國際可持續(xù)發(fā)展研究所-印尼能從南非的公正能源轉(zhuǎn)型進(jìn)程中學(xué)到什么？（英）

POLICYBRIEF

WhatCanIndonesiaLearnfrom

SouthAfrica’sExperienceofthe

JustEnergyTransitionProcess?

AnissaSuharsono,MarthaMaulidiaJuly2023

JustEnergyTransitionPartnershipsandtheImportanceofAcceleratingEnergyTransition

JustEnergyTransitionPartnerships(JETPs)areessentiallyafinancingmechanismagreedbetweenagroupofindustrializedcountriesandadevelopingcountry,designedtofundatransitionofthecoal-dependentdevelopingnationawayfromfossilfuelproductionandconsumptiontowardlow-carbonenergywhileaddressingthesocialconsequencesinvolved.AsofMay2023,JETPdealshavebeenannouncedforSouthAfrica,Indonesia,andVietnam.

Inanationwherecoalplaysanimportantroleintheeconomy,robustsocialandeconomicmeasuresmustbetakenandincludedintheJETPplans,astransitioningawayfromcoalwillaffectasignificantportionofthepopulation.

FinanceprovidedundertheJETPmayincludegrants,loans,andinvestments,and,asofMarch2023,thedonorgroupincludestheInternationalPartnersGroup(IPG)andtheGlasgowFinancialAllianceforNetZeroWorkingGroup.TheIPGrepresentsthedonorcountries,madeupofCanada,Denmark,theEuropeanUnion,France,Germany,Italy,Japan,Norway,theUnitedKingdom,andtheUnitedStates.TheGlasgowFinancialAllianceforNetZeroWorkingGrouprepresentsover550majorfinancialinstitutionsfrom50countries,suchasHSBCandCitibank(Kusuma,2023).

TheJETPschemewasfirstannouncedattheUNClimateChangeConference(COP26)inNovember2021.Itwasdescribedatthetimeasalong-termpartnershipdesignedtosupporttheRepublicofSouthAfricaindecarbonizingitsenergysystem—preventingupto1–1.5gigatonnesofemissionsoverthenext20years—andhelpthecountryaccelerateitstransitionfromcoaltoalow-emission,climate-resilienteconomy.ItwaslaunchedwithafundingcommitmentofUSD8.5billioninthefirstphaseoffinancing,withthecomprehensiveinvestmentplanmadepublicafewdaysbeforeCOP27(EuropeanCommission,2022).

?2023InternationalInstituteforSustainableDevelopment

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ThesecondJETPdealwasannouncedduringtheG20SummitinNovember2022.TheIPG—ledbytheUnitedStatesandJapan—pledgedtomobilizeUSD20billion(aroundIDR300trillion)overthenext3–5yearstoaccelerateIndonesia’senergytransitionthroughearlyretirementofcoalpowerplantsanddeploymentofrenewableenergy.Thedealappearstoheraldadramaticshiftinenergypolicy,settinganewtargetforrenewables—whichwillneedtoaccountfor34%ofthecountry’spowerproductionby2030.

Indonesiaiscurrentlyintheprocessofpreparingitscomprehensiveinvestmentplan.ThisbriefwillassesstheJETPprocessSouthAfricawentthrough1yearafteritwasannouncedtohighlightanyrelevantfindingsandlessonstoassistpolicy-makersimplementingtheIndonesianJETP.

ProcessandOrganizationalStructureof

SouthAfrica’sJETP

SincetheannouncementoftheJETPatCOP26inNovember2021,severalpolicyreformsthatwillbenefitandenabletheSouthAfricanJETPhavebeenstartedorannounced.Thesereformsincludethefollowing:

?anupdatedClimateChangeBill;

?proposedchangestoelectricitysectorregulations;

?releaseofaJustTransitionFrameworkandajustenergytransitioninvestmentplan;

?greenhydrogendevelopments,includingaHydrogenEconomyRoadmap;

?theSouthAfricanGreenfinancetaxonomyandSustainabilityandClimateChangeDisclosureGuidance,withthecarbontaxrateexpectedtoincreaseprogressivelyeveryyear;

?aNationalMineClosureStrategyanddiscussiononSouthAfricanRenewableEnergyMasterPlan;

?furtherroundsofbidsforrenewableenergyprojectsareunderway,andthelicensingthresholdfornewgenerationcapacityhasbeenraisedto100MW,openingnewwaysforprivatesectorinvestmentinrenewableenergyprojects(PresidentialClimateFinanceTaskTeam&IPG,2022a,2022b).

