德國發(fā)展研究所（DIE）：可持續(xù)發(fā)展目標(biāo)的本地化：坦桑尼亞的案例

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Received:November2019

Accepted:February2020

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DevPolicyRev.2021;39:181–196.

/journal/dpr

DOI:10.1111/dpr.12497

ARTICLE

LocalizingtheSustainableDevelopmentGoals:ThecaseofTanzania

KristinaJ?nsson

|MagdalenaBexell

DepartmentofPoliticalScience,LundUniversity

Correspondence

KristinaJ?nsson

Email:

Kristina.Jonsson@svet.lu.se

Abstract

Motivation:DespiteincreasingresearchontheUnitedNations’2030Agendaandits17SustainableDevelopmentGoals(SDGs),thereisalackofattentiontotheroleofpoliticalinstitutionsinlocalizingtheSDGs.Byexploringlocalizationofthe2030Agendainaconcretepoliticalcontext,wegobeyondpriorresearchthatmainlystudiesinterlinkagesanddis-coursesunderpinningtheagenda.

Purpose:Thisarticleexplorespoliticalqualitiesoflocalizationprocessesthroughthreeanalyticalconceptsthatbringsuchqualitiestothefore—legitimacy,responsibilityandaccountability.Weinvestigatelocalizationattemptswithregardtothe2030AgendainTanzania,aimingtoidentifydriversandobstaclesoflocalization.

ApproachesandMethods:Thearticleprovidesanexplorativecasestudybasedonpolicydocumentreviewand28semi-structuredinterviewswithcivilservants,parliamentarians,representativesfromcivilsocietyorgan-izations,theUNandotherinternationalagenciesinDaresSalaamandDodomabetween2017and2019.

Findings:Elementsoflocalizationarepolicyalignmentatthenationallevel,workwithstatisticsandindicators,andawarenesscreationamongavarietyofactors.Driversoflocalizationarethegovernment,civilsocietyorganizations,theUN,membersofparliamentanddemandsforreviewattheUNHigh-levelPoliticalForum.Obstaclestolocalizationareunclearallocationofresponsibility,insufficientco-ordination,highturnaroundofpeopleinkeypositions,alackofdataavailability,lowawarenessoftheSDGsamongcitizens,ashortageofresourcesandshrinkingdemocratic

space.

PolicyImplications:Wepositthataclearallocationofresponsibilityfacilitatesimplementationandensuingaccountabilitymeasures.Forlo-calizationtooccur,knowledgeoftheSDGsmustreachbeyondalimitedcircleofelites.Moreover,itisimportanttoacknowledgethatsustainabledevelopmentisapoliticallychargedfield.Politicalinstitutionsatalllev-elsshouldthereforebecentralarenasfordebatingandadoptingthe2030Agendaaspartofitslocalization.

KEYWORDS

2030Agenda,accountability,legitimacy,responsibility,SustainableDevelopmentGoals,Tanzania

Thisisanopenaccessarticleunderthetermsofthe

CreativeCommonsAttribution

License,whichpermitsuse,distributionandreproductioninanymedium,providedtheoriginalworkisproperlycited.

?TheAuthors.DevelopmentPolicyReviewpublishedbyJohnWiley&SonsLtdonbehalfofOverseasDevelopmentInstitute

