貨幣金融學(xué)（第十三版）課件 英文第8章 金融結(jié)構(gòu)的經(jīng)濟學(xué)分析

TheEconomicsofMoney,Banking,andFinancialMarketsThirteenthEditionChapter8AnEconomicAnalysisofFinancialStructureCopyright?2022,2019,2016PearsonEducation,Inc.AllRightsReservedPreviewAhealthyandvibranteconomyrequiresafinancialsystemthatmovesfundsfrompeoplewhosavetopeoplewhohaveproductiveinvestmentopportunities.LearningObjectives(1of2)8.1Identifyeightbasicfactsabouttheglobalfinancialsystem.8.2Summarizehowtransactioncostsaffectfinancialintermediaries.8.3Describewhyasymmetricinformationleadstoadverseselectionandmoralhazard.8.4Recognizeadverseselectionandsummarizethewaysinwhichtheycanbereduced.LearningObjectives(2of2)8.5Recognizetheprincipal-agentproblemarisingfrommoralhazardinequitycontractsandsummarizethemethodsforreducingit.8.6Summarizethemethodsusedtoreducemoralhazardindebtcontracts.BasicFactsAboutFinancialStructureThroughouttheWorldThischapterprovidesaneconomicanalysisofhowourfinancialstructureisdesignedtopromoteeconomicefficiency.ThebarchartinFigure1showshowAmericanbusinessesfinancedtheiractivitiesusingexternalfunds(thoseobtainedfromoutsidethebusinessitself)intheperiod1970–2000andcomparesU.S.datatothoseofGermany,Japan,andCanada.Figure1SourcesofExternalFundsforNonfinancialBusinesses:AComparisonoftheUnitedStateswithGermany,Japan,andCanadaSource:AndreasHackethalandReinhardH.Schmidt,“FinancingPatterns:MeasurementConceptsandEmpiricalResults,”JohannWolfgangGoethe-UniversitatWorkingPaperNo.125,January2004.Thedataarefrom1970–2000andaregrossflowsaspercentageofthetotal,notincludingtradeandothercreditdata,whicharenotavailable.8BasicFactsAboutFinancialStructureThroughouttheWorld(1of2)Stocksarenotthemostimportantsourcesofexternalfinancingforbusinesses.Issuingmarketabledebtandequitysecuritiesisnottheprimarywayinwhichbusinessesfinancetheiroperations.IndirectfinanceismanytimesmoreimportantthandirectfinanceFinancialintermediaries,particularlybanks,arethemostimportantsourceofexternalfundsusedtofinancebusinesses.8BasicFactsAboutFinancialStructureThroughouttheWorld(2of2)Thefinancialsystemisamongthemostheavilyregulatedsectorsoftheeconomy.Onlylarge,well-establishedcorporationshaveeasyaccesstosecuritiesmarketstofinancetheiractivities.Collateralisaprevalentfeatureofdebtcontractsforbothhouseholdsandbusinesses.Debtcontractsareextremelycomplicatedlegaldocumentsthatplacesubstantialrestrictivecovenantsonborrowers.TransactionCostsFinancialintermediarieshaveevolvedtoreducetransactioncosts.EconomiesofscaleExpertiseAsymmetricInformation:AdverseSelectionandMoralHazardAdverseselectionoccursbeforeatransactionoccurs.Moralhazardarisesafterthetransactionhasdeveloped.Agencytheoryanalyseshowasymmetricinformationproblemsaffecteconomicbehavior.TheLemonsProblem:HowAdverseSelectionInfluencesFinancialStructureIfqualitycannotbeassessed,thebuyeriswillingtopayatmostapricethatreflectstheaveragequality.Sellersofgoodqualityitemswillnotwanttosellatthepriceforaveragequality.Thebuyerwilldecidenottobuyatallbecauseallthatisleftinthemarketispoorqualityitems.Thisproblemexplainsfact2andpartiallyexplainsfact1.ToolstoHelpSolveAdverseSelectionProblemsPrivateproductionandsaleofinformationFree-riderproblemGovernmentregulationtoincreaseinformationNotalwaysworkstosolvetheadverseselectionproblem,explainsFact5FinancialintermediationExplainsfacts3,4,&6CollateralandnetworthExplainsfact7TheEnronImplosionEnronCorporationdeclaredbankruptcyinDecember2001,uptothatpointthelargestbankruptcydeclarationinU.S.historyTheEnroncollapseillustratesthatgovernmentregulationcanlessenasymmetricinformationproblemsbutcannoteliminatethem.TheEnronbankruptcynotonlyincreasedconcernsinfinancialmarketsaboutthequalityofaccountinginformationsuppliedbycorporationsbutalsoledtohardshipformanyofthefirm’sformeremployees,whofoundthattheirpensionshadbecomeworthlessHowMoralHazardAffectstheChoiceBetweenDebtandEquityContractsCalledthePrincipal-AgentProblem:Principal:lessinformation(stockholder)Agent:moreinformation(manager)SeparationofownershipandcontrolofthefirmManagerspursuepersonalbenefitsandpowerratherthantheprofitabilityofthefirm.ToolstoHelpSolvethePrincipal-AgentProblemMonitoring(CostlyStateVerification)Free-riderproblemFact1GovernmentregulationtoincreaseinformationFact5FinancialIntermediationFact3DebtContractsFact1HowMoralHazardInfluencesFinancialStructureinDebtMarketsBorrowershaveincentivestotakeonprojectsthatareriskierthanthelenderswouldlike.Thispreventstheborrowerfrompayingbacktheloan.ToolstoHelpSolveMoralHazardinDebtContractsNetworthandcollateralIncentivecompatibleMonitoringandenforcementofrestrictivecovenantsDiscourageundesirablebehaviorEncouragedesirablebehaviorKeepcollateralvaluableProvideinformationFinancialintermediationFacts3&4SummaryTable1AsymmetricInformationProblemsandToolstoSolveThem(1of2)AsymmetricInformationProblemToolstoSolveItExplainsFactNumberAdverseselectionPrivateproductionandsaleofinformation1,2BlankGovernmentregulationtoincreaseinformation5BlankFinancialintermediation3,4,6BlankCollateralandnetworth7Moralhazardinequitycontracts(principal–agentproblem)Productionofinformation:monitoring1BlankGovernmentregulationtoincreaseinformation5BlankFinancialintermediation3BlankDebtcontracts1SummaryTable1AsymmetricInformationProblemsandToolstoSolveThem(2of2)AsymmetricInformationProblemToolstoSolveItExplainsFactNumberMoralhazardindebtcontractsCollateralandnetworth6,7BlankMonitoringandenforcementofrestrictivecovenants8BlankFinancialintermediation3,4Note:Listoffacts:Stocksarenotthemostimportantsourceofexternalfinancing.Marketablesecuritiesarenottheprimarysourceoffinancing.Indirectfinanceismoreimportantthandirectfinance.Banksarethemostimportantsourceofexternalfunds.Thefinancialsystemisheavilyregulated.Onlylarge,well-establishedfirmshaveaccesstosecuritiesmarkets.Collateralisprevalentindebtcontracts.Debtcontractshavenumerousrestrictivecovenants.Application:FinancialDevelopmentandEconomicGrowth(1of2)Financialrepressioncreatedbyaninstitutionalenvironmentischaracterizedby:Poorsystemofpropertyrights(unabletousecollateralefficiently)Poorlegalsystem(difficultforlenderstoenforcerestrictivecovenants)Weakaccountingstandards(lessaccesstogoodinformation)Governmentinterventionthroughdirectedcreditprogramsandstate-ownedbanks(lessincentivetoproperchannelfundstoitsmostproductiveuse)Application:FinancialDevelopmentandEconomicGrowth(2of2)Thefinancialsystemsindevelopingandtransitioncountriesfaceseveraldifficultiesthatkeepthemfromoperatingefficiently.Inmanydevelopingcountries,thesystemofpropertyrights(theruleoflaw,constraintsongovernmentexpropriation,absenceofcorruption)functionspoorly,makingithardtousethesetwotoolseffectively.TheTyrannyofCollateralTouseproperty,suchaslandorcapital,ascollateral,apersonmustlegallyownit.Unfortunately,itisextremelyexpensiveandtime-consumingforthepoorindevelopingcountriestomaketheirownershipofpropertylegal.Whenthefinancialsystemisunabletousecollateraleffectively,theadverseselectionproblemworsensbecausethelenderneedsevenmoreinformationaboutthequalityoftheborrowerinordertodistinguishagoodloanfromabadone.Littlelendingwilltakeplace,especiallyintransactionsthatinvolvecollateral,suchasmortgages.Application:IsChinaaCounterexampletotheImportanceofFinancialDevelopment?AsChinagetsricher,thestrategyofmaintainingahighsavingsratetosupporteconomicgrowthi