Collectively,thesepolicymeasuresaimtoreducebarrierstocleanenergydeploymentandtoalignenergypolicywiththeagreedphase-downofcoalgeneration.Despitethehigh-levelagreementandmovestowardpolicyreform,thesereformsarestillcontroversial.

TheSouthAfricanJETInvestmentPlan(JETIP)wasdevelopedthroughoutthecourseof2022,anditarticulatedtheneedforZAR1,48trillion(USD98billion)investmentinthreeprioritysectorsoveraperiodof5years.ItisimportanttonotethattheJETIPonlysetsouttheguidingprinciplesforimplementationoftheJustTransitionFrameworkandisnotexhaustiveofallthetransitionneedsinSouthAfrica.TheUSD8.5billioninthefirstphaseoffinancingwillbespentonthemosturgentprogramsidentifiedundertheIP.

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Inthepastfewyears,SouthAfricahasbeenundergoingtheprocessofelectricitysectorreform.ThisreformprocessisalsorecognizedtobeoneofthekeymeasurestosupporttheimplementationoftheJETIP.Inthe12monthsfollowingtheannouncementoftheJETP(PresidentialClimateFinanceTaskTeam&IPG,2022),thepresidentannouncedseveralstepsinthetransformationoftheelectricitysector,suchas

?removinglicensingthresholdsforembeddedgenerationtoenableprivateinvestmentsinlarge,utility-scalegenerationprojects;

?reviewingtheIntegratedResourcePlan2019toreflecttheneedforadditionalgenerationcapacityandSouthAfrica’sclimatecommitments;

?reducingdesignatedlocalcontentforsolarpanelsfrom100%to35%(ThePresidencyRepublicofSouthAfrica,2023);

?offeringincentivesforrooftopsolar,developingfeed-intariffsforthepurchaseofelectricitysurplusfromresidentialcustomers,andfurtherworkontaxincentives;

?enhancingtheefforttorestructureEskomaswellasaddressingcrimeandcorruptionthroughalaw-enforcementteam;

?usingclimatefundingprovidedthroughtheJETPtoinvestintransmissiongridandrepurposecoalpowerplantsthathavereachedendoflife;

?establishingaNationalEnergyCrisisCounciltostrengthenPresidentialoversightofdeliveryagainstannouncedreforms.SouthAfrica’ssevereload-sheddingduetotheongoingenergycrisisisalsopartlythereasonfortheestablishmentoftheNationalEnergyCrisisCouncil(Proctor,2023).

Theelectricitysectorreformmeasuresarealsobroadlyaimedatincreasingtherateofdeploymentofnew(and,inmanycases,privatelyowned)generation,muchofitrenewable.However,therearestillelementswithinthegovernmentwhoareopposedtoreforms,remainingunconvincedthatrenewablescanreplacethermalgenerators.Theseelementsmaycontinuetoseektoundermineorreversethereforms.Asinmanycountries,inSouthAfrica,thereisoftenagapbetweenpolicyandimplementation,andnotalloftheseinitiativeshavetranslatedintopracticalchanges.

OrganizationStructureandRoles

ChairedbytheUnitedKingdom,theIPGwasestablishedtocoordinatethepartnershipannouncedatCOP26betweenitsmembersandthegovernmentofSouthAfrica.InFebruary2022,thePresidentialClimateFinanceTaskTeamwasformed,anditservesasacounterpartfortheIPG.ItengageswiththeIPGtoadviseCabinetonthefinancingpackage’scomposition,affordability,andalignmentwiththeregulatoryenvironment.Italsocoordinateswithrelevantgovernmentdepartmentsandtheprivatesectortodeveloprelevantfinancingmechanismsandfacilitiestoenableinternationalclimatefinance.

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Chair

InternationalPartnerGroup

(IPG)

Members:

Capitalsandlocalteams

Mandate:

Financingofferandendorsed

InvestmentPlan

WhatCanIndonesiaLearnfromSouthAfrica’sExperience

oftheJustEnergyTransitionProcess?

