外文翻譯-政府績效-教訓和挑戰(zhàn)

PAGE中文4350字外文文獻翻譯原文：GovernmentPerformance:LessonandChallengesThisarticleconcentratesonattemptsbyOECDcountriestointroduceperformance-basedorresults-basedbudgetingandmanagement.Theneedtoenhancepublicsectorperformancehasbecomemoreurgentasgovernmentsfacemountingdemandsonpublicexpenditure,callsforhigherqualityservicesand,insomecountries,apublicincreasinglyunwillingtopayhighertaxes.Performancebudgetingandperformancemanagementseektomovethefocusofbudgeting,managementandaccountabilityawayfrominputstowardsresults,i.e.bettervalueformoney.DrawingondatafromtheOECD/WorldBankBudgetPracticesandProceduresDatabase,thearticleexploresthetrendsandcountryapproaches(differentphases,variousobjectives),discussesaccountabilitytothepublic(includingexternalperformanceauditing),andrecognisestheimportanceofcontextandawhole-of-governmentapproach,inparticularforchangingthebehaviourofkeyactorsandmotivatingpoliticianstouseperformanceinformation.Thelimitationsandtensionsofperformancebudgetingandperformancemanagementarealsodiscussed,aswellasproblemsofmeasurementandtheefficientuseofperformanceinformation.Agreatdealofrhetorichassurroundedtheintroductionofperformancemanagementandbudgeting.Supportersclaimthatithasthecapacitytotransformgovernments.However,itisimportantthatthisreformshouldnotbeseenasapanaceaandthatgovernmentshaverealisticexpectationsaboutwhatitcanachieveandthetimeneededtoreachtheseobjectives.Evencountriesthathavebeenusingthisapproachforover15yearscontinuetostrugglewithissuesofmeasurement;thisisespeciallythecaseforoutcomes.Akeychallengeforallcountriesisobtaininggoodqualityinformationwhichisvalid,reliable,andtimely.Numerouschallengescanbeencounteredincludingsettingclearobjectives,findingaccuratemeasuresofperformanceandhavinggoodsystemsofdatacollection.Settingobjectives:Forsomeagenciesorprogrammes,evensettingclearobjectivescanbeaproblemwhenthereisnoagreementonwhatthemissionis,ortherearediversemissions,overlappingandfragmentedprogrammes,andstakeholderswithdifferentinterests.Findingaccuratemeasuresofperformance:Thedesignofmeasuresismadedifficultbyfindingmeasuresforspecificactivities,andbyrelatingwhatanagencyorprogrammeactuallycontributestowardsachievingspecificoutcomes.Outputandoutcomemeasureseachpresentadifferentsetofchallenges(OECD,2002b).Outcomesaretechnicallymoredifficulttomeasure;theyarecomplexandinvolvetheinteractionofmanyfactors,plannedandunplanned.Also,thereareproblemswithtimelagissuesandinsomecasestheresultsarenotwithinthecontrolofthegovernment.Outcomes,however,haveastrongappealforthepublicandpoliticians.Mostcountriesappeartohaveadoptedacombinationofoutputsandoutcomes.Establishingandmaintainingsystemsofdatacollection:Toensurequalitythereneedstobeaprocessbywhichdatacollectedareverifiedandvalidated.However,settingupandmaintainingthesesystemscanbebothcomplexandcostly.AsdiscussedinSection6,theauditingofperformanceinformationcanhelptoimprovestandardsandprovidesomelegitimacyforthereportedresults.Itisespeciallychallengingtoassurethequalityofthedatawhenagenciesaredependentonthirdpartiestoprovidetheinformation.Thisisparticularlyaprobleminfederalistsystems(Curristine,2002).Performancetargetshelptoclarifyperformanceexpectationsforanorganisationforagiventimeperiod.Countries,however,continuetostrugglewiththeissuesoftargetlevelandnumbers.Thereareproblemswithsettingtargetstoolowand/ortoohigh.Settingtargetstoolowmeansthatagenciesarenotchallengedtoimproveperformance.Settingthemtoohigh,whileitcanmotivateorganisations,alsocreatesunrealisticexpectationsandsituationsinwhichagencieswillfail(Perrin,2002).Ittakestimetogettherightlevelandtogetthecomparativedatatorealisethattargetsaresetattoohighortoolowalevel.Toomanytargets:Thereisalsoanissueabouthowmanytargetstohave.Toomanytargetscreateinformationoverloadandmakeitdifficulttoselectpriorities;toofewtargetscreatedistortioneffects.Againittakestimetogetarealisticbalance.Severalcountrieshavestartedoutwithalargenumberoftargetsandsubsequentlyreducedthem.Forexample,intheUnitedKingdomwhenperformanceagreementsfordepartmentswerefirstintroducedaspartofthecomprehensivespendingreviewin1998,therewereintotal600targetsacrossgovernment.Bythetimeoftherevisedspendingreviewin2002,thatnumberhadbeenreducedto130targets(H.M.Treasury,2004).Avoidingdistortingbehaviour:Thisisachallengeforallgovernments.Possibleperverseeffectsincludegoaldistortion–thatis,organisationsandmanagersfocusingonafewspecificindicatorsandtargets,usuallythemostachievableor“saleable”,attheexpenseoftheoverallobjectivesorprogramme.Inextremecasesofgoaldistortion,agenciesorstaff,underpressuretomeettargets,maydeliberatelypresentmisleadinginformation.InmanyOECDcountries,theobjectiveofintroducingperformanceintothebudgetprocessistoimprovebudgetarydecisionmakingandtoactasanincentiveforagenciestoimproveperformance.Mostcountries,however,continuetostrugglewiththisapproach.Asdiscussedabove,oneofthekeyissuesisobtaininggoodqualityandreliableperformancedata.Briefly,otherchallengesincludeestablishingsomelinkbetweenfinancialinformationandperformanceinformation.Thisisparticularlychallengingforoutcomemeasures.Inmanycountriestherearealsoproblemswiththestructureofthebudgetandaccountingissues.Budgetstendtobestructuredinaccordancewithinstitutionalandfunctionalboundariesandnotaccordingtoresultscategories.Alsoifthereisnosystemofcostrecording,itisdifficulttorelatetruecoststoresults.Gettingtherightmixofincentives:Thisisparticularlyimportantwhencountriesuseperformanceinformationinresourceallocation.Afundamentalquestioniswhetherfinancialrewardsshouldbegivenforgoodperformanceandbadperformanceshouldbepunishedand,ifso,how.Punishingfailurebyremovingresourcescreatesaclearsignaltootheragenciesthatperformanceisconsideredimportant.However,itdoesnothelpaddresstheunderlyingcausesofpoorperformance.Indeedinsomecasesfailuretomeettargetscanbetheresultoflackoffundingorotherresources.Whilerewardinggoodperformanceisintuitivelyappealing,itdoesnottakeintoaccountcostissuesandgovernmentpriorities.Inaclimateofbudgetarysaving,aquestioniswhethertogiveadditionalfundingtoanagency,especiallyonethatisnotagovernmentpriority.Ineithercase,thereisalwaysthedangerthatlinkingresultstofinancialresourcescancreateincentivestodistortandcheatinpresentinginformation.Oneofthemostdifficultchallengesistocreatearesults-basedculturewithinorganisationsandthroughoutgovernment.Toachievechangeinbehaviourandcultureacrossgovernmentrequiresawhole-of-governmentapproachandthecreationoftherightmixofincentivesthattakesaccountofhowtheactionsofkeyactorsinfluenceeachother.Mostcountriescontinuetostrugglewithachievingchangeinthebehaviourofpublicservantsandpoliticians;thisisalong-termprocess.Obtainingandmaintainingthesupportofmanagersandemployeeswithingovernmentorganisationsiscrucial.Thisreformhasthepotentialtoimprovethefocusonorganisationalgoals,toprovidemanagerswithbetterinformationfordecisionmakingonprogrammes,budgetsandpolicies,andtoimproveinternalreportingandcontrols.Gainingthesebenefitsischallengingbecauseitrequirestechnicalaswellasculturalchange.Intechnicaltermsitcanbedifficulttomeasurewhatanagencydoesandtolinkorganisationalobjectivestoindividualgoals.Itisimportanttoobtainthebuy-inoffrontlineemployees;thiscanbefacilitatedbytherightmixofformalandinformalincentivesandcontrols.Obtainingthestrongsupportoftheorganisationalleadershipandmanagerscanbefacilitatedbygivingthemthenecessaryflexibilitytoachievegoals.Withoutthisflexibility,managerswillhavetheresponsibilityforachievingtargetswithouttheabilitytodeliver,andnoonewantstobeheldaccountablefortargetsthatarenotwithinhis/hercontrol.Withinthecontextofagovernment-wideapproach,ifandhowtheperformanceinformationisusedbypoliticiansandtheMinistryofFinancecancreateincentiveswhichimpactonhowmanagersbehave.Ifperformanceinformationisrequiredbutnotusedbyleadersormanagersindecisionmaking,thereisadangerofitbecomingaburdenonorganisationsintermsofcostofinformationsystemsandstafftime.Theprovisionofthisinformation,inadditiontotherequirementsofthetraditionalcontrolmechanisms,caninterferewithgettingthejobdone.Ifthishappens,thenperformancemanagementandbudgetingcanbecomeadistraction,adistortionoranexpensivepaperexerciseratherthanameanstotransformorganisationsandanessentialpartofgoodmanagement.Obtainingandmaintainingthesupportofpoliticians:AsdiscussedinSection7,thisisakeychallengefacingreformers.Thesupportofpoliticiansinthelegislatureandtheexecutivehelpstoreinforcetheneedforchangeandtopushreform,althoughitisparticularlydifficulttoobtainthesupportofpoliticiansinthelegislature.Issuesofhorizontalandverticalco-ordination:Manygoalsandoutcomescutacrossgovernmentorganisationsandinvolvetheworkofmanyagencies.WhilesomeOECDcountrieshaveestablishedcross-governmentalhorizontalgoalsandtargets,itisprovingdifficulttoachieveco-ordinationacrossdepartmentsandtoholdthemaccountableforresults.Ataverticallevelthereisanissuewithdifferentactorswantingthesameinformationfordiversepurposes;theirinformationalneedsarenotthesame.Managingexpectations:Realisticexpectationsareneededbothaboutwhatcanbeachievedbythisreformandhowlongitwilltake.Along-termapproachandpersistenceareneeded:ittakestimetoovercomethetechnicalissuesandtochangethebehaviourofpublicservantsandpoliticians.Theperformanceofgovernmentcanbeimprovedthroughafocusonresultsinpolicyadvice,centralanddepartmentalmanagementprocesses,andparliamentaryandpublicaccountability.Itisimportanttofirstidentifytherelativepriorityoftheseareasinaparticularcountry.Whatagovernmentshoulddoisdifferentineachcase.ThemajorityofOECDcountriesareimplementingperformancemanagementandperformancebudgeting,althoughtheextentandtheapproachesvarywidelyacrosscountries.Theintroductionofperformancemanagementandbudgetingappearstobeanimportantandenduringinnovationinpublicmanagement.Itisclearlyastrongdeviceforhorizontalprioritysetting,policyalignmentandcostanalysis.Thesereformshaveimprovedtransparencythroughtheprovisionofmoreinformationongovernmentperformancetothepublic.However,someinitialhopeshavebeentooambitious.Mostcountriescontinuetostrugglewithchangingthebehaviourofpublicservantsandpoliticians.Thisisalong-termprocess.Toachievechangeinbehaviourandcultureacrossgovernmentrequiresawhole-of-governmentapproachandthecreationoftherightmixofincentivesandcontrols(formalandinformal)andanunderstandingofthesystemsandhowtheactionsofkeyactorsinfluenceeachother.Thereisnoclearpatternofinputcontrolsbeinglightenedasperformanceindicatorsarestrengthened.Thisraisesissuesaboutbalancingaccountabilityandflexibility.Whatevertheaccountabilitysystemsinplace,theyneedtobebalancedagainstthefreedomrequiredbymanagerstodotheirjobs.Criticsofthetraditionalsystemofaccountabilityarguethatruleshadbecomeendsinthemselves,thataccountabilitystressedcompliance,andthathierarchicalstructureshinderedefficiencyandperformance.Thus,thecriticsemphasisedtheneedstorelaxinputcontrols.Thereareobviousdangersinrelaxinginputcontrolstoosoonaftertheintroductionofoutputandoutcomemeasures.However,