風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資公司的不同形態(tài)解析課件

PrivateEquity

and

VentureCapitalLecture2:differenttypesofVCfirmsPrivateEquity

and

VentureC1VCfirmsandotherinvestorsThereareatotalof7differenttypesofVCfirmsinadditionaltoangelinvestors:privateindependentventurecapitalpartnershipsprivatesmallbusinessinvestmentcompaniespublicventurecapitalcompaniesventurecapitalsubsidiariesoflargecorporationsstateventurecapitalfundsuniversityrelatedincubators&privatesectorincubatorsinvestmentbankingfirmsVCfirmsandotherinvestorsTh2PrivateindependentVCpartnershipLimitedpartnership:taxbenefits10yearslife,2yearextensionTwotypesofPIP:wealthyfamilies-venrockassociates,institutionalinvestors--KPCB,twotypesoffunds:usually$2-5milliontraditionalvcfunds-investinginseed,orstartupsturnaroundorLBOsPrivateindependentVCpartner3VCfirmsandVCfundsVCFirmVCfundVCfundVCfundVCfundVCfundVCfirmsandVCfundsVCFirmVC4VClimitedpartnership

LPGPVClimitedpartnershipLPGP5GeneralPartners:

HowtheirIncomestructuredAngelinvestors:managingandinvestingtheirownmoneyVentureCapitalists--GPs:managingandinvestingothersmoneyGPincome:managementfees:1.5-2.5%ofthemoneytheymanaged,offices,telephones,computers,othercostsCarriage:carriers--20/80.Now,it’shigher:25/75common.Even30/70GeneralPartners:

