麥格理全球宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)年中展望貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)和它造成的損失

1、8 July 2019 GlobalThis publication has been prepared by Sales and Trading and is not a product of the Macquarie Research Department.nel at MacquarieMACRO STRATEGYGlobal Economic and Markets Outlook: Mid-Year UpdateThe Tariffs and the Damage DoneThis year marks the 10thof the global expansion, making

2、 it thelongest in the post-war period. While global GDP growth has averaged a respectable 2% saar a pace similar to the average of the past 40 years in the main it has felt unfulfilling, as central banks have worked (mostly unassisted by the political classes) to support output in the face of numero

3、us structural headwinds. While we dont think expansions die of old age, the ongoing slowdown, along with the recent tariff increases, has seen markets once again contemplate the possibility of recession.The big “known unknown” is the path of the trade war. While the probability of a further escalati

4、on is difficult to assess, in our central scenario we assume the US announces a 10% tariff on the remaining imports from China in September, before a longer-lasting “ceasefire” in the New Year, just in time for the US election (we see the probability of an H2 escalation as something like 60%).In thi

5、s world, after slowing to around 2% saar in Q2, global GDP growth is likely to dip to a little below 2% by Q4, before gradually recovering nextEconomists/StrategistsMacquarie Securities (Australia) LimitedRic Deverell +61 2 8232 4307 ric.deveJustin Fabo +61 2 8232 0696 justin.Hayden Skilling, CFA +6

6、1 2 8232 2623 hayden.skilMacquarie Capital Markets CanadaDavid Doyle, CFAdavid.d.Neil Shankarneil.shaMacquarie Capital LimitedLarry Hu, PhDlarryear, as Fed easing,stimulus (we expect another push in early Q4) anddiminished trade uncertainty support activity.Irene WuirenWhile the risk of recession co

7、ntinues to build the NY Feds yield curve-basedmestimates a probability of around 30% the slowdown still feels moreLynn Zhaolynn.+86 21 2412 9035like a repeat of 2012 and 2016 than the beginning of something more sinister.With trade and industrial production already weak, however, the risk is that bu

8、siness investment continues to slow in the face of higher tariffs and policy uncertainty (as has already occurred in the UK as Brexit uncertainty weighs). Businesses could also slow hiring, which in turn could hit consumption.Melody Dong +86 21 2412 9085 melody.Macquarie Capital (Europe) LimitedTom

9、Pricetom.pWe expect the Fed to cut the fed funds rate three times over the next 6 months, while the ECB will cut the deposit rate by 10 basis points to minus 50, and possibly restart QE. Long-term interest rates are likely to fall modestly further in H2, but then move a little higher over 2020 as gr

10、owth recovers.However, with growth in the US expected to be around trend next year, it is unlikely the Fed will be able to reverse the cuts ahead of the next mini downturn that could arrive sometime in 2021, suggesting limited upside for yields.Higher tariffs could see currency safe havens benefit i

11、n H2, with the US dollar and the Yen the prime beneficiaries. However, as the year comes to an end, enthusiasm for a “weak” dollar among the US political classes could build.For commodity markets this suggests further downward pressure over the remainder of this year, although as always performance

12、will diverge, with gold benefiting from the uncertainty while iron ore and copper come under pressure.Equity markets are already pricing recovery, and could feel disappointed in the next few months as growth slows. However, history suggests that the market is likely to be supported by the economic r

13、ecovery in 2020 once the Fed “put” is in play, equities only fall materially if the economy tips into recession.Vivienne Lloydvivienne.l+44 20 3037 4530Serafino Capoferri +44 20 3037 2517 serafino.capofJim Lennon, Senior Commodities Consultant+44 20 3037 4271jim.leEimear Daly +44 20 3037 4802 eimear

14、.Macquarie Bank Limited Singapore BranchGareth Berrygareth.bMacquarie Futures USA LLCThierry Wizmanthierry.wiMacquarie Bank LimitedTrang Thuy Letrang.thBranchSales and Tradingnel at Macquarie are not independent and, therefore, the information herein may be subject to certains ofinterest, and may ha

