卡羅軟件，互聯(lián)網(wǎng)，以及無處不在的個人電腦。工業(yè)研發(fā)是典型的遞延收益與高風險投資的項目，這個對工業(yè)社會的公司尤其至關重要，發(fā)達國家50%的財富來自產(chǎn)品技術創(chuàng)造的研發(fā)。但是衡量價值創(chuàng)造和價值之間的差異是不容易區(qū)別的，其混亂的原因是在會計慣例中把這項財務費用當作一項開支，而不是一項投資，不把它作為一個基本的研發(fā)問題，也不把過去業(yè)績作為未來指標。在過去的十五年，商業(yè)、金融和學術界在面對困難的測量問題面前，不斷地改善和發(fā)展研發(fā)分析和管理的測量問題，在戰(zhàn)后的第一階段，產(chǎn)業(yè)研發(fā)被認為是一項具有研發(fā)創(chuàng)造性的管理事業(yè)。其中主要財務指標是年度預算（一個工具基本上不足以評估一個投資）。預算是按行業(yè)基準確定的，比如研發(fā)作為費用占收入的比例來確定一部分的。因此研發(fā)人員的財務技能主要集中在成本會計和成本控制。在許多公司，高層管理人員（通常是缺乏研發(fā)人員的經(jīng)驗）沒有對價值關系到成本進行探索，并試圖以管理一個簡潔描述為“管理經(jīng)驗出來功能”的管理。換言之，窮人的研發(fā)返回被看做比對一個公司的戰(zhàn)略，這個解決方案導致的后果是產(chǎn)品的管理不善，更是經(jīng)常被形容為一個新聘請來的男孩。第二階段，在20世紀70年代，越來越多的投資風險評估被金融分析師引入研發(fā)，可以形容為“明顯的勝利DCF法（貼現(xiàn)現(xiàn)金流）。DCF法在評估投資的使用是一個重要的步驟，因為它引入了商業(yè)計劃紀律中的風險因素的概念，并幫助協(xié)調(diào)了技術和非技術人員的溝通分歧。工具包中包含凈現(xiàn)金流量折現(xiàn)現(xiàn)值（NPV）的回報率（內(nèi)部收益率）和風險加權資本成本內(nèi)部收益率。但它是在實踐過程中過度使用貼現(xiàn)率，以及過度和保守終值相結合，譴責任何長期研發(fā)的項目。結果是違背了行業(yè)中認為創(chuàng)新是長期醞釀的最賺錢的這一共同經(jīng)驗。在過去二十年，這個詞的價值已成為固定的業(yè)務詞匯。不幸的是，這倆個無所不在的詞語有很不同的背景：經(jīng)濟價值和市場價值。這倆種價值形式并不是完全相同的，這種區(qū)別是深刻的研發(fā)因為最初是科斯廷創(chuàng)新的經(jīng)濟價值，但它往往也是市場價值驅動。經(jīng)濟價值明確經(jīng)濟價值這一詞的概念，調(diào)用商業(yè)行話，是作為經(jīng)濟增加值（EVA），并含蓄地對“價值鏈”和價值命題的討論。一個企業(yè)的經(jīng)濟價值是取決于它的自由現(xiàn)金流量預測總結其資本成本貼現(xiàn)。EVA的概念，雖然可以追溯到斯隆，通用汽車公司的傳奇總裁，但重新被引入到企業(yè)是在20世紀90年代的戴爾公司，具有相當?shù)挠绊憽VA是指凈營業(yè)利潤對在企業(yè)全部資本投資的機會成本的適當收取。（EVA與經(jīng)濟之間的價值關系很簡單：經(jīng)濟僅僅是價值的EVA的款項，則每連續(xù)三年在企業(yè)相加QEVA是一個真正的經(jīng)濟利潤，或者死收入數(shù)額超過投資所要求的最低回報率，且與其他證券的投資風險相比，股東和貸款人的收入周期比較短。市場價值對于證券專業(yè)投資者來說，底線不是經(jīng)濟回報，而是股東回報（TSR），即股價加分紅。這是“現(xiàn)金為王”的推理，因為液體證券和現(xiàn)金股利平均現(xiàn)金的總回報是基金經(jīng)理的成績單。在這樣的一個世界，股票的市場價值作為它的組成部分是最后的度量和經(jīng)濟價值。投資者同時還衡量每個企業(yè)的戰(zhàn)略地位，以及在加上其他因素造成的市場價值，如投資者情緒和宏觀經(jīng)濟趨勢。股東價值在很大程度上與當前的市場價值型股票價格是同義詞，無論是行政人員還是董事，誰無視這個現(xiàn)實都有相當大的風險。經(jīng)濟價值價值危機的一部分源于歷史成本為基礎的市場價值與會計的估值角度日益增大的差別。從提供卓越的智能管理來看，在這種情況下有可能產(chǎn)生現(xiàn)金流量，但這種解釋并不能成立，需要公司對實際現(xiàn)金流量進行預測和審議。年輕，是基于在未來5年中的眾所周知的“短期”，一次，超過75%的股票市值總額比其他外部界限預期的經(jīng)濟現(xiàn)金流價值要短。在這種情況下，只要認識的機會增長速度快于經(jīng)濟資本，“成長部門”將跑贏“價值”產(chǎn)業(yè)，從而吸引更多的投資。這種連帶效應將導致較高的市盈率，因為價格的市盈率指標是聯(lián)系在一起的經(jīng)濟表現(xiàn)，這就是發(fā)生在上世紀90年代的十年間的市場。實際上，投資者等同于“價值”的股票投資，在有限的機會內(nèi)進行股票投資并主張“增長”部門。在20世紀90年代，隨著估值差距越來越大，主流文章開始擴大古老的知識產(chǎn)權理念，增加了智力和知識資本這一重要的新層面，無形資產(chǎn)的概念。有些學者甚至選擇市場價值與有形資產(chǎn)的智力資本價值的差額作為定義。這種方法是報價來例證的：任何組織在今天面臨的最大挑戰(zhàn)是了解資產(chǎn)負債表之間的估值和市場的巨大差別，這個差別代表了公司的核心價值-智力資本。從這個傳統(tǒng)基礎上，現(xiàn)在這一概念已經(jīng)擴大到了包括員工的組織能力和學習知識的能力。因此它遠遠超過了技術訣竅和商業(yè)秘密這比較有限的概念。最重要的是，人們認識到致死與人力資本可能遠遠超過對有形資本估價的目的。這一見解是重要的，但不是很明確。