巴菲特致股東信

1、巴菲特2013年致股東信 (2013-03-02 20:02:40)巴菲特致股東的信是最好的投資學(xué)習(xí)資料 巴菲特2013年致股東公開(kāi)信(要點(diǎn)全譯) 2013年03月02日 新浪財(cái)經(jīng) 新浪財(cái)經(jīng)訊北京時(shí)刻3月2日晚間消息，股神巴菲特已在伯克希爾-哈撒韋網(wǎng)站上公布2012年致股東公開(kāi)信。鑒于發(fā)表于2013年，媒體一般稱(chēng)為巴菲特2013年致股東公開(kāi)信，但信中要緊討論的是伯克希爾2012年得失。對(duì)價(jià)值投資者來(lái)講，巴菲特每年致股東信是寶貴的學(xué)習(xí)資料，新浪財(cái)經(jīng)將這封長(zhǎng)達(dá)24頁(yè)信件的要點(diǎn)部分全部翻譯附后。依照慣例，第一頁(yè)是伯克希爾業(yè)績(jī)與標(biāo)普500指數(shù)表現(xiàn)的對(duì)比，2012年伯克希爾每股賬面價(jià)值的增幅是14.4%

2、，而標(biāo)普500指數(shù)的增幅為16.0%，伯克希爾跑輸1.6個(gè)百分點(diǎn)。然而，從長(zhǎng)期來(lái)看，1965-2012年，伯克希爾的復(fù)合年增長(zhǎng)率為19.7%，明顯超過(guò)標(biāo)普500指數(shù)的9.4%，而1964-2012年伯克希爾的整體增長(zhǎng)率是令人吃驚的586817%(即5868倍以上)，而標(biāo)普500指數(shù)為7433%。巴菲特致股東信第1頁(yè)對(duì)比企業(yè)績(jī)效與標(biāo)普500指數(shù)表現(xiàn)與此前部分市場(chǎng)人士推測(cè)的不同，巴菲特在2013年股東信中明確表示不派發(fā)股息。在譯文的最后部分對(duì)此有專(zhuān)門(mén)闡述。以下是股東信要點(diǎn)全文翻譯：致伯克希爾-哈撒韋公司的股東：2012年伯克希爾為股東制造的總收益是241億美元。我們使用了13億美元來(lái)購(gòu)買(mǎi)我們的股票

3、，因此我們?nèi)ツ陜粼鲋?28億美元。我們每A類(lèi)和B類(lèi)股的賬面價(jià)值增長(zhǎng)14.4%。在過(guò)去48年中(即目前治理層上任以來(lái))，每股賬面價(jià)值已從19美元增至114214美元，復(fù)合年增長(zhǎng)率為19.7%。(注：本文所有的每股數(shù)據(jù)均為適用于A類(lèi)股數(shù)據(jù)，B類(lèi)股對(duì)應(yīng)數(shù)據(jù)為A類(lèi)股的1/1500。)去年伯克希爾有專(zhuān)門(mén)多成績(jī)，但首先我們講講要緊的壞消息。* 在1965年我的合伙企業(yè)操縱伯克希爾之時(shí)，我可能連做夢(mèng)都可不能想到，我們一年賺鈔票241億美元依舊沒(méi)有跑贏大盤(pán)，請(qǐng)參照我們?cè)诘谝豁?yè)貼出的對(duì)比表。然而，我們確實(shí)沒(méi)有跑贏。在過(guò)去48年中，2012年伯克希爾賬面價(jià)值的百分比增幅第九次低于標(biāo)普500指數(shù)的漲幅(后者的計(jì)算包

4、括了股息以及股價(jià)上漲)。應(yīng)指出的是，在這九年中的八年，標(biāo)普500指數(shù)的漲幅為15%甚至更高。在大市不行時(shí)我們的表現(xiàn)要出色一些。迄今為止，我們從來(lái)沒(méi)有過(guò)在5年時(shí)段的表現(xiàn)不及大盤(pán)，在48年中我們已有43次的5年表現(xiàn)超越標(biāo)普500指數(shù)。然而，標(biāo)普500指數(shù)在過(guò)去4年中每年都上漲，整體表現(xiàn)已超過(guò)我們這4年的業(yè)績(jī)。假如市場(chǎng)在2013年接著上漲，我們5年業(yè)績(jī)跑贏標(biāo)普500指數(shù)的紀(jì)錄將終結(jié)。有一件情況你們能夠放心，不管伯克希爾的業(yè)績(jī)?nèi)绾?，我的合伙人、公司副主席查?芒格和我可不能改變我們的績(jī)效標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。我們的工作確實(shí)是以超過(guò)標(biāo)普500指數(shù)漲幅的速度來(lái)提升企業(yè)內(nèi)在價(jià)值，而我們使用賬面價(jià)值這一顯著低估了內(nèi)在價(jià)值的尺

