外文翻譯---股利政策：爭議問題-其他專業(yè)

1、原文： Dividend policy: The Issues1. Introduction The determinants of dividend policy are a continuing puzzle, as noted by Black (1976). In this paper we review the major issues in dividend policy and relate them to some of the themes explored in companion papers in this volume. The paper is d ivided i

2、nto five sections. Section 2 surveys the literature on the information signalling properties of dividends. Section 3 discusses some tax issues related to dividend policy and section 4 draws on some agency costs explanations for dividend payments. The conclusion draws together the arguments and highl

3、ights some of the unresolved issues. 2. Dividend policy and information signalling In their classic paper, Miller and Modigliani (1961) provide a cogent argument for the claim that dividend policy does not affect the value of the firm. They assume a world without transactions costs and taxes, a give

4、n investment policy and fully informed investors. In these circumstances it follows that "the irrelevance of dividend policy, given investment policy, is 'obvious, once you think of it'"(p.414). With a given level of investment, if a firm chooses to pay a dollar more of dividend no

5、w, it will have to raise an extra dollar of external finance to support its investment: The higher current dividend to existing shareholders will be exactly offset by a decrease in future dividends as the firm must now pay dividends to its new shareholders. In the absence of tax effects and transact

6、ions costs and given full information, the value of the firm to existing shareholders will not be affected by its dividend policy. Dividend policy is therefore irrelevant. Miller and Modigliani (1961) note that the "informational content" of dividends is assumed absent from their model. Th

7、ey note, however, that in practice "where a firm has adopted a policy of dividend stabilization with a long-established and generally appreciated 'target payout ratio', investors are likely to (and have a good reason to) interpret a change in dividend rate as a change in management'

8、s views of future profit prospects for the firm". This echoed the stance recorded by Lintner (1956) in his survey of U.S. company practices which led him to develop the 'partial adjustment' model of dividend beha-viour. Lintner suggests that the primary determinant of dividend payments

9、is the relationship between the existing dividend rate and "that rate which would constitute a target pay-out of current and reasonably forseeable profits". A number of different interpretations of Lintner's behavioural model are possible. One interpretation is that management signals

10、changes in their perception of the company's long-term profitability by changes in dividend payments. A paper by Allen, in this volume, assesses the use of target payout ratios by a sample of British companies, drawing on evidence obtained in a questionnaire survey. The results are consistent wi

11、th the implications of the Lintner model. Respondents report that a desire to maintain stable dividends and the company's recent dividend history are the main factors influencing target payouts. The importance of the use of payout levels to signal changes in expectations of future earnings is al

12、so emphasized. The role of information signalling has been emphasized in recent theoretical work on dividend policy. Miller and Rock (1985) provide a formal model of the role of dividend policy under asymmetric information. They assume that firm's managers know more than outside investors about

13、the true state of the firm's current earnings; both dividend payments and external financing will consequently have announcement effects as they provide information about the firm's sources and uses of funds that will enable the market to deduce the firm's current earnings. This estimate

14、 of current earnings can then be used to estimate expected future earnings and firm value. Unfortunately, this leads to the possibility that management may try to push up the share price in the short-run by over-generous dividend payments. Ultimately, the truth will be revealed but not before some i

15、nvestors have reaped an excess return by selling before the true information is revealed. Miller and Rock suggest a potential solution to this problem but at the expense of Fisher's criterion for optimal invest-ment. They provide a signalling equilibrium in which the dividend payout ratio is hig

16、her and real investment is lower than in the full information case. The above approach is consistent with the well-documented dividend an-nouncement effects as reported by Aharony and Swary (1980), Asquith and Mullins (1983), and Brickley (1983). Ball and Brown (1968) provide the first evidence of t

17、he linkage between unexpected changes in earnings and share prices. 3.Taxation and dividend policyThere are a number of potential linkages between corporate dividend policies and the tax system. Farrar and Selwyn (1967) and Brennan (1970) point out, that in tax regimes where dividend income is taxed

18、 at a higher marginal personal tax rate than capital gains, shareholders in different tax brackets will prefer different payout policies. It makes sense for higher personal tax rate investors to invest in lower dividend payout stocks so that they can take most of their gains in the form of capital g

19、ains. Indeed, pushed to the limit, this argument suggests that it is tax inefficient, from a highly taxed investor's point of view, for a company in this type of tax regime to pay any dividends. If equilibrium conditions are assumed, the argument also suggests that rational investors should dema