15、ve been shared with other parties prior to publication. Note: To the extent Macquarie Research is referenced, it isidentified as such and the associated disclaimers are included in the published research report. Please refer to the important disclosures alesandtradingdisclaimer.獲取報(bào)告1、2、3、每周群內(nèi)7+報(bào)告；當(dāng)日

16、華爾街日報(bào)、4、行研報(bào)告均為公開利歸原作者所有，起點(diǎn)財(cái)經(jīng)僅分發(fā)做內(nèi)部學(xué)習(xí)。掃一掃關(guān)注 回復(fù)：加入“起點(diǎn)財(cái)經(jīng)”群。Global Economic and Markets Outlook: Mid-Year UpdateContentsGlobal economic outlook: In the eye of the tariff storm3United States: Trade policy uncertainty and slower growth9China: Stimulus could escalate later this year13Eurozone: ECB lift-off

17、 unlikely before the next downturn17Japan: Sustained monetaryodation amid weak inflation20Australia: Cork in the ocean23New Zealand: Cork in the ocean (too)27Canada: Stabilization, but structural imbalances remain29EMs ex-China & India: A disproportionate growth drag31Rates outlook: Time for “Insura

18、nce”33FX outlook: Hinging on the CNY, but USD policy will matter too37Commodities outlook: Demand, impaired39Equities outlook: The Fed put vs. sluggish growth43Economic and market forecasts458 July 20192Global Economic and Markets Outlook: Mid-Year UpdateRic Deverell+61 2 8232 4307ric.deveHayden Ski

19、lling, CFA+61 2 8232 2623hayden.skilGlobal economic outlook: In the eye of the tariff storm2018/2019 taxonomy of a slowdown“You have to know the past to understand the present”.Carl SaganThe global slowdown that commenced in late 2017 has continued in recent months, with the pace of GDP growth dippi

20、ng to something like 2% saar in Q2, down from 2% in Q1. While fears of recession have increased, growth remains significantly stronger than the low point in the mini-cycles of 2016 and 2012 (1% and 1% respectively) and well above the 1% y/y seen at the trough of most “global recessions” see A short

21、history of “global recessions” - The US in the driving seat.The initial phase of the slowdown was part of the regular cycle growth was never likely to stay at the well above average 3% pace seen in 2017Q3 however, the weakness over the past year looks to have been exacerbated by the trade war betwee

22、n the US and China, with the fading US fiscal stimulus also a factor this year.Fig 1 Global growth has dipped meaningfully belowaverageFig 2 with the slowdown in trade weighing on both industrial production and GDPGlobal IP Growth3m/3m annualisedGlobal TraJanuaryIndexPer cent12515129630-3-6-9-12-151

23、20115GIndustrial production110105100*Dashed line indicates post-1980 average, while*Dashed lines indicate implementatio of major US-China tariffsgrey shaded areas indicate US recessions.958085909500051012131415Source: NBER, Macrobond, Macquarie Macro StrategySource: IMF, Macrobond, Macquarie Macro S

24、trategyAs shown in thepanying figures, global trade, industrial production and GDP have onaverage grown at the same pace in recent years, with the cycles heavily interrelated industrial production and trade tend to have a higher cyclical amplitude, while GDP is a little smoother.Following the imposi

25、tion of US tariffs on $250 billion of US imports between July and September last year, global trade volumes declined heavily, falling by 2.9% between October and December.This weighed on global IP, with the level of production essentially flat from October to April around the weakest it has been in

26、recent decades (outside recession).With a lag, the trade and IP weakness has also begun to weigh on GDP, with growth slowing from an above-average 3% saar in H1 last year to a below-average 2% saar in Q2 this year.The biggest impact on domestic demand has been through business investment, with growt

