貨幣金融學(xué)（第十三版）課件 英文第10章 金融監(jiān)管的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)分析

TheEconomicsofMoney,Banking,andFinancialMarketsThirteenthEditionChapter10EconomicAnalysisofFinancialRegulationCopyright?2022,2019,2016PearsonEducation,Inc.AllRightsReservedPreviewThischapterdevelopsaneconomicanalysisoffinancialregulation.LearningObjectives10.1Identifythereasonsforandformsofagovernmentsafetynetinfinancialmarkets.10.2Listandsummarizethetypesoffinancialregulationandhoweachreducesasymmetricinformationproblems.AsymmetricInformationasaRationaleforFinancialRegulationBankpanicsandtheneedfordepositinsurance:F

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C:shortcircuitsbankfailuresandcontagioneffectPayoffmethodPurchaseandassumptionmethod(typicallymorecostlyfortheF

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C)Otherformofgovernmentsafetynet:Lendingfromthecentralbanktotroubledinstitutions(lenderoflastresort)TheSpreadofGovernmentDepositInsuranceThroughouttheWorld:IsThisaGoodThing?Hasgovernmentdepositinsurancehelpedimprovetheperformanceofthefinancialsystemandpreventbankingcrises?Theanswerseemstobe“no.”ResearchattheWorldBankseemstoanswer“no,”sinceonaverage,theadoptionofexplicitgovernmentdepositinsuranceisassociatedwithlessbankingsectorstabilityandahigherincidenceofbankingcrises.Furthermore,onaverage,depositinsuranceseemstoretardfinancialdevelopment.DrawbacksoftheGovernmentSafetyNetMoralHazardDepositorsdonotimposedisciplineofmarketplaceFinancialinstitutionshaveanincentivetotakeongreaterriskAdverseSelectionRisk-loversfindbankingattractiveDepositorshavelittlereasontomonitorfinancialinstitutions“TooBigtoFail”Governmentprovidesguaranteesofrepaymenttolargeuninsuredcreditorsofthelargestfinancialinstitutionsevenwhentheyarenotentitledtothisguarantee.UsesthepurchaseandassumptionmethodIncreasesmoralhazardincentivesforbigbanksFinancialConsolidationandtheGovernmentSafetyNetLargerandmorecomplexfinancialorganizationschallengeregulation:Increased“toobigtofail”problemExtendssafetynettonewactivities,increasingincentivesforrisk-takingintheseareas(ashasoccurredduringtheglobalfinancialcrisisTypesofFinancialRegulation:RestrictionsonAssetHoldingsAttemptstorestrictfinancialinstitutionsfromtoomuchrisktaking:BankregulationsPromotediversificationProhibitholdingsofcommonstockCapitalrequirementsMinimumleverageratio(forbanks)BaselAccord:risk-basedcapitalrequirementsRegulatoryarbitrageTypesofFinancialRegulation:CapitalRequirementsGovernment-imposedcapitalrequirementsareanotherwayofminimizingmoralhazardatfinancialinstitutionsTherearetwoforms:Basedontheleverageratio,theamountofcapitaldividedbythebank’stotalassets:tobeclassifiedaswellcapitalized,abank’sleverageratiomustexceed5%;alowerleverageratio,especiallyonebelow3%,triggersincreasedregulatoryrestrictionsonthebank.Risk-basedcapitalrequirementsRegulatoryarbitrageproblemWhereIstheBaselAccordHeadingAftertheGlobalFinancialCrisis?(1of3)StartinginJune1999,theBaselCommitteeonBankingSupervisionreleasedseveralproposalstoreformtheoriginal1988BaselAccord.TheseeffortshaveculminatedinwhatbanksupervisorsrefertoasBasel2,whichisbasedonthreepillars.WhereIstheBaselAccordHeadingAftertheGlobalFinancialCrisis?(2of3)Pillar1linkscapitalrequirementsforlarge,internationallyactivebanksmorecloselytoactualriskofthreetypes:marketrisk,creditrisk,andoperationalrisk.Pillar2focusesonstrengtheningthesupervisoryprocess,particularlyinassessingthequalityofriskmanagementinbankinginstitutionsandevaluatingwhethertheseinstitutionshaveadequateproceduresinplacefordetermininghowmuchcapitaltheyneed.WhereIstheBaselAccordHeadingAftertheGlobalFinancialCrisis?(3of3)Pillar3focusesonimprovingmarketdisciplinethroughincreaseddisclosureofdetailsaboutabank’screditexposures,itsamountofreservesandcapital,theofficialswhocontrolthebank,andtheeffectivenessofitsinternalratingsystem.FinancialSupervision:PromptCorrectiveActionIftheamountofafinancialinstitution’scapitalfallstolowlevels,seriousproblemsresult.Topreventthis,theFederalDepositInsuranceCorporationImprovementActof1991adoptedpromptcorrectiveactionprovisionsthatrequiretheF

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Ctointerveneearlierandmorevigorouslywhenabankgetsintotrouble.FinancialSupervision:CharteringandExaminationChartering(screeningofproposalstoopennewfinancialinstitutions)topreventadverseselectionExaminations(scheduledandunscheduled)tomonitorcapitalrequirementsandrestrictionsonassetholdingtopreventmoralhazardCapitaladequacyAssetqualityManagementEarningsLiquiditySensitivitytomarketriskFilingperiodic“callreports”AssessmentofRiskManagementGreateremphasisonevaluatingsoundnessofmanagementprocessesforcontrollingriskTradingActivitiesManualof1994forriskmanagementratingbasedon:QualityofoversightprovidedAdequacyofpoliciesandlimitsforallriskyactivitiesQualityoftheriskmeasurementandmonitoringsystemsAdequacyofinternalcontrolsInterest-raterisklimits:InternalpoliciesandproceduresInternalmanagementandmonitoringImplementationofstresstestingandvalue-atrisk(V

