英國智庫-6G的戰(zhàn)略設(shè)置：中國和美國的路徑（英）

StrategicSettingsfor6G:PathwaysforChinaandtheUSJohnLee,MeiaNouwensandKaiLinTayAugust2022TheInternationalInstituteforStrategicStudiesContentsExecutiveSummary2ChapterOne:6G:TechnicalFundamentals,EnablingTechnologiesandEnvisagedUses4ChapterTwo:DevelopmentoftheWirelessTelecommunicationsSector6TheUSPathTowards5Gand6G7ChinasPathTowardsGandGChapterThree:WirelessTelecomsInnovationEcosystems12AcademicCollaborationandKnowledgeNetworks12CollaborationBetweentheUSandChina13RoleofGovernment14RoleofIndustry16StandardSetting18ChapterFour:GeopoliticsofWirelessInnovation19ChapterFive:DefenceandSecurityImplicationsfortheUSandChina21Conclusion23ExecutiveSummaryationsisakeyemergingtechnologythathasalreadybecomeafieldforinternationalstrategiccompetition,mostnotablybetweentheUnitedStatesandChina.BydramaticallyincreasingcapacityeringlatencyforwirelessdatatransmissionGpromisestoenableapplicationsonnewordersofmag-tativelynewTheseeffectswilltranslateintocomparativenationaleconomicperfor-manceandintomilitarycapabilitiesavailabletostates.6G’sperformanceparametersarestillbeingdefined,anditsenablingtechnologiesarestillinrelativelyearlystagesofresearchanddevelopment(R&D).However,boththeUSandChina,motivatedbytheirintensify-ingstrategicrivalry,arealreadyprioritisingthetech-nology’sdevelopmentandexploringitspotentialformilitaryuses.Whereasnational-securityconcernsaround5Garefocusedonitspotentialforespionageorsabotagethroughthepresenceinnetworksofequipmentfrompoliticallyuntrustedactors,6Gwilldirectlyimpacttheinternationalbalanceofmilitarycapabilities.Forexam-ple,oneof6G’sexpectedmilitaryusesisrapid,reliableandsecuretransmissionofmuchhighervolumesofdatabetweenfast-movingmilitaryplatforms,includinginouterspaceforballistic-missileearlywarning.Todate,Washingtonhasnotprioritiseddevelop-mentofnext-generationtelecomstotheextentthatBeijinghas,notablyindeploymentof5Ginfrastruc-tureandservices.Theupshotislong-termerosionoftheUStelecomsequipmentindustry.Atthesametime,theUSstillhasstrengthsinitsinnovationecosystemslpositionedinkeyenablingtechnologiesfornext-generationtelecoms,forexamplecapabilitiesinsoftwareandsemiconductors.TheUSisnowshiftingtowardsamoreactivegovernmentroleinluding6G.Washingtonisalsopursuingpartnershipswithalliedandpartnernationstoaccelerateaswellascoor-sinwaysthatincreasinglyexcludeChinaandcapitaliseonUSstrengths.China’sapproachtotechnologicaldevelopmentisunderdirectgovernmentinfluenceandtomanipu-latemarketsandglobalstandardssettinginBeijing’sfavour.ThisstatistapproachhashelpedChinesefirmsandresearchinstitutionsimmensely.Fromanegligibleroleintheglobaltelecomsindustryinthe1980s,Chinanowholdsadvantageouspositionsinmanyaspectsoflecomsprovidingastrongfoundationfortationsofrelevantenablingorprecursortechnologies.However,China’scapacitytodevelop6Gfacesmajorconstraintsfromcontinuingrelianceonforeigntechno-logicalinputsandUStargetingofthesedependenciesthroughexportcontrolsaswellasothermeasures.Giventhepotentiallysignificanteffectsof6Gonnationalsecurityandeconomics,coupledwithincreas-inglydiverginggeopoliticalinterestsbetweentheUSandChina,competitioninthisfieldamongthetwoalongsideothertechnologicallycapablestatesisationwillincreasinglyextendtothird-partymarketsasmorecountriesbuildnext-generationtelecomsinfrastructure–withimplica-tionsforinternationaltechnologicalecosystemsandtheglobalbalanceoftechnologicalpower.ardommercialavailcomingyearsthusprovideawindowtoframepolicy-researchagendasfor6Gandtoexaminetheunderlyingationecosystemsforfuturewirelesstelecomsdevelopment.ThisrequiresagraspofthebasicpositionsoftheUSandChinainitsdevelopmentandthewaythesetwostates’intensifyingrivalrywillshapeevolutionofaglobaltelecomsindustrythathasbecomeiallydrivenThisreportfirstoutlinesthetechnologicalbasicsthenStrategicSettingsfor6G:PathwaysforChinaandtheUS2currentpositionsinthedevelopmentofwirelesstelecoms.Next,thereportexaminesacademiccollabo-rationandknowledgenetworksbetweenthetworyort3TheInternationalInstituteforStrategicStudiesChapterOne:6G:TechnicalFundamentals,EnablingTechnologiesandEnvisagedUses6Gisexpectedtodelivermajorbooststovarioustelecomsperformancemetricssuchascapacity,latency,reliabilityandefficiency(intermsofbothspectrumusageaswellasenergyusage).1Networksbuiltto5Gspecificationsalreadypromisesignificantcapabilityimprovements,buttheycannotmeettherequirementsofvariousemergentapplicationslikemulti-sensoryextended-realityapplications,multi-wayvirtualmeetingwithholographicprojections,remotesurgeryandautonomousrobotics.26Gwire-lessnetworkswillexploithigher-frequencyrangesoftheelectromagneticspectrumthatarenotcur-rentlyusedbytelecommunications.Developmentof6Gtechnologiesisfocusedonthe95gigahertzto3terahertz(THz)frequencyrange:theUSgovernmentbeganlicensingthisspectrumrangeforexperimentaldevelopmentin2019.3Thetablebelowshowsaselec-tiverepresentationcomparingtechnicalparametersof5Gand6G.Technologiescommonlycitedaspotentialappli-cationsof6Gincludepervasiveartificialintelligence(AI),3Dcommunicationsinfrastructureandterahertzcommunicationstechnologies.4AlthoughAIisalreadybeingusedin5Gnetworks,currenttechniquesstillrelyoncentralisedlearningandhaveyettorealiseatrulydistributedlearningmechanismattheedgeofnetworks,withsignificantintelligentfunctionsresid-inginterminaldevicesratherthanthenetworkcore.Table1:ComparisonBetweenKeyPerformanceIndicators(KPIs)of5Gand6G*KPIs5G6G20gigabytespersecond(Gbps)second(Tbps)OneTbpserfaceOnemillisecondisecondcityTenmegabytesperpsmsDywherepsDywheresGiventhepropagationcharacteristicsoftheshortwavelengthfrequencies6Gislikelytouse,networksbasedonexistingcellulararchitecturesmaynotbecommerciallyviable,meaningthat6Gmayinsteadusemoredistributedanddynamic(cell-free)networkarchitecturesthatwillbeenabledbyintelligentend-pointdevices.5FurtherprogressinAIwillberequiredtorealiseself-sustaining6Gnetworkscapableofadaptingtheirfunctions,resourceusageandspectrummanagementaccordingtostrictrequirementsofdifferingapplica-tions.6Regarding3Dcommunicationsinfrastructure,ironmentfrequencyandnetworkingplanningwouldberequiredtoeffec-tivelyintegrateterrestrial,airborneandsatellitenet-worksTerahertzcommunicationsfacechallengesfromsusceptibilitytohighpropagationlossandmolecularabsorption,necessitatingfurtherstudyonantennaandcircuitrytechnology.Other6G-enablingtechnologiescurrentlyunderresearchincludecommunicationwithlargeintelligentsurfaces,datatransmissionusingthevisiblelightspec-trumaswellastechnologyandquantumcommunica-tions.8Continuedadvancesinmicroprocessorswillbeneededtodelivertheprocessingpowerandenergyeffi-cienciesrequiredby6Gdevices.Beyondimproving5Gfunctionalitiesanduserexpe-rience,6Gisenvisionedtointroducerevolutionaryapplicationswithwide-rangingeconomic,securityandsocio-economicimpacts.Threecommonlycited6Guse-casesareoutlinedbelowtogiveanimpressionofthetechnology’spotential.6Gisexpectedtoenableextended-oraugmented-realityservicesintegratedwithsensoryinputs,holo-graphicprojectionandhapticcommunication.9Forexample,3Drepresentationsofapersoncouldbeaccuratelyreplicatedacrosstheworld,andhumansensorydatacouldbetransmittedtoprovideatrulyimmersiveuserexperience.Such‘multi-sensoryholo-graphicteleportation’10hasmanyapplicationssuchasStrategicSettingsfor6G:PathwaysforChinaandtheUS4remotesurgeryandmilitaryuseslikevirtualreality-enabledpersonneltrainingandenhancedbattlefieldsituationalawareness.116Gcouldalsogreatlyenhancetheperformanceofconnectedroboticsandautonomoussystems.12Automatingindustrial-controlnetworksinhigh-pre-cisionmanufacturingrequiresextremelylowdelayjitterandhighreliability.13With6G-enabledlevelsofreliability,lowlatencyandhighdata-transmis-sionrates(measuredinterabytespersecond),fullyautonomousvehiclesequippedwithadvancedAIandsensorscouldsharetrafficandhazarddatainrealtimesoastoensurepassengersafety.14Thesamecapabilitiescouldalsobeappliedtoautonomousrobotsandothernetworkedsystemsandplatformsinmilitaryscenarios.15Inaddition,6Gconnectivitywouldenablenewwirelessbrain–computerinteractions(BCI)sce-narios.Microdevicesimplantedinthebodycouldmonitorbiologicalprocessestodetectdevelopingdiseasesandallowforremoteanalysis.16BCIhasobviouse-healthapplications,butisalsousefulfordefencepurposes,suchasenhancingcognitivecapa-bilityinmilitarypersonnelanddeployingmind-con-trolleddrones.fulsensingplatformsabletointelligentlyprocesstelligentlearningmininganaly?real-timevisualisationofcombatoperations,andtherebycontrolofthebattlefieldthroughsuperiorsituationalawareness.mthatcanbetterprotectdeployedforcesandforcegenerationresourcesinrealtime.17Variouscommentatorsarguethat6Gconnectivitypromisestoachieveparadigmchangesineffectiveinte-grationofthephysical,digitalandbiologicalworlds.18apervasivepublicgoodalsomeansthatindicatorsrepresentingsustainabilityandsocietalneeds(forexample,thoserelatingtotheUnitedNationsSustainabilityGoals),transparency,ethicsandinclusivenesswouldideallybeincorporatedinthedesignof6Gsystems.195TheInternationalInstituteforStrategicStudiesChapterTwo:DevelopmentoftheWirelessTelecommunicationsSectortelecommunicationsderivefromtheconvergenceofalonglistofseparatetechnologies.20Duringthesecondhalfofthetwentiethcentury,telecomstech-nologybecameaglobalindustrialenterpriseledbyfirmsfromvariousindustrialisedcountries,withglobaleconomiesofscaleandtechnologicaldiffusionresult-ingintheworldwideadoptionofwirelesstelecoms.Withthespreadanddevelopmentoftheinternet,therangeofcomponentsandcontributorsintheglobaltel-ecomstechnologyecosystemhasdiversifiedfurther.Wirelesstelecomsisnowbasedonasprawlingnet-workoftechnologiesandactors,whichisinternation-allydistributedandextremelycomplex.Anideaofthiscomplexityisconveyedina2021studythatlistedtendifferentsetsofstakeholdersdividedbetweendevel-opers,researchers,lawmakers,standardsbodies,con-sumers,vendors,telecomsmanufacturers,internetvateconsumers