20、nd a higher risk-adjusted return, on a pre-tax basis, from high dividend yield stocks. This will compensate for their relatively unfavourable personal tax treatment. Trueman (1986) model the interaction of dividend policy, invest-ment decisions and financing decisions in the context of a corporate t

21、ax regime with varying investor personal tax rates. Their model implies that shareholders in different personal tax brackets will not agree on what constitutes the optimal investment/divi-dend policy. Investors in high personal tax brackets would prefer the firm to invest more whilst those in lower

22、tax brackets will prefer higher payouts and lower invest-ment. This problem will be reduced if clienteles of investors cluster around firms with different dividend payout policies. The possibility of a dividend clientele effect was first suggested by Miller and Modigliani (1961). It provides one pot

23、ential explanation of companies' observed reluctance to alter their dividend payout ratios. The result would be that shareholders would incur transactions costs in rearranging their portfolios to achieve desired income streams. Elton and Gruber (1970) examine the drop-off ratio, defined as the d

24、ifference between the ex-dividend and cum-dividend price scaled by the dividend, to try and measure clientele effects. If the price declines by the full amount of the dividend, after the payment of the dividend, the drop-off ratio is one. Elton and Gruber report a positive association between the me

25、an dividend yields and drop-off ratios. They interpret this as being consistent with the existence of a tax clientele effect and infer the marginal tax rates of investors from the size of the drop-off ratio. The implication is that shares with a larger drop-off ratio possess a clientele of investors

26、 with a lower tax burden on dividends received. Kalay (1982) has argued that it is not possible to infer investor clientele tax rates from the size of the drop-off ratio. This is because drop-off ratios would be bounded by transactions costs, not marginal tax rates. A paper by Clarke, in this volume

27、, assesses the impact of a change in tax regime on drop-off ratios in a sample of Australian shares resulting from the switch to a dividend imputation tax system in July 1987. However, these differences were not statistically significant and the large amount of noise in the data makes it difficult t

28、o draw clear cut conclusions. Further evidence relating to the impact of changes in dividend taxation regimes on security prices and yields is provided by Poterba and Summers (1984). They analyse a sample of British share price data for a period from 1955 to 1981. 4. Agency costs and dividend policy

29、 Jensen (1976) demonstrate that if management serve their own interests and not those of outside shareholders, then agency costs could arise. These will result because shareholders forsee that managers can increase their own wealth at their expense by the excessive use of perks or by shirking. In th

30、e Jensen and Meckling (1976) scenario, owner-managers may find it optimal to incur monitoring and bonding costs to reduce potential agency costs. These agency costs take a number of forms including monitoring costs and excessive risk aversion by managers who have a significant portion of their own w

31、ealth tied up with the fortunes of the firm. Unduly conservative behaviour may serve the interests of the firm's creditors but not the shareholders. Rozeff (1982) suggests that in the absence of taxes, it is possible for a firm to have an optimal dividend policy due to the existence of agency co

32、sts. He argues that dividend payout ratios could be conditioned by a tradeoff between the flotation costs of raising external finance and the benefit of reduced agency costs, realised when the firm increases its dividend payout ratio. Easterbrook (1984) also suggests that dividend payments may serve

33、 to reduce agency costs. Management can change the risk of the firm by changing both the profile of its real investment projects and the relative balance of debt and equity. By maintaining a constant payment of dividends it avoids a build up in the balance of equity funds and simultaneously forces t

34、he firm to seek external finance. The raising of external finance will cause periodic reviews of the firm's activities by the contribu-tors of capital; their presence therefore eases the burden on existing shareholders. Shareholders will also benefit from the adjustment of leverage ratios which

35、will accompany the raising of external finance. This argument also provides a potential explanation of why companies pay dividends and raise external finance at the same time. The final paper in this volume, by Allen, examines some of the pecularities of Japanese company dividend policies. Japanese

36、dividend policies have a number of interesting aspects. The standard policy is to pay a dividend which is 10 per cent of the par value of the stock. At first glance, this suggests that dividend policy cannot act as a signalling device in Japan. However, the payment of special and memorial dividends

37、is common and there is an emphasis on stock splits, both of which could be used as signalling mechanisms. On the other hand, many Japanese companies are members of groups with stable systems of cross-shareholdings. The group banks hold equity in group companies as well as providing loans. As group c

38、ompanies have many points of contact and channels of information, they are unlikely to require information signals from divi-dend payments. Furthermore, the fact that major lenders are also shareholders means that conflicts of interest giving rise to agency costs are also likely to be reduced. Divid