27、h slowing in most of the major economies in the past year.While consumption growth has also slowed, as is normally the case it has been less impacted. As we previously demonstrated, this is not terribly surprising as consumption (and services in particular) rarely moves as much as trade, production

28、and investment, even during recession.8 July 20193Global Economic and Markets Outlook: Mid-Year UpdateFig 3 Trade, GDP and industrial production growth tend to cycle together, with GDP more stable than the othersFig 4 Global trade is a key factor in global investment, with the trade weakness beginni

29、ng to weigh as uncertainty buildsGlobal Trade & Output3m/3m annualised grow thBusiness Investment & Global TradeQuarterly, year-ended growthPer centPer centPer cent121086420-2-4-6-84.520Major advanced economies*, real business investmentIndustrial production (LHS)154.0103.553.002.5-52.0Global realtr

30、ade-10GDP(quarterly, RHS)1.5Real trade (LHS)-15*Includes Canada, Germany, Japan, UK, and US1.0-2014151617181998 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18Source: IMF, Macrobond, Macquarie Macro StrategySource: Macrobond, Macquarie Macro StrategyThe outlook: Living on the edgeThe key question for markets is wheth

31、er the slowdown will continue, or whether a base is being formed? To that end, the recent hard data have been encouraging, with global industrial production momentum (3m/3m saar) improving from zero in February to around 2% in May.In normal circumstances, this rebound would suggest that broader meas

32、ures of global growth will soon bottom out, and that a recovery will start in the second half of the year. In the current cycle, however, the trade threat remains front and centre, with the full impact of the May/June tariff increases yet to be seen.To that end, the PMI surveys have not reflected th

33、e improvement in the hard production data, with the global manufacturing PMI falling further in June the new orders component has dipped again, after earlier signs of stabilisation while the composite PMI was flat. This, along with the fact that global trade has yet to recover back in line with the

34、level of global IP suggests that growth could slow further in Q3 (see Global Trade Is the recovery over before it began?). With a further 10% tariff on the remainder of the USs imports from China expected in September, we suspect growth will continue to slow in Q4. In many economies, GDP in Q1 was f

35、lattered by an inventory and net export boost that will unwind in Q2, suggesting that the Q2 GDP outturn could be materially weaker than Q1.Fig 5 Global IP momentum has been recovering since February, although the global PMI has fallen again recentlyFig 6 with the recovery broad-based outside the US

36、, which continues to lagGlobal Industrial Production GrowthIP Growth3m/3m annualisedPer centIndexPer cent655545352511210Global manufacturingPMI (RHS)5China4864US32Average(1980-Present)5020149048-2-4-6Industrial production grow th, monthly (LHS)Globalex-US & ChinaIndustrial production grow th, annual

37、ised 3m/3m (LHS)-147-24612 13 14 15 16 17 181912 13 14 1516 17 18 19Source: IHS Markit, Macrobond, Macquarie Macro StrategySource: Macrobond, Macquarie Macro Strategy8 July 20194Global Economic and Markets Outlook: Mid-Year UpdatePolicy to the rescue?While the temptation is to focus on the negative,

38、 as we noted in The Slowdown Scare of 2019 Mid-cycle correction or impending recession?, the global economy has had several “mini cycles” in the past decade, with central banks turning dovish each time growth has slowed. And while there is less monetary policy ammunition than seen in the past, the U

39、S and China remain the main drivers of the global economy (growth in Japan and Europe is essentially derivative), with both retaining significant capacity to stimulate. In the US, the Fed is likely to cut the fed funds rate by 75 basis points over the next 6-9 months, with long-term rates having alr

40、eady fallen dramatically the 10-year is down 120 basis points to 2% and the key 30-year mortgage rate has fallen by a similar amount since November. Working against this, however, is the fact that the fiscal stimulus continues to abate, with recent CBO estimates suggesting that fiscal spending could