Figure1.SouthAfricanJETPgovernancestructure

SouthAfricanCabinet

Inter-MinisterialCommittee(IMC)JustEnergyTransition

PresidentialClimateFinance

TaskTeam(PCFTT)

Members:

Individualswithrelevantexperience

Mandate:

FinalrecommendationsforInvestmentPlanand?nancingpackage

JETPSecretariat

Independentteam:

Coordinatingtechnicalworkinggroups,accountabletoJET(SAandIPG)

Mandate:

CoordinatethejointworkingprogramofPCFTTandIPGfor?nal

recommendationsoftheInvestmentPlanand?nancingpackage,

draftthereports,coordinatemediaengagementsofJETP

Source:EuropeanCommission,2022.TheJETPsecretariatistaskedwithprovidingtechnicalandcoordinationsupporttothepartnershipinaneutralandobjectivemanner.Inordertoassistwiththesecretariat’swork,theClimateInvestmentFundBoardwillprovidethesupportandresourcesneeded.Severalconsultationscoveringkeyissues—suchasthenatureofthefinancialoffer,sharedunderstandinginpriorityareas,JETPIPoutlineandcontents,andthescopeandresponsibilitiesofthesecretariat—wereheldinMay2022.TheyinvolvedthePresidentialClimateFinanceTaskTeam,IPG,governmentfocalpoints,anddevelopmentfinanceinstitutions.Theseconsultationsincludedanassessmentofrelevantpoliciesandguidelines,preliminaryreviewofinvestmentandpolicyimplications,andmappingdevelopmentfinanciers’activitiesandprogramsthatcansupportthejustenergytransition.Atthesametime,thesecondmissionoftheAcceleratingCoalTransitionInvestmentProgramme(fundedbytheClimateInvestmentFundandledbytheWorldBankGroupandTheAfricanDevelopmentBank)washeldinordertoaligntheprogramandsupportthebroaderJETP.

Tosupportthesecretariat,JETPhasalsoestablishedfiveworkinggroupstogathertechnical

expertiseandexperienceinthefollowingareas:finance,implementation,power,green

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hydrogen,andtransport.Termsofreferenceforeachworkinggrouparestillbeingdeveloped,buttheywillcentrearoundinvestmentsequencinginrelationtoSouthAfrica’sgoalsandchallenges.

HighlightedShortcomingsoftheSouthAfricaJETPProcess

TheJETPdealmayserveasacatalystforenergytransitionandcouldalsoopenthedoortomoreclimatefunds.However,becauseitisanewmechanismwhereallthedetailsarestillunderdevelopment,thereisalwaystheriskofthedealfailingtodeliveronitspotential.Oneoftheaspectsthatmustbemetinordertofulfillthe“just”aspectoftheenergytransitionistoensureabalancebetweentacklingcleanenergyissuesanddeliveringasociallyjusttransition.Raisingfinancesimplyforenergyinfrastructureisrelativelyeasyduetotheprospectoffavourableinvestmentreturns,butthesamecannotbesaidaboutraisingfinancetosupportcoalworkersandcommunities.EnsuringthatJETPprogramsareabletodeliverajustenergytransitionaswellasinfrastructureinvestmentisasignificantchallenge(Halsey,2022).

Box1.ThepolicyimplementationgapandtheSouthAfricanJETP

Thegapbetweenstatedtargetsandpolicyobjectivesandtheirimplementation(thepolicyimplementationgap)isanoften-observedphenomena.Newinitiatives,particularlythosethatareambitiousandunprecedented,faceatoughjourneytorealization.

Threekeyfactorsinfluencethelikelihoodofdelivery;Indonesianpolicy-makersshouldconsiderand,wherepossible,mitigatethesefactorsinthedevelopmentoftheJETP.

1.Shortcomingsatthefeasibilitystage.Policiesdevelopedwithoutfullunderstandingoftheeconomic,social,andinstitutionalbarriersmayproveimpossibletoimplement.Toavoidthis,transparencyandconsultationatthedesignstagearecritical.ThereportedlackofcivilsocietyconsultationinSouthAfricamayhavegivenrisetopolicy-makingblindspots.

2.Misestimationofthepoliticallandscapeandcrossdepartmentalcoordination.Proposalsaretypicallydevelopedbyaleadgovernmentministry.Withoutadequatecoordination,theproposalsmaynotcarrythesupportofallgovernmentstakeholders.InSouthAfrica,theoriginalpremiseofthedeal—earlyphase-outofcoalgenerationinexchangeforinternationalfinanceforcleanenergy—iscurrentlybeingopenlyquestionedbygovernmentministers.Thisindicatesthatthepoliticallandscapewasnotfactoredintothedealattheinceptionphase.

3.AstheJETPmovestowardsimplementation,furtherproblemswillarise.Monitoringandevaluationwillbecomeincreasinglyimportanttoidentifyproblemsanddevelopmitigationmeasures.ThedevelopmentofstructurestomonitorandevaluatetheJETPwillbecomeincreasinglyimportant.

