英文版產業(yè)經濟學教程第4章價格歧視課件

1、Chapter 4 Price discriminationECNU Oriental Real Estate CollegeChapter 4 Price discriminat4.1 Definition A prevalent marketing skill and economic phenomena. preferential price or quantity discount. eg.Sometimes people will think that if firms charge different price on different consumers for the sam

2、e goods, it means price discrimination. But this understanding is incomplete. In much case, discrete price maybe only reflect traffic cost and sales cost fee. And in certain case, universal price means discrimination on the contrary (fixed fee in bus eg.). 4.1 Definition A prevalent marPrice discrim

3、ination means one firm sales the identical goods to different consumers with different net price.(Philips,1983) Net price, subtract product difference from goods price. If price differentiation just reflects the cost difference of supplying to different consumers, we deem price discrimination doesnt

4、 exist. Ratio test Harry potterin painly packed edition vs. deluxe edition ,eg.Price discrimination means oneAt the same time, we cant say providing different quality goods to different consumers means no discrimination.Reason of providing service in different quality (such as classed cabin in aircr

5、afts and trains) partly is to get consumers surplus by segmenting consumers into different groupsThe concept of “identical” goods： BMW in USA is the same to in German?General equilibrium theorist may point out with some excuse，goods delivered in different time, different location and different state

6、 or different quality is different goods, so scope of pure price discrimination is very limited.英文版產業(yè)經濟學教程第4章價格歧視課件Conditions of price discrimination1、firms must has market power. We often confine it in monopoly or oligopoly market, only when firms can price higher than marginal cost, can they charg

7、e different price on different consumers. Locay and Rodriguez,1992：competitive firms is possible to practice price discrimination, if consumers purchase in group unit.2、the ability of effective market segmentation.3、ensure of no arbitrage. Conditions of price discriminaMarket segmentation Can we fin

8、d a right way to conduct market segmentation（the result must be related to price elasticity and WTP(willing to pay) statusgenderageLocationtimeusePurchasing amountMarket segmentation Can we Kinds of arbitrages Possibility of price discrimination is related with possibility of arbitrage.One kind of a

9、rbitrage is related with transferability of goods.If transaction cost is low, price discrimination will encounter arbitrage, namely low-price consumers will buy for reselling to high-price consumers. Transaction cost provides one clue to feasibility of price discrimination. Absolute arbitrage or no

10、arbitrage is only two extreme case. Generally, some limited arbitrage will occurs, it depends on relative cost and income.Kinds of arbitrages PossibilThe other kind of arbitrage is related with transferability of different consume packages or bundles provided to consumers.That not means physical tra

11、nsfer of goods among consumers. That means firms try to make every buyer really select consume package designed for him, not for others.Incentive compatibility and self-selection.The other kind of arbitrage isInfluence of arbitrageInfluence of two kinds of arbitrage is different.Transferability of g

12、oods is inclined to prevent discrimination.Transferability of demand may cause firms increase discrimination.Influence of arbitrageInfluencThree kinds of price discriminationPerfect price discrimination suppliers get all consumer surplus in condition of holding perfect information of willing payment

13、.Second-degree price discriminationsuppliers extract consumer surplus incompletely using self-selection when information of individual preference is incomplete.Third-degree price discrimination Market segmentation using direct information about demand such as age, profession and location etc. and se

14、t different price for each group.Three kinds of price discrimin4.2 Perfect price discriminationsimplest case：single consumer (or some identical consumers) has one unit of demand. Monopoly make price equal to reserve price, getting all consumer surplus.A classical example：a doctor is a little village

15、 similar with everybody in there and their economic information. He estimates how much everyone is willing to pay for and then charge for that amount.Another case：airline company pay for each aircraft in different price.4.2 Perfect price discriminat(2) Complex caseassumption：n consumers hold the sam

16、e demand curve, and monopoly know about it.q = D(p)/n, so D(p)=nqT gross of consumers payment Two pricing projects：linear pricing and two part tariffLinear pricing：T=pqTwo part tariff：T=A+pq(2) Complex caseassumption：n cProfit maximizationIn linear pricing, monopoly price：p=Two part tariff：set as ne

17、t consumer surplus in competitive price p = , set “l(fā)icense fee” A = , so pricing project as below T(q)=Profit compare： Monopoly pricing： = Two part tariff： 0If q0If q=0Profit maximizationIn linear pProfit compareDMCABC=ABCObviously, all the consumer surplus is grabbed in two part tariff.Profit compa

18、reDMCABC=ABCObvio(3) Universal caseAssumption：consumers hold different demand curves, and monopoly know about them.Optimal project：set p = , and ask each consumer pay its net surplus as “l(fā)icense fee” , namelyProblem of information reveal when consumer has unit demand and supplier only know distribut