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1|INTRODUCTION

In2015,theUnitedNationsGeneralAssemblyadoptedthe2030AgendaforSustainableDevelopmentandits17SustainableDevelopmentGoals(SDGs)afterthreeyearsofunprecedentedworldwidecon-sultationprocesses.Withanendpointin2030,athirdoftheirtimeframehasnowpassed.Thisinvitesthequestionofhowindividualcountriesfareintheirworktowardsrealizingtheagenda.Untilnow,mostresearchpublicationshavefocusedonthechallengesoffulfillingindividualgoals,howtobestusesynergiesbetweengoals,onissuesnotcoveredbythegoals,oronbroaderglobalgovernancechal-lengesinthepursuitofrealizingtheSDGs(e.g.Dalbyetal.,2019;Fukuda-Parr,2017).Whiletheseareimportantandusefulcontributions,theyfailtoanalysetheSDGsintermsofapoliticaldecisionatthegloballevelthatneedstobelocalizedthroughnationalpoliticalandpolicyprocessesinordertobeachieved.Apriorarticleinthisjournalhaspointedtothebroadrangeofresearchquestionsthatareofcriticalimportancetothepost-2015agenda.Amongthosearekeyquestionsongovernanceandparticipationthatpointtowardstheroleofpoliticalinstitutionsandprocesses(Oldekopetal.,2016).Inthisarticlewethereforeexplorethepoliticalqualitiesoflocalizationprocessesthroughthreeanalyticalconcepts—legitimacy,responsibilityandaccountability.Wechoosetheseconceptsonnor-mativegrounds,asfromademocraticperspectivetheyrepresentcentralpoliticalqualitiesofSDGlo-calizationprocesses.Theconceptsprovideanalyticalleverageforcriticallyinquiringintolocalizationofglobalagreementsthroughpoliticalinstitutionsatotherlevelsthatareinchargeofimplementation.

Politicallegitimacymeansthattheexerciseofrule-makingpowerisperceivedtobeappropriate.Inlinewithagrowingliteratureonlegitimacyandlegitimationininternationalrelations(Tallbergetal.,2018;Zürn,2018),weexpectaglobalagreementsuchasthe2030Agendatorequireahighleveloflegitimacyinordertoberealized.Atthesametime,thisliteratureengagesmainlywithinternationalorganizationsperseanddoesnottakeintoaccountthenationalpoliticalcontextthatshapeslegiti-macyperceptionsoftheSDGslocally.Intermsofresponsibility,mostpolicydocumentsandofficialstatementsconveythatgovernmentsareultimatelyresponsiblefortherealizationoftheSDGs(e.g.UnitedNations,2015).YettheencompassingscopeoftheSDGsbringsseveraltensionsrelatedtothedistributionofresponsibility.Wecontributeanunderstandingofresponsibilitythattakesinstitutionalarrangementsandtemporalityintoaccountbydistinguishingbetweenforward-lookingobligationsandretrospectiveaccountability(Bexell&J?nsson,2016).AndwhileseveralpublicationsunderlinetheimportanceofaccountabilitythroughSDGtargetsandindicators(Karlsson-Vinkhuyzenetal.,2018),orraisechallengesofquantitativereviewofsustainabledevelopment(Kanie&Biermann,2017),fewanalyseaccountabilitythroughpoliticalinstitutionstakingintoconsiderationtheinterplaybetweengloballyandnationallydrivenpolicyprocesses.Thusfar,onlyafewstudieshaveusedtheconceptoflocalizationinrelationtotheSDGs.WhilethosestudiesemphasizetheimportanceofthelocallevelforSDGattainment(e.g.Jones&Comfort,2019),theyhavenotexploredthepoliticalqualitiesoflocalizationprocessesthroughafocusonpoliticalinstitutions.Rather,theirfocushasbeenontheaidsector(Belda-Miqueletal.,2019),ongovernancebynumbers(Fisher&Fukuda-Parr,2019),ondevelopingsystemsthinkingcapacityatthelocallevel(Tanetal.,2019)andonthecitylevelassuch(Valenciaetal.,2019).Bycombiningthethreeconceptsoflegitimacy,responsibilityandaccountabilityinourstudy,wearriveataricherunderstandingofthepoliticsofSDGlocalizationthatisalsoreflectedinreal-lifepoliticalprocesses.Thisisakeycontributionofthisarticle.