Theumbrellagroupingforglobalstandards-set-tingactivityforwirelesstelecoms,the3GPP(ThirdGenerationPartnershipProject),embodiesthemulti-nationalcharacterofthistechnologicalecosystem.ThegrouphassevenregionalandnationalorganisationalpartnerbodiesspanningtheUS,EuropeandAsia.Itsindividualmembersinclude439entitiesfromEurope(includingtheUnitedKingdom),171fromChina,145fromIndia,95fromtheUS,46fromJapan,15fromFinland,18fromSweden,ninefromTaiwanandtwofromRussia.Manyoftheseactorsarenowengagedin‘pre-posi-tioning’for6Ginanticipationofstandardisationoverthenextfewyearsandcommercialisationfromthelate2020s.226Gdevelopmentcancurrentlybedescribedasatapre-competitivestage,withresearchbeingcon-ductedintopotentiallyprofitableavenuesfor6Gappli-cations,theirassociatedrequirementsandkeyenablingtechnologies.Giventhecapital-intensivenatureandtechnicalcomplexityoftheseactivities,manyactorshaveenteredresearch-and-developmentcollaborationsonvarioustechnologiesbehind6Gnetworking.TheseTableTable2:Selected6GCollaborationsdNextGAlliancecomprisingmainlyUScompaniesbutalsoconveningahostofleadingICTcompaniesfromCanada,Finland,nyJapanSouthKoreaandelBell,Nokia,Samsung,dNextGAlliancerojectEuropeanGIndustrialHexa-XisledbyNokiaandEricssoninvolving25organisationsfromFrance,Germany,Greece,Hungary,Italy,Spain,SwedenandTurkey.ThisinitiativeencompassesmultinationalfirmssuchasSiemens,Atos,IntelDeutschland,TelefónicaOrangeaswellassmallerICTcompanieslikeWingsICTSolutionsandNextworks.6G-IArepresentsEuropeanprivateindustryinpartnershipwiththeEU.Globalinitiative–InnovationOpticalandWirelessNetworkGlobalForum***FoundedinJanuary2020byNTT,IntelandSony,theentityconsistsofmorethan90membercompaniesfromtheUS,Europe,Japan,SouthKoreaandTaiwan,includingDell,Oracle,ChunghwaTelecom,Wistron,Fujitsu,NEC,Telefónica,Nokia,Samsungandtfrombusinesscompanies,academicandresearchinstitutesalsoformpartofthenetwork.sovativeOpticalandWirelessNetworkGlobalbershipactorsincludemajorUS,EuropeanandNorthAsianfirmsasindicatedinTable2above.Notonlydosuchopencollaborationsinthepre-competitivephasespurandsustainresearchmomentumin6Gthroughclosecollaborationwithinindustryandwithacademia,theyalsocreatebreadthandheftfortechandtelecomsfirmstoattractfundingfromvariousgovernmentsAt3GPPmeetings,firmsfromtheleadingcountriesintelecomstechnologyarerepresented:notablySouthKorea(Samsung,LG),Japan(Fujitsu,NTTDocomo23,NEC),theUS(Cisco,AT&T,Qualcomm,Verizon),Europe(Nokia,Ericsson,Orange)andChina(Huawei,ZTE).24Bycontrast,6GHexa-XisasolelyEuropeanini-tiative.IOWNGFandtheNextGallianceappeartobeudingChinesecompanieslikeHuaweiStrategicSettingsfor6G:PathwaysforChinaandtheUS6ChinaTelecomChinaMobile,ChinaUnicomandZTE,whichareallpursuing6Gresearchanddevelopment.AnexceptionisFutureweiTechnologies,25aUS-basedresearcharmofHuaweiwhichisamemberoftheNextGalliance.Evenasindustryplayersadvocateforcooperationinthispre-competitivephaseof6Gdevel-opment,thefaintlinesofgeopoliticalcompetitionareemerginginthesetechnologyalliancesasnationsvieforsuperiorityinthisstrategictechnology.Besidestheselargetransnationalcoalitions,therearealsosmaller-scale6Gpartnershipsestablishedacrossandwithinnationalborders.Forexample,SKTelecomhassignedagreementswithEricsson,NokiaandSamsungtoconductR&Din6Gbusinessmodelsandtechnicalrequirements.26ChinesefirmslikeChinaUnicomandZTEhaveformedjointresearchpro-grammesin6G-relatedfields.27Smallerpartnershipsalsofacilitatetargetedresearchinspecificareasof6Gtechnology.InJune2022,Nokiaannouncedpartner-shipwithDocomoandNTTtofocusontwoproof-of-concepts,namelytheAI-basedairinterfacefor6GandsubTHzradioaccess.28Itisevidentthatfirmsleadingdevelopmentandimplementationof5Gtechnologiesarecurrentlythedominantactorsin6Gdevelopment.Because6Gisanevolutionaryprogressionfrom5G,telecomsindus-tryleaderscanbuildontheirexistingcapabilitiesinthetransitionto6Gnetworks.29ThefollowingsectionbrieflyreviewshowthewirelesstelecomssectorsinthedChinarespectivelyarrivedattheircurrentpositions,andthefoundationthishasprovidedfor5Gand6Gdevelopment.TheUSPathTowards5Gand6GAlthoughtheUSremainsaworldleaderinmanyICTfields,thisisnotthecaseintermsoftelecomsnetworkequipment.Asthetransitionto5Gand6Gdependsonnetworkfunctionality,thelossofdomesticcapacityinthisindustryhasmadetheUSdependentonashrink-ingnumberofforeignequipmentvendors.BythelateadconsolidatedtobeheavilydominatedbyFinland’sNokia,Sweden’sEricssonaswellastheChinesefirmsHuaweiandZTE.30Asdiscussedbelow,technologicaltrendsfavourUSfirmsrecaptur-ingsomeofthismarketshareoverthecomingdecade.ndZTEasnetworkequipmentvendorshashamperedUSeffortstopersuadeothercountriesnottouseChineseequipmentintheirnew5Gnetworks.Inthe1970s,thetwolargestmanufacturersoftel-ecomsequipmentgloballywereUScompanies.31Subsequently,thenegativeeffectsoffederalanti-trustpolicywereaggravatedbypoorinvestmentdecisionsandUSgovernmentfailuretocountermeasuresbyforeigngovernmentsthatsupportedtheirowncom-panies.32ExacerbatingmatterswasafocusbyUSfirmsoncostcuttingandshareholderreturns.Bytheendof2000s,theUStelecomsequipmentindustryhadbeenalmostcompletelydisplacedorboughtoutbyforeignbyFinland’sNokia.ThenotableexceptionwasCisco,aSiliconValleyfirmfoundedinthemid-1980sthatpros-eredbyprovidingnetworkingequipmentroutersfortheexpandingglobalinternet.From2011however,theUSledtheworldinrapidlydeploying4Gwirelesstechnologydomesticallyandinleveraging4Gcapabilitiesintogloballeadershipinmarketshareandtechnicalcapabilities.ThiseffortwasThebenefitsthataccruedtothesefirmsandthewiderUSeconomy–byoneestimate,USannualGDPwasDbillionhigherbyduetotheGtransition–werenotedbypolicymakerselsewhere,especiallyinChina,whichbeganaccordinglytoprioritisedevelop-mentofnext-generationwireless-telecomstechnology.RecognisingthattheUSwouldfaceintensifiedfor-ecommandingheightsof5G,theBarackObamaadministrationtookmeasurestoacceleratedevelopmentanddeploymentof5Gnet-worksdomesticallyTheseincludedmakinganewelecavailableforcommercialwirelessbroadbandservicesandfundingtargetedR&DthroughtheNationalScienceFoundation