5、度來(lái)衡量它。假如我們做到了，伯克希爾的股價(jià)將隨著時(shí)刻推移跑贏標(biāo)普500指數(shù)，盡管年度間的表現(xiàn)是難以預(yù)測(cè)的。然而，假如我們沒(méi)有做到，我們治理層沒(méi)有給投資者帶來(lái)價(jià)值，投資者能夠自己購(gòu)買(mǎi)低成本的指數(shù)基金來(lái)獲得與標(biāo)普500指數(shù)相同的回報(bào)。查理和我相信，伯克希爾的內(nèi)在價(jià)值隨著時(shí)刻推移將小幅跑贏標(biāo)普500指數(shù)。我們的自信是因?yàn)槲覀儞碛幸恍┏錾钠髽I(yè)，一批極為出色的經(jīng)營(yíng)治理者和以股東為尊的文化。然而，在市場(chǎng)下跌或持平常，我們的相對(duì)表現(xiàn)幾乎確信會(huì)超越大盤(pán)，但在市場(chǎng)特不強(qiáng)勢(shì)的年份，可能我們的表現(xiàn)將不及大盤(pán)。* 2012年第二件令人失望的情況是我們沒(méi)有完成一樁大型收購(gòu)。我曾追逐好幾只大象，但最終空手而歸。但幸運(yùn)的

6、是，今年初我們已有了改變。今年2月，我們同意收購(gòu)擁有亨氏公司全部股份的一家控股公司50%股權(quán)。另一半股權(quán)將歸屬一個(gè)以雷曼(Jorge Paulo Lemann)為首的小規(guī)模投資人集團(tuán)，他是一位倍受尊敬的巴西商人和慈善家。我們不可能找到一家比這更好的公司了。雷曼是我的多年好友，是一位出色的經(jīng)理人。他的集團(tuán)和伯克希爾每家將貢獻(xiàn)約40億美元收購(gòu)這家控股公司50%的一般股。伯克希爾還將投資80億美元購(gòu)買(mǎi)股息率為9%的優(yōu)先股。這些優(yōu)先股還有兩項(xiàng)可顯著增加其價(jià)值的特點(diǎn)：在某個(gè)時(shí)刻它們將以大幅溢價(jià)的方式被贖回，這些優(yōu)先股附有權(quán)證，同意我們以名義價(jià)格收購(gòu)該控股公司5%的一般股。我們總計(jì)約120億美元的投資花掉

7、了伯克希爾去年所賺資金的專(zhuān)門(mén)大一部分。然而，我們依舊擁有充足現(xiàn)金，同時(shí)正在以良好步調(diào)產(chǎn)生更多的現(xiàn)金。因此工作又恢復(fù)正常了，查理和我已再次穿好我們的狩獵裝備，重新開(kāi)始搜尋大象?，F(xiàn)在講講2012年的一些好消息：* 去年我差不多通告你們，我們五個(gè)最賺鈔票的非保險(xiǎn)類(lèi)公司：伯靈頓北圣達(dá)菲鐵路公司(BNSF)、伊斯卡機(jī)械公司(Iscar)、路博潤(rùn)化學(xué)品公司(Lubrizol)、美聯(lián)集團(tuán)(Marmon Group)和中美能源公司(MidAmerican Energy)在2012年可能賺得超過(guò)100億美元的稅前利潤(rùn)。它們做到了。盡管美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)緩慢，世界大部分地區(qū)的經(jīng)濟(jì)放緩，我們的“盈利5強(qiáng)”總計(jì)賺鈔票101

8、億美元，較2011年多出約6億美元。在5強(qiáng)中，僅有中美能源是伯克希爾8年前收購(gòu)的，當(dāng)時(shí)它的稅前利潤(rùn)為3.93億美元。此后，我們用純現(xiàn)金的方式收購(gòu)了5強(qiáng)中的3家。在收購(gòu)第5家，即伯靈頓北圣達(dá)菲時(shí)，我們購(gòu)款中約70%是現(xiàn)金，而剩下的來(lái)自發(fā)行股票，這導(dǎo)致我們的在外流通股增加6.1%。因此，這5家公司交給伯克希爾97億美元年盈利的同時(shí)僅產(chǎn)生了專(zhuān)門(mén)小稀釋作用。這符合我們的目標(biāo)，即不僅僅是簡(jiǎn)單增長(zhǎng)，而是要增加每股的業(yè)績(jī)。除非美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)崩盤(pán)，事實(shí)上我們可能這可不能發(fā)生，我們的盈利5強(qiáng)在2013年應(yīng)會(huì)交出更高利潤(rùn)。五位經(jīng)營(yíng)這5家公司的優(yōu)秀CEO將負(fù)責(zé)辦到。* 盡管我在2012年沒(méi)有進(jìn)行一樁大型收購(gòu)，但我們子公司