HowtheirI6VCfirmsandVCfundsVCFirmVCfundVCfundVCfundPC-2PC-3PC-4Pc-1PC-5VCfirmsandVCfundsVCFirmVC7TheagreementofPEpartnership-1Fundsizes,investmentmaximumandminimum.Numberofinvestors,GPcontributionstakedownschedule:bothGPandLPdonotliketopaythecommittedcapitalimmediatelyfirstamounttobedisbursedatclosing:10-33%,thedatesofthesubsequentpaymentsmaybesetintheagreement.TheagreementofPEpartnershi8TheagreementofPEpartnership-2ThecontrolofLP:if51%+LPagreecanreplaceaGPGPcannotinvestinareabeyondtheirexpertisenofaultdivorcethecontrolofGP:ifLPpaylate,alatefeeischargedconditiononLP’ssharetransfersTheagreementofPEpartnershi9TheagreementofPEpartnership-3Managementofthefundsizeonanyoneinvestment,preventGPfromattemptingtosalvageapoorlymanagedinvestmentGPcannothaveanysharebeforeLPgetbacktheiroriginalcapital,GPshareasacalloptionpercentageofthefundcanbeinvestedinonedeallimitGP’sattempttoleveragethefund,limitthedebttoapercentagelimitGPtocoinvestbetweenfunds.GP’sattempttosalvagethetroubledinvestmentlimitGPtoreinvestprofitsTheagreementofPEpartnershi10TheagreementofPEpartnership-4GPactivities--5restrictions1.RestrictGPtoinvestpersonalfundintothefirm,maypaymoreattention,maynotliketopulloutifnecessary2.RestrictonGPtoselltheirsharesofthefundtoothers,reducetheincentiveoftheGPtomonitor3.Restrictonfuturefundraisinguntila%offundinvested:additionalfundrequireadditionalattentionoftheGP4.RestrictonGPfortheirotheractivities5.RestrictonhiringnewGPwithlessexperiencesTheagreementofPEpartnershi11TheagreementofPEpartnership-5TypesofinvestmentlimitedsizeinanygiveninvestmentclasscannotinvestintopublicsecuritiescannotinvestintootherPEfundscannotinvestintoareaswithlittleexpertiserestrictionsonforeigninvestmentrestrictionsonLBOTheagreementofPEpartnershi12SBICsCreatedin1958,licensedandregulatedbySBAinvestedcompanies,ie.Apple,federalexpress,intel,crayresearch,etc.becauseofSBA,investmentfromSBICismorerestrictivethanotherVCsomeoftheSBICinvestasequity,othersasdebtgovernmentprovidesloansthreetimesofSBIC’spaidincapitalfourtimesofitiftheyareMESBIC--minorityenterprisesmallbusinessinvestmentcompaniesSBICsCreatedin1958,licensed13PublicventurecapitalcompaniesPublicvsprivatecompanies--differentconceptsSomeBigpublicvcfirmscalledBDC--businessdevelopmentcompaniessomeareSBICsbecauseoftheyarepubliccompanies;differenttaxtreatmentthanotherVChavetoconcerntheirstockpricespubliclyavailableinformationPublicventurecapitalcompani14BenefitstocorpVCsubsidiary-1Characteristics:onlyOneLP!!!Deriveattractivefinancialreturnsdeveloptechnologylicensees,manufacturingrights,supplieragreementscontrolsupplieruncertaintyidentifyflourishingindustriesspinoffbusinessesgeneratenewproductslearnthedynamicsofaparticularmarketplacegainexposuretonewmarketsandtechnologiesBenefitstocorpVCsubsidiary15Benefitstothecorpvcsubsidiary2Productmarketingrights:smallfirmsareoftenhappytohavelargercorpselltheirproducts.Acquisitioncandidates:GEwantedtoacquireaCAD/CAMco,butbitlow,later,itacquiredasimilarco.awindowontechnologythemostnotablebenefitthatlargecorpinvestinsmallfirmisthewindowtogainnewtechnologicaldevelopmentthelastdecade,thebiggest10AUSelectronicscorpdidthis.Benefitstothecorpvcsubsid16Benefitstothecorpvcsubsidiary3Motorolafocusonlookingfortechnologiesthataregoingtohaveamajorimpactonourcorebusinesses.JustasCiscotendstoacquireentireproducts,wetendtolookattechnologysuppliers.ThesestartupsfeelthattheVCsdon'tunderstandtheirtechnology.Hightechcompanies,ontheotherhand,maybeabletounderstandthegeniusofwhattheentrepreneursaredoing.Thesecompanieshavetheirownengineerswhoareexpertsinthefield.Benefitstothecorpvcsubsid17BenefitsofcorpvctoinvesteecoAnestablishedcustomerbasecredibilitywithcustomersandsupplierscredibilitywithbankersandotherfinancialsourcesgeneralassistanceinmanagingthebusinessamergerpartneradditionalcapitalaflexiblefinancingpackageinvestinginitsemployeestostarttheirownco.signacollaborativeresearchcontractBenefitsofcorpvctoinveste18ProblemsincorpvcsubsidiaryContradictoryinvgoalsofthevcandthepresentcorpunwillingnessonthepartofthevctoinvestin7-10yrs.Conflictsofinterestandlegalproblemsinconsistentgoalsofthecorpandtheentrepreneurofthenewco.limitedinvestmentopportunitiesthedifficultyofacquiringthefundedcompanycomplicationinvolvedinobtainingtechfromthefundedcompanydifferencesbetweenorganizationalrequirementforthecorpandtheinvestmentportfolio.

Problemsincorpvcsubsidiary19StateventurecapitalfundsOriginallyfromMassachusetts,(suchasCDFC--communitydevelopmentfinancialcorporation)Connecticut,laterotherstatesstatefundedtopromotehightech,startups,andothersociallybeneficialprojectsstategovernmentpromotetheprogramsbyprivatesourceswillgettaxbenefitsstatemoneypromotionsStateventurecapitalfundsOri20UniversityrelatedincubatorsIncubators:providelowcostlaboratoryandofficespace,state-of-the-arttechnicalexpertiseandequipment,administrativesupports,computerandlibraryfacilities.Contactswiththevc,bankers,governmentofficials.Sharingideasandcontactamongentrepreneurs1984,40incubatorsinthestates,nowabout400,especiallyinPA,IL,NY.I.e.UniversitycitysciencecenterinPhiladelphia.Affiliatedwith28universitiesandcollegesinPA.Tohouse100smallcoinitsImillionsquftspace.UniversityrelatedincubatorsI21InvestmentbanksandboutiquesInvestmentbanksusuallyinvestinlargeamountsboutiquesinasmallerscales:$1-10millioncommonlyusedarrangementinequitytransactionsistheso-calledlehmanformula--5-4-3-2-1:5%forthefirstmilliondollarsofcapitalraised,4%ofthenext,andsoon.Ex.Thefeesfora$3milliondealwouldequalto$120,000Investmentbanksandboutiques22FVP:backgroundTheexistenceofintermediariesb/wGP,LPAngelsinvesting$20-30billionVentureCapitalPartnershipswhyfamilieswouldlikethisidea:taxbenefits:39%incometax,but28%capitalgaintax,14%ifinvestedintosmallbusinessandlongtermfederalinheritancetaxes,50%onindividuals>$18millionassets.Giftstochildren<$10,000/year,generation-skippingtaxtograndchildren>$1million1992,3%ofthefamilieswith>$1millionnetassetscontrol44%ofUShouseholdfinancialassetsFVP:backgroundTheexistenceo23FoxventurePartnersA$100millionfund:fundoffundconceptsourcesoffund:wealthyfamilieshavetocommitatleast$2millionwhyvclikethisidea:1.TheLPsmaybevaluableinformationsource2.Avoidingvcdependenttooheavilyoninstitutionalinvestors3.Lessrestrictivetermsfromfamilies4.WanttoinvolveinsubsequentroundofinvestmentsFoxventurePartnersA$100mil24FoxVenturePartnersFVPintendedtoinvest$5MMeachin20funds35%wellknownfunds40%specifiedbyregionorindustry20%newfunds5%internationalfundsthisisdifferentfrombuyoutfunds($20MMinminimum)1994,100.4billioninPE,$32billioninVC,therest:5%mezzanine,2%distresseddebtpurchase362fundinPE,amongthem,194VCFoxVenturePartnersFVPintend25FVP:historyoffundoffundGatekeepersmanaged$18billionofPEfunds,about18%ofthetotaltheyprovideadvisoryservicestosomeclientstheyserveaslinkagebetweentheVCsandthestartupsprovidingthefirstscreeningfortheventurecapitalfirms,chargeaservicefeesFVP:historyoffundoffundGa26TheConceptofFundofFundVCFirmVCfundVCfundVCfundVC-2VC-3VC-4VC-1VC-5TheConceptofFundofFundVC27FoxVenturePartnersTheresistancefromthewealthyfamilies:1.Informationasymmetries,theonewhoneedtheservicemaynotappreciateit.2.Agencyproblems,familyfinancialmanagers…3.Lackofresources,notusingaleadinvestor,limitedresourcetomarkettheidea.4.Ineffectivemarketing.Notshowtheirtrackrecords5.Thestructureoftheproposedincentivescheme.Thesizeoftheproposedcompensation.FoxVenturePartnersTheresist28FoxVenturePartnersThechallengesthatFVPfaces:theeducationalrole:theFVPwillteachthefamiliesaboutthefundspotentialcompetitorsarelots:ontheconceptoffundsoffundssincefamiliesnowhiredtheirfinancialmanagers,thesimilaragencyproblemsintheinstitutionalinvestorsappearedaswellFoxVenturePartnersThechalle29YaleUniversityendowmentoriginYalewasestablishedin1701by10Connecticutclergymen.Theendowmentstarted1818,divinityschooltooffertheologicalinstruction,severalalumnimadelargegifts.Yaleusethemoneyonlandandbuilding,andtoinvestincorp,railroadbond,equitiesby1899,theendowmentreached$5millionYaleUniversityendowmentorig30YaleU.endowmenthistory1930,yaleendowheld42%inequity,otherUhadonly11%later1930,thentreasurer,Tighedecidedtoreduceequity%butstockmarketboomingin1950-60,endof1960,thetrusteewantedtoincreasetheequityportionandtocontractouttheportfoliomanagementtoanoutsideadvisorbybearmarket:1969-1979,yale’sendowmentdeclinedby46%YaleU.endowmenthistory1930,31Yaleinvestmentsoffice-1997Davidswensen:15employeeofficeinvestmentphilosophy:differentfromotherU.DavidlikesKeynesmaxim:worldlywisdomteachesusthatitisbetterforreputationtofailconventionallythentosucceedunconventionally.Butheiswillingtotaketheriskofbeingdifferent.Notfollowingthecrowd.Yaleinvestmentsoffice-1997D32DavidSwensen’sphilosophy-1Stronglybelievedinequity:whetherpublicorprivateequitiesarerealstreamofincome,bandsareacontractualsequenceofnominalcashflow$1investedinendof1925incorpstocksworth$1371byendof1996,butonly$34inTbonds,$14inTbillsholdadiversifiedportfolio,riskcanbereducedbydiversificationratherthantimethemarketDavidSwensen’sphilosophy-1S33DavidSwensen’sphilosophy-2Increasinglyseekopportunitiesinlessefficientmarkets:why?Thedifferenceb/w25and75thpercentiles:fixedincomefundmg:minimalcommonstockmg:3%perannumprivateequitymg:15%perannumtoutilizeoutsidemanagersforallbutmostroutineorindexedinvestmentthemanagershavethemaxautonomybuttheselectionprocessislongandcarefulincentives:notbythesizeofthemanagementbutbytheperformanceDavidSwensen’sphilosophy-2I34PrivateEquity