therearealsodangersinfailingtorelaxthesecontrolssufficiently,withthepossibleeffectthatoutputandoutcomemeasuresbecomeanexpensivepaperexercise,withlittleimpactonmanagers’abilitytoimproveperformance.Ifthesystemhastoomanyrestrictionsandmanagersdonothaveenoughfreedomtoimproveperformance,thenfailuretorelaxinputcontrolscanresultininefficiency.Thecommonassumptionthattheperformanceinformationthatisusefulfortheexecutivewouldalsoservethelegislatureremainsunproven.Withafewexceptions,performancereportinghasbeenneitherwelcomednorusedbyOECDmembercountrylegislaturesintheiroversightanddecisionmaking.Performancemeasuresandtargetsareonlyonesourceofinformationaboutperformance,andtheyarenosubstitutefortheindependent,in-depthqualitativeexaminationoftheimpactofpoliciesthatevaluationscanprovide.ThecombinedexperiencesofOECDcountrieshighlighttheimportanceoftakingalong-termapproachandhavingrealisticexpectationsaboutthecapacityofperformancemanagementandbudgetingtoimproveperformanceandaccountability.Along-termapproachandpersistenceareneededtoachievethenecessarytechnicalandbehaviouralchangesthatthisleverrequires.Finally,fromawiderperspective,thedesignofcross-governmentperformanceinterventionsneedscarefulanalysisandconsiderationofoptions.Broadly,theseinterventionsare:leadership;strategicplanning;performancemanagement;theinclusionoftargetsandmeasuresintheformalbudgeting,managementandoversightprocesses;andpolicyevaluation.Eachhasdifferentstrengthsandlimitations.Thereisadangerofgovernmentsbecomingfixatedonaparticularformalsolutiontotheproblemofimprovingperformance.Theperformanceorientationofpublicmanagementisheretostay.Itisessentialforsuccessfulgovernment.Societiesarenowtoocomplextobemanagedonlybyrulesforinputandprocessandapublic-spiritedculture.Theperformancemovementhasincreasedformalisedplanning,reportingandcontrolacrossmanygovernments.Thishasimprovedtheinformationavailabletomanagersandpolicymakers.Butexperienceshowsthatthiscanriskleadingtoanewformofbureaucraticsclerosis.Moreattentionneedstobegiventokeepingperformancetransactioncostsincheck,andtomakingoptimaluseofsocialandinternalisedmotivatorsandcontrols.Source：TeresaCurristine.GovernmentPerformance：LessonsandChallenges[J].OECDJournalonbudgeting，2005，5(1)：127-151.譯文：政府績效：教訓和挑戰(zhàn)本文將集中介紹經(jīng)濟合作與發(fā)展組織國家引入的，以績效結(jié)果為基礎(chǔ)的預算編制和績效管理。在一些國家，公眾越來越不愿意支付更高的稅款，而各國政府的公共支出需求卻越來越大，因此面臨著很大的財務危機，且壓力巨大，因此需要在支出不增加的基礎(chǔ)上滿足公共服務需求是關(guān)鍵，政府績效是一種以尋求實現(xiàn)政府服務更高質(zhì)量的重要工具，可以舒緩財務危機的巨大壓力，因此必須加強公共部門的政府績效?？冃ьA算和績效管理使公眾忽略了對政府公共服務項目落成和項目開銷的關(guān)注，轉(zhuǎn)而重視預算編制、管理和問責制，即追求更好的經(jīng)濟效益。結(jié)合經(jīng)合組織、世界銀行的預算方式和程序數(shù)據(jù)庫編制的數(shù)據(jù)，文章探討了政府績效的發(fā)展趨勢和國家的行政手段（不同階段，不同的目標），討論了對公眾的問責（包括審計的外在表現(xiàn)），并認識到環(huán)境的重要性和總體的政府方針是改變關(guān)鍵行為者的行為和激勵政客利用特定的績效信息。文章也對績效預算和績效管理受到的限制和所處的緊張局勢，以及計量問題和績效信息的有效利用進行了討論?？冃Ч芾砗皖A算編制的引入已經(jīng)受到很多輿論的關(guān)注。支持者認為政府進行績效行為可以改變政府活動。然而，需要認識到的是，績效行為不應該被看作是靈丹妙藥。各國政府關(guān)于它能達到什么效果，以及達到績效目標所需要的時間，都要切合實際，不能有過高的期望。即使國家使用政府績效這種手段解決計量問題已經(jīng)持續(xù)超過了15年，但效果不彰。對于所有國家來說，關(guān)鍵的挑戰(zhàn)在于要取得良好的質(zhì)量信息（包括有效，可靠，及時）。在這之中可能會遇到諸多挑戰(zhàn)：包括設(shè)定明確的目標，尋找準確的績效計量措施，并具有良好的數(shù)據(jù)收集系統(tǒng)。設(shè)定目標：對于某些機構(gòu)或方案，即使是設(shè)定了明確的目標，但當人們沒有明確績效任務，或沒有達成一致的意見，或出現(xiàn)有不同的績效任務，或方案又有重疊或大相徑庭，或利益相關(guān)者有不同利益等許多情況下，設(shè)定目標都無法完成。尋求精確的績效措施：績效措施的設(shè)計工作難點在于需要具體問題具體分析，針對不同的活動需求來設(shè)計不同的方案。比如，在實際工作中怎樣聯(lián)系相關(guān)機構(gòu)，具體的操作步驟該怎么做，使得最后可以得到高質(zhì)量的績效成果。這對要實現(xiàn)生產(chǎn)和成果的每項措施都提出了不同的挑戰(zhàn)（OECD，2002b）。結(jié)果在技術(shù)上是難以衡量的：它們非常復雜，涉及很多的因素，是計劃內(nèi)的、計劃外的相互作用形成的。另外，因為時間滯后的原因，以及在某些情況下績效結(jié)果是不受政府控制的?？冃ЫY(jié)果對于公眾和政界來說，會形成強烈的反響。多數(shù)國家采取了生產(chǎn)和成果的相結(jié)合的方式以尋求精確的績效措施。建立和維護數(shù)據(jù)收集系統(tǒng)：為了保證信息質(zhì)量，需要有一個對收集的數(shù)據(jù)進行驗證和確認的過程。但是，建立和維護這些系統(tǒng)可能既昂貴又復雜?？冃徲嬓畔⒖梢杂兄谔岣呖冃藴剩榱⒎C關(guān)提供報告結(jié)果。機構(gòu)依賴于第三方所提供的信息以保證數(shù)據(jù)的質(zhì)量，是特別具有挑戰(zhàn)性的做法。尤其在聯(lián)邦制系統(tǒng)中，是一個關(guān)鍵問題(Curristine，2002)。績效目標有助于證實組織在給定的時間內(nèi)的績效期望是否能夠完成。國家則繼續(xù)為目標的標準問題，比如水平和數(shù)字而尋求解決方案。對目標的設(shè)定過高或過低都是問題。設(shè)定目標太低意味著各機構(gòu)在提高績效時不會有挑戰(zhàn)。如果設(shè)定目標太高，雖然可以激發(fā)組織的動力，但也會造成政府不切實際的期望，在某些情況下機構(gòu)會失敗(Perrin，2002)。因此需要花費時間去確認績效水平，并獲得比較數(shù)據(jù)，以實現(xiàn)制定的目標不會過高或過低。過多的目標：目標的多少也是一個問題。過多的目標會造成信息過載，并難以選擇先后次序。過少的目標會造成信息失真。同樣的，這也需要時間來平衡。有些國家一開始進行績效時有大量的政府績效目標，但隨后越來越少。例如，在英國，當部門的績效協(xié)議第一次被作為1998年綜合開支審查的一部分介紹給公眾時，總共有超過600個政府績效目標。到了2002年修訂的支出審查進行時，這一數(shù)字已減少到130個(H.M.Treasury，2004)。避免扭曲行為：這對于所有政府來說都是挑戰(zhàn)?？赡茉斐傻呢撁嬗绊懓繕耸д妫唇M織和管理人員要重點關(guān)注一些具體的指標和目標——通常是最可實現(xiàn)的或“實用”——在總體目標或計劃上的開支。在目標失真、機構(gòu)或工作人員、存在實現(xiàn)目標的壓力，在極端的情況下實現(xiàn)目標，可能會出現(xiàn)故意誤導的信息。在許多經(jīng)合組織國家，引入績效目標是進入預算過程，提高預算決策，作為提高績效的一種鼓勵機制。關(guān)鍵問題之一是取得有良好質(zhì)量和可靠的績效數(shù)據(jù)。而另外有的一些挑戰(zhàn)包括建立一些財政信息和績效信息之間的聯(lián)系。這是特別具有挑戰(zhàn)性的成果措施。很多國家也有關(guān)于預算和會計結(jié)構(gòu)的問題。財政預算往往是按照體制和職能界限構(gòu)建的，而不是按結(jié)果類別。此外，如果沒有成本記錄系統(tǒng)，它是很難講清真正的成本與成果的。獲得獎勵的正確組合：當國家在資源配置中使用績效信息時，這是特別重要的。一個根本的問題是，是否應對好的績效給予經(jīng)濟回報，對壞的績效進行處罰。如果真的這么做了，應該怎么做？通過沒收資源來懲治失敗的績效，制造了一個明確的信號給其他機構(gòu)，讓它們認識到績效的重要性。但是，它并不能幫助解決質(zhì)量較差的績效的根本原因。事實上，在某些情況下，未能達到目標，可能是因為資金或其他資源的缺乏。同時，獎勵良好的績效是直觀的表現(xiàn)，但它沒有考慮到成本問題以及政府的優(yōu)先事項。在節(jié)約預算的大氣候下，有一個問題是：是否能提供額外資金給進行績效的機構(gòu)，尤其當這不是一個政府的優(yōu)先事項的情況下。而在同個大氣候下，總有一種危險，就是讓財政資源與結(jié)果掛鉤，激勵措施可能會造成提供信息的歪曲和欺騙。最困難的一個挑戰(zhàn)是通過政府和組織建立一個以績效結(jié)果為基礎(chǔ)的風氣。為了達到行為和文化的改變，通過政府尋求政府整體方式，該獎勵的正確組合結(jié)果需要考慮關(guān)鍵人員會怎么行動來互相影響。大多數(shù)國家不斷的在解決這個對于達到公務員和政治家的行為的變化問題——這是一個長期的過程。獲取和保持管理者和人員在政府內(nèi)部組織的支持是至關(guān)重要的。這項改革有可能提高對組織目標的重視，向管理者做出方案，預算和政策，提供更好的決策信息，并改善內(nèi)部報告和內(nèi)部控制。但獲得這些好處是不容易的，