9、的經(jīng)理人做得比我好得多。我們的“補(bǔ)強(qiáng)收購(gòu)”創(chuàng)下了歷史紀(jì)錄，斥資約23億美元收購(gòu)了26家公司，它們已融合到我們現(xiàn)有的企業(yè)之中。這些交易是在伯克希爾沒(méi)有發(fā)行任何股票的條件下完成的。查理和我都專(zhuān)門(mén)觀賞這些收購(gòu)：一般而言它們差不多上低風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，可不能給總公司帶來(lái)任何負(fù)擔(dān)，拓展的是我們成熟經(jīng)理人熟知的領(lǐng)域。* 我們的保險(xiǎn)企業(yè)去年表現(xiàn)出色。它們不僅提供給伯克希爾730億美元的自由資金進(jìn)行投資，還交出了16億美元的承保收益，承保業(yè)務(wù)連續(xù)第十年盈利。這確實(shí)是魚(yú)與熊掌兼得。GEICO表現(xiàn)領(lǐng)先，它接著贏取市場(chǎng)份額同時(shí)沒(méi)有犧牲承保規(guī)則。自1995年我們獲得GEICO的操縱權(quán)以來(lái)，GEICO在個(gè)人汽車(chē)市場(chǎng)的份額已從2.5

10、%增至9.7%。與此同時(shí)保費(fèi)總額從28億美元增至167億美元。以后它還會(huì)有更大成長(zhǎng)。GEICO的優(yōu)異表現(xiàn)應(yīng)歸功于萊斯利(Tony Nicely)和他的2.7萬(wàn)名同事。在這份名單中，我們還應(yīng)該加上我們的吉科壁虎(Gecko)。(注：GEICO的宣傳吉祥物，英文中壁虎Gecko的發(fā)音與GEICO類(lèi)似)。不管風(fēng)雨依舊晝夜都不能停止它工作，這小家伙始終堅(jiān)持不懈，告訴美國(guó)人如何上GEICO.com能關(guān)心他們省專(zhuān)門(mén)多鈔票。當(dāng)我盤(pán)點(diǎn)我的好運(yùn)氣時(shí)，我會(huì)把GEICO算兩次。* 我們新聘的投資經(jīng)理人：庫(kù)姆斯(Todd Combs)和惠斯勒(Ted Weschler)已證明自己富有智慧、品德高尚，在專(zhuān)門(mén)多方面而不是

11、在資產(chǎn)治理一域有助于伯克希爾，同時(shí)完美符合我們的企業(yè)文化。這兩位讓我們中了大獎(jiǎng)。2012年他們每個(gè)人的業(yè)績(jī)比標(biāo)普500指數(shù)都高出10%以上。他們也讓我望塵莫及。因此，我們已將兩位所治理的資金每人增加約50億美元(其中一些源自我們子公司的退休基金)。庫(kù)姆斯和惠斯勒都年輕，在查理和我謝幕的專(zhuān)門(mén)久之后，他們還會(huì)治理伯克希爾的龐大資產(chǎn)組合。在他們接管公司后，你們能夠高枕無(wú)憂。* 截至2012年底伯克希爾的雇員總數(shù)達(dá)到創(chuàng)紀(jì)錄的28萬(wàn)8462人，較此前一年增加1萬(wàn)7604人。然而，我們的總部人數(shù)沒(méi)有變化，依舊24個(gè)，為此抓狂實(shí)在是毫無(wú)意義。* 伯克希爾的“四大”投資 美國(guó)運(yùn)通、可口可樂(lè)、IBM和富國(guó)銀行

