米什金貨幣金融學(xué)(商學(xué)院版)第8章課件

Chapter8AnEconomicAnalysisofFinancialStructureChapter8AnEconomicAnalysisSourcesofExternalFinance

inU.SSourcesofExternalFinance

iFIGURE1SourcesofExternalFundsforNonfinancialBusinesses:AComparisonoftheUnitedStateswithGermany,Japan,andCanadaSource:AndreasHackethalandReinhardH.Schmidt,“FinancingPatterns:MeasurementConceptsandEmpiricalResults,”JohannWolfgangGoethe-UniversitatWorkingPaperNo.125,January2004.Thedataarefrom1970–2000andaregrossflowsaspercentageofthetotal,notincludingtradeandothercreditdata,whicharenotavailable.FIGURE1SourcesofExternal8.1EightBasicFactsStocksarenotthemostimportantsourcesofexternalfinancingforbusinessesIssuingmarketabledebtandequitysecuritiesisnottheprimarywayinwhichbusinessesfinancetheiroperationsIndirectfinanceismanytimesmoreimportantthandirectfinanceFinancialintermediaries,particularlybanks,arethemostimportantsourceofexternalfundsusedtofinancebusinesses.8.1EightBasicFactsStocksarEightBasicFacts(cont’d)ThefinancialsystemisamongthemostheavilyregulatedsectorsoftheeconomyOnlylarge,well-establishedcorporationshaveeasyaccesstosecuritiesmarketstofinancetheiractivitiesCollateralisaprevalentfeatureofdebtcontractsforbothhouseholdsandbusinesses.DebtcontractsareextremelycomplicatedlegaldocumentsthatplacesubstantialrestrictivecovenantsonborrowersEightBasicFacts(cont’d)The8.2TransactionCostsandFinancialStructureTransactioncostshinderflowoffundstopeoplewithproductiveinvestmentopportunitiesFinancialintermediariesmakeprofitsbyreducingtransactioncosts1. Takeadvantageofeconomiesofscale Example:MutualFunds2. Developexpertisetolowertransactioncosts ExplainsFact38.2TransactionCostsandFina8.3AsymmetricInformationAdverseSelection:1. Beforetransactionoccurs2. PotentialborrowersmostlikelytoproduceadverseoutcomesareonesmostlikelytoseekloansandbeselectedMoralHazard:1. Aftertransactionoccurs2. Hazardthatborrowerhasincentivestoengageinundesirable(immoral)activitiesmakingitmorelikelythatwon’tpayloanbackAgencytheoryanalyseshow

asymmetricinformationproblemsaffecteconomicbehavior8.3AsymmetricInformationAdve8.4AdverseSelection

andFinancialStructure8.4.1LemonsProbleminSecuritiesMarkets1. Ifcan’tdistinguishbetweengoodandbadsecurities,willingtopayonlyaverageofgoodandbadsecurities’values.2. Result:Goodsecuritiesundervaluedandfirmswon’tissuethem;badsecuritiesovervalued,sotoomanyissued.3. Investorswon’twanttobuybadsecurities,somarketwon’tfunctionwell. ExplainsFact2andFact1.

AlsoexplainsFact6:Lessasymmetricinformationforwellknownfirms,sosmallerlemonsproblem8.4AdverseSelection

andFin8.4.2ToolstoHelpSolveAdverseSelectionProblem1. PrivateProductionandSaleofInformation Free-riderprobleminterfereswiththissolution2. GovernmentRegulationtoIncreaseInformation ExplainsFact53. FinancialIntermediationA. Analogytosolutiontolemonsproblemprovidedbyused-cardealersB. Avoidfree-riderproblembymakingprivateloans ExplainsFact3and48.4.2ToolstoHelpSolveAdve4. CollateralandNetWorth --Collateral,propertypromisedtothelenderiftheborrowerdefaults,reducestheconsequencesofadverseselectionbecauseitreducesthelender’slossesintheeventofadefault.ExplainsFact7--Networth,thedifferencebetweenafirm’sassetsanditsliabilities,canperformasimilarroletocollateral.“Onlythepeoplewhodon’tneedmoneycanborrowit!”4. CollateralandNetWorth8.5MoralHazardinEquityContractsCalledthePrincipal-AgentProblemPrincipal:lessinformation(stockholder)Agent:moreinformation(manager)Separationofownershipandcontrol

ofthefirmManagerspursuepersonalbenefitsandpowerratherthantheprofitabilityofthefirm8.5MoralHazardinEquityConPrincipal-AgentProblem:Solutions

Monitoring:productionofinformationButthemonitoringprocesscanbeexpensiveintermsoftimeandmoney.Andthefree-riderproblemdecreasestheamountofinformationproduction.2.GovernmentregulationtoincreaseinformationExplainsFact5Governmenthavelawstoforcefirmstoadheretostandardaccountingprinciplesthatmakeprofitverificationeasier.Theyalsopasslawstoimposestiffcriminalpenaltiesonpeoplewhocommitthefraudofhidingandstealingprofits.Partlyeffective.Principal-AgentProblem:SolutFinancialintermediationExplainsFact3Venturecapitalfirmcanhelpsreducethemoralhazard.DebtcontractsMoralhazardariseswithanequitycontract.Fordebtcontracts,onlywhenthefirmcannotmeetitsdebtpayments,isthereaneedforthelendertoverifythestateofthefirm’sprofits.ExplainsFact1:WhydebtusedmorethanequityFinancialintermediation8.6MoralHazardinDebtMarketsMoralhazard:borrowerwantstotakeontoomuchriskToolstoHelpSolveMoralHazardNetworthandcollateralMakethedebtcontractincentive-compatible.Monitoringandenforcementofrestrictive covenantsCovenantstodiscourageundesirablebehavior.Covenantstoencouragedesirablebehavior.CovenantstokeepcollateralvaluableCovenantstoprovideinformation8.6MoralHazardinDebtMarkeMoralHazard:Solutions3. Financialintermediation Banksandotherintermediarieshavespecial advantagesinmonitoring ExplainsFact3,4.MoralHazard:Solutions3. FinaSummaryTable1AsymmetricInformationProblemsandToolstoSolveThemSummaryTable1AsymmetricIn8.7ConflictsofInterestTypeofmoralhazardproblemcausedbyeconomiesofscope(applyingoneinformationresourcetomanydifferentservices).Arisewhenaninstitutionhasmultipleobjectivesand,asaresult,hasconflictsbetweenthoseobjectivesAreductioninthequalityofinformationinfinancialmarketsincrea