信貸危機 中英翻譯

1、信貸危機拯救系統(tǒng)最后還有一線希望，為避免一場全球經(jīng)濟大災(zāi)難發(fā)生，還需要更大膽。對金融而言，信心就是全部。到本周為止，那些努力應(yīng)對信貸危機的政要們在重建信心這一基本因素上作為甚少。在美國，國會猶豫不決地通過了布什政府7000億美元的救市計劃。在歐洲，政府間隨意地玩著以鄰為壑的政治游戲，各國紛紛對本國存款進行擔(dān)保，沒有顧及這樣會動搖其他國家的銀行。然而，還是讓人們看到了第一束希望的曙光全球?qū)⒁恢滦袆訌浐闲判牧芽p。一個明確的信號是10月8日全球主要央行空前地聯(lián)合降息，其中包括美聯(lián)儲、歐洲央行、英國央行（英格蘭銀行）和中國央行（官方稱是巧合）。許多歐洲大陸國 家也開始計劃調(diào)整銀行資本結(jié)構(gòu)。但最令人驚駭

2、的進展發(fā)生在美國和英國。美聯(lián)儲將對其短期內(nèi)對銀行提供的貸款規(guī)模擴大到9000億美元，為原來的兩倍，并宣布將直接從企業(yè)購買未擔(dān)保的商業(yè)票據(jù)。更令人驚訝的是，迄今為止不知所措到極點的戈登?布朗政府采取了應(yīng)對危機的第一個系統(tǒng)的計劃，不僅向銀行提供資本和 短期貸款，還對三年內(nèi)到期的新債進行擔(dān)保。這的確是個進步，但還不夠。本周末，國際貨幣基金組織（IMF）和世界銀行的年會將在華盛頓召開，與會的世界各國財長和央行行長應(yīng)該傳遞出一條簡單的信 息：還會有更多行動。世界經(jīng)濟很顯然處于糟糕的境地，但它很可能會更糟糕?，F(xiàn)在正是將教條和政見擱到一旁，集中尋找實實在在的解決方式的時候。意即，就眼前來說政府干預(yù)和合作更重

3、要，而不是報紙通常所青睞報道的納稅人、政客或是對自由市場的質(zhì)疑（諸如此類問題）。在地板上痛苦掙扎的病人如果阻塞了全球信貸大動脈的恐慌不能迅速被平息，發(fā)達國家經(jīng)濟面臨的風(fēng)險將會增加，其產(chǎn)出不會只是收縮，而是崩潰。同樣的危機還會發(fā)生在新興市場，尤其是那些依賴外資的地區(qū)。沒有一個國家或是產(chǎn)業(yè)會在全球金融心臟病發(fā)作時毫發(fā)無傷。各國股市都處在恐慌之中。但主要的問題仍在信貸市場。銀行間拆借市場的利率繼續(xù)創(chuàng)出新高。同時，隨著貨幣市場資金紛紛逃離到最安全的資產(chǎn)上，企業(yè)借貸者發(fā) 現(xiàn)商業(yè)票據(jù)難以發(fā)行。新興市場上，債券價格飛漲，本國貨幣貶值。有些國家已經(jīng)開始陷入困境。冰島政府被迫將其最大的兩家銀行國有化，并發(fā)狂似的

4、向俄羅斯尋求續(xù)命貸款。世界銀行主席羅伯特?佐立克表示，超過30個發(fā)展中國家將出現(xiàn)國際收支差額問題。實體經(jīng)濟受到的損傷正在逐漸顯現(xiàn)。美國消費信貸在收縮，9月失業(yè)人數(shù)高達159,000人，創(chuàng)2003年以來最高。一些產(chǎn)業(yè)也被嚴重挫傷：因為意愿購車消費者無法取得貸款，汽車銷售量降到16年以來最低。通用汽車臨時關(guān)閉了數(shù)家歐洲工廠。全球經(jīng)濟展望的指標(biāo)，如采購經(jīng)理人指數(shù)等，都表現(xiàn)得十分低迷。如果說發(fā)達經(jīng)濟衰退的可能性已經(jīng)漸成定局，新興經(jīng)濟體集體增長下滑的可能性則高于衰退。中國經(jīng)濟的復(fù)原能力看起來仍然非常強勁。整體而言，全球經(jīng)濟明年的增速極有可能下滑到3%以下，普遍將這一速度視為經(jīng)濟進入衰退期。因此，前景可謂