12、在過(guò)去多年都有良好表現(xiàn)。2012年我們?cè)谶@四家公司的股權(quán)都有所增長(zhǎng)。我們收購(gòu)了富國(guó)和IBM的更多股份，前者已增至8.7%而2011年底為7.6%，后者現(xiàn)在為6.0%而2011年底為5.5%。與此同時(shí)，可口可樂(lè)和美國(guó)運(yùn)通的股票回購(gòu)?fù)苿?dòng)我們的持股比例增加。我們?cè)诳煽诳蓸?lè)的比例從8.8%增至8.9%，美國(guó)運(yùn)通的從13.0%增至13.7%。 以后伯克希爾在所有這四家公司的股份可能接著增長(zhǎng)。蕙絲(Mae West)講得對(duì)：“好東西越多越好”。這四家公司都擁有非凡的業(yè)務(wù)，由既有才能又尊重股東的經(jīng)理人經(jīng)營(yíng)。在伯克希爾，我們更傾向于擁有一家優(yōu)秀企業(yè)非操縱性但專(zhuān)門(mén)大的股份，而不去擁有一家專(zhuān)門(mén)一般公司100%的所

13、有權(quán)。我們?cè)谫Y本配置方面的靈活性使我們能明顯領(lǐng)先于那些只限于收購(gòu)自己能運(yùn)營(yíng)企業(yè)的公司。依照我們年底的持股比例計(jì)算，2012年“四大”公司利潤(rùn)屬于我們的股份總計(jì)39億美元。然而，在我們提交你們的盈利報(bào)告中，我們僅計(jì)罷了我們收到的約11億美元股息。但不要誤會(huì)，這28億我們沒(méi)有報(bào)告的利潤(rùn)對(duì)我們來(lái)講與已紀(jì)錄的利潤(rùn)是同等寶貴?！八拇蟆惫舅Ｓ械睦麧?rùn)經(jīng)常用于回購(gòu)，這將提升我們?cè)谒鼈円院罄麧?rùn)中的份額，它們還將用于為商業(yè)機(jī)會(huì)提供資金，而這通常將給企業(yè)帶來(lái)優(yōu)勢(shì)。我們可能，隨著時(shí)刻推移我們將從這四家公司獲得顯著增長(zhǎng)的利潤(rùn)。假如我們是正確的，派給伯克希爾的股息將增加，更為重要的是，將增加我們的未實(shí)現(xiàn)資本收益(截至

14、2012年底，這四家公司的這一收益總計(jì)267億美元)。* 去年CEO們面臨專(zhuān)門(mén)多棘手的問(wèn)題，當(dāng)面臨資本配置決策時(shí)，他們都吶喊“不確定性”(盡管其中許多CEO企業(yè)的利潤(rùn)和現(xiàn)金都達(dá)到了創(chuàng)紀(jì)錄的水平)。在伯克希爾那個(gè)地點(diǎn)，我們不存在他們那樣的恐懼，2012年我們?cè)诠S和設(shè)備方面花了創(chuàng)紀(jì)錄的98億美元，其中約88%用在美國(guó)境內(nèi)，這一金額較2011年高出19%，而2011年的數(shù)字依舊我們此前的歷史新高。查理和我都喜愛(ài)向值得投入的項(xiàng)目大額投資，而不管專(zhuān)家們講什么。相反，我們認(rèn)同歌手艾倫(Gary Allan)新鄉(xiāng)村民謠的歌詞：“每場(chǎng)風(fēng)雨后差不多上陽(yáng)光”。我們將接著致力于此，幾乎能夠確信的是，2013年的資

15、本開(kāi)支又將創(chuàng)紀(jì)錄。美國(guó)境內(nèi)的機(jī)會(huì)多得專(zhuān)門(mén)。有一點(diǎn)方法與我的CEO朋友們分享，因此以后近期內(nèi)是不確定的，但美國(guó)自1776年以來(lái)一直面臨未知。只是有時(shí)人們看重事實(shí)上一直存在的數(shù)不清不確定性，有時(shí)人們又忽略它們(通常這是因?yàn)榇饲耙欢螘r(shí)刻平安無(wú)事)。美國(guó)企業(yè)隨著時(shí)刻推移會(huì)有良好表現(xiàn)。股市也會(huì)向好是確信的，因?yàn)槭袌?chǎng)的命運(yùn)與企業(yè)業(yè)績(jī)聯(lián)系在一起。是的，周期性的挫折會(huì)發(fā)生，但投資者和經(jīng)理人參加的這場(chǎng)博弈給他們積存了大額籌碼。(20世紀(jì)道指從66點(diǎn)增至11497點(diǎn)，令人吃驚的17320%增長(zhǎng)已成為現(xiàn)實(shí)，盡管期間伴隨四次代價(jià)慘重的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)、大蕭條和許多次經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退。不要不記得，在整個(gè)世紀(jì)中股東也收到了豐厚股息。)既然博