19、ion of estimation among them but no about everyones estimation, it will set single price means no price discrimination. (3) Universal caseAssumption：cHow to make Perfect price discriminationIn fact its a question of information emergingCompretively use coupon or accumulated consuming volumesAuction

20、or bidPricing in bindBargaining directlyHow to make Perfect price disc優(yōu)惠券的使用(Journal of Marketing Research, 1978)就業(yè)狀態(tài)產品種類鋁箔蠟紙頭痛藥清潔液面巾紙就業(yè)29.0%(62)17.7%(62)25.0%(76)32.6%(92)22.4%(116)失業(yè)38.3%(128)23.5%(153)28.6%(161)37.4%(214)29.2%(226)表中條目是有使用優(yōu)惠券傾向的全職主婦購買商品的比例括號中的數(shù)字表示所表示比例的抽取樣本中人數(shù)優(yōu)惠券的使用(Journal of Ma

21、rketing R4.3 Third-degree price discrimination（Multi-market）assumption：Monopoly can segment consumers in some groups according to some exogenous information, and know about each of their demand curves.No arbitrage among groups, and monopoly cant practise price discrimination in one group.A special e

22、xample of multiple products monopoly pricing：independent demand and interdependent cost4.3 Third-degree price discriHow to prevent arbitrage 持卡、憑證擔保（轉售限制，尤其是對于中間商）摻雜交易費用合約垂直一體化 專欄：航空公司如何防止套利？How to prevent arbitrage 持卡、憑證Profit maximizationGeneral demand Profit function According to Inverse elastici

23、ty rule (Lerner index), in every market should existsOptimal pricing means setting comparatively high price in market with lower elasticity.Profit maximizationGeneral demMR1D1MR2D2MCp1p2Q1Q2MR1D1MR2D2MCp1p2Q1Q2Welfare compareCompare it with the result of uniform pricingAssume that scale reward fixed

24、：C is constant Welfare compareCompare it withProfit and surplusIn case of price discrimination, price in market i is pi, profit as belowGeneral consumer surplus isIn case of uniform pricing, price is ,sales amount in market I is , profit as belowGeneral consumer surplus is Profit and surplusIn case

25、of pDifference on welfareGeneral difference equals to change of surplus plus profit To set up limit and down limit, makeFunction of NSW is convex function of market price, and S (p) = -D (p) , according to Lagrange median theory,we can getSo, if price discrimination cannot increase sales volume, wel

26、fare will be reduced. That is the necessary condition of existence of price discrimination in the social angle.Difference on welfareGeneral dConclusion Generally, the welfare effect of the third-degree price discrimination is uncertain. It depends on the compare between loss of low-elasticity compar

27、ison and gain of high-elasticity consumers and suppliers.One of the central question in policy is its influence to income distribution. Price discrimination transfers benefit of low-elasticity consumers partly to high-elasticity consumers and suppliers.It may be not appropriate, but as we know , low

28、-elasticity consumers are generally (not always) richer group.Conclusion Generally, the welf三級價格歧視實例1Office2000在新加坡的定價 常規(guī)價格學術機構價格Excel579199Power Point579199Word579199三件產品的組合759219中國大使館在新加坡的簽證費簽證提前時間1天3天7天單次入境756025雙次入境857035三級價格歧視實例1Office2000在新加坡的定價 常規(guī)價三級價格歧視實例2：迪斯尼世界門票價格，2006成人門票的類型非佛羅里達居民佛羅里達居民所

29、有主題公園、水上樂園和歡樂島優(yōu)惠年票5394294個主題公園的年票415325淡季佛羅里達居民四個主題公園季票不提供2154天，4個主題公園季票1951711天，1個主題公園季票6356.7三級價格歧視實例2：迪斯尼世界門票價格，2006成人門票的類4.4 Second-degree price discriminationAssumption：consumer demand is heterogeneous.If monopoly know about tastes of all consumers, it can make perfect price discrimination thro

30、ugh providing personal consume packages or bundles.But monopoly generally cannot classify consumers according to some explicit information, and it can provide a menu for selection. Then possibility of arbitrage must be considered, namely consumers belonging to one group may choose consume package de

31、signed for other groups.The restriction of self-selection or incentive-compatible. 4.4 Second-degree price discri4.4.1 indirect price discrimination based on time航空公司基于訂票時間的價格歧視p起飛時間預售時間票價與提前訂票時間的關系提前訂票時間2-3天4.4.1 indirect price discrimin4.4.2 Indirect price discrimination based on qualityProduct li

