中國“重商主義”政策損害了全球創(chuàng)新

1、INTRODUCTIONIt has become clear to even the most committed free traders that China is not engaged in anything approaching free trade, especially with regard to its technology sectors, such as telecommunications equipment, aircraft, pharmaceuticals, and semiconductors. While some dismiss the effects

2、and effectiveness of Chinas advanced industries policies, many acknowledge their deleterious effects on U.S. production and jobs.But what has largely been unappreciated, at least in policy circles, is the effect of Chinas policies and practices on global innovation. Robust technological innovation i

3、s the single greatest driver of higher living standards, better health outcomes, better quality of life, and a cleaner planet. As such, anything that slows the rate of global innovation should be seen as a challenge to all humanity.Chinas long-standing and rampant “innovation mercantilist” policies

4、harm global innovation largely by taking market share and revenues away from more-innovative foreign competitors, thereby diminishing their innovation capabilities. To be sure, some of Chinas policies have been legitimate and consistent with World Trade Organization (WTO) principles, such as funding

5、 university research and supporting STEM (science, technology, education, and math) education, and these policies contribute to global innovation. But most of Chinas innovation policies are mercantilist in nature and have reduced global innovation. As China seeks to win in even more advanced-technol

6、ogy industries, its policies will likely have an increased negative effect on innovation unless market-oriented, rule-of-law nations take stronger action.Logic alone suggests that Chinas policies have harmed innovation because, in most industries, Chinese firms operate far from the global innovation

7、 frontier, so to the extent these policies reduce market share for innovation leaders, they also reduce those leaders revenues, making it harder for them to invest in the next round of innovation. HYPERLINK l _bookmark4 1 Moreover, firms in innovation industries depend on intellectual property (IP)

8、protection, so if Chinese firms can get access to their IP without paying, those innovators returns from research and development (R&D) are reduced.As China seeks to win in advanced-technology industries, its policies will likely have an increased negative effect on innovation unless market-oriented

9、, rule-of-law nations take stronger action.With support from the Smith Richardson Foundation, the Information Technology and Information Foundation (ITIF) conducted a research project to assess the impact of Chinas policies on global innovation, including a review of scholarly research examining thi

10、s issue and case studies of five technology-based industries.Both the economic studies and the case studies demonstrated that the logical hypothesis is correct: While at least two scholarly studies found that Chinese competition spurred innovation in other nations, the majority, including ones that

11、critique these earlier studies, found the effect of Chinese economic growth and trade expansion was negative for innovation in most developed nationsparticularly in North America and Europe.ITIF found the same result with the case study analyses of five industries: telecommunications equipment, high

12、-speed rail, solar panels, biopharmaceuticals, and semiconductors. The impacts in the latter two industries are more prospective because of the relatively small Chinese market share, but the impacts in the first three are quite sizeable. For example, in telecom equipment, the leading non-Chinese equ

13、ipment companies (i.e., Ericsson, Nokia and Samsung) invest more in R&D, and patent and contribute more to international standards when compared with Huawei and ZTE, when controlling for sales and size. Without unfair Chinese policies (such as forced tech transfer for market access, blocked Chinese

14、market access, IP theft, and government funding of product development), Huawei and ZTE would barely exist. By artificially taking market share from more innovative companies, the latter have had less revenue to invest in cutting-edge R&D. In fact, if Ericsson and Nokia took all of Huawei and ZTE sa

15、les, there would be 20 percent more global telecom equipment R&D and 75 percent more essential 5G patents. HYPERLINK l _bookmark5 2 We see the same dynamic in solar panels and high-speed rail, wherein the less innovative took market share from more-innovative foreign firms. HYPERLINK l _bookmark6 3

16、We even see it in the semiconductor industry, wherein ITIF found that if Chinese firms had 80 percent fewer sales, there would be more than 5,000 more United States Patent Office (USPTO) semiconductor patents annually. HYPERLINK l _bookmark7 4To be clear, this is not to say that everything China doe

17、s in this space is harmful to global innovation. As we note with regard to solar panels, it appears that while Chinese subsidies and import barriers harm product innovation, because of the scale achieved by Chinese producers, they likely spur process innovation. HYPERLINK l _bookmark8 5 Likewise, Ch

18、inese legitimate innovation policies, such as supporting early-stage research and encouraging STEM graduates, likely help global innovation. But on net, Chinas single-minded goal to become the world innovation leader by using a vast array of unfair practices comes at the expense of global innovation

19、.THE NATURE OF CHINAS INNOVATION MERCANTILISMDespite Chinas agreement to join WTO in 2001, it has never fully taken those obligations seriously, especially over the last decade as the Chinese government has doubled down on unfair and mercantilist practices targeting advanced sectors. HYPERLINK l _bo

20、okmark9 6This first became evident in 2006, when China pivoted from an economic development strategy that sought principally to induce foreign multinationals to shift production to China to a “China Inc.” model of “indigenous innovation” that focused explicitly on supporting Chinese enterprises, oft