16、弈的差不多格局特不有利，查理和我認(rèn)為，試圖步入舞池卻依照塔羅牌的翻轉(zhuǎn)就退場(chǎng)是一個(gè)可怕的錯(cuò)誤，依據(jù)所謂專(zhuān)家的預(yù)測(cè)、企業(yè)活動(dòng)的潮漲潮落而退出差不多上如此。不參加這場(chǎng)游戲的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)要遠(yuǎn)大于參與其中的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。我自己的經(jīng)歷提供了一個(gè)絕佳的例子：我在1942年春首次購(gòu)買(mǎi)股票，當(dāng)時(shí)美國(guó)正承受整個(gè)HYPERLINK /realstock/company/sh601099/nc.shtml太平洋戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的戰(zhàn)區(qū)所帶來(lái)的巨大損失。每天媒體頭條差不多上更多的失敗。即使如此，當(dāng)時(shí)也沒(méi)有關(guān)于不確定的議論，我認(rèn)識(shí)的每個(gè)美國(guó)人都相信我們將贏得勝利。那個(gè)國(guó)家的成功源自那個(gè)令人困惑的危險(xiǎn)時(shí)期，從1941至2012年，對(duì)通脹做出修正的人均G

17、DP增長(zhǎng)了三倍以上。這一時(shí)期從始至終，每一個(gè)改日差不多上不確定的。然而，美國(guó)的運(yùn)數(shù)始終是確定的：富足程度不斷增長(zhǎng)。假如你是一個(gè)擁有大型可盈利項(xiàng)目但因?yàn)槎唐趦?nèi)憂慮而擱置的CEO，請(qǐng)給伯克希爾打電話。讓我們來(lái)給你減壓?？偟膩?lái)講，查理和我希望通過(guò)以下方式增加每股內(nèi)在價(jià)值：(1)提升我們多家子公司的盈利能力；(2)通過(guò)補(bǔ)強(qiáng)收購(gòu)進(jìn)一步提高它們的利潤(rùn)；(3)參與我們所投資對(duì)象的成長(zhǎng)；(4)在可獵取價(jià)格顯著低于內(nèi)在價(jià)值時(shí)回購(gòu)伯克希爾的股票；(5)不定期進(jìn)行大規(guī)模收購(gòu)。我們還將通過(guò)一種專(zhuān)門(mén)罕見(jiàn)但并非不可能的方式來(lái)為股東實(shí)現(xiàn)業(yè)績(jī)最大化，那確實(shí)是發(fā)行伯克希爾的股票。我們企業(yè)的磚石建立在磐石般穩(wěn)固的基礎(chǔ)之上。以后一

18、個(gè)世紀(jì)，伯靈頓北圣達(dá)菲和中美能源將接著在美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)中扮演重要角色。此外，保險(xiǎn)對(duì)企業(yè)和個(gè)人來(lái)講仍將是差不多保障，沒(méi)有那家公司能比伯克希爾更多地將資源引入這一領(lǐng)域。鑒于我們深知這些以及公司其他的優(yōu)勢(shì)，查理和我看好公司的前景。企業(yè)內(nèi)在價(jià)值盡管查理和我談企業(yè)內(nèi)在價(jià)值談得這么多，我們卻不能精確告訴你伯克希爾每股內(nèi)在價(jià)值是多少(對(duì)任何其他股票也是如此)。然而，在我們2010年報(bào)中，我們列出了三個(gè)差不多要素，其中一個(gè)是定性的，我們相信這些是明智可能伯克希爾內(nèi)在價(jià)值的關(guān)鍵。這方面的討論我們已復(fù)制在完整股東報(bào)告的104-105頁(yè)。以下是對(duì)剩下的兩個(gè)定量指標(biāo)的更新：2012年我們的每股投資增加15.7%，至11萬(wàn)3

19、786美元，我們來(lái)自保險(xiǎn)和投資之外業(yè)務(wù)的每股稅前利潤(rùn)也增長(zhǎng)15.7%，至8085美元。1970年以來(lái)，我們每股投資的復(fù)合年增長(zhǎng)率為19.4%，我們每股利潤(rùn)的這一增長(zhǎng)率為20.8%。在這42年里，伯克希爾股價(jià)的增長(zhǎng)率與我們這兩個(gè)價(jià)值指標(biāo)的增速專(zhuān)門(mén)接近，這絕對(duì)不是一個(gè)巧合。查理和我樂(lè)于看到這兩個(gè)指標(biāo)的增長(zhǎng)，但我們最為強(qiáng)調(diào)的始終是持續(xù)增加運(yùn)營(yíng)盈利。股息多位伯克希爾的股東，其中包括一些我的好朋友都希望伯克希爾支付現(xiàn)金股息。讓他們感到不解的是，我們喜愛(ài)收取伯克希爾擁有的多數(shù)股票所產(chǎn)生的股息，但卻不給自己股東任何股息。因此，讓我們審視何時(shí)派息對(duì)股東有意義，何時(shí)又是無(wú)益的。一家盈利的公式可將利潤(rùn)通過(guò)多種方式