TheSouthAfricanJETPdesignprocesshasbeencriticizedfornotbeinginclusiveofthepeoplemostaffectedbyitsimplementation.PriortothepublicationoftheJETPIPin

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November2022,eventhoughvariouspolicydocumentshadbeendiscussedandformalized(andtheSouthAfricataskteamandtheworkinggroupshadbeenworkingontheinvestmentplan),thegeneralpublicdidnothavethechancetoconsultthesedocuments,norhadanyrepresentativesofaffectedcommunities.TheJETforumsconvenedbythePresidentialClimateCommissionarealsoseenasnotyetsufficienttoaddresstheseconcerns.

Thereisalsothefactthatevenwiththeinclusionofacomprehensivedefinitionof“just”transition,thereisaverynarrowfocusonthemitigationofdecarbonizationandthehistoricalimpactsofcoalmininginSouthAfrica.Thecurrentstateoftheenergysystem—wherethereisstill“unjustness”intermsofaccesstoandaffordabilityofelectricity—isalsonotaddressedintheJETPdeal,sinceuniversal,affordableaccessisnotidentifiedasaJETPfocusarea.ThisshowsalackofalignmentbetweentheinterestsoftheJETPwiththeself-identifiedinterestsinthepowerofthemajorityofSouthAfricans(PublicAffairsResearchInstitute,2023).

Theissueofvestedinterestsandwidespreadcontinued(andpossiblyevenincreasing)supportforcoalinSouthAfricawouldalsobearelevantissueforpolicy-makersinIndonesiatoconsider.InthecaseofSouthAfrica,theelectricitysupplycrisis,whichwouldhave

beenanidealargumentfortransitioningtowardrenewables,isdrivingdemandstoextendthelifeofcoalassetsandpossiblyevenbuildoutmorecoalinfrastructure(PublicAffairsResearchInstitute,2023).TherulingAfricanNationalCongresswentasfarasissuingarecommendationforEskomtodelaythedecommissioningofitsagingcoalpowerplantstominimizeload-shedding.Thecontradictionbetweenthediscussionofacceleratedphase-outsundertheJETPandlifeextensionsreflectsthecontroversyaroundelectricityplanningandtheimplementationoftheenergytransition.

Despiteannouncementsandtargets,manypoliciesdonotcometofruition.Box1outlinesthreedriversforthisgapbetweenpolicyandimplementation.

OverviewoftheSouthAfricaJETPIPandComparisonwiththeIndonesianContext

ThissectiondescribesthekeyfeaturesandchallengesofSouthAfrica’sJETPIPandidentifieskeysimilaritiesanddifferenceswiththeIndonesiancontext.

BudgetAllocationsandPrioritySectors

SouthAfricacreatedtheJETPIPtodefineitsprimaryinvestmentneedsinthefieldsofelectricity,new-energyvehicles,andgreenhydrogenforthenext5yearstosupporttheobjectivesofenergysecurity,economicgrowth,andjusttransition.TheJETPIPalsohighlightsinitiativesrelatedtotheelectricitysector’stransitionintheMpumalangaProvince,aswellasoutliningtwocrucialcross-cuttingpriorities(skillsdevelopmentandmunicipalcapacity).

TheJETPIPestimatesthattotalinvestmentintheidentifiedsectorsisUSD98.7billion.Itshouldbenoted,therefore,thattheIPG’spledgeofUSD8.5billioncannotfundalltheinvestmentslisted.Instead,themostcatalyticprogramsandprojectsthatarereadytobeimplementedintheJETIP’sportfolioofneedsshouldbeprioritized.Inaddition,thereisaneedforadditionalfundingtoimplementalltheidentifiedactions.

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Tables1and2showthetotalJETIPfundingrequirementspersectorforthenext5years,aswellastheindicativeallocationofthepledgedUSD8.5billion.

Table1.SouthAfricaJETIPfundingrequirementspersector,2023–2027

Fundingrequirements2023–2027

ZARbillion(USDbillion)

Electricitysector

711.4(47.2)

Newenergyvehiclesector

128.1(8.5)

Greenhydrogensector

319(21.2)

Skillsdevelopment

2.7(0.18)

Municipalcapacity

319.1(21.3)

TOTAL

1,480(98.7)

Source:ThePresidency,RepublicofSouthAfrica,2022.

