英文論文2000字經(jīng)濟(jì)

英文論文2000字經(jīng)濟(jì)篇一：英語論文-中國在世界經(jīng)濟(jì)中的優(yōu)勢與劣勢

對外經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易高校遠(yuǎn)程訓(xùn)練畢業(yè)論文

(僅供同學(xué)們參考)

畢業(yè)論文/設(shè)計(jì)

題目：

學(xué)號****************姓名******

學(xué)院遠(yuǎn)程訓(xùn)練學(xué)院指導(dǎo)老師

專業(yè)商務(wù)英語論文成果

完成時間：*****年***月**日

中國在世界經(jīng)濟(jì)中的優(yōu)勢與劣勢

UniversityofInternationalBusinessandEconomics

GraduationThesis/Design

Title:

Department/SchoolSpecialty（chooseone）AuthorofThesis/Design

StudentIDNo.ThesisAdvisorGrade

Date

Index

Abstract……………….6

Chapter1IntroductionandOverview………………...7Chapter2China’sStrengthsintheWorldEconomy…………………8

2.1Economy-orientedPolicy……………………8

2.2HugeMarket………………...10

2.3LowCostandHighQualityofHumanResource…………...11

Chapter3China’sWeaknessesintheWorldEconomy……………13

3.1AbsenceofCreditLegalandJudicialSystem………………13

3.2InefficiencyinStateOwnedEnterprisesandFinancialSystem…………….13

3.3InadequateInfrastructure…………………...15

3.4UnemploymentandIncomeDisparity……..16

3.5Pollution……………………17Conclusion……………18

Reference……………..19

篇二：EconomicEssay經(jīng)濟(jì)英文論文

TheLikonomics

--TheLikonomics--

“Likonomics”,thetermtodescribeChinesePremierLiKeqiang`seconomicpolicy.WascoinedonJune27bythreeeconomistsatBarclaysCapital.LikeThatcherism,Reaganomics,andmorerecently“Abenomics”,LikonomicshasbecomethebuzzwordtodescribetheimplicationsofChinasneweconomicprogram.Andwhatis“Likonomics”?TheBarclaysCapital`seconomistsalsogiveouraexplain,“Likonomics”wasaseriesofmeasuresadoptedbytheStateCouncil.ThemeasureswerepassedtoensurethesustainabilityofChina`seconomy.“whichcouldbesummarizedasLikonomics,consistsofthreekeypillars:nostimulus,Deleveragingandstructuralreform.ItismeantheChinaneedtofreethemarket,andstopthegovernmentcontrolthemarket.Andthisnewpoliceisalong-termobjectives,sothenextthreeyearsthegrewrateofChinesequarterofEconomicwillbereducedatleast4%.

“Sinceassumingofficeinmid-March,PremierLiKeqianghastakenadifferentpolicypath.Itskeyeconomicpolicyframework,whichcouldbesummarizedasLikonomics,consistsofthreekeypillars:nostimulus,deleveragingandstructuralreform.”(ChinaDaily07/05/2023page9byHuangYiping).Inthenews,weknowthethreesolutions,“nostimulus”,“Deleveraging”and“structuralreform”.The“stimulus”meanthegovernmentintheshorttime,

followingtheliabilitiesorexpandthemoneysupplytostimulatetheeconomy,butatthesametimetheinflationalsocoming,SothefirstwayistodecreasetheChineseinflation.Andthesecondsolutionis“Deleveraging”,thissolution`smeaningis“repay”,repaythemoneythatborrowbeforetheeconomiccrisis,atthesametimethemostassets,suchasstocks,bonds,realestatethepricesofthoseassetswillbedecrease,andthecountry`seconomyalsowillbereduced.Thelastsolutionisthe“structuralreform”,everyoneknowthegovernmenthasnoabletocontrolthemarket,becausethegovernmentcannotgetallinformationforthegovernment,butitjustisthehalfreasonforthissolution,theotherpartisthe“corruption”intheChinesegovernmentsystem,thepowerofficialhaveabletocontroltheeconomy.SothePremierLiKeqiangbuildthe“freetradezone”inShanghai,inthisareanoonecancontroltheeconomy,thatmeaneverythinghappeninthisareaareallformthemarket`sselfadjusting.