20、配置(這些方式并不相互排斥)。一家公司的治理層首先應(yīng)探尋當(dāng)前業(yè)務(wù)能提供的再投資可能性，諸如使公司變得更有效率的項(xiàng)目，擴(kuò)大經(jīng)營(yíng)地域，增加和改善產(chǎn)品線或其他能加深公司與競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手之間經(jīng)濟(jì)護(hù)城河的措施等?？偟膩?lái)講，股息政策應(yīng)該是清晰、連貫和理性的。反復(fù)的政策將困惑股東，同時(shí)趕走可能的投資者。54年前，費(fèi)雪(Phil Fisher)就驚人地將這一表述寫(xiě)在他所著一般股和不一般的利潤(rùn)的第7章。對(duì)嚴(yán)肅投資者來(lái)講，這本書(shū)在歷史最佳書(shū)單上僅排名于聰慧的投資者和1940年版的證券分析之后。費(fèi)雪解釋了你能夠成功經(jīng)營(yíng)一家提供漢堡的餐館，或者也能成功經(jīng)營(yíng)一家中國(guó)食品餐館，但你不能在這兩者之間變來(lái)變?nèi)ビ直Ｗ煞矫娴氖晨头劢z

21、。多數(shù)公司持續(xù)支付股息，通常它們?cè)噲D每年增加股息，特不不愿削減股息。我們投資組合中的“四大”公司奉行這一明智和可理解的方式，在某些情況下還積極回購(gòu)股票。我們贊同它們的行動(dòng)，希望它們接著保持現(xiàn)在的路線。我們喜愛(ài)派息增加，我們深?lèi)?ài)企業(yè)以合適價(jià)格回購(gòu)股票。然而，在伯克希爾方面，我們一直奉行一種不同的而我們一直認(rèn)為明智的方式。只要我們認(rèn)為我們所設(shè)定的增加賬面價(jià)值和市場(chǎng)價(jià)格溢價(jià)的前提是合理的，我們將堅(jiān)持這一政策。假如這兩個(gè)因素中任何一個(gè)前景惡化，我們將重新評(píng)估我們的行動(dòng)。(立悟/編譯)巴菲特致股東的信(2013年3月1日)英文原版Berkshires Corporate Performance vs.

22、the S&P 500Annual Percentage Changein Per-Share in S&P500BookValueof with Dividends RelativeBerkshire Inclued ResultsYear (1) (2) (1)-(2)1965 23.8 10.0 13.81966 20.3 (11.7) 32.01967 11.0 30.9 (19.9)1968 19.0 11.0 8.01969 16.2 (8.4) 24.61970 12.0 3.9 8.11971 16.4 14.6 1.81972 21.7 18.9 2.81973 4.7 (1

23、4.8) 19.51974 5.5 (26.4) 31.91975 21.9 37.2 (15.3)1976 59.3 23.6 35.71977 31.9 (7.4) 39.31978 24.0 6.4 17.61979 35.7 18.2 17.51980 19.3 32.3 (13.0)1981 31.4 (5.0) 36.41982 40.0 21.4 18.61983 32.3 22.4 9.91984 13.6 6.1 7.51985 48.2 31.6 16.61986 26.1 18.6 7.51987 19.5 5.1 14.41988 20.1 16.6 3.51989 4

24、4.4 31.7 12.71990 7.4 (3.1) 10.51991 39.6 30.5 9.11992 20.3 7.6 12.71993 14.3 10.1 4.21994 13.9 1.3 12.61995 43.1 37.6 5.51996 31.8 23.0 8.81997 34.1 33.4 0.71998 48.3 28.6 19.71999 0.5 21.0 (20.5)2000 6.5 (9.1) 15.62001 (6.2) (11.9) 5.72002 10.0 (22.1) 32.12003 21.0 28.7 (7.7)2004 10.5 10.9 (0.4)20

25、05 6.4 4.9 1.52006 18.4 15.8 2.62007 11.0 5.5 5.52008 (9.6) (37.0) 27.42009 19.8 26.5 (6.7)2010 13.0 15.1 (2.1)2011 4.6 2.1 2.52012 14.4 16.0 (1.6)Compounded Annual Gain1965-2012 19.7% 9.4% 10.3Overall Gain1964-2012 586,817% 7,433%Notes: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 19

26、66, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31. Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshires results through 1978 have b

27、een restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated using the numbers originally reported. The S&P 500 numbers are pretax whereas the Berkshire numbers are after-tax. If a corporation such as Berkshire were simply to have owned the S&P 500 and accrued the

28、appropriate taxes, its results would have lagged the S&P 500 in years when that index showed a positive return, but would have exceeded the S&P 500 in years when the index showed a negative return. Over the years, the tax costs would have caused the aggregate lag to be substantial.BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY

29、 INC.To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:In 2012, Berkshire achieved a total gain for its shareholders of $24.1 billion. We used $1.3 billion of that to repurchase our stock, which left us with an increase in net worth of $22.8 billion for the year. The per-share book value of both our Cl

30、ass A and Class B stock increased by 14.4%. Over the last 48 years (that is, since present management took over), book value has grown from $19 to $114,214, a rate of 19.7% compounded annually.*(* All per-share figures used in this report apply to Berkshires A shares. Figures for the B shares are 1/

31、1500th of those shown for A.)A number of good things happened at Berkshire last year, but lets first get the bad news out of the way. When the partnership I ran took control of Berkshire in 1965, I could never have dreamed that a year in which we had a gain of $24.1 billion would be subpar, in terms

32、 of the comparison we present on the facing page.But subpar it was. For the ninth time in 48 years, Berkshires percentage increase in book value was less than the S&Ps percentage gain (a calculation that includes dividends as well as price appreciation). In eight of those nine years, it should be no

33、ted, the S&P had a gain of 15% or more. We do better when the wind is in our face.To date, weve never had a five-year period of underperformance, having managed 43 times to surpass the S&P over such a stretch. (The record is on page 103.) But the S&P has now had gains in each of the last four years,

34、 outpacing us over that period. If the market continues to advance in 2013, our streak of five-year wins will end.One thing of which you can be certain: Whatever Berkshires results, my partner Charlie Munger, the companys Vice Chairman, and I will not change yardsticks. Its our job to increase intri

35、nsic business value for which we use book value as a significantly understated proxy at a faster rate than the market gains of the S&P. If we do so, Berkshires share price, though unpredictable from year to year, will itself outpace the S&P over time. If we fail, however, our management will bring n

36、o value to our investors, who themselves can earn S&P returns by buying a low-cost index fund.Charlie and I believe the gain in Berkshires intrinsic value will over time likely surpass the S&P returns by a small margin. Were confident of that because we have some outstanding businesses, a cadre of t

37、errific operating mangers and a shareholder-oriented culture. Our relative performance, however, is almost certain to be better when the market is down or flat. In years when the market is particularly strong, expect us to fall short. The second disappointment in 2012 was my inability to make a majo

38、r acquisition. I pursued a couple of elephants, but came up empty-handed.Our luck, however, changed early this year. In February, we agreed to buy 50% of a holding company that will own all of H. J. Heinz. The other half will be owned by a small group of investors led by Jorge Paulo Lemann, a renown

39、ed Brazilian businessman and philanthropist.We couldnt be in better company. Jorge Paulo is a long-time friend of mine and an extraordinary manager. His group and Berkshire will each contribute about $4 billion for common equity in the holding company. Berkshire will also invest $8 billion in prefer

40、red shares that pay a 9% dividend. The preferred has two other features that materially increase its value: at some point it will be redeemed at a significant premium price and the preferred also comes with warrants permitting us to buy 5% of the holding companys common stock for a nominal sum.Our t

41、otal investment of about $12 billion soaks up much of what Berkshire earned last year. But we still have plenty of cash and are generating more at a good clip. So its back to work; Charlie and I have again donned our safari outfits and resumed our search for elephants.Now to some good news from 2012

42、:. Last year I told you that BNSF, Iscar, Lubrizol, Marmon Group and MidAmerican Energy our five most profitable non-insurance companies were likely to earn more than $10 billion pre-tax in 2012. They delivered. Despite tepid U.S. growth and weakening economies throughout much of the world, our “pow

43、erhouse five” had aggregate earnings of $10.1 billion, about $600 million more than in 2011.Of this group, only MidAmerican, then earning $393 million pre-tax, was owned by Berkshire eight years ago. Subsequently, we purchased another three of the five on an all-cash basis. In acquiring the fifth, B