and

VentureCapitalLecture2:differenttypesofVCfirmsPrivateEquity

and

VentureC35VCfirmsandotherinvestorsThereareatotalof7differenttypesofVCfirmsinadditionaltoangelinvestors:privateindependentventurecapitalpartnershipsprivatesmallbusinessinvestmentcompaniespublicventurecapitalcompaniesventurecapitalsubsidiariesoflargecorporationsstateventurecapitalfundsuniversityrelatedincubators&privatesectorincubatorsinvestmentbankingfirmsVCfirmsandotherinvestorsTh36PrivateindependentVCpartnershipLimitedpartnership:taxbenefits10yearslife,2yearextensionTwotypesofPIP:wealthyfamilies-venrockassociates,institutionalinvestors--KPCB,twotypesoffunds:usually$2-5milliontraditionalvcfunds-investinginseed,orstartupsturnaroundorLBOsPrivateindependentVCpartner37VCfirmsandVCfundsVCFirmVCfundVCfundVCfundVCfundVCfundVCfirmsandVCfundsVCFirmVC38VClimitedpartnership

LPGPVClimitedpartnershipLPGP39GeneralPartners:

HowtheirIncomestructuredAngelinvestors:managingandinvestingtheirownmoneyVentureCapitalists--GPs:managingandinvestingothersmoneyGPincome:managementfees:1.5-2.5%ofthemoneytheymanaged,offices,telephones,computers,othercostsCarriage:carriers--20/80.Now,it’shigher:25/75common.Even30/70GeneralPartners:

HowtheirI40VCfirmsandVCfundsVCFirmVCfundVCfundVCfundPC-2PC-3PC-4Pc-1PC-5VCfirmsandVCfundsVCFirmVC41TheagreementofPEpartnership-1Fundsizes,investmentmaximumandminimum.Numberofinvestors,GPcontributionstakedownschedule:bothGPandLPdonotliketopaythecommittedcapitalimmediatelyfirstamounttobedisbursedatclosing:10-33%,thedatesofthesubsequentpaymentsmaybesetintheagreement.TheagreementofPEpartnershi42TheagreementofPEpartnership-2ThecontrolofLP:if51%+LPagreecanreplaceaGPGPcannotinvestinareabeyondtheirexpertisenofaultdivorcethecontrolofGP:ifLPpaylate,alatefeeischargedconditiononLP’ssharetransfersTheagreementofPEpartnershi43TheagreementofPEpartnership-3Managementofthefundsizeonanyoneinvestment,preventGPfromattemptingtosalvageapoorlymanagedinvestmentGPcannothaveanysharebeforeLPgetbacktheiroriginalcapital,GPshareasacalloptionpercentageofthefundcanbeinvestedinonedeallimitGP’sattempttoleveragethefund,limitthedebttoapercentagelimitGPtocoinvestbetweenfunds.GP’sattempttosalvagethetroubledinvestmentlimitGPtoreinvestprofitsTheagreementofPEpartnershi44TheagreementofPEpartnership-4GPactivities--5restrictions1.RestrictGPtoinvestpersonalfundintothefirm,maypaymoreattention,maynotliketopulloutifnecessary2.RestrictonGPtoselltheirsharesofthefundtoothers,reducetheincentiveoftheGPtomonitor3.Restrictonfuturefundraisinguntila%offundinvested:additionalfundrequireadditionalattentionoftheGP4.RestrictonGPfortheirotheractivities5.RestrictonhiringnewGPwithlessexperiencesTheagreementofPEpartnershi45TheagreementofPEpartnership-5TypesofinvestmentlimitedsizeinanygiveninvestmentclasscannotinvestintopublicsecuritiescannotinvestintootherPEfundscannotinvestintoareaswithlittleexpertiserestrictionsonforeigninvestmentrestrictionsonLBOTheagreementofPEpartnershi46SBICsCreatedin1958,licensedandregulatedbySBAinvestedcompanies,ie.Apple,federalexpress,intel,crayresearch,etc.becauseofSBA,investmentfromSBICismorerestrictivethanotherVCsomeoftheSBICinvestasequity,othersasdebtgovernmentprovidesloansthreetimesofSBIC’spaidincapitalfourtimesofitiftheyareMESBIC--minorityenterprisesmallbusinessinvestmentcompaniesSBICsCreatedin1958,licensed47PublicventurecapitalcompaniesPublicvsprivatecompanies--differentconceptsSomeBigpublicvcfirmscalledBDC--businessdevelopmentcompaniessomeareSBICsbecauseoftheyarepubliccompanies;differenttaxtreatmentthanotherVChavetoconcerntheirstockpricespubliclyavailableinformationPublicventurecapitalcompani48BenefitstocorpVCsubsidiary-1Characteristics:onlyOneLP!!!Deriveattractivefinancialreturnsdeveloptechnologylicensees,manufacturingrights,supplieragreementscontrolsupplieruncertaintyidentifyflourishingindustriesspinoffbusinessesgeneratenewproductslearnthedynamicsofaparticularmarketplacegainexposuretonewmarketsandtechnologiesBenefitstocorpVCsubsidiary49Benefitstothecorpvcsubsidiary2Productmarketingrights:smallfirmsareoftenhappytohavelargercorpselltheirproducts.Acquisitioncandidates:GEwantedtoacquireaCAD/CAMco,butbitlow,later,itacquiredasimilarco.awindowontechnologythemostnotablebenefitthatlargecorpinvestinsmallfirmisthewindowtogainnewtechnologicaldevelopmentthelastdecade,thebiggest10AUSelectronicscorpdidthis.Benefitstothecorpvcsubsid50Benefitstothecorpvcsubsidiary3Motorolafocusonlookingfortechnologiesthataregoingtohaveamajorimpactonourcorebusinesses.JustasCiscotendstoacquireentireproducts,wetendtolookattechnologysuppliers.ThesestartupsfeelthattheVCsdon'tunderstandtheirtechnology.Hightechcompanies,ontheotherhand,maybeabletounderstandthegeniusofwhattheentrepreneursaredoing.Thesecompanieshavetheirownengineerswhoareexpertsinthefield.Benefitstothecorpvcsubsid51BenefitsofcorpvctoinvesteecoAnestablishedcustomerbasecredibilitywithcustomersandsupplierscredibilitywithbankersandotherfinancialsourcesgeneralassistanceinmanagingthebusinessamergerpartneradditionalcapitalaflexiblefinancingpackageinvestinginitsemployeestostarttheirownco.signacollaborativeresearchcontractBenefitsofcorpvctoinveste52ProblemsincorpvcsubsidiaryContradictoryinvgoalsofthevcandthepresentcorpunwillingnessonthepartofthevctoinvestin7-10yrs.Conflictsofinterestandlegalproblemsinconsistentgoalsofthecorpandtheentrepreneurofthenewco.limitedinvestmentopportunitiesthedifficultyofacquiringthefundedcompanycomplicationinvolvedinobtainingtechfromthefundedcompanydifferencesbetweenorganizationalrequirementforthecorpandtheinvestmentportfolio.