AsTables1and2show,highpriorityisgiventotheelectricitysector,whichtakesup48%ofthetotalbudgetallocation.Theprimaryinvestmentareasforinfrastructureintheelectricitysectorareasfollows:

?tohandlethedecommissioningoftheretiringcoalgenerationfleetinaccordancewiththerevisedIntegratedResourcePlanwhilesimultaneouslyimplementingtherapidandlarge-scalegenerationofrenewableenergy;

?topromptlyenhancethetransmissiongridinfrastructuretoaccommodatethetransitiontorenewableenergy;

?toupdateandmodernizetheelectricitydistributionsystem.

Table2showsthatover73%ofthebudgetforelectricitygoestowardnewsolarPVandnewwind,whileabout20%ofthebudgetgoestotransmission.

Table2.SouthAfricanationalelectricitysector’sinfrastructureinvestmentneeds,

2023–2027

Nationalelectricitysector’sinfrastructureinvestmentneeds

ZARbillion

Coalplantdecommissioning

4.1

Transmission

131.8

Distribution

13.8

NewsolarPV

233.2

Newwind

241.7

Newbatteries

23.1

TOTAL

1,480(98.7)

Source:ThePresidency,RepublicofSouthAfrica,2022.

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TheImportanceofUpgradingtheTransmissionGrid

TheSouthAfricaJETPIPallocatesZAR647.7billion(35.4USDbillion)toelectricityinfrastructure,or48%ofthetotalJETPinvestmentneedsofZAR1,480billion(USD98.7billion).Around20%oftheinfrastructurefundisallocatedforthedevelopmentoftransmissionsystem.SouthAfrica’selectricitylandscapeoperatessimilarlytoIndonesia’sintermsofthestrongpresenceofthegovernment,whereitsstateutilitycompany,Eskom,controlsthesupplychainfromgenerationtodistributionandisthesolebuyerofpower.However,recentregulatorychangeshavegraduallyerodedthismonopoly.Forexample,independentgeneratorsarenowpermittedtodevelopprojectsandselloutputdirectlythroughtheEskom-ownedpowernetworktolargeconsumers.

Since2019thePresidentofSouthAfrica,CyrilRamaphosamandatedthesplitofEskomintothreedivisions:generation,transmissionanddistribution(Paton,2019).Thismove,partoflargerreformefforts,willspreadthecontroloverthethreefunctionsandmaycreateopportunitiestoaccelerategridstrengtheningandupgrade.However,implementationremainsdifficultandcontroversial.

Intermsoftransmission,thetwocountries’situationsaresomewhatcomparable.SouthAfrica’stransmissioninfrastructurelacksthecapacitytoacceptelectricity,especiallyfromthenewrenewableenergypowerplants.Indonesiaalsourgentlyneedstoupgradeitsoutdatedtransmissionsystemtoadapttotheflexiblenatureoftheincreasedshareofrenewablesinthegrid.

TransformingIndonesia’selectricitytransmissionsystemiscriticaltoensuringthereliabilityofpowersupplyfromrenewablesources:therefore,theJETPIPcouldbeakeyopportunitytoraiseambitionsinthisarea.Currently,Java–BaliistheonlyinterconnectedgridsysteminIndonesia,withothersystemsremainingisolated.Indonesiaaspirestocompletetheinterconnectionofallmajorislandstobefollowedbyinter-islandpowergridconnectionasstatedintheGrandStrategyofEnergy(NationalEnergyCouncil,2022).However,thefeasibilityoftheplanremainsquestionableduetothelengthyplanninganddevelopmenttimesandcapital-intensivenatureofinterconnectionprojects.ItwillbeevenmorechallengingifitistobeadoptedaspartofJETP.ThebrieftimewindowofJETP(only3to5years)demandsquickwinstobeincludedintheprojectpipeline.Onlycertaintransmissionprojectsarelikelytomeetthecriteria,suchasanupgradeoranexpansionofexistingsystemsoraconnectionbetweentwosystemsliketheongoingJava–Baliconnectionproject.Generally,ittakesaround10yearstobuildagreenfieldtransmissionline.Thiscaneventakelongerconsideringthetime-to-builddelays.