5、十分嚴峻，但信貸市場持續(xù)干涸可能將情況變得糟糕得多。新舊教訓(xùn)歷史的教訓(xùn)是，政府及早、決斷采取措施能夠減輕危機造成的痛苦和付出的代價。20世紀(jì)90年代，瑞典政府快速地向銀行注資，其恢復(fù)的速度也很快；而在日本，執(zhí)政者未能處理壞死債務(wù)，經(jīng)濟陷入長達近10年的衰退。與以往不同的是，這次信貸危機更嚴重（影響到各類市場），范圍更廣（波及到更多國家）。任何解決辦法都必須比以往更系統(tǒng)化、更全球化。單一國家試圖修正其銀行系統(tǒng)某一方面的問題是徒勞的。全面的解決之道聽起來很簡單，雖然代價昂貴。但政要們未能領(lǐng)會這一點。歐洲各國始終頑固地執(zhí)著于這場麻煩是“美國制造”的理念。約翰?麥凱恩和巴拉克?奧巴馬則將一切都歸咎于現(xiàn)

6、代銀行家的貪婪。然而，早在建造華爾街數(shù)個世紀(jì)之前，金融過剩的問題就存在了。我們在本周的特別報道里指出，造成今天的失敗和此前的泡沫的原因不僅只有高風(fēng)險地借貸，還包括來自新興經(jīng)濟體的廉價資本潮，過時的規(guī)則，體制扭曲和監(jiān)管不力。這些失誤在美國和其他地方都很明顯。鑒于對這場危機癥結(jié)的診斷有誤，許多決策者未能把握其進展也就不足為奇了。今天的信心崩潰建立在三個相互關(guān)聯(lián)的問題上：銀行的償付能力，銀行在流動性凍結(jié)的市場上融資的能力，實體經(jīng)濟是否健康。房地產(chǎn)市場泡沫的破裂造成嚴重的信貸損失：大多數(shù)西方國家金融機構(gòu)資金短缺，部分已經(jīng)破產(chǎn)。但流動性的問題更急迫。美國上個月讓雷曼兄弟破產(chǎn)加速了全球大規(guī)模信貸市場的流動

7、性問題，其破產(chǎn)造成的損失牽連到持有其債券的貨幣市場基金。銀行融資難度越來越大，即使是健康的銀行?，F(xiàn)金流良好的大型企業(yè)也得不到貸款，只能獲得最短期的融資。對實體經(jīng)濟的擔(dān)憂由此增加，反過來又進一步增加了對銀行償付能力的擔(dān)憂?；谏鲜龇治觯畱?yīng)該立刻對這三個問題全面出擊。首先，在阻止恐慌方面，是為堵塞的信貸市場清除障礙。在大多數(shù)情況下，這意味著將中央銀行作為一個能夠 提供短期資金的來源。本周美聯(lián)儲朝著這個方向又邁進了一步：通過購買商業(yè)票據(jù)，美聯(lián)儲現(xiàn)在可以直接向企業(yè)提供有效的貸款。英國的舉措也是同樣大膽。除英格蘭銀行（英國央行）提供短期資金外，財政部還表示將為銀行發(fā)行的新短期和中期債券提供2500億

8、英鎊（4300億美元）的擔(dān)保。這種做法存在風(fēng)險：如果沒有限定期限，這些保證會給銀行不顧風(fēng)險地經(jīng)營提供動機（道德風(fēng)險）。但暫時的擔(dān)保系統(tǒng)是阻止恐慌的最佳選擇，如果是全球一致行動，則比大量國家各自的承諾更加可靠、風(fēng)險更低。解決危機戰(zhàn)略的第二擊是增加銀行資本金。IMF的一份最新報告指出，西方國家銀行需要大約6750億美元的新增資本，以阻止其賬面上貸款數(shù)量快速減少，避免損害到實體經(jīng)濟。盡管還有大量的私人資本四處流竄，但這是一個雞生蛋蛋生雞的問題：沒有人愿意在一個缺乏足夠資本的行業(yè)里購買股權(quán)。很顯然，政府必須注資或至少是政府干預(yù)，加速重建銀行的資產(chǎn)負債表。最初，美國更多地集中在從銀行購買問題資產(chǎn)，現(xiàn)在更