Infactthewords“nostimulus”,“Deleveraging”and“structuralreform”areprofessional,soIusemyownwordtoexplainthe“Likonomics”.Ihavefoursteps.Firststep,only“fight”theinflationanddonotcaretheChineseEconomygrowrate,rightnowinChinatheRIBORbetweenbanksisfrom2%increaseto30%,itiseffectivetostopthebanks`sventureinvestment,because

whentheRIBORincreasethebankhavetokeepthe“workingcapital”intheirownhand,theyhavenoenoughabletopaytheextremelyhighinterestrate,sothatthetotalmoneyinthemarketgoingtodecrease.ButatthesametimetheChina“TotalSocialFinancing”itreduced43%.Secondlystep,isdecreasetheTAX,assameasthepictureshowas,rightnowtheChinesetaspriceisstandonthepointA,andifthegovernmentreducedthetaxpricethetotaltaxrevenuewill

be

increase.Thirdlystep,isfreethecoal`sprice,becauseinChinathecoalisthemostimportantresource,peopleusethecoaltogenerateelectricity,warmandothers,butonthecoalhave88kindsoftax,andthegovernmentdisagreetotradethecoalwithothercountries,sothatifthegovernmentstoptocontrolthecoal`sprice,thepricewillbedecrease,thentheburdenofenterpriseswillaccordinglydrop.Fourthstep,andalsothelaststepistalkabout

thegovernmentcontrol.Weallknow,thatifthegovernmentcontrolthemarkettheefficiencyofmarketwillgoesdown,becausethegovernmentcannotgetalltheinformationinthemarket.Sothe“Freetradezone”wasborninShanghai,inthiszonethegovernmentcannotcontrol,andtheotherlargeenterprisealsocannotintervene,itisa100%freemarket.ThePremierLiisusethiswaytobreakthebureaucracyinChina.

Rightnow,theChinaisthefastestdevelopcountryintheworld,andatthesametimethestagflationalsoiscoming.SothePremierLiusetheextremelyhardcosttostoptheChineseinflationincrease.Wedon`tknowwhatwillbehappenintheaftertenyears,eventwentyyears,theChina,standonthetopofworld,everyactionofChinacanhaveabletoeffecttheinternationaleconomic.

Alltheinformationsarefromthosewebsite:

篇三：一篇經(jīng)濟(jì)類英文論文(含中文翻譯)

TheProblemofSocialCost

社會成本問題

RONALDCOASE

羅納德·科斯

RonaldCoaseisProfessorEmeritusatUniversityofChicagoLawSchoolandaNobelLaureateinEconomics.ThisarticleisfromTheJournalofLawandEconomics(October1960).Severalpassagesdevotedtoextendeddiscussionsoflegaldecisions

havebeenomitted.

羅納德·科斯在芝加哥高校法學(xué)院名譽(yù)教授和諾貝爾經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)獎得主。本文是其外法學(xué)與經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)雜志（1960年10月）。特地的法律問題的打算的延長爭論的幾個

段落已被省略。

I.THEPROBLEMTOBEEXAMINED

Thispaperisconcernedwiththoseactionsofbusinessfirmswhichhaveharm-fuleffectsonothers.Thestandardexampleisthatofafactorythesmokefromwhichhasharmfuleffectsonthoseoccupyingneighbouringproperties.Theeconomicanalysisofsuchasituationhasusuallyproceededintermsofadivergencebetweentheprivateandsocialproductofthefactory,inwhicheconomistshavelargelyfollowedthetreatmentofPigouinTheEconomiesofWelfare.Theconclusiontowhichthiskindofanalysisseemstohaveledmosteconomistsisthatitwouldbedesirabletomaketheownerofthefactoryli-ableforthedamagecausedtothoseinjuredbythesmoke,oralternatively,toplaceataxonthefactoryownervaryingwiththeamountofsmokeproducedandequivalentinmoneytermstothedamageitwouldcause,orfinally,toexcludethefactoryfromresidentialdistricts(andpresumablyfromotherareasinwhichtheemissionofsmokewouldhaveharmfuleffectsonothers).Itismycontentionthatthesuggestedcoursesofactionareinappropriate,inthattheyleadtoresultswhicharenotnecessarily,orevenusually,desirable.