TheresolutionTransformingourworld:The2030AgendaforSustainableDevelopmentunderlinesthatthe2030Agendaisapplicabletoallcountries,taking“intoaccountdifferentnationalrealities,capacitiesandlevelsofdevelopmentandrespectingnationalpoliciesandpriorities”(UnitedNations,2015,§5).ThisisopentoawiderangeofinterpretationsonhowtolocalizetheSDGs.Inthepresentarticle,wehavechosentostudyacountrywithapoliticalleadershipthatwasveryengagedinthe

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consultationandnegotiationprocessesatglobal,nationalandlocallevelspriortotheadoptionoftheSDGs(Doddsetal.,2017,pp.31,49)butthatsincethenhasadoptedamoreinward-lookingapproachtodevelopment,namelyTanzania(DaresSalaam,personalcommunication,May2018).TheshiftofpoliticalleadershipinTanzaniainNovember2015providesagoodexampleoftheroleofnationallevelpoliticsforlegitimacy,responsibilityandaccountabilityinrelationtolocalizationoftheSDGs.Tanzaniaisalow-incomecountryrankednumber123intermsoflikelihoodofrealizingtheSDGsintheSDGIndexandDashboard(Sachsetal.,2018).Ithasalonghistoryofinternationaldevelopmentco-operationwithmanyexternalactorsinvolvedindifferentstagesofpolicy-making.ThisprovidesarichempiricalillustrationofthepoliticsoflocalizingtheSDGsthroughourthreeconcepts.Inordertofurtherinvestigatethis,weask:howdoesthepoliticsofSDGlocalizationunfoldinTanzaniaandwhatarethedriversandobstaclesoflocalization?Moreover,whatarethemainpolicylessonstobedrawnfromtheTanzaniancase?

Thisarticleprovidesanexplorativecasestudybasedonpolicydocumentreviewandinterviewswithkeyinformants.ThedocumentreviewincludesreportsbyarangeofactorsinvolvedinSDGworkinTanzania,suchasreportsfromconsultationsledbytheUnitedNations(UN),CivilSocietyOrganization(CSO)awarenessworkshops,andgovernmentaldocumentsreportingonSDGwork.Weconducted28interviewsbetween2017and2019inDaresSalaamandthecapitalDodoma.Initially,ourintervieweeswereidentifiedthroughpolicydocuments,buteventually“snowballed”asrecom-mendationssupplementedoursearchforrelevantinterviewees.Aimingforavarietyofinterviewees,weinterviewedcivilservantsatministryaswellasdistrictlevel,parliamentarians,representativesfromCSOs,theUNandotherinternationalagencies.Interviewsweresemi-structuredandquestionssomewhattailoredtothepositionoftheintervieweeathand,althoughinprinciplecoveringthesametopicsforall.QuestionsconcernedperceptionsoftheSDGs,theroleofconsultationsandexistingpolicyframeworks,divisionsofresponsibility,reportingmeasures,andchallengesofrealizingtheSDGs.Theinterviewswererecordedandgenerallylastedaroundonehour.Forreasonsofanonymity,wedonotstatethenameorpositionofourintervieweesbutonlyrefertotheinterviewsaspersonalcommunication,neitherdoweincludealistofinterviewees.Wearewellawarethatsincemostinter-vieweesworkinsomecapacitywiththeSDGs,theirperceptionsofthegoalsmaybepositivelybiased.However,asknowledgeabouttheSDGsisstilllimitedbeyondpolicy-makingcircles,thisselectionofintervieweesishighlyrewardingforempiricallystudyingSDGlocalization.Thisrichnewmaterialallowsustoalsomakeauniqueempiricalcontributiontotheevolvingstudyofthe2030AgendainaregionwheretheSDGsareexpectedtohavesignificantimplicationsfordevelopment(Hansonetal.,2018).Byexploringanactualpoliticalcontextwherethe2030Agendafacesseveralconstraints,wegobeyondresearchdealingwithgoalinterlinkages,contradictionsanddiscoursesofthe2030Agendaassuch(e.g.Cummingsetal.,2018).

Thearticleisstructuredaccordingtoourthreeanalyticalconcepts.Afteroutliningtheconceptualframework,welookintotheconsultationprocessesconductedpriortoandaftertheadoptionoftheSDGsintermsoflegitimacyandlegitimation.Wethenstudyhowresponsibilityforthe2030AgendaisallocatedinTanzania,followedbyadiscussionaboutpoliticalaccountabilitythroughSDGindica-torsandreportingprocesses.Finally,wedrawconclusionsondriversandobstaclesforthelocalizationofthe2030AgendainTanzaniaandsuggestpolicyimplicationsofourobservations.