39、end policy should have less of a role in reducing agency costs in Japan. Indeed, it is quite conceivable that there are three distinct categories of share-holders in Japan: stable group shareholders, external institutional investors, and external individual shareholders. Institutional investors woul

40、d conceivably benefit from more generous dividend payout policies to help them meet their liabilities. Accounting standards and practices plus methods of conducting company annual general meetings mean that Japanese individual investors are not likely to be well-informed about company prospects rela

41、tive to stable shareholders who should be much better informed. Do the former glean any information from dividend policy? It is not clear why Japanese companies follow their current dividend policies, nor is it clear whether they can serve the interests of all their stakeholders equally. 5. Conclusi

42、on Dividend policy remains, as Black (1976) suggested, "a puzzle". The evidence in the West seems to suggest that dividend payments do impart information. There is also some evidence of taxation impacting upon share prices and returns via dividend policies. Why do firms pay dividends and r

43、aise external finance at the same time? It may be the case that Western companies see some benefit in the form of reduced agency costs resulting from the joint impact of the policy. However, it has to be admitted, dividend policies pursued in Japan do not fit neatly with any of the above theories.So

44、urce: D.E. Allen, H.Y. Izan, (1993) "Dividend Policy: The Issues", Managerial Finance, Vol. 18 Iss: 1, pp.1 8.二、翻譯文章譯文：股利政策：爭議問題1、介紹股利政策的決定因素是一個持續(xù)的謎題,值得注意的是由布萊克(1976)在文中提出的論點,在文中我們回憶股利政策的重大課題以及關(guān)注了一些與股利政策相關(guān)的文章。論文分成了五個局部。第二局部調(diào)查的文獻是信息信號性能的股息。第三局部討論一些股利政策的相關(guān)的稅收問題，第四局部引用了一些代理本錢股利發(fā)放的解釋。結(jié)論得出的這些觀點

45、一起強調(diào)了一些懸而未決的問題。2、股利政策和信息發(fā)送信號米勒和莫迪里阿尼1961在他們的經(jīng)典論文中提供了一個有力的論據(jù)聲稱股利政策不影響企業(yè)的價值。They ass他們假設(shè)a world without transactions costs and taxes, a given investment policy and full 世界上沒有一個全面的交易本錢和稅收，給定的投資政策和投資者informed investors.有的充分信息。在這樣的情況下,遵循“毫不相干的股利政策, “一旦你認為是對于投資政策的作用是明顯的。在給定的投資水平下,如果一個公司現(xiàn)在選擇支付一美圓更多的股息,它必須籌

46、集外部資本額外的一美元以支持他們的投資：更高的的紅利正好抵消現(xiàn)有股東未來股利的減少和企業(yè)現(xiàn)在必須支付股息給新股東。在缺乏稅收效應(yīng)和交易本錢、信息充分下企業(yè)的價值對現(xiàn)有股東不受股利政策影響。In the absence of tax effects and transactions costs and given fulDividend policy is therefore irrelevan因此，股利政策是無關(guān)。Miller and Modigliani (1961) note that the "informational content" of dividends米勒

47、和莫迪利亞尼1961注意到，“信息內(nèi)容股息is assumed absent from their model.假設(shè)偏離了他們的模型。They note, however, that in practice "whereThis echoed the stance recorded by Lintner (1956) in his survey of US company這照應(yīng)林特納1956在他的調(diào)查practices which led him to develop the 'partial adjustment' model of dividend beha-中美

48、國公司的活動中使他產(chǎn)生了用不同的模型局部調(diào)整的股息的記錄。Lintner suggests that the primary determinant of dividend payments is the林特納說明，發(fā)放股利的主要決定因素是relationship between the existing dividend rate and "that rate which would constitute現(xiàn)有的股息率的存在和“這個速度即會構(gòu)成a target pay-out of current and reasonably forseeable profits" (p.

49、103).目標的當前和合理可預(yù)見的利潤對于這點林特納有不同的解釋possible.可能。一種解釋是, 公司的長期贏利和股利發(fā)放通過改變管理信號的感知變化而變化。One interpretation is that management signals changes in their perceptionA paper by Allen, in this volume, assesses the use of target payout ratios by a艾倫在文章中評估了對通過借鑒英國公司進行問卷調(diào)查利用了目標的支付比率的樣品證據(jù)。其結(jié)果比擬吻合林特納模型的含義。受訪者report th

50、at a desire to maintain stable dividends and the company's recent dividend報告說，一個希望保持穩(wěn)定分紅和公司最近股息history are the main factors influencing target payouts.歷史是目標支付的主要因素影響。使用的重要性支出水平變化信號對股票未來盈利的預(yù)期也是強調(diào)的重點。The importance of the use oThe role of information signalling has been emphasized in recent theore