一、要檢查的問題

本文關(guān)注的是這些行動的企業(yè)有損害他人有用的影響。標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的例子是，一個工廠的煙霧從那些占據(jù)鄰近物業(yè)的有害影響。在這種狀況下的經(jīng)濟(jì)分析，通常已在工廠的私人和社會產(chǎn)品之間的分歧方面著手，在經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家們基本上遵循治療庇古福利經(jīng)濟(jì)。這種分析的結(jié)論，好像使大多數(shù)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家是工廠里的煙霧，或者受傷的人造成的損害能夠使雇主，這將是可取的，上放置一個稅在金錢方面的損害，或最終，它會導(dǎo)致排解住宅區(qū)（也許是從其他地區(qū)排放的煙霧將有對他人有害影響）工廠廠主不同的金額產(chǎn)生的煙霧，相當(dāng)于。行動的建議的課程是不合適的，由于它們導(dǎo)致的結(jié)果是不肯定，甚至是通常狀況下，可取的，它是我的論點(diǎn)。

II.THERECIPROCALNATUREOFTHEPROBLEM

Thetraditionalapproachhastendedtoobscurethenatureofthechoicethathastobe

made.ThequestioniscommonlythoughtofasoneinwhichAinflictsharmonBandwhathastobedecidedis:howshouldwerestrainA?Butthisiswrong.Wearedealingwithaproblemofareciprocalnature.Toavoidtheharmto,BwouldinflictharmonA.Therealquestionthathastobedecidedis:shouldAbeallowedtoharmBorshouldBbeallowedtoharmA?Theproblemistoavoidthemoreseriousharm.Iinstancedinmypreviousarticlethecaseofaconfectionerthenoiseandvibrationsfromwhosemachinerydisturbedadoctorinhiswork.Toavoidharmingthedoctorwouldinflictharmontheconfectioner.Theproblemposedbythiscasewasessentiallywhetheritwasworthwhile,asaresultofrestrictingthemethodsofproductionwhichcouldbeusedbytheconfectioner,tosecuremoredoctoringatthecostofareducedsupplyofconfectioneryproducts.Anotherexampleisaffordedbytheproblemofstrayingcattlewhichdestroycropsonneighbouringland.Ifitisinevitablethatsomecattlewillstray,allincreaseinthesupplyofmeatcanonlybeobtainedattheexpenseofadecreaseinthesupplyofcrops.Thenatureofthechoiceisclear:meatorcrops.Whatanswershouldbegivenis,ofcourse,notclearunlessweknowthevalueofwhatisobtainedaswellasthevalueofwhatissacrificedtoobtainit.Togiveanotherexample,ProfessorGeorgeJ.Stiglerinstancesthecontaminationofastream.Ifweassumethattheharmfuleffectofthepollutionisthatitkillsthefish,thequestiontobedecidedis:isthevalueofthefishlostgreaterorlessthanthevalueoftheproductwhichthecontaminationofthestreammakespossible.Itgoesalmostwithoutsayingthatthisproblemhastobelookedatintotalandatthemargin.

二、互惠性的問題

傳統(tǒng)的做法往往掩蓋作出的選擇，自然。這個問題通常被認(rèn)為作為一個在B上一個敵人造成的損害和什么要打算的是：我們應(yīng)當(dāng)如何抑制一個？但這是錯誤的。我們正在處理的互惠性質(zhì)的問題。為了避開損害，B將A上造成的危害，真正的問題，必需打算是：應(yīng)當(dāng)允許A損害B或應(yīng)允許B損害嗎？問題是要避開更嚴(yán)峻的損害。我在我以前的文章中實(shí)例化一個糕點(diǎn)師的噪音和振動機(jī)械擔(dān)心醫(yī)生在他的工作狀況。為了避開傷及醫(yī)生會造成損害的糕點(diǎn)?；旧线@種狀況下所造成的問題是它是否值得，作為一種限制方法可以用于糕點(diǎn)生產(chǎn)的結(jié)果，以爭取更多的糖果產(chǎn)品的供應(yīng)削減，成本篡改。另一個例子是賜予由偏離破壞鄰近土地上的農(nóng)作物的牛的問題。假如這是不行避開的，一些牛會偏離，只能獲得全部的肉類供應(yīng)增加作物供應(yīng)削減開支。選擇的性質(zhì)是明確的：肉類或農(nóng)作物。應(yīng)賜予什么樣的答案是，當(dāng)然，不明確的，除非我們知道得到什么價(jià)值，以及什么犧牲得到它的價(jià)值。給另一個例如，教授喬治·J.斯蒂格勒實(shí)例流的污染。假如我們假定污染的有害影響是，它殺死的魚，將要打算的問題是：是魚的價(jià)值損失大于或小于流的污染，使產(chǎn)品的價(jià)值。當(dāng)然，幾乎沒有說，這個問題要看著總保證金。

III.THEPRICINGSYSTEMWITHLIABILITYFORDAMAGE

Iproposetostartmyanalysisbyexaminingacaseinwhichmosteconomistswouldpresumablyagreethattheproblemwouldbesolvedinacompeletelysatisfactorymanner:whenthedamagingbusinesshastopayforalldamagecausedandthepricingsystemworkssmoothly(strictlythismeansthattheoperationofapricingsystemis

withoutcost).