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R)DisclosureRequirementsRequirementstoadheretostandardaccountingprinciplesandtodisclosewiderangeofinformationTheBasel2accordandtheS

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CputaparticularemphasisondisclosurerequirementsTheSarbanes-OxleyActof2002establishedthePublicCompanyAccountingOversightBoardMark-to-market(fair-value)accountingConsumerProtectionConsumerProtectionActof1969(Truth-in-lendingAct)FairCreditBillingActof1974EqualCreditOpportunityActof1974,extendedin1976CommunityReinvestmentActThesubprimemortgagecrisisillustratedtheneedforgreaterconsumerprotection.RestrictionsonCompetitionJustifiedasincreasedcompetitioncanalsoincreasemoralhazardincentivestotakeonmorerisk.Branchingrestrictions(eliminatedin1994)Glass-SteagallAct(repeatedin1999)Disadvantages:HigherconsumerchargesDecreasedefficiencyInternationalFinancialRegulationParticularproblemsinfinancialregulationoccurwhenfinancialinstitutionsoperateinmanycountriesandthuscanshifttheirbusinessreadilyfromonecountrytoanother.Financialregulatorscloselyexaminethedomesticoperationsoffinancialinstitutionsintheirowncountry,buttheyoftendonothavetheknowledgeorabilitytokeepaclosewatchonoperationsinothercountriesTable1MajorFinancialLegislationintheUnitedStates(1of5)FederalReserveAct(1913)CreatedtheFederalReserveSystemMcFaddenActof1927EffectivelyprohibitedbanksfrombranchingacrossstatelinesPutnationalandstatebanksonequalfootingregardingbranchingBankingActsof1933(Glass-Steagall)and1935CreatedtheF

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CSeparatedcommercialbankingfromthesecuritiesindustryProhibitedinterestoncheckabledepositsandrestrictedsuchdepositstocommercialbanksPutinterest-rateceilingsonotherdepositsSecuritiesActof1933andSecuritiesExchangeActof1934RequiredthatinvestorsreceivefinancialinformationonsecuritiesofferedforpublicsaleProhibitedmisrepresentationsandfraudinthesaleofsecuritiesCreatedtheSecuritiesandExchangeCommission(S

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C)InvestmentCompanyActof1940andInvestmentAdvisersActof1940Regulatedinvestmentcompanies,includingmutualfundsRegulatedinvestmentadvisersTable1MajorFinancialLegislationintheUnitedStates(2of5)BankHoldingCompanyActandDouglasAmendment(1956)Clarifiedthestatusofbankholdingcompanies(B

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Cs)GavetheFederalReserveregulatoryresponsibilityforB

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CsDepositoryInstitutionsDeregulationandMonetaryControlAct(D

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A)of1980GavethriftinstitutionswiderlatitudeinactivitiesApprovedN

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WandsweepaccountsnationwidePhasedoutinterest-rateceilingsondepositsImposeduniformreserverequirementsondepositoryinstitutionsEliminatedusuryceilingsonloansIncreaseddepositinsuranceto$100,000peraccountDepositoryInstitutionsActof1982(Garn-St.Germain)GavetheF

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CandtheFederalSavingsandLoanInsuranceCorporation(F

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C)emergencypowerstomergebanksandthriftsacrossstatelinesAlloweddepositoryinstitutionstooffermoneymarketdepositaccounts(M

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s)GrantedthriftswiderlatitudeincommercialandconsumerlendingTable1MajorFinancialLegislationintheUnitedStates(3of5)CompetitiveEqualityinBankingAct(C

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A)of1987Provided$10.8billiontoshoreuptheF

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CMadeprovisionsforregulatoryforbearanceindepressedareasFinancialInstitutionsReform,Recovery,andEnforcementAct(F

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A)of1989Providedfundstoresolvesavingsandloan(S&L)failuresEliminatedF

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CandtheFederalHomeLoanBankBoardCreatedtheOfficeofThriftSupervisiontoregulatethriftsCreatedtheResolutionTrustCorporationtoresolveinsolventthriftsRaiseddepositinsurancepremiumsReimposedrestrictionsonS&LactivitiesFederalDepositInsuranceCorporationImprovementAct(F

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A)of1991RecapitalizedtheF

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CLimitedbrokereddepositsandthetoo-big-to-failpolicyTable1MajorFinancialLegislationintheUnitedStates(4of5)SetprovisionsforpromptcorrectiveactionInstructedtheF

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Ctoestablishrisk-basedpremiumsIncreasedexaminations,capitalrequirements,andreportingrequirementsIncludedtheForeignBankSupervisionEnhancementAct(F

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A),whichstrengthenedtheFed’sauthoritytosuperviseforeignbanksRiegle-NealInterstateBankingandBranchingEfficiencyActof1994OverturnedprohibitionofinterstatebankingAllowedbranchingacrossstatelinesGramm-Leach-BlileyFinancialServicesModernizationActof1999RepealedGlass-SteagallandremovedtheseparationofbankingandsecuritiesindustriesSarbanes-OxleyActof2002CreatedPublicCompanyAccountingOversightBoard(P

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B)ProhibitedcertainconflictsofinterestRequiredcertificationbyC

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OoffinancialstatementsandindependenceofauditcommitteeTable1MajorFinancialLegislationintheUnitedStates(5of5)FederalDepositInsuranceReformActof2005MergedtheBankInsuranceFundandtheSavingsAssociationInsuranceFundIncreaseddepositinsuranceonindividualretirementaccountsto$250,000peraccountDodd-FrankWallSt