Thecurrenttransmissionplanisstillnotinlinewiththeambitiontohaveinterconnectedgridsystemsthataredesirableforanincreasedshareofvariablerenewableenergy.IntheNationalElectricityCompany(PerusahaanListrikNegara/PLN)’scurrentbusinessplan(NationalElectricitySupplyBusinessPlan/RencanaUsahaPenyediaanTenagaListrik/RUPTL2021–2030),PLNplanstobuild1.4timesthecurrenttransmissionlines’lengthand2.2timesthecurrentcapacityofmainsubstationsbetween2021and2030(PLN,2021)Thisnumberisbasedontheobjectiveofbuildingreliabletransmissionsystemsthatconnectlocallyavailableenergysourceswithdemand,minimizingtheneedforaninterconnectedgrid.Withahigher

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targetofrenewableenergy,asagreedinJETP,PLNneedstobuildmorethanwhatithasalreadyplanned.

Onepotentialbarriertoexpansionisthecurrentownershipstructure.ThecurrentsystemisownedandoperatedbyPLN,allowinglittleroomforprivatesectorparticipation.GridimprovementwillrequirealargeamountofinvestmentthatPLNneedstorecover.ThedevelopmentofNusantaraGridwillneedinvestmentofUSD100billionuntil2050(InstituteforEssentialServicesReform[IESR]etal.,2021)whichdoesnotincludeinter-islandconnectivity(Guitarra,2022).PLN’ssmart-gridprogram,aimedatimprovingtheefficiencyandproductivityofthegrid,requirescapitalexpendituresofuptoIDR25trillion(aroundUSD1.7billion)inthefirstphase.Thesecondphase,whichfocusesonresilience,customerengagement,sustainability,andself-healing,willrequirecapitalexpenditureofuptoIDR

50trillion(aroundUSD3.4billion)(Arifin,2021).ThetotalinvestmentofUSD5billionisalmostsixtimesPLN’snetprofitofUSD887millionin2021.Deliveringthesevolumesofinvestmentwillrequireinnovation.

Overall,themovesinSouthAfricatoprioritizethedevelopmentofthetransmissionnetworkalongsideinstitutionalreformstoenableadditionalmodelsofownershipandinvestmentshouldbeincludedinpolicy-makingdiscussionsinIndonesia.

FocusonCoal-DependentRegions

SouthAfrica’sJETPIPputsanemphasisonjusttransitionmeasuresinitscoal-dependentprovince,Mpumalanga,whichaccountsformorethan80%ofthecountry’scoalproduction.Transitioningintocleanenergywillaffectaround90,000peopleemployedinthecoalminesandpowerplantsinthisregion,moreemployeesinthecoalsupplychainandservices,localcommunitiesaffectedbythecoalphaseout,andsmallandmedium-sizedenterprises,aswellaspeopleself-employedeitherformalorinformallyincoal-relatedbusinesses.Mpumalangaishometo12ofEskom’s15CFPPs,includingthelargestCFPPinthecountry,KusilePowerPlant.Afterstartingoperationin2017,Kusile’slasttwounitswillbecompletedin2024,foratotalcapacityof4,800MW.

Meanwhile,EastKalimantan,thelargestcoal-producingprovinceofIndonesia,has21CFPPsthatsuppliedmorethan45%oftheprovince’selectricityin2022(EastKalimantanProvincialGovernment,2023).ThelargestCFPPsaremostlylocatedonJavaisland,hometo55%ofIndonesia’spopulation.Tolowertheshareofcoalinpowerproduction(andhenceincreaserenewableenergy’sshareoftheenergymix),PLNplannedtoretireoldandinefficientCFPPsinJavaandSumatra,withatotalcapacityofaround4.8GW.Evenwiththisgoal,itwillnotmeettheJETP’stargetofreaching34%ofrenewableenergyshareby2030.TomeettheJETPtarget,IndonesiashouldconsidercancellingallCFPPscurrentlyinRUPTL’spipeline(2.9GW),retiremoreCFPPs(includingthoseownedbyindependentpowerproducersandcaptiveplantsupto8.2GW),andreplacethelostcoalcapacitywithrenewableenergy(IESR,2023).

Indonesiahasbeentheworld’slargestexporterofcoalsince2005,withtotalproductionof687milliontonnesin2022,ofwhich72%(494milliontonnes)wasexported(MinistryofEnergyandMineralResources,2023a),mainlytoChina,India,Japan,andSouthKorea

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(Kusnandar,2022).Thelucrativecoalmarketofthepast2yearsboostedthestate’snon-taxrevenuefromthemineralsandminingsectortorecordlevels:IDR124.4trillionin2021(Syahputra,2022)andIDR183.35trillionin2022,around25%ofthetotalnon-taxrevenue(MinistryofFinance,2023).Morethan80%ofthenon-taxrevenueisfrom