41、 turn contractionary later this year. In China, while the initial stimulus late last year has faded, as growth continues to slow weexpect policy to once again turnmodative in Q4 see G20 and China June PMI In linewith consensus, still too early for big stimulus.Fig 7 US 30-year mortgage rates have fa

42、llen materially, providing a big boost to the economyFig 8 Working against that, the fiscal stimulus turns to a drag this yearUS 30-Year Mortgage RateUS Federal Government SpendingNominal, quarterly annualised grow thPer centPer cent5.51086420-2-4-6-8-105.0Forecasts4.54.0Actual3.53.01011121314151617

43、18191Q173Q17 1Q18 3Q18 1Q19 3Q19 1Q20 3Q20Source: Macrobond, Macquarie Macro StrategySource: BEA, CBO, Macquarie Macro StrategyThis all suggests to us that while global growth will remain subdued for a time, absent another major tariff increase, it should begin to recover early next year. Indeed, if

44、 there is no trade war escalation later this year, the recovery could occur more quickly than suggested by our central scenario.That said, we suspect that the upswing next year could be more modest than those seen in previous mini cycles, a phenomenon likely to be exacerbated by the fact that unempl

45、oyment is now very low in the major economies, suggesting that there is little spare capacity. China is likely to continue to structurally slow, while the US looks unlikely to benefit from another fiscal stimulus.Looking further ahead, if the recent pattern is repeated, the US and global economies c

46、ould enter yet another “slowdown” scare in 18 months to 2 years time, with the risk of recession in the coming year or two after that relatively high given diminished policy space and very tight labour markets.With the trade war still working its way through the system, we doubt the Fed will be game

47、 to hike during the coming slow upswing, which will mean we enter the 2021 downturn with even less policy space than at present.In this world, most of the other major central banks keep rates at end 2019 levels through 2020.8 July 20195Global Economic and Markets Outlook: Mid-Year UpdateFig 9 We exp

48、ect GDP growth to begin to recover later this year, but for the recovery to remain relatively subduedFig 10 Recent up cycles have lasted around 2 years, suggesting the next “slowdown scare” could arrive in 2021Global GDP GrowthMarket exchange rate w eightedGlobal GDP Growth & PMIIndexPer centPer cen

49、t5564.021 months24 monthsAv erage (1980-Present)Year-ended(no escalation)Quarterly annualised GDP grow th* (RHS)4553.53542Global recession3.0Year-ended (central)5312.5052Quarterly (central)-12.051-2Markit Composite PMI (monthly, LHS)1.550-3*Dashed line indicates forecasts-4491.090 92 94 96 98 00 02

50、04 06 0810 12 14 16 18 20121314151617181920Source: IMF, Macrobond, Macquarie Macro StrategySource: IHS Markit, IMF, Macrobond, Macquarie Macro StrategyRisksUnsurprisingly, the key risk remains yet another increase in trade tensions. While peace was declared at the G-20 meeting in late June, Mr Trump

51、 has in the past shown that such agreements can prove fleeting, with the risk of further tariffs still very real. A Q1 “truce” ahead of the election is our base case, but we suspect that the tensions between China and the US will be ongoing, and see little prospect of a near term “solution” that inv

52、olves all of the recent tariffs being removed.If the tensions continue to escalate, we suspect the impact could be significant. In a speech on 2July, Bank of England Governor, Mark Carney, noted that “while traditional ms suggest thatthe direct effects of the tariff measures implemented so far are l

53、ikely to be small, these estimates may underestimate the non-linear effects of tariffs on tightly integrated global supply chains.” To that end, Mr Carney noted that the indirect effects of trade tensions on business confidence and investment can be much more material than the direct effects alone,

54、as seen in the UK, where business investment has flatlined since the referendum. To us the biggest risk is that ongoing uncertainty sees the slowdown in business investment intensify recessions are generally driven by a big fall in investment with businesses also starting to cut back on hiring as the uncertainty lingers.Fig 11 Brexit uncertainty has seen UK investment flatlineFig 12 Business investment normally drives recessionBusiness Investm