國(guó)際事務(wù)研究院-2021年歐洲-非洲互聯(lián)互通展望：后疫情時(shí)代挑戰(zhàn)和戰(zhàn)略機(jī)遇（英文）-2021.5-32正式版

ISSN2610-9603|ISBN978-88-9368-194-0?2021IAI

IAIPAPERS21|20-MAY2021

Europe–AfricaConnectivityOutlook

2021:Post-Covid-19Challengesand

StrategicOpportunities

byMicha?lTanchum

ABSTRACT

TheEuropeanUnionstandsatacriticaljunctionintheinternationalscrambletoestablishEurope–Africacommercialcorridors.Morocco,AlgeriaandEgyptarethegeopoliticalgatekeepersinthecompetitionforthreeemergingcorridors:Morocco’sWestAfrica–WesternEuropecorridor,anAlgeria-anchoredCentralMaghrebcorridorandanEgypt-basedEastAfrica-Eastern/CentralEuropecorridor.UndeterredbytheCovid-19pandemic,China,Russia,TurkeyandtheArabGulfstateshaveexpandedtheireconomicinvestmentsinthesecountries,reshapingtheconfigurationofthetrans-Mediterraneancorridors.NorthAfrica’sleadingforeignpartnerswillbethecountriesthatinvestinlocalmanufacturingonastrategicallysignificantscaletocreatemanufacturingvaluechains.TheEUstillretainsawindowofopportunitytoinfluencethedirectionofEurope–AfricaconnectivitytopromoteEuropeanprioritiesandensureEuropeaninterests.

EuropeanUnion|Infrastructures|Transports|Mediterranean|North

keywords

Africa|Morocco|Algeria|Egypt

ISSN2610-9603|ISBN978-88-9368-194-0?2021IAI

IAIPAPERS21|20-MAY2021

Europe–AfricaConnectivityOutlook2021:

Post-Covid-19ChallengesandStrategicOpportunities

Europe–AfricaConnectivityOutlook2021:Post-Covid-19ChallengesandStrategicOpportunities

byMicha?lTanchum*

Introduction

FollowingtheCovid-19pandemic,theEuropeanUnionstandsatacriticaljunctionintheinternationalscrambletoestablishEurope-AfricacommercialcorridorsacrosstheMediterraneanbasin.Priortothepandemic’soutbreak,theEUalreadyfacedapressingstrategicchallengetoformacoherentpolicyinNorthAfrica,whichhasbecomeanarenaofintenseglobalcompetitionoverthenewnexusoftradeandenergytransitroutesaswellasindustrialmanufacturingvaluechainsthatwillconnectEurope,AfricaandMiddleEast.

Duringthepreviousdecade,ChinabecameAfrica’stoptradepartnerwhileRussiaandTurkeymassivelyexpandedtheirtraderelationshipsonthecontinent,witnessingratesofgrowthintradethatsurpassedtheEUbyafactorofsevenandfiverespectively.1ThemembersoftheGulfCooperationCouncil(GCC),especiallySaudiArabia,theUnitedArabEmirates(UAE)andQatar,havesimilarlyincreasedtheireconomicengagementwithAfrica.

ThepandemichasintensifiedtheurgencyfortheEUtofocusontrans-Mediterraneanconnectivity.By2025,Africawillhaveoverahundredcitieswithmorethanonemillioninhabitants.2TheAfricanContinentalFreeTradeArea,

1From2006to2018,Russia’stradewithAfricagrewbymorethan300percentandTurkey’sbymorethan200percent,whiletheEuropeanUnion’stradewithAfricagrewby41percent;Economist,“TheNewScrambleforAfrica”,inTheEconomist,7March2019,

/

leaders/2019/03/07/the-new-scramble-for-africa.

2RobertMuggahandKatieHill,“AfricanCitiesWillDoubleinPopulationby2050.HereAre4WaystoMakeSureTheyThrive”,inWorldEconomicForumArticles,27June2018,

https://www.weforum.

Micha?lTanchumteachesatUniversidaddeNavarraandisaseniorfellowattheAustrianInstituteforEuropeanandSecurityPolicy(AIES).TheauthorthanksDaniel“Mac”Lang,MatildeRomito,GabrielaPajueloandMaríadelPilarCazaliCasta?ónfortheirresearchassistance.