2|CONCEPTUALFRAMEWORK

Weexplorethepoliticalqualitiesoflocalizationprocessesthroughourthreeanalyticalconcepts;legitimacy,responsibilityandaccountability.Ourconcerniswithpoliticsplayedoutinthepublic

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sphereinvolvingpoliticalinstitutionsandotheractorsengagedinpublicpolicyprocesses.Takentogether,thethreeconceptstouchattheheartoftheidealdemocraticrelationshipbetweengovernorsandgovernedasengagedinthroughpoliticalinstitutions.Inthisarticle,weunderstandlocalizationasaprocessthroughwhichpoliticaldecisionsatthegloballevelareadoptedbypoliticalinstitutionsatlowerlevelsandintegratedintothepolicyambitionsofthoseinstitutions.Theconceptoflocaliza-tionhasbeenwidelydiscussedindevelopmentstudiesandisoftenusedinabroadersensethaninthepresentarticle.Recentstudiesarguethatlocalizationusuallystaysatarhetoricallevel,elevatinga“myth”ofthelocal(Anderl,2016),andtheyinquireintowhoclaimstorepresentthelocalandwhodefinesit(Roepstorff,2019).Theconceptisalsoincreasinglyusedinnormsdiffusionresearchwhereitstandsfortheembeddingofglobalnormsinthelocalsocialenvironment(e.g.Bonackeretal.,2017,p.2).Weareawarethatlocalizationhasbecomeabuzzwordinpolicycirclesaswellasinacademia.Nevertheless,itcapturestheprocess-orientedapproachweemployanditallowsustoemphasizetheimportanceofpoliticalinstitutionsandpoliticalcontextatdifferentlevels.Whilelocalizationneednotsolelybeunderstoodinterritorialterms,thereisaclearterritorialcomponenttoitwhenourfocusisonpoliticalmatters,giventheglobal,regional,nationalandlocalterritorialdivisionofpoliticalinsti-tutions.Yet,wedonotconsiderlocalizationtobeinbinaryoppositiontotheinternationalorglobal,nordoweunderstanditasasmoothlinearprocess(seeRoepstorff,2019).Rather,wedrawattentiontotheintricateinteractiveprocessbetweenthelocalandglobalasepitomizedintheSDGcaseandweemphasizeitsentanglementinbroaderpoliticalcontexts.

Legitimacyisakeyconceptinouranalysisasglobalpoliticaldecisionsonjointgoalsinvolveclaimstoauthoritativerule-makingthatdependonbroadlegitimacyfortheirrealizationintheabsenceofenforcementmechanisms.Literatureonpoliticallegitimacyandlegitimationbringsourattentiontoquestionsrelatedtothepoliticalqualitiesofgoal-settingattemptsliketheSDGs.Iflegitimacyisun-derstoodasapropertyattributedtoanorganization,policyoractor,legitimationreferstotheactivityofeitherseekingorgrantinglegitimacy(Bexell,2014;Tallbergetal.,2018).Weareprimarilycon-cernedwithanempiricallygroundedstudyoflegitimationratherthanwithnormativeassessmentofdegreesoflegitimacyofSDG-relatedpoliticaldecisions.Legitimacyisnotstaticbutintersubjectivelyshapedthroughdeliberation,claims-makingandcontestation.Keysourcesoflegitimacyareproce-duralorinput-based,aswellasproblem-solvingoroutput-based.Foritspart,delegitimationstandsforaprocessofcontestationthatpotentiallyunderminesthelegitimacyofinstitutionsorpolicies.WelabelthosewhoactivelylegitimatetheSDGsasagentsoflegitimationandthosewhomtheytrytoconvinceasaudiencesoflegitimation(Bexell&J?nsson,2018).Localizationgivesrisetolegitimacychallengesatseveralpoliticallevelsaswellascrucialquestionsofwhoselegitimacyperceptionsagentsoflegitimationtrytoaffect.