“但是智力資本是個新的想法，”沙利文說，它帶來的前景是承認組織的智力資產(chǎn)比傳統(tǒng)的土地、勞動力、有形資產(chǎn)重要。如果進行一項調(diào)查，一致認為會有許多現(xiàn)代公司與智力資本填補，比如律師事務所、咨詢公司、軟件公司，一些的電腦公司等。但是如果接著調(diào)查什么是知識資本的定義時，將會有廣泛的答案。這些答案不會收斂到一個簡單的智力資本的定義，但存在著許多的比較。對于描述和界定智力資本方面數(shù)量存在著不同的意見且比較廣泛，沒有一個明確的重點，所以常常令人困惑??…技術鑒定在20世紀90年代，一種有關知識產(chǎn)權的實際應用的經(jīng)濟價值方法得到了很大的發(fā)展。它被稱為技術鑒定，這種方法在備考業(yè)務計劃中被評為DCF估值。技術鑒定被用于稅收的主要目的有：專利估價捐贈，兼并和收購公司的研發(fā)估值。杜邦詳細描述了與先鋒海蘭國際公司的收購連接時的典型技術鑒定方法。在過去二十年里，企業(yè)融資工具發(fā)生了深遠的變化，可以預期導致工業(yè)研發(fā)結構性變化這意義趨勢。杠桿收購的影響（LBO）20世紀80年代標志著杠桿收購時代，高收益或“垃圾債券”的到來。尤其以雷諾競購戰(zhàn)這個案例，正如書籍和電影所描述的由于證券內(nèi)幕交易這一違法行為產(chǎn)生的影響尤為突出。雷諾在80年代投標了約400億美元的杠桿收購，雖然這十年的資助引起了廣泛的第一個垃圾債券市場的崩潰，但是這一杠桿收購技術還活著，在一個更復雜的杠桿收購企業(yè)的收購資金支持下，產(chǎn)生了工業(yè)市場的新收購機會。杠桿收購的資金一般是通過百分之十或更少的股票賣給有限合伙，另外90%是銀行貸款及百分之次級貸款，通常的形式是高收益?zhèn)３蔀橐粋€杠桿收購的可能性時，目標公司的股價下降到需要購回本公司的債務來支付銷售下跌帶來的資產(chǎn)經(jīng)營活動所需的現(xiàn)金流量的支持的水平。杠桿收購不是價值最大化的問題，而是現(xiàn)金流量最大化。目標公司可能耗費了體力和智力在資本上，但是當一個杠桿收購進入市場時，管理層努力提升價值可能會失敗或被市場視為失敗，這樣可能會對公司產(chǎn)生重創(chuàng)。因此，這個持久的效果可能會使管理層錯過創(chuàng)造價值，提高股東價值的機會。這一概念是，如果股東能夠受益于精簡，管理人員可能早就做了裁員之類的事情。企業(yè)擺脫昂貴的裝飾，如昂貴的總部，無利可圖的項目，專注于核心業(yè)務，并審查經(jīng)濟價值觀的新收購和資本投資。財務管理研發(fā)對資金的影響比較顯著：長期研發(fā)，往往是縮減現(xiàn)有的業(yè)務，以支撐短期的現(xiàn)金流量。這一過程不僅發(fā)生在有杠桿收購模式的公司內(nèi)部，也在債務杠桿收購的公司。中央研究中心表示，縮減或淘汰規(guī)模來創(chuàng)造價值，已經(jīng)被直接運用連接到那些戰(zhàn)略業(yè)務單位。此外，一個企業(yè)受到外部威脅典型的反應是與行業(yè)的其他人合并，并消除重復創(chuàng)建總部帶來的資本消耗，提高銷售組織和研發(fā)業(yè)務的價值。這些費用明顯消除了產(chǎn)生的經(jīng)濟價值，成為了戰(zhàn)略價值的一個很大的成本問題。出處：彼得波爾，2002?財務管理的研發(fā)》.研究技術管理，《研究技術管理》，原文：R&DandFirmPerformanceinaTransitionEconomyINTRODUCTIONAccordingtointernationalcomparativestatisticstheEasternEuropeancountriesshowmuchlessinnovativeactivitythane.g.theEUaverageThismightbegoodorbad.IfthefirmsarenotcapableenoughtohandleR&Dprocessesitisgoodthattheyrecognizethis.Duringacountry,stransformationprocesstoamarketeconomy,adoptionofestablishedprocessesandproductsinconnectionwithproductvariationandcompetitiveproductionpossibilitiesareanattractivealternativetoinnovation.HowevermostobserversaskformoreR&Dinthesecountriesandforpolicieseasinginnovationinordertoincreasegrowth.Thosepolicyinterventionsarenotonlysubjectoftheoreticaldiscussions.SubsidiesgrantedbytheEuropeanCommissioninmembercountries,likethesixthframeworkprogram,arealsorelevantfortheaccessioncountriesoftheEuropeanUnion.PerhapsR&Dsubsidiesarepartlywastedifgrantedinanearlystageofthetransformationprocessandcouldbeusedinamoreproductiveway.ItmightbethecasethatinsteadofconductingresearchanddevelopmentfirmsintheseareasarebetteroffbytheproductionofestablishedproductsatlowercoststhanintheWesterncountries.Answerstothesequestionswouldsurelybehelpfulforthepolicydesignfortransformationprocesses.ThepurposeofourarticleistocomparethesuccessofinnovativeactivityinEasternandWesternGermanyinordertoinvestigatewhethertherearedifferenceswithrespecttoR&DperformancebetweenthetwopartsofreunifiedGermany.EasternGermanyisaveryspecialexampleofatransitioneconomy.ThemovementfromtheformerGermanDemocraticRepublictostatesoftheGermanFederalRepublicwasaccompaniedbytheintroductionofawellestablishedcurrency,astableandreliablelegalframeworkandahighlydevelopedsystemofindustrialrelations.AlthoughdifferencesbetweenbothpartsofthereunifiedGermanyaroseinthemeantime,thesearecertainlysmallerthanthosewithrespecttoothertransitioneconomics.Hencethisistheunparalleledopportunitytocompareanestablishedmarketeconomywithatransitioneconomyonthebasisofverysimilarenvironmentalconditions.Hence,theceterisparibusconditionapplies.R&DconductedbyEast-Germanfirmsisheavilysubsidizedasthepolicydecisionmakersregarditasbeingveryimportantthatthecompetitivenessofthesecompaniesisimprovedbytechnologicalleadership.Itremainstobeshownthatthesesubsidiesarenotwasted.WeintendtoanswerthisquestionbycomparingtheperformanceofEasternandWesternGermanenterprises.InnovationinatransitioneconomylikeEasternGermanymightsufferfromlackingexperiencewithboththecurrenttechnologicalfrontierandmechanismsatplaceinamarketeconomy.Forexample,outdatedhumancapitalmayoftenleadtoduplicateresearch(byaccident),orfirmscouldrelyonlyonimitation(onpurpose).Incombinationwithhighdemanduncertaintyandlackingexperienceinmarketingstrategy,investmentsinR&Dmaynotleadto(expected)returns.Reasonablereturnscouldbenecessarytosurviveforstartupfirms,though.Thepurposeofthispaperhastwodimensions:Ononehand,wecompareWesternandEasternGermanmanufacturingfirmsbyrelatingacreditratingindexasmeasureofperformancetoR&Dspendingandotherfirmcharacteristics.Ontheotherhand,weextendtheratingmodelbyasecondequationdealingwithfinancialdistressandbankruptcy.ThisisparticularlyinterestingbecauseEasternGermanmanufacturingispredominantlycomposedofsmallandmedium-sizedenterprisesthatwerenewlyfoundedaftertheGermanreunificationin1990.WeaskthequestionwhetherinvestmentinR&DisvaluedasinWesternGermany,orifagenciesratesuchfirmsmoreconservative,becauseyoungfirmslackacorrespondingtrackrecordonwhichtheratingcouldbebased.Thisstudycouldbehighlyrelevantforinnovationpolicy.EasternGermanfirmsreceiverelativelymoresubsidiesthantheirWesternGermancounterparts.TheGermangovernmentintendstofosterthetransformationprocessfromaplannedeconomytoaviablemarketeconomybyamongotherpolicies,anintensivesupportforinnovativeactivitiesinordertostrengthenthecompetitivenessoftheEasternGermanregions.If,however,innovationactivitiesintheEastdonotleadtosuccessfulproductsandmarketsuccess,butfailor,intheworstcase,putfirmsattheriskofbankruptcy,thispolicystrategymaybeaninefficientallocationofresources.Ourstudyisanextensionofthe(few)existingstudiesontheeffectsofinnovationsintransitioneconomies.Aghionetal.(2002)aswellasCarlinetal.(2004)investigatetheeffectofinnovationsongrowthofasampleof2,245respectively3,288firmsfrom24EasternEuropeancountriesandtheyfindthatsomecompetitivepressureisgoodforinnovativeness,buttoomuchcanbecounterproductive(Carlinetal.2004).Innovativenesshasapositiveimpactongrowth.However,itisnottestedwhetherinnovationshavealsoapositiveeffectonprofitability.KoningsandXavier(2002)utilizeinformationconcerninginnovationandusetheratioofintangibleassetstototalfixedassetsasanexogenousvariableexplainingsurvivalandgrowthforasampleof2,813Slovenianfirmsoverthetimeperiodfrom1994to1998.Itturnsoutthattheinnovationvariablehasnegative,yetinsignificant,coefficientsbothinthegrowthandthesurvivalequations.However,thisisafirstindicationthatinnovationmightnotsupportgrowthandsurvivaloffirmsinatransitioneconomy.Thisstandsincontrasttotheempiricalresultsestimatedforfirmsinnon-transitioncountries(seee.g.Hall1987,CefisandMarsili2006).Wearenotawareofastudythatdirectlycomparesnon-transitionandtransitioncountries.CONCEPTUALFRAMEWORKFirmperformancewithrespecttoR&Dhasbeenmeasuredbyavarietyofindicatorssuchasproductivity,profitability,andfirm,sstockmarketvaluations.Inthispaperweemployabroadmeasureencompassingproductivity,profitabilityandstockmarketvalue.Weapproximatetheoverallfirmvaluebyfirmscreditratings.Thefirmvalueisexpectedtoreflectthevalueofbothtangibleassetsandintangibleassets,inparticularknowledgecapital,theintangibleassetscreatedbyR&Dactivity.Itaccountsforbusinessandfinancialrisks,suchasindustrycharacteristics,competitiveposition,management,productivity,profitability,liquidityaswellasfinancialpolicyandflexibility.Thusitreflectsbothcurrentlyobservablefirmcharacteristicsandexpectationsregardingfuturedevelopments.Thestatementthatinnovativeactivityisariskyundertakingisclosetotriviality.Riskisexpectedtoaffectfirmvaluenegatively,astheprobabilityofabankruptcyoratleastpaymentdelayswillincrease.However,duetothefactthatinnovationisadrivingforceforeconomicsuccess,atrade-offbetweenriskandfuturesuccessexists.Theremightwellbeaninternaloptimumwhichmeansthat'some‘R&Disuseful,whilsttoomuchR&Ddoesnotmaximizethepresentfirmvalue.Thusa"moderately5successfullyR&Dperformingfirmisexpectedtohavehighrevenuesandagoodfinancialperformance.Inthelongrunaninnovativefirmmayhavebetterchancestosurvive,ifinvestmentsintotheseactivitiesarenottoolarge.AsideofthegeneralrelevanceofevaluatingtheeffectofR&Dactivityonfirmvalue,itisofspecificinterestinthecaseofEasternGermany.WeareabletocomparethemarketeconomyofWesternGermanywithaneconomyintransitionwherebothhavethesamecurrencyunit,thesamelegalsystem,thesameeconomicsystemandallotherimportantcontributionstothebusinessenvironment.Itshouldbenoted,though,thatinEasternGermanyamuchsmallershareofallworkersiscoveredbycollectivebargainingagreementsandthatmorethan15yearsaftertheunification,wagesarestilllowerinEasternGermany,onaverage.However,thisshouldimprovethecompetitivenessoftheaffectedcompanies.AftertheGermanreunificationin1990,theEastGermanindustrialsectormoreorlesscollapsed.Theexistinglargerfirmsweresoldtonewownersandarestructuringprocesstookplace.Amongintroductionsofotherpolicymeasures,R&Dhasbeenheavilysubsidizedinordertospeeduptheconvergenceprocess.Fosteringinnovationisclearlyintendedtoimprovethecompetitivenessofthecompaniesinquestionandthiswashighlyneededfortheformerproducersinacentrallygovernedplanningsociety.Inordertobeasuccessfulstimulustothecatching-upprocess,thesubsidiesmustbeusedefficientlywithinthefirm.Assaidaboveweusecreditratingsasthevariablereflectingeconomicperformanceofafirm.Inasecondstepofouranalysisweinvestigatewhethertheresultswefindwithrespecttotheratingarealsoreflectedinotherperformanceindicators.SinceEasternGermanfirmsare,onaverage,muchyoungerandsmallerthanWesternGermanfirms,theyfacehighermarketuncertainty.Thiscouldresultinmoreconservativeratingssimplyduetolackingtrackrecordsandexperiencewithsuchbusinesses.Inordertoassessapotentialdownwardbiasfornon-economicallymotivatedreasonsbytheratingagency,weverifyourfindingonthecreditratingbyanestimationofasecondequation.Asanalternativetotherating,weconsiderfinancialdistress.Althoughweobserveactualbankcruptcy,too,weprefertouseabroadermeasureoffinancialdistress,becausefirmbankruptciesarerareevents,andtheeconometricanalysisofsuchisdifficult.Financialdistressisdescribedbythepaymentbehavioroffirms.Adefaultiscertainlyanincidencethatalenderdefinitelywantstoavoid,butlatepaymentsarealsoaproblemandusuallyrelatedtofinanciallossesand,inaddition,itmaybeawarningthatmoreseriousproblemscouldariseinthenearfuture.Therefore,webelievethatpaymentbehaviorisanobjectivemeasureconcerningtheriskof