Agoodexampleoftheproblemunderdiscussionisaffordedbythecaseofstrayingcattlewhichdestroycropsgrowingonneighbouringland.Letussup-posethatafarmerandcattle-raiserareoperatingonneighbouringproperties.Letusfurthersupposethat,withoutanyfencingbetweentheproperties,anincreaseinthesizeofthecattle-raiser’sherdincreasesthetotaldamagetothefarmer’scrops.Whathappenstothemarginaldamageasthesizeoftheherdincreasesisanothermatter.Thisdependsonwhetherthecattletendtofollowoneanotherortoroamsidebyside,onwhethertheytendtobemoreorlessrestlessasthesizeoftheherdincreasesandonothersimilarfactors.Formyimmediatepurpose,itisimmaterialwhatassumptionismadeaboutmarginaldamageasthesizeoftheherdincreases.

Giventhatthecattle-raiserisliableforthedamagecaused,theadditionalannualcostimposedonthecattle-raiserifheincreasedhisherdfrom,say,2to3steersis$3andindecidingonthesizeoftheherd,hewilltakethisintoaccountalongwithhisothercosts.Thatis,hewillnotincreasethesizeoftheherdunlessthevalueoftheadditionalmeatproduced(assumingthatthecattle-raiserslaughtersthecattle)isgreaterthantheadditionalcoststhatthiswillentail,includingthevalueoftheadditionalcropsdestroyed.Ofcourse,if,bytheemploymentofdogs,herdsmen,aeroplanes,mobileradioandothermeans,theamountofdamagecanbereduced,thesemeanswillbeadoptedwhentheircostislessthanthevalueofthecropwhichtheypreventbeinglost.Giventhattheannualcostoffencingis$9,thecattle-raiserwhowishedtohaveaherdwith4steersormorewouldpayforfencingtobeerectedandmaintained,assumingthatothermeansofattainingthesameendwouldnotdosomorecheaply.Whenthefenceiserected,themarginalcostduetotheliabilityfordamagebecomeszero,excepttotheextentthatanincreaseinthesizeoftheherdnecessitatesastrongerandthereforemoreexpensivefencebecausemoresteersareliabletoleanagainstitatthesametime.But,ofcourse,itmaybecheaperforthecattle-raisernottofenceandtopayforthedamagedcrops,asinmyarithmeticalexample,with3orfewersteers.

Itmightbethoughtthatthefactthatthecattle-raiserwouldpayforallcropsdamagedwouldleadthefarmertoincreasehisplantingifacattle-raisercametooccupytheneighbouringproperty.Butthisisnotso.Ifthecropwaspreviouslysoldinconditionsofperfectcompetition,marginalcostwasequaltopricefortheamountofplantingundertakenandanyexpansionwouldhavereducedtheprofitsofthefarmer.Inthenewsituation,theexistenceofcropdamagewouldmeanthatthefarmerwouldselllessontheopenmarketbuthisreceiptsforagivenproductionwouldremainthesame,sincethecattle-raiserwouldpaythemarketpriceforanycropdamaged.Ofcourse,ifcattle-raisingcommonlyinvolvedthedestructionofcrops,thecomingintoexistenceofacattle-raisingindustrymightraisethepriceofthecropsinvolvedandfarmerswouldthenextendtheirplanting.ButIwishtoconfinemyattentiontotheindividualfarmer.