9、青睞“歐洲”作法向銀行注入資本。一些分歧不可避免，但還需要更多的協(xié)調(diào)。第三，決策者應(yīng)該聯(lián)合行動幫助經(jīng)濟軟著陸。如今，大宗商品價格跳水，通貨膨脹的風(fēng)險已經(jīng)戲劇化地從發(fā)達國家消退了。隨著資產(chǎn)價格垂直下落和經(jīng)濟收縮，通縮將很快成為更大的擔(dān)憂。各國紛紛降息是一個重要的開端。理想狀態(tài)下，決策者不應(yīng)該僅僅使用貨幣政策。舉例而言，中國可以通過放松財政政策和加速人民幣升值來幫助其他國家經(jīng)濟（和中國自身）。長久等待即使在最佳的環(huán)境里，史上最大的資產(chǎn)和信貸泡沫破滅的后續(xù)效應(yīng)也將延續(xù)很久。但是，如果恐慌能夠消除，在新興市場經(jīng)濟力量的緩沖下，這場危機會是一個容易解決的問題。國際間經(jīng)濟協(xié)作的成就有著一頁斑駁的記錄。在2

10、0世紀(jì)80年代，廣場協(xié)議和盧浮宮協(xié)議的制定分別促成美元貶值和升值，取得了相互混雜的成功。 今天的問題更加嚴重，牽涉的國家更多。但賭注也高得多。The credit crunchSaving the systemOct 9th 2008From The Economist print editionAt last a glimmer of hope, but more boldness is needed to avert a global economic catastropheConfidence is everything in finance. Until this week the p

11、oliticians trying to tackle the credit crunch had done little to restore this essential ingredient. In America Congress dithered over the Bush administrations $700 billion bail-out plan. In Europe governments have casually played beggar-my-neighbour politics, with countries launching deposit-guarant

12、ee schemes that destabilize banks elsewhere. This week, however, saw the first glimmers of a comprehensive global answer to the confidence gap.One clear sign was an unprecedented co-ordinated interest-rate cut on October 8th by the worlds main central banks, including the Federal Reserve, the Europe

13、an Central Bank, the Bank of England and (officially a coincidence) the Peoples Bank of China. Various continental European countries also set about recapitalizing their banks. But the most astounding developments were in America and Britain. The Fed doubled the amount of money available to banks on

14、 a short-term basis to $900 billion and announced that it would buy unsecured commercial paper directly from corporate borrowers. More surprisingly, Gordon Browns government, hitherto the ditherer par excellence, produced the first systemic plan for dealing with the crisis, not just providing capita

15、l and short-term loans to banks but also offering to guarantee new debt for up to three years.This is certainly progress, but it is not enough (see our extended finance section). The worlds finance ministers and central bankers, gathering in Washington, DC, this weekend for the annual meetings of th

16、e IMF and World Bank, should deliver a simple message: more will be done. The world economy is plainly in a poor state, but it could get a lot worse. This is a time to put dogma and politics to one side and concentrate on pragmatic answers. That means more government intervention and co-operation in

17、 the short term than taxpayers, politicians or indeed free-market newspapers would normally like.The patient writhing on the floorIf the panic that has choked the arteries of credit across the globe is not calmed soon, the danger will increase that output in rich economies will not simply shrink, bu

18、t collapse. The same could happen in many emerging markets, especially those that rely on foreign capital. No country or industry would be spared from the equivalent of a global financial heart attack.Stockmarkets are in a funk. But the main problem remains the credit markets. In the interbank marke

19、t the prices banks pay to borrow money from each other are still near record highs. Meanwhile corporate borrowers have found it hard to issue commercial paper, as money-market funds have fled from all but the safest assets. In emerging markets bond spreads have soared and local currencies plunged. A