Problemsincorpvcsubsidiary53StateventurecapitalfundsOriginallyfromMassachusetts,(suchasCDFC--communitydevelopmentfinancialcorporation)Connecticut,laterotherstatesstatefundedtopromotehightech,startups,andothersociallybeneficialprojectsstategovernmentpromotetheprogramsbyprivatesourceswillgettaxbenefitsstatemoneypromotionsStateventurecapitalfundsOri54UniversityrelatedincubatorsIncubators:providelowcostlaboratoryandofficespace,state-of-the-arttechnicalexpertiseandequipment,administrativesupports,computerandlibraryfacilities.Contactswiththevc,bankers,governmentofficials.Sharingideasandcontactamongentrepreneurs1984,40incubatorsinthestates,nowabout400,especiallyinPA,IL,NY.I.e.UniversitycitysciencecenterinPhiladelphia.Affiliatedwith28universitiesandcollegesinPA.Tohouse100smallcoinitsImillionsquftspace.UniversityrelatedincubatorsI55InvestmentbanksandboutiquesInvestmentbanksusuallyinvestinlargeamountsboutiquesinasmallerscales:$1-10millioncommonlyusedarrangementinequitytransactionsistheso-calledlehmanformula--5-4-3-2-1:5%forthefirstmilliondollarsofcapitalraised,4%ofthenext,andsoon.Ex.Thefeesfora$3milliondealwouldequalto$120,000Investmentbanksandboutiques56FVP:backgroundTheexistenceofintermediariesb/wGP,LPAngelsinvesting$20-30billionVentureCapitalPartnershipswhyfamilieswouldlikethisidea:taxbenefits:39%incometax,but28%capitalgaintax,14%ifinvestedintosmallbusinessandlongtermfederalinheritancetaxes,50%onindividuals>$18millionassets.Giftstochildren<$10,000/year,generation-skippingtaxtograndchildren>$1million1992,3%ofthefamilieswith>$1millionnetassetscontrol44%ofUShouseholdfinancialassetsFVP:backgroundTheexistenceo57FoxventurePartnersA$100millionfund:fundoffundconceptsourcesoffund:wealthyfamilieshavetocommitatleast$2millionwhyvclikethisidea:1.TheLPsmaybevaluableinformationsource2.Avoidingvcdependenttooheavilyoninstitutionalinvestors3.Lessrestrictivetermsfromfamilies4.WanttoinvolveinsubsequentroundofinvestmentsFoxventurePartnersA$100mil58FoxVenturePartnersFVPintendedtoinvest$5MMeachin20funds35%wellknownfunds40%specifiedbyregionorindustry20%newfunds5%internationalfundsthisisdifferentfrombuyoutfunds($20MMinminimum)1994,100.4billioninPE,$32billioninVC,therest:5%mezzanine,2%distresseddebtpurchase362fundinPE,amongthem,194VCFoxVenturePartnersFVPintend59FVP:historyoffundoffundGatekeepersmanaged$18billionofPEfunds,about18%ofthetotaltheyprovideadvisoryservicestosomeclientstheyserveaslinkagebetweentheVCsandthestartupsprovidingthefirstscreeningfortheventurecapitalfirms,chargeaservicefeesFVP:historyoffundoffundGa60TheConceptofFundofFundVCFirmVCfundVCfundVCfundVC-2VC-3VC-4VC-1VC-5TheConceptofFundofFundVC61FoxVenturePartnersTheresistancefromthewealthyfamilies:1.Informationasymmetries,theonewhoneedtheservicemaynotappreciateit.2.Agencyproblems,familyfinancialmanagers…3.Lackofresources,notusingaleadinvestor,limitedresourcetomarkettheidea.4.Ineffectivemarketing.Notshowtheirtrackrecords5.Thestru