51、tical信息的信號的作用也是最近股息政策理論一直強調(diào)的。Miller and Rock (1985) provide a formal model of the rol米勒和羅克1985提供一個正式模式作用的非對稱信息條件下的股利政策。They assume that firm's manager他們認為公司的管理者know more than outside investors about the true state of the firm's current earnings;了解公司目前的盈利超過了對外部投資者了解的真實情況；both dividend payment

52、s and external financing will consequently have announcement同時紅利收支和對外融資將因此需要發(fā)布相關(guān)的影響消息effects as they provide information about the firm's sources and uses of funds that，因為它們提供資金的信息是有關(guān)公司的消息來源和用該will enable the market to deduce the firm's current earnings.將使市場來推斷公司的當期損益。This estimate of curren

53、t目前的估計，這earnings can then be used to estimate expected future earnings and firm value.收益可以被用來估計預(yù)期未來收益和公司價值。Unfortunately, this leads to the possibility that management may try to push up不幸的是，這將導(dǎo)致管理可能會嘗試試圖太高股價短期過度支付高股利。Ultimately, the最終，truth will be revealed but not before some investors have reaped

54、 an excess return by真相將被揭示而不是之前一些投資者賺取超額返回selling before the true information is revealed.銷售前的真實信息顯示出來。Miller and Rock suggest a potential米勒和羅克提出一個潛在solution to this problem but at the expense of Fisher's criterion for optimal invest-解決這個問題，但在代價是Fisher的最正確投資標準m。它們提供一個較高的信令均衡的派息率,實際利用外商直接投資是低于完整信

55、息的情況。保爾They provide a signalling equilibrium in which the dividend payout ratio isThe above approach is consistent with the well-documented dividend an-How much additional informa-Ball and Brown (1968) provide the first evidence of the linkage between保爾保爾和布朗1968提供了第一個證據(jù)是著名的對利潤和股票價格之間意想不到變化的聯(lián)系觀點。Simi

56、lar evidence in a US context is provided by Kane, Lee and Marcus (1984).3Taxation and dividend policy稅務(wù)及股息政策 在股利政策和稅收制度有一些潛在的聯(lián)系。There are a number of potential linkages between corporate dividend policiesFarrar and Selwyn (1967) and Brennan (1970) point out,that in法拉和塞爾溫1967和布倫南1970指出，法勒和塞爾溫(1967)和布

57、倫南(1970)指出,在稅收制度中在股息收入是在更高的邊際個人所得稅資本收益中得到的,股東的比例比在不同的稅級下將喜歡不同的支付政策，It makes sense for higher personal tax rate investors to invest in lower這是有道理的，稅率更高的個人投資者投資于低派息股票以便他們能夠獲得他們大局部的獲取形式的資本收益。 Indeed, pushed to the limit, this argument suggests that it is tax inefficient,事實上，是推到了極限，這種說法說明，它是稅收效率不高，from

58、a highly taxed investor's point of view, for a company in this type of tax regime從高度征稅投資者的角度來看對于公司一個因為在這類型的稅收制度愿意to pay any dividends.支付任何股息。如果條件公平,爭論結(jié)果也說明,合理的投資者應(yīng)該要求更高的風險調(diào)整后的回報,在稅前股票高股息率。這將彌補各自的相對不利的個人稅收待遇。If equilibrium conditions are assumed, the argument alsoThiswill compensate for their rel

59、ativelyMiller and Scholes (1978) reduce the impact of the above argument by demon-Masulis and Trueman (1986) model the interaction of dividend policy, invest-特魯曼1986模型的政策之間的相互作用分紅，投資ment decisions and financing decisions in the context of a corporate tax regime wi決策和融資決策的制度下的法人稅與varying investor per

60、sonal tax rates.不同投資者的個人所得稅稅率。Their model implies that shareholders in different他們的模型意味著在不同的股東personal tax brackets will not agree on what constitutes the optimal investment/divi-個人所得稅不會同意什么構(gòu)成了最優(yōu)投資/股息的政策 dend policy.表示的公司股息政策。投資者在高個人稅級下寧可在公司同時進行更多的投資在低稅率下會選擇更高的支付和較低的投資。米勒和莫迪里阿尼(1961) 首次提出這個問題將造成客戶集群減少，投資者在公司不同的派息政策下可能影響顧客的紅利。Investors in high personal tax brackets would pr