WhilelegitimacyisaconceptthatallowsustostudylegitimationattemptsaspartofSDGlocal-ization,theconceptofresponsibilityaddsaconcernwiththepoliticalinstitutionsandactorschargedwithrealizingthegoals(Bexell&J?nsson,2016,2017).Clearly,theconceptofagoalrequiresthattherebeanagentwhosegoalitis,whoholdsobligationstofulfilit(Pogge&Sengupta,2015).Wethereforeunderstandresponsibilityinthesenseofobligation,meaningthatsomeoneisrequiredtoundertakespecifictasksinaforward-lookingmanner.Tobearsuchprospectiveresponsibilityistohaveadutyorobligationinvirtueofsomerolethatonefills,toensurethatsomethingoccurs.Inthepolitical–institutionalsettingofsustainabledevelopmentgovernance,obligationsareprimarilyrealizedthroughthecollectiveactionofinstitutions.Politicalresponsibilityishenceaformofinsti-tutionalresponsibility.TheallocationofresponsibilityforthebroadsetofSDGsisfarfromclear-cutandweexpectcountry-specificfactorstoshapehowthatallocationtakesshape.LocalizationmeansthatresponsibilityforrealizingtheSDGsisassignedtopoliticallevelsbelowtheglobal,withresultingtensionsarounddivisionsandlimitsofobligations.

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Thethirdtheoreticalconceptofourframeworkisaccountability,theretrospectivemirrorofrespon-sibility.Accountabilityreferstosomeonehavingtoanswerforthewayinwhichthatpersonororgani-zationcarriesoutitsdesignatedobligations.Itinvolvesapresumptionofmonitoringandsanctioninginstruments.Ininternationalgoal-settingonsustainabledevelopment,effectiveenforcementandver-ticalaccountabilityisoftenlackingandmanycommitmentsmadebygovernmentsarenon-binding.Inparticular,webuildonliteratureexploringglobalgoal-settingshowingthat“count-ability”oftenshapesaccountabilityinsustainabledevelopmentgovernance(Fukuda-Parr&McNeill,2015).Thismeansaccountabilityissteeredinthedirectionofwhatcanbemeasured.Academicshaveshownthatthesoftpowerofnumbershasimportantconsequencesforpolitics,policy-makingandpatternsofinclusionandexclusion(e.g.Kelley&Simmons,2015).Attheglobal–nationalnexusoftheSDGs,follow-upandreviewpracticeshavetakencentrestageandareformativeforSDGpolicyinmanycountries(Bexell&J?nsson,2019;seealsoOcampo&Gómez-Arteaga,2016;Perssonetal.,2016).ThechallengesofdevelopingglobalSDGindicatorswereacknowledgedearlyon,anditwasdecidedthatglobalindicatorswouldbe“complementedbyindicatorsattheregionalandnationallevelswhichwillbedevelopedbyMemberStates”(UN,2015,§75).Thislocalizationofaccountabilitymeasuresisnotameretechnicalexercisebutinvolvespoliticalchoicesonwhatmeasurestoprioritizeandhowtoadapttolocalcircumstances.Belowweproceedwithanin-depthanalysisofhowSDGlocalizationoperatesintheTanzaniancase.

3|LEGITIMACYANDTHESDGs

ThelegitimacyofglobalagreementsisrepeatedlychallengedduetothecompromisesrequiredintheUNGeneralAssemblyandtothelackofenforcementcapacities.InthissectionweexaminethelocalizationoftheSDGsthroughalegitimationlens.Tobegin,weshouldrecallthattheSDGsbuildonthelegacyoftheMillenniumDevelopmentGoals(MDGs).AmajorcriticismoftheMDGswasthattheybuiltonpoliticalprioritiesofdevelopmentagenciesandasmallgroupofdonorgovernments.Despitebeingsignatoriestotheagreement,thisimpliedalackofownershipamongthosewhoweretoimplementthegoals(Cummingsetal.,2019,p.9).Consequently,andasawaytoseeklegitimacyforthenewgoals,broadconsultationswereconductedworldwidefrom2012andonwards(Doddsetal.,2017;Kamauetal.,2018).Inotherwords,increasedparticipationbyawiderangeofstakeholderswasperceivedaskeytogreaterownershipandresultinglegitimacyofthenewsustainabledevelop-mentagenda.