21、en at the expense of foreign ones. Marking this shift was a seminal document called the National Medium- and Long-Term Program for Science and Technology Development (2006 2020), or “MLP,” which called on China to master 402 key technologies, from intelligent automobiles to integrated circuits and h

22、igh-performance computers. China doubled down on this with its later “Made in China, 2025” program that targeted eight key technologies for massive government support.At the heart of Chinas strategy is foreign technology acquisition. The Chinese leadership knows that if it just relies on market forc

23、es, few if any foreign technology leaders will provide them with the technology Chinese firms need. And domestic Chinese firms, while making progress, lag behind the global technology leaders. As a result, China has deployed a panoply of tools to unfairly and often illegally obtain needed foreign te

24、chnology. And once it obtains that technology, it relies on an array of tools, including protected markets and massive subsidies, to scale up and gain global market share.China deploys an array of unfair, innovation mercantilist policies.Intellectual Property TheftIP theft is an important tool in th

25、e Chinese arsenal, with China having deployed industrial spies to obtain foreign secrets. Another vector is cyber theft. Seven percent of U.S. firms operating in China list cyber theft as a problema number that presumably would be higher if every firm that had faced an intrusion were aware of it. HY

26、PERLINK l _bookmark10 7 Then National Security Agency (NSA) director Keith Alexander called Chinese IP theft “the greatest transfer of wealth in history.” HYPERLINK l _bookmark11 8 Another vector for purloined IP is to trick companies in the United States into thinking that a Chinese firm wants to i

27、nvest in them, and then through the process of due diligence, the Chinese learn that companys trade secrets. Another path is through exchange visits and student enrollments in U.S. universities. HYPERLINK l _bookmark12 9Table 1: Assessing Chinas innovation policies on global innovationType of Policy

28、Impact on Global InnovationFunding and sharing of technology development with Chinese firmsHarmfulForced technology transferHarmfulIntellectual property theftHarmfulCurrency manipulationHarmfulExport financing above OECD guideline levelsHarmfulTariffsHarmfulGovernment-allocated domestic market share

29、s to Chinese firmsHarmfulPolitical hardball for access to foreign marketsHarmfulSupport of foreign corrupt business practicesHarmfulR&D tax incentives (favorable to Chinese firms)NeutralR&D subsidies (favorable to Chinese firms)NeutralLow-cost financing (for Chinese firms only)NeutralLimited export

30、control regimeNeutralSupport of STEM educationHelpfulWeak IP ProtectionWeak enforcement of IP law is another vector. Chinese firms can often copy and reengineer foreign technologies with impunity (what they call “introducing, digesting, absorbing, and re- innovating”)even those technologies protecte

31、d by patents. As an MIT Sloan Management Review article, “Protecting Intellectual Property in China,” notes, “Intellectual property protection is the No. 1 challenge for multinational corporations operating in China.” HYPERLINK l _bookmark13 10 The Chinese patent office also favors domestic over for

32、eign patent applicants in strategic industries. HYPERLINK l _bookmark14 11State-Backed Purchases of Foreign Technology CompaniesChinese firms regularly gain access to needed technology by buying up foreign technology companies or investing in high-tech start-ups, which both the recent enactment of t

33、he Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA) and aggressive efforts by the Trumpadministration have succeeded in limiting, at least with acquisitions. But Chinese government- backed firms continue to try to do this in other advanced economies, particularly Europe.Forced Technology Tr

34、ansferChina routinely requires firms to transfer technology in exchange for being granted the ability to invest, operate, or sell in China. HYPERLINK l _bookmark15 12 Because such conditions usually contravene Chinas WTO commitments, officials are careful not to put such requirements in writing, usu

35、ally resorting instead to oral communications to pressure foreign firms to transfer technology. HYPERLINK l _bookmark16 13 The Chinese term for this is “exchanging market for technology.” HYPERLINK l _bookmark17 14Protected Domestic MarketsOne of the biggest unfair advantages Chinese firms often enj

36、oy is having the massive and rapidly growing domestic market almost completely to themselves. The large and growing Chinese market plays a key role in enabling these firms to gain scale and boost innovation so they can then take on foreign firms in foreign markets. For example, Chinese governments f

37、avor Chinese- company-produced drugs for its hospital systems and requires drug import licenses, which can be difficult to obtain, that are issued for only for five yearsand renewals are not guaranteed.The Chinese government also imposes import tariffs on a variety of industries. Meanwhile, under th

38、e WTO Pharmaceutical Agreementto which China is not a partythe United States does not impose tariffs on biopharmaceutical products. For instance, Chinas drug imports are subject to a 5 to 6 percent import tariff.Discriminatory ProcurementThe Chinese government also uses discriminatory procurement pr

39、actices to favor Chinese-owned firms. In 5G equipment, it lets foreign firms have only a de minimis share of the market such that these foreign firms are forced to push back against home-region efforts to fight unfair Chinese policies, knowing that failing to do so would result in even less access.G

40、overnment-Backed Venture Capital InvestingWhile many governments support venture investing, just as they support export financing, Chinas investments are massive. At the end of 2017, there were a recorded 1,166 government- led venture funds, up from 214 funds in 2013, with 5.3 trillion yuan ($780 bi