.ThispaperwaspreparedinthecontextoftheNew-MedResearchNetwork,aprojectrunbytheIstitutoAffariInternazionali(IAI)withthesupportoftheItalianMinistryofForeignAffairsandInternationalCooperation(MAECI),theOSCESecretariatinViennaandtheCompagniadiSanPaoloFoundation,May2021.Viewsexpressedaretheauthor’salone.

2

ISSN2610-9603|ISBN978-88-9368-194-0?2021IAI

IAIPAPERS21|20-MAY2021

Europe–AfricaConnectivityOutlook2021:

Post-Covid-19ChallengesandStrategicOpportunities

launchedon1January2021,isexpectedspurinternationalfirmstolocateevenmoreoftheiroperationsinAfrica,givenitslargesupplyofaffordablelandandlabour,alongwithitsexpandingyetunder-servedconsumermarket.3Thepost-pandemicglobalimpetustoshortensupplychainshasfurtheracceleratedthistrendaswellasthetimeframeforinvestmentsbyinternationalactors.Undeterredbythepandemic’ssevereeconomicimpact,China,Russia,TurkeyandtheArabGulfstateshaveexpandedtheireconomicinvolvementinNorthAfricatoreshapethecommercialconfigurationandgeopoliticsofthetrans-Mediterraneanconnectivity.

Thefundamentalarchitectureoftrans-MediterraneanconnectivityconsistsofthethreeEurope-Africacorridors:Morocco’sWestAfrica-WesternEuropecorridor,anAlgeria-anchoredCentralMaghrebcorridorandanEgypt-basedEastAfrica-Eastern/CentralEuropecorridorviatheEasternMediterranean(Figure1).PriortoCovid-19’soutbreak,Morocco’sWestAfrica-WesternEuropecorridorwasthemostadvancedinitsdevelopmentwhiletheEgypt-basedEastAfrica-Eastern/CentralEuropecorridorwasatamorepreliminarystage,albeitwithenormouseconomicpotential.TheAlgeria-based,centralcorridorremainsinaformativestate,characterisedbyajockeyingamonginternationalactorsforposition.Algeria’spoliticalparalysissinceearlyspring2019andtheresultantpauseinforeignmanufacturinginvestmentsendangerthecorridor’sdevelopment.Ashort-termdevelopmenthiatusamidsttensionswithMoroccoovertheWesternSaharaandcontinuedinstabilityinLibyacouldleaveAlgeria–andTunisiaalongwithit–dangerouslyisolatedandeconomicallyvulnerable.

TherecenthistoryofallthreecorridorsshowsthatiftheEuropeanUnionfailstoeffectivelyplanaheadandlaythegroundworkforindustrialbasedevelopmentandvaluechainintegrationinpartnershipwithNorthAfricannations,thiswillleaveindividualEUmemberstatesthatplayleadingrolesintrans-MediterraneanconnectivitylittleoptionotherthantopartnerwithactorsoutsidetheEUsystem.Thiswillfuelfurtherintra-EUdivisionsandunderminethebasicobjectivesoftheEuropeanNeighbourhoodPolicyaswellasthenewlyannouncedEUAgendafortheMediterranean.4

org/agenda/2018/06/Africa-urbanization-cities-double-population-2050-4%20ways-thrive.

3CarolineKende-Robb,“6ReasonsWhyAfrica’sNewFreeTradeAreaIsaGlobalGameChanger”,inWorldEconomicForumArticles,9February2021,

/agenda/2021/02/

afcfta-africa-free-trade-global-game-changer.

4EuropeanCommission,SouthernNeighbourhood:EUProposesNewAgendafortheMediterranean,

9February2021,

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_426.

3

ISSN2610-9603|ISBN978-88-9368-194-0?2021IAI

IAIPAPERS21|20-MAY2021

Europe–AfricaConnectivityOutlook2021:

Post-Covid-19ChallengesandStrategicOpportunities

Figure1|Europe–AfricacorridorsandconnectorstotheTrans-AfricanHighwaynetwork

Note:WestAfrica–WesternEuropecorridor(green);CentralMaghrebcorridor(red);EastAfrica–Eastern/CentralEuropecorridor(blue);Algeria–LagosHighway(orange);Tunis–Tripoli–Widehoek–CapetownHighway(yellow);Dakar–N’DjamenaHighway(grey);ContinuationofCairo–Aswan–KhartoumraillinetoUganda(pink).

Source:Micha?lTanchum,“Europe-Mediterranean-AfricaCommercialConnectivity:GeopoliticalOpportunitiesandChallenges”,inKASMediterraneanDialogueSeries,No.31(November2020),p.2,

https://www.kas.de/documents/282499/282548/Europe-

Mediterranean-Africa+MED+Dialogue+31.pdf.

4

ISSN2610-9603|ISBN978-88-9368-194-0?2021IAI

IAIPAPERS21|20-MAY2021

Europe–AfricaConnectivityOutlook2021:

Post-Covid-19ChallengesandStrategicOpportunities

On9March2020,theEuropeanCommissionandtheHighRepresentativeforEUforeignandsecuritypolicyissuedajointcommunicationfor“anewcomprehensiveEUstrategywithAfrica”,basedonaprogrammeof“fivepartnerships”for(1)greentransitionandenergyaccess;(2)digitaltransformation;(3)sustainablegrowthandjobs;(4)peaceandgovernance;and(5)migrationandmobility.5Torealisethisambition,theEUshouldincreaseinvestmentsintrans-Mediterraneanconnectivity,assistinginthedevelopmentoflocalgreeneconomymanufacturingsectorsintegratedinEuropeanvaluechains.

WithoutacoherentEUpolicytoincentivisememberstatesandEuropeanfirmstocooperatewithNorthAfricannations,theresultingspaceleftbytheEuropeanUnioninthedevelopmentoftrans-MediterraneanconnectivitywillbefilledbyChina,Russia,TurkeyandtheGCCstates.China’searlypost-CovideconomicrecoveryhasprovidedBeijingwithafirst-moveradvantageineachofthethreeemergingtrans-Mediterraneancommercialcorridors,openingthepossibilityforBeijingtoreorientthemtowardsitsBeltandRoadInitiative(BRI)framework.

IntheabsenceofcoordinatedEUaction,theemergingarchitectureoftrans-MediterraneanconnectivityisentrenchingdangerousdividesamongthesixMediterraneanEUmemberstatesaswellasexacerbatinggeopoliticalfaultlinesacrossNorthAfricaitself.ThedeepeningcommercialinterestsofTurkey,itsstrategicpartnerQatar,andtheirmainregionalrival,theUAE,ensurethatallthreeactorswillremainengagedacrossNorthAfrica.

NorthAfrica’sleadingforeignpartnersintrans-MediterraneanconnectivitywillbethecountriesthatinvestininfrastructurethatisdirectlytiedtoEurope-Africamanufacturingvaluechains.WiththeEuropeanNeighbourhoodPolicy’s“strongfocusongoodgovernance,democracyandtheruleoflaw”,6theEUmustnavigateadditionalchallengesindevelopingitstrans-Mediterraneanpartnershipsnotfacedbyotherinternationalactors.Still,theEUretainsacriticalwindowofopportunitytoimpactthedirectionoftrans-Mediterraneanconnectivity.ThemannerandextenttowhichtheEUexercisesleadershipinthedevelopmentoftrans-MediterraneanconnectivitywilldeterminetheparametersofitsfuturegeopoliticalinfluenceinNorthAfricaandtheeffectivenessoftheEU’sAfricapartnershipstrategyoverall.

1.TheWestAfrica–WesternEuropeCorridor:ThemodelofMorocco

Morocco’ssuccessinadvancingitsWestAfrica-to-WesternEuropecorridorstemsfromtheconsiderableinvestmentsmadebyRabatanditsforeignpartnersintheconcurrentdevelopmentofMorocco’stransportationinfrastructureandits

5EuropeanCommission,TowardsaComprehensiveStrategywithAfrica(JOIN/2020/4),9March

2020,

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52020JC0004.

6EUNeighboursportal:TheEuropeanNeighbourhoodPolicy(ENP),

https://www.euneighbours.eu/

en/node/11210.

5

ISSN2610-9603|ISBN978-88-9368-194-0?2021IAI

IAIPAPERS21|20-MAY2021

Europe–AfricaConnectivityOutlook2021:

Post-Covid-19ChallengesandStrategicOpportunities

industrialbase,anchoringMorocco’semergingtrans-Mediterraneancommercialconnectivityinmanufacturingvaluechains.7

Figure2|High-speedraillinesinMorocco,includingplannedextensionsoftheal-BoraqLine

Source:WikipediaCommons:RailwaysofMoroccoasper2018,

https://commons.

/wiki/File:Railways_Morocco.2018.png.

Priortothepandemic,Morocco’s2018inaugurationoftheal-Boraqhigh-speedrailline–Africa’sfirsthigh-