44、NSF, we paid about 70% of the cost in cash, and for the remainder, issued shares that increased the amount outstanding by 6.1%. Consequently, the $9.7 billion gain in annual earnings delivered Berkshire by the five companies has been accompanied by only minor dilution. That satisfies our goal of not

45、 simply growing, but rather increasing per-share results.Unless the U.S. economy tanks which we dont expect our powerhouse five should again deliver higher earnings in 2013. The five outstanding CEOs who run them will see to that. Though I failed to land a major acquisition in 2012, the managers of

46、our subsidiaries did far better. We had a record year for “bolt-on” purchases, spending about $2.3 billion for 26 companies that were melded into our existing businesses. These transactions were completed without Berkshire issuing any shares.Charlie and I love these acquisitions: Usually they are lo

47、w-risk, burden headquarters not at all, and expand the scope of our proven managers. Our insurance operations shot the lights out last year. While giving Berkshire $73 billion of free money to invest, they also delivered a $1.6 billion underwriting gain, the tenth consecutive year of profitable unde

48、rwriting. This is truly having your cake and eating it too.GEICO led the way, continuing to gobble up market share without sacrificing underwriting discipline. Since 1995, when we obtained control, GEICOs share of the personal-auto market has grown from 2.5% to 9.7%. Premium volume meanwhile increas

49、ed from $2.8 billion to $16.7 billion. Much more growth lies ahead.The credit for GEICOs extraordinary performance goes to Tony Nicely and his 27,000 associates. And to that cast, we should add our Gecko. Neither rain nor storm nor gloom of night can stop him; the little lizard just soldiers on, tel

50、ling Americans how they can save big money by going to GEICO.com.When I count my blessings, I count GEICO twice. Todd Combs and Ted Weschler, our new investment managers, have proved to be HYPERLINK /brand/20020smart, models of integrity, helpful to Berkshire in many ways beyond portfolio management

51、, and a perfect cultural fit. We hit the jackpot with these two. In 2012 each outperformed the S&P 500 by double-digit margins. They left me in the dust as well.Consequently, we have increased the funds managed by each to almost $5 billion (some of this emanating from the pension funds of our subsid

52、iaries). Todd and Ted are young and will be around to manage Berkshires massive portfolio long after Charlie and I have left the scene. You can rest easy when they take over. Berkshires yearend employment totaled a record 288,462 (see page 106 for details), up 17,604 from last year. Our headquarters

53、 crew, however, remained unchanged at 24. No sense going crazy. Berkshires “Big Four” investments American Express, Coca-Cola, IBM and Wells Fargo all had good years. Our ownership interest in each of these companies increased during the year. We purchased additional shares of Wells Fargo (our owner

54、ship now is 8.7% versus 7.6% at yearend 2011) and IBM (6.0% versus 5.5%). Meanwhile, stock repurchases at Coca-Cola and American Express raised our percentage ownership. Our equity in Coca-Cola grew from 8.8% to 8.9% and our interest at American Express from 13.0% to 13.7%.Berkshires ownership inter

55、est in all four companies is likely to increase in the future. Mae West had it right: “Too much of a good thing can be wonderful.”The four companies possess marvelous businesses and are run by managers who are both talented and shareholder-oriented. At Berkshire we much prefer owning a non-controlli

56、ng but substantial portion of a wonderful business to owning 100% of a so-so business. Our flexibility in capital allocation gives us a significant advantage over companies that limit themselves only to acquisitions they can operate.Going by our yearend share count, our portion of the “Big Fours” 20

57、12 earnings amounted to $3.9 billion. In the earnings we report to you, however, we include only the dividends we receive about $1.1 billion. But make no mistake: The $2.8 billion of earnings we do not report is every bit as valuable to us as what we record.The earnings that the four companies retai

58、n are often used for repurchases which enhance our share of future earnings and also for funding business opportunities that are usually advantageous. Over time we expect substantially greater earnings from these four investees. If we are correct, dividends to Berkshire will increase and, even more

59、important, so will our unrealized capital gains (which, for the four, totaled $26.7 billion at yearend). There was a lot of hand-wringing last year among CEOs who cried “uncertainty” when faced with capital-allocation decisions (despite many of their businesses having enjoyed record levels of both e

60、arnings and cash). At Berkshire, we didnt share their fears, instead spending a record $9.8 billion on plant and equipment in 2012, about 88% of it in the United States. Thats 19% more than we spent in 2011, our previous high. Charlie and I love investing large sums in worthwhile projects, whatever