Whilethereiscertainlyaviewofthe2030Agendaascomingfromoutsidethecountry,wedonotfindamongourintervieweestheviewthatitwasimposedfromabove.Byandlarge,the2030Agendawasperceivedtobelegitimateamongthoseofourintervieweeswhoworkwithpolicyanddevelop-mentissues.SeveralintervieweesclaimedthatownershipwasgrantedthroughtheUN-drivennationalconsultationspriortotheadoptionoftheSDGs,andthatthegovernmentatthetimefeltithadanim-pactontheintergovernmentalnegotiationsattheUN(Dodoma,personalcommunication,May2018).Tanzanialaunchedanationalconsultation“post-2015”processin2012inordertoidentifyitspriorityareasfornewglobalgoals,followedbyactivitiesatbothnationalandlocallevels.ThePresident’sOfficePlanningCommissionchargedtheEconomicandSocialResearchFoundation(ESRF)withco-ordinatingtheconsultationprocess.Consultationsinvolvedlocalgovernmentauthorities,CSOs,vulnerablegroups(theelderly,women,youngwomen,youthandchildren),theprivatesector,officialsfromthegovernmentandrepresentativesfromhighereducationandresearchinstitutionsaswellas“VolunteerInvolvingOrganizations”.FortheconsultationsconductedinTanzania’sdifferentzones,representativeswereselectedfromallfourlevelsoflocalgovernmentineachregion.TwoCSOswere

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selectedrandomlyfromeachmainlandzone.InZanzibar,representativesfromthegovernment,localgovernmentauthoritiesandothergovernmentalorganizations,universitiesandresearchinstitutionswereconsultedaswellastheCSOsandtheprivatesector.ConsultationswerealsoheldwithYouthofUnitedNationsinTanzania(ESRF,2013;President’sOffice,PlanningCommission,2013;President’sOffice,PlanningCommission&DepartmentofEconomics,UniversityofDaresSalaam,2012).Nodoubtawiderangeofstakeholderswereinvitedtopartakeintheseconsultations.

In2014consultationswereheldinTanzaniaonthelocalizationofthepost-2015developmentagenda.ThefocusonlocalizationwaspartoftheUN“consultationtemplate”andimplementedinpartnershipbythePresident’sOfficePlanningCommissionandtheUNCountryTeam.Fourconsultationworkshopspluse-consultationswereheldwithkeystakeholdersfromthecentralandlocalgovernments,CSOs,academiaandtheUNinordertodrawlessonsfromtheimplementationoftheMDGsandtofosterabroadsenseofownershipofthenewdevelopmentagenda(President’sOffice,PlanningCommission,&theUN,2014).ItwashighlightedthatTanzaniahadconductedandbenefittedfrompreviousconsultationprocessesinconjunctionwithnationallong-termdevel-opmentplansandtwopovertyreductionstrategies,andthattheinformationfromthefirstroundofconsultationsinformedTanzania’smid-termdevelopmentplanning.Thereportbearswitnesstothetensionbetweenadheringtoaspecificwayoflocalizing(consultations)toconformtoglobaldemandsandatthesametimetoshowthatconsultationisacommonpracticeinTanzania.TheSDGsepitomizetheimperativetolocalizeandtofulfilgloballydecidedgoalssimultaneously,il-lustratingatrendinwhichthelocalclearlyhasbeennormativelyupgradedindevelopment(Anderl,2016,p.198).InthecaseoftheSDGs,localizationhasevenbecomeacentralpolicyimperativethatisascribedgreatnormativestrength,amountingtoacentrallegitimationstrategyonthepartofpolicy-makingelites.