(NSF).34Ex-presidentDonaldTrumpreplacedthesemeas-uresbyinstructingthefederalgovernmenttodevelopanationalstrategythatwouldmaketheunusedelec-tromagneticspectrumavailabletotheprivatesector.35Atthesametime,aproposalbynational-securitystaffintheTrumpadministrationcalledtobuildastate-owned5GnetworktoexcludeChinese5Gproviders,7TheInternationalInstituteforStrategicStudiesasopposedtoallowingtheprivateindustrytobuild,ownandoperatenext-generationtelecomsnetworks.Generally,however,USpolicyfortelecomslackedcoherenceduringTrump’spresidency.Thisincoher-encereflecteddivisionsbetweengovernmentagencies,policypriorities,especiallytheprivilegingofnational-securityconsiderationsthreatsfromChina,attackingtheroleofHuaweiandotherChinesefirmsintheglobaltelecomssectorandotherICTindustries.37Underlyingthesethreatpercep-tionsofChinawereuniversalconcernsaboutthesecu-esentailedbyvastlyenhancedconnectivitybroughtonby5GnetworksandtheexpandingInternetofThings(IoT).38Publicdebatesover5GsecurityhavehelpedtechnologicalcompetitionwithChinabecomeahigh-profileissueinUSdomesticpolitics,andthishasnsIn2018,USfederalagencieswereprohibitedbylawfromprocuringequipmentfromChinesecompaniestedbytheFederalCommunicationsCommission(FCC)asnational-securitythreats.39Trumpin2019signedanExecutiveOrdergivingUSauthoritieswidediscretiontoprohibittheprocurementofICTequipment–byanyactorwithinUSjurisdiction–fromentitiesdeemedtobe’underthejurisdictionordirectionofaforeignadversary’.40TheTrumpadministrationpursuedaglobalcampaignagainstChinesefirmsandHuaweiinparticularunderthe‘CleanNetworkProgram’rubric,aimingtoexcludeChinesebusinessesfromtelecomsnetworksanddigitalservicesmarkets,ontopofcajol-ingothercountriestofollowtheUSlead.41AsdescribedalsointroducedexportcontrolsonHuaweiandotherChineseICTfirmsthathavehadquantifiableimpacts,idenregimehasmaintainedandexpandedtheserestrictions.TheBidenadministrationhasalsomovedquicklytoengagewithalliesandpartnerstoreducethecloutofChinesedigitalinfrastructureglobally.TheEU-USTradeandTechnologyCouncilisreportedlydiscussingjointfundingofdigitalinfrastructureindevelop-ingcountries,withaviewtocompetingwithChinesecompanieslikeHuawei.PresidentBiden,withthesup-portofG7leaders,alsoannouncedthePartnershipforGlobalInfrastructureandInvestmentinJune2,aim-ingtomobilisegovernmentandprivatecapitaltofundglobalinfrastructure.42peredtheseeffortstoadvocateabroadagainstChinesevendors.Consequently,boththeTrumpadministrationatorsbeganpromotingOpenRadioAccessNetwork(ORAN)architecturesasanalternativetointegrated-equipmentofferingsfromHuaweiandZTE,orevenNokiaorEricsson.43ThebasicconceptbehindORANistodeveloptechnicalsolutionsto‘openup’theradioaccessnetworkwhicharecurrentlyunderproprietarycontrolofthemajorvendorsandtherebyunderpintheirdominanceoftheequipmentmarket.44Intheory,thiswillfacilitatealargervendorecosystemandresultinlowerequip-mentprices,makingORANcommerciallyattractivetotelecoms-networkoperatorssuchasAT&T,VerizonandT-Mobile.AstelecomsnetworksbecomeevermoreansitiontoGnetworkoperatorsarealsoincentivisedtobeinvolvedinthedevelopmentofORANandfuturetechnicalapproachessoastoensurethattheydonotbecomemereprovidersof‘dumbpipes’fortechnologyownedbyothercompanies.NecosystemwouldlikelygiveadvantagetoUSfirmsgiventheirexistingpositionsinrelevanttech-nologies,notablydesignofsoftwareandprocessorstoenablethenetworkvirtualisationthatwillbeintegraltoORANarchitectures.45Unsurprisingly,thesystemhasarousedsomesuspicionamongstUSallies.Forinstance,theEuropeanCommission’smid-2021reporton5GsupplymarkettrendswarnedthatORANcouldleadtoanewoligopolybyUSfirmstothedetrimentofEuropeanfirmsandconsumers.46ThoughitisunlikelytobeadoptedbymostcountriesasabasisfortheirtivesdrivingORAN’sdevelopmentmeanthatitmightprovidethefoundationfor6Gfromthemid-2020s.47MovestowardsORANbylargeUS-alliedeconomiesandincreasinglyalignedpartner-stateswillinfluenceStrategicSettingsfor6G:PathwaysforChinaandtheUS8thisoutcome.IndiaislikelytotaketheORANrouteinits5Ginfrastructurerollout.48Japan,homeofthefirstcompany(NTTDocomo)tocommercialiseORAN-ntlyawardednumerousRDgrantstosupportits‘5GSupplyChainDiversificationStrategy’thatexpresslypromotesORAN.50TheUSalsonowhasheodytheORANAlliancepolitics,ORAN’stechnicalandbusinessdriverswouldmakeexclusionofChinesefirmsfrominvolvementinstandardisingthenextgenerationofwirelesstelecomsChina’sPathTowards5Gand6GChina’spoliciesforitstelecomsinfrastructureanddomesticdevelopmentofwireless-telecomstechnol-ogyreflectitslatecomersituationthathasshapedthenation’sparticipationinthelargerglobalICTsector.AsthePeople’sRepublicopenedupitseconomyinthe1980s,itreformeditsstate-runtelecomssector.Withexpansionandtechnologicalupgradingofthetelecomsnetworkbeinganationaldevelopmentpriority,Beijingallowedtheimportoftelecommunicationsequipmentfromforeignfirms.AsaconditionforenteringChinesemarkets,foreignvendorswererequiredtoenterintojointventures(JVs)withChinesepartners,whichestab-lishedlocalequipmentmanufacturingfacilitiesandR&Dcentres.52ThegovernmentencouragedtheseJVstoraisetheproportionofdomesticallyproducedcomponents,andshelpedtoreducecostsTheJVsalsofacilitatedtechChinesepartners.Moreover,stateministriesorganisedtrainingorjobrotationsatjointventuresforstafffromChinesecompaniesnotdirectlypartnered,therebyedtoimportquotaslinkedtotheirwillingnesstolocaliseproductionandtransfertechnologytoChinesecompanies.53Inthe1990s,asChinesefirms’capabilitiesmaturedandJVsexpandedtheirbusinesswithinChina,theysICTindustriesprivatelyruneslikeHuaweiweregenerallymoresuccessfulthanstate-ownedenterprises(SOEs),althoughZTE,acompanythatoriginatedasanSOEjointventureandretainsadominatingSOEpresenceinitsownershipstructurealsogainedsignificantmarketshare54Thoughself-portrayedasaprivatelyownedandprivatelymanagedcompany(私有私營),Huawei’srelationshipwiththestatehasplayedasignificantroleinitssuccess.ThesymbioticrelationshipbetweentheeChinesestatespolicygoalswasepitomisedinareportedcommentbyHuawei’sCEOatdidnothaveitsowntelecomsswitchingBy1996,China’sgovernmenthadstoppedspecialimportpoliciesfortelecommunicationsequipment.Inthelate1990s,thethen-MinistryofInformationIndustry(MII)directedChinesetelecomsoperatorstobuydomesticallymanufacturedequipmentinstead.By2000,thepercentageofChina’stelecomsequipmentmarketprovidedbyimportshadfallentozero,with60%nowprovidedbyforeign-ChineseJVsandtherestfrom