Ihavesaidthattheoccupationofaneighbouringpropertybyacattle-raiserwouldnotcausetheamountofproduction,orperhapsmoreexactlytheamountofplanting,bythefarmertoincrease.Infact,ifthecattle-raisinghasanyeffect,itwillbetodecreasetheamountofplanting.Thereasonforthisisthat,foranygiventractofland,ifthevalueofthecropdamagedissogreatthatthereceiptsfromthesaleoftheundamagedcroparelessthanthetotalcostsofcultivatingthattractofland,itwillbeprofitableforthefarmerandthecattle-raisertomakeabargainwherebythattractoflandisleftuncultivated.Thiscanbemadeclearbymeansofanarithmeticalexample.Assumeinitiallythatthevalueofthecropobtainedfromcultivatingagiventractoflandis$12andthatthecostincurredincultivatingthistractoflandis$10,thenetgainfromcultivatingthelandbeing$2.Iassumeforpurposesofsimplicitythatthefarmerownstheland.Nowassumethatthecattle-raiserstartsoperationsontheneighbouringpropertyandthatthevalueofthecropsdamagedis$1.Inthiscase$11isobtainedbythefarmerfromsaleonthemarketand$1isobtainedfromthecattle-raiserfordamagesufferedandthenetgainremains$2.Nowsupposethatthecattle-raiserfindsitprofitabletoincreasethesizeofhisherd,eventhoughtheamountofdamagerisesto$3;whichmeansthatthevalueoftheadditionalmeatproductionisgreaterthantheadditionalcosts,includingtheadditional$2paymentfordamage.Butthetotalpaymentfordamageisnow$3.Thenetgaintothefarmerfromcultivatingthelandisstill$2.Thecattle-raiserwouldbebetteroffifthefarmerwouldagreenottocultivatehislandforanypaymentlessthan$3.Thefarmerwouldbeagreeabletonotcultivatingthelandforanypaymentgreaterthan$2.Thereisclearlyroomforamutuallysatisfactorybargainwhichwouldleadtotheabandonmentofcultivation.*Butthesameargumentappliesnotonlytothewholetractcultivatedbythefannerbutalsotoanysubdivisionofit.Suppose,forexample,thatthecattlehaveawell-definedroute,say,toabrookortoashadyarea.Inthesecircumstances,theamountofdamagetothecropalongtheroutemaywellbegreatandifso,itcouldbethatthefarmerandthecattle-raiserwouldfinditprofitabletomakeabargainwherebythefarmerwouldagreenottocultivatethisstripofland.

Butthisraisesafurtherpossibility.Supposethatthereissuchawellde-finedroute.Supposefurtherthatthevalueofthecropthatwouldbeobtainedbycultivatingthisstripoflandis$10butthatthecostofcultivationis$11.Intheabsenceofthecattle-raiser,thelandwouldnotbecultivated.However,giventhepresenceofthecattle-raiser,itcouldwellbethatifthestripwascultivated,thewholecropwouldbedestroyedbythecattle.Inwhichcase,thecattle-raiserwouldbeforcedtopay$10tothefarmer.Itistruethatthefarmerwouldlose$1.Butthecattle-raiserwouldlose$10.Clearlythisisasituationwhichisnotlikelytolastindefinitelysinceneitherpartywouldwantthistohappen.Theaimofthefarmerwouldbetoinducethecattle-raisertomakeapaymentinreturnforanagreementtoleavethislanduncultivated.Thefarmerwouldnotbeabletoobtainapaymentgreaterthanthecostoffencingoffthispieceoflandnorsohighastoleadthecattle-raisertoabandontheuseoftheneighbouringproperty.Whatpaymentwouldinfactbemadewoulddepend

ontheshrewdnessofthefarmerandthecattle-raiserasbargain-ers.Butasthepaymentwouldnotbesohighastocausethecattle-raisertoabandonthislocationandasitwouldnotvarywiththesizeoftheherd,suchanagreementwouldnotaffecttheallocationofresourcesbutwouldmerelyalterthedistributionofincomeandwealthasbetweenthecattle-raiserandthefarmer.

Ithinkitisclearthatifthecattle-raiserisliablefordamagecausedandthepricingsystemworkssmoothly,thereductioninthevalueofproductionelsewherewillbetakenintoaccountincomputingtheadditionalcostinvolvedinincreasingthesizeoftheherd.Thiscostwillbeweighedagainstthevalueoftheadditionalmeatproductionand,givenperfectcompetitioninthecattleindustry,theallocationofresourcesincattle-raisingwillbeoptimal.Whatneedstobeemphasizedisthatthefallinthevalueofproductionelsewherewhichwouldbetakenintoaccountinthecostsofthecattle-raisermaywellbelessthanthedamagewhichthecattlewouldcausetothecropsintheordinarycourseofevents.Thisisbecauseitispossible,asaresultofmarkettransactions,todiscontinuecultivationoftheland.Thisisdesirableinallcasesinwhich