32、nes with different quality statusDifferent kinds of consumers：high value type,low value typeCommon strategy：“harmed” goods，IBM,Sony, IntelpProduct status400350300600486SX4864.4.2 Indirect price discrimin質量歧視的三個決策：廠商應該確定幾種不同的等級？ 實踐表明，三個而不是兩個等級是最優(yōu)的。各個等級水平如何選擇？如何為每個等級的產品制定相應的價格？ 參與約束&激勵相容約束質量歧視的三個決策：例：

33、參考價格對高價位產品的影響微波爐型號選擇率（%）第一組（60人）第二組（60人）松下型13松下型4360愛默生5727例：參考價格對高價位產品的影響微波爐型號選擇率（%）第一組（4.4.3 Indirect price discrimination based on quantityquantity discount. taxi feeelectric power usePackage strategy（quantityprice portfolio）4.4.3 Indirect price discrimin（P、F）組合類型One2one銅服務價格One2one金服務價格月租費17.50英

34、鎊36.00英鎊工作日白天通話費29便士18便士英國移動通信公司的二部定價套餐此外還有，移動的動感地帶短信套餐等。（P、F）組合類型One2one銅服務價格One2one金服4.5 Comparision among several methods in nonlinear pricingTwo-part tariff (T(q)= A+ pq) provides a menu of consume bundles in a line. Generally the line does not pass origin.Simplicity is its primary attraction, a

35、nd sometimes it depends on possibility of limited arbitrage.Full arbitrage is prevented, namely only one buyer pays for fixed fee A, and then resale goods to other consumers.Notice：actually two-part tariff corresponds to quantity discount, average price decrease with increase of consume quantity.4.5

36、 Comparision among several Profit and welfareAssumption：consumers reference as below U=V(0)=0,V(q)0,V(q)1 ,monopoly produce in fixed cost c, and c 1 2 . for simplicity, assume so V(q)=1-q A simple modelTwo kinds of conUtility functionNotice：fixed cost only influence the decision of buying or not. On

37、ce consumers decide to buy, it is out of consider.Consumer utility maximization：U=iV(q)- pqFirst-order condition：iV(q) = pAccording to assumption before,i(1-q) = pSo , demand function is educed as q = Di(p) = 1-p/ iNet consumer surplus isUtility functionNotice：fixed cGeneral demand functionIn this c

38、ase, consumer surplus isNotice that ,and 2 type consumers always hold higher surplus.Make as harmonic mean of 1 and 2 Then general demand in price p is General demand functionIn this2 1pP1=cD1D2S2(p)S1(p)2 1pP1=cD1D2S2(p)S1(p)Case1：perfect price discriminationAssume that monopoly can observe i direc

39、tly. Then it can set marginal price as p1=c, and set personal fixed feeManufacturers monopolistic profit isLeave distribution question out of account, welfare here is optimal.Case1：perfect price discriminaCase2：Monopoly pricingAssume that consumers have complete arbitrage, so that monopoly can only

40、set uniform price： T(q) = pqProfit is (p-c)D(p), and D(p) =1- p/ Monopoly price is Monopolistic profit isHere we assume that monopoly decides to provide goods to two kinds of consumers. It need (c+2)/21, or is large enough.Case2：Monopoly pricingAssume tCase3：Two-part tariffAssume also that monopoly

41、provides goods to two kinds of consumers.Set marginal price p. Maximal fixed fee that can make 1 type consumers buy goods is A=S1(p). Then 2 type consumers will purchase, because So profit function of monopoly isPrice of profit maximization isSimply, we can see that profit of two-part tariff is as g

42、ood as in linear pricing at least (the late can be seen as the special case of the former ). Case3：Two-part tariffAssume alComparison in welfare effectIts simple to judge that And also, in the case of supplying two kinds of consumers at the same time, marginal of two-part tariff is between competiti

43、ve price and monopoly price, namelyNotice：welfare under two-part tariff is higher than in linear pricing, because marginal price decreasing will bring purchasing more by two kinds of consumers, so distortion is reduced. To monopoly, it can make up loss by fixed fee when decreasing price. So fixed fe

44、e will induce monopoly decrease price so that welfare is gained.Comparison in welfare effectItConclusionWe can make a more complex project to get more profit through complete nonlinear pricing. (process omitted)Conclusion 1：low-demand consumers do not get net surplus, while high-demand consumers can

45、 get positive net surplus. Conclusion 2：effective restriction to personal arbitrage will prevent high-demand consumers buy low-demand bundles.Conclusion 3：high-demand consumers buy socially optimal quantity; and low-demand consumers buy quantity lower than optimal quantity.ConclusionWe can make a more c4.6 Quality discriminationMonopoly can also practise discrimination through providing different quality goods to different tasty consumers. It is very similar to quantity discrimination.Assume that cons