41、llion) in targeted capital. These government-backed VC funds are targeted to industries deemed strategic by the Chinese government.State-Owned and Backed EnterprisesChinese governments also influence the industry structure through state ownership, which gives Chinese firms innumerable advantages suc

42、h as lower business taxes, low-cost loans, and reduced regulatory scrutiny.Subsidies to Chinese FirmsChinese governments (national, provincial and local) provide massive subsidies to the countrys advanced technology firms. This involves grants, tax exemptions, and low-interest loans. Once firms have

43、 the technology, competencies, and scale to go global, the government then often subsidizes global market expansion, such as through the China Export-Import Bank and Chinas Export and Credit Insurance Corporation (Sinosure). HYPERLINK l _bookmark18 15 These subsidies not only help the recipients dir

44、ectly, but are often tied to buying Chinese components. For example, in the high-end equipment manufacturing sector, China maintains a program that conditions the receipt of a subsidy on an enterprises use of at least 60 percent Chinese-made components when producing intelligent manufacturing equipm

45、ent. HYPERLINK l _bookmark19 16As George and Usha Haley documented in their book, Subsidies to Chinese Industry: State Capitalism, Business Strategy, and Trade Policy, Chinas game plan has long been to “aggressively subsidize targeted industries to dominate global markets.” In the 2000s, China provi

46、ded almost $100 billion in subsidies to just three industries alone: $33 billion for paper,$28 billion for auto parts, and $27 billion for steel. HYPERLINK l _bookmark20 17 Chinas share of global solar-panel exports grew from just 5 percent in the mid-2000s to 67 percent today, with Chinese solar ou

47、tput turbocharged by at least $42 billion in subsidies from 2010 to 2012 alone. HYPERLINK l _bookmark21 18 China now wants to replicate this strategy in other advanced-technology industries, such as semiconductorsand electric batteries. HYPERLINK l _bookmark22 19 For instance, Chinas National Integr

48、ated Circuit (IC) Strategy calls for at least $160 billion in subsidies to create a completely closed-loop semiconductor industry in China, including explicit plans to halve Chinese imports of U.S.-manufactured semiconductors by 2025 and eliminate them entirely by 2035. The “Made in China 2025 Strat

49、egy” is supported by some 800 state-guided funds to the tune of more than $350 billion, including advanced- battery manufacturing, wide-body aircraft, and robotics.THE LOGIC FOR INNOVATION HARMChinas policies seek to expand global market share for Chinese companies, and to the extent they succeed, t

50、his enhances competition in the relevant markets, unless the effected firms go out of business.Economic theory suggests that such enhanced competition could have two effects. It could spur affected firms to “pedal faster” and try to innovate more as a way escape the competition, or it could eat into

51、 revenues, thereby limiting the ability of the affected firms to reinvest in R&D and advanced production.Some economists, notably Kenneth Arrow, contend that innovation would be greater in more competitive markets. HYPERLINK l _bookmark23 20 In contrast, Joseph Schumpeter argued firms with temporary

52、 market power from innovation (e.g., a patented product) would have both the resources and the incentive to innovate further. Firms with little market power and “normal” (e.g., low) rates of profits would not have the resources to effectively innovate.One way to square this circle comes from scholar

53、s who argue the relationship between competition and innovation resembles an inverted “U.” HYPERLINK l _bookmark24 21 When a market is dominated by one or two firms, and the firms have the revenues to invest in innovation but lack the competitive pressures to do so, innovation is hindered. In contra

54、st, in fragmented and hypercompetitive markets, firms tend to produce less innovation because, while they have the competitive motivation, they lack the revenues from superior profits to invest in costly R&D.How China might affect foreign-firm innovation depends in part on where industries are on th

55、e inverted U. If industries are on the right side of the U, then more competition from trade might very well spur more innovation. In contrast, if they are at the peak or on the left side, more competition might reduce innovation. Few if any of the advanced industries China has targeted, however, ha

56、ve been characterized by oligopolistic market conditions, and even where this is the case (e.g., aerospace), competition has been intense.Since most industries have been on the left side of the curve, unfair Chinese competition is likely to have reduced innovation by not only reducing the size of th

57、e market for the innovative firms (e.g., closing off the Chinese market) but also by reducing their sales in other markets. This matters because innovation industries usually have high fixed costs for design and development, but relatively low marginal costs for production. In other words, the cost

58、of the first product is extremely high, while subsequent items are much less costly. In these industries, larger markets better enable firms to amortize those fixed costs over more sales, so unit costs can be lower and revenues for reinvestment in innovation higher. Firms in most innovation industri

59、es are therefore global. If they can sell in 20 countries rather than just 5thereby expanding their sales by a factor of 4then their costs increase disproportionally less.Trade barriers and distortions can limit scale economies if they limit market access to foreign firms in favor of domestic firms,

60、 and raise total global innovation costs by enabling more firms than necessary. Unfair competition also limits innovation by reducing revenues and profits needed to reinvest in the next generation of innovation. As Carl Shapiro noted, “Innovation incentives are low if ex-post competition is so inten