Additionalconsultationshavetakenplacesince.ThemostrecentonewasheldinconjunctionwiththevoluntarynationalreviewsubmittedtotheUNHigh-levelPoliticalForuminJuly2019.TheMinistryofFinanceandPlanningco-ordinatedpreparationsofthevoluntarynationalreviewinvolv-ingawiderangeofstakeholdersfromalloverthecountryfocusingondifferentSDGs,andasawaytoengagetheprivatesector,thebusiness-orientedUNGlobalCompactTanzaniawasresponsibleforasubstantialpartoftheconsultations(GlobalCompact,2019;UnitedRepublicofTanzania,2019a),aswasfurtherconfirmedinourinterviews.Inaddition,CSOshavearrangedseveralawarenesscam-paignsandworkshopsforlocalCSOs,civilservantsandmembersofparliament,actingasagentsoflegitimation(seee.g.PolicyForum,2017).TheUNhasorganizedworkshopsfor“MinisterialPermanentSecretariestopresentimplementationstatusintheirrespectiveministries”(DaresSalaam,personalcommunication,June2019).

Yet,despiteconsultations,theNationalAuditOfficeofTanzaniareportedthatawarenesscam-paignshavebeeninadequatelyconductedatthenationalaswellassub-nationallevels.Allegedly,therehasbeenalackofinvolvementofactorssuchasnon-stateorganizationsandtheprivatesector(NationalAuditOfficeofTanzania,2018).Thiscantoalargeextentbeexplainedbylimitedresources,butaccordingtooneCSOinterviewee“eveninvoluntarynationalreviewmeetingsparticipationwasnotrepresentativeasonlyfewparticipated”.Further,“multi-stakeholderpartnershipshavenotbeeninstitutionalizedproperlyanditspracticeshavenotbeenconsistent.Forexample,thegovernmenthaschosentoworkindependentlyonseveraloccasions,onlyinvolvingotherstakeholdersatthefinalstageofthepolicyprocess”.OurinterviewsalsoconfirmthatknowledgeoftheSDGsisveryunevenatdistrictlevel,somethingwewillreturntolater.TheyalsoindicatethattheattempttolegitimizetheSDGshasprimarilybeendirectedtowardsarelativelynarrowaudience,the(urban)elitesuchasgovernmentofficialsandrepresentativesfromthedevelopmentcommunity.Interestingly,theSDGsaremainlymentionedinEnglish-speakingnewspapers,suchasTheCitizensandTheGuardian.Inthe

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Kiswahiliversions(Nipashe,RaiaMwemaandMwananchi)wehavefoundverylittlewrittenabouttheSDGs,whichcontributestoweaklocalizationoftheSDGsamongcitizens.

ItisimportanttonotethatthecurrentPresident,JohnMagufuli,hassofartakenaninward-lookingapproachtoeconomicdevelopmentthroughindustrializationandfightingagainstcorruptionratherthanbeingengagedinglobalsustainabledevelopmentwork(DaresSalaam,personalcommunication,June2017;Dodoma,personalcommunication,May2018;alsoseeArthur,2018,p.26).AccordingtoJacobandPedersen(2018),tendenciestowardsanewnationalismbasedonincreasedresourcecontrolvis-à-visforeigncompanieshasbeenpronouncedduringthecurrentpresident,whichpresumablyalsofeedintopoliticalprioritizations.In2015formerPresidentJakayaKikwetelosttheelectiontocurrentPresidentJohnMagufuliwhothenbecamememberoftheSwedishPrimeMinisterStefanL?fvén’shigh-levelgrouponthe2030Agenda.Theideaofthegroupwastoencourageimplementationthroughexperiencesharing,butaccordingtoourintervieweesinvolvementfromtheTanzaniansidewasratherpassiveatthetimeofinterviews(DaresSalaam,personalcommunication,May2018).ThisisjustoneexampleindicatingthatSDGworkmaynotbethemainpriorityofthepoliticalleadership,whichwewoulda