20、nd whole countries have begun to get into trouble. The government of Iceland has had to nationalise two of its biggest banks and is frantically seeking a lifeline loan from Russia. Robert Zoellick, president of the World Bank, says there could be balance-of-payments problems in up to 30 developing c

21、ountries.The damage to the real economy is becoming apparent. In America consumer credit is now shrinking, and around 159,000 Americans lost their jobs in September, the most since 2003. Some industries are hurting badly: car sales are at their lowest level in 16 years as would-be buyers are unable

22、to get credit. General Motors has temporarily shut some of its factories in Europe. Across the globe forward-looking indicators, such as surveys of purchasing managers, are horribly gloomy.If the odds of a rich-world recession have risen towards a near certainty, the emerging world as a whole is slo

23、wing rather than slumping. China still seems fairly resilient. Taken as a whole, though, growth in the world economy seems likely to slow below 3% next yeara pace that many count as recessionary. So the prospects are grim enough, but a continuing credit drought would make this much worse.Lessons old

24、 and newThe lesson of history is that early, decisive government action can stem the pain and cost of banking crises. In the 1990s Sweden moved to recapitalise its banks quickly and recovered quickly; in Japan, where regulators failed to tackle toxic debt, the slump lasted for most of the decade. Th

25、e twist is that this credit crisis is deeper (it affects many more types of markets) and broader (many more countries). Any solution has to be both more systemic and more global than before. One country trying to mend one part of its banking system will not work.The idea of a comprehensive solution

26、sounds simple, if expensive. But politicians have found it hard to grasp. Europeans have remained stubbornly wedded to the notion that the mess was “Made in America”; John McCain and Barack Obama talk as if it was all down to the greed of modern bankers. But financial excesses existed centuries befo

27、re a brick had been laid on Wall Street. As our special report this week lays out, todays bustand the bubble that preceded ithad several causes besides dodgy lending, including a tide of cheap money from emerging economies, outdated regulation, government distortions and poor supervision. Many of th

28、ese failures were as evident outside America as within it.With a flawed diagnosis of the causes of the crisis, it is hardly surprising that many policymakers have failed to understand its progression. Todays failure of confidence is based on three related issues: the solvency of banks, their ability

29、 to fund themselves in illiquid markets and the health of the real economy. The bursting of the housing bubble has led to hefty credit losses: most Western financial institutions are short of capital and some are insolvent. But liquidity is a more urgent problem. Americas decision last month to let

30、Lehman Brothers failand the losses that implied to money-market funds that held its debtprompted a global run on wholesale credit markets. It has become hard for banks, even healthy ones, to find finance; large companies with healthy cash flows have also been cut off from all but the shortest-term f

31、inancing. That has increased worries about the real economy, which itself adds to the worries about banks solvency.This analysis suggests that governments must attack all three concerns at once. The priority, in terms of stemming the panic, is to unblock clogged credit markets. In most cases that me

32、ans using central banks as an alternative source of short-term cash. This week the Fed took another step in that direction: by buying commercial paper, it is now in effect lending direct to companies. The British approach is equally bold. Alongside the Bank of Englands provision of short-term cash,

33、the Treasury says it will sell guarantees for as much as 250 billion ($430 billion) of new short-term and medium-term debts issued by the banks. That is risky: if left for any length of time, those pledges give banks an incentive to behave recklessly. But a temporary guarantee system offers the best

34、 chance of stemming the panic, and if it were internationally co-ordinated it would be both more credible and less risky than a collection of disparate national promises.The second prong of a crisis-resolution strategy must aim to boost banks capital. A new IMF report suggests Western banks need som

35、e $675 billion of new equity to prevent banks from rapidly reducing the number of loans on their books and hurting the real economy. Although there is plenty of private capital sloshing around, there is a chicken-and-egg problem: nobody wants to buy equity in an industry without enough capital. It is becoming abundantly clear that government fundsor at least government interventionwill be necessary to catalyse the rebuilding of banks balance sheets. Initially, America focused more on buying tainted assets from banks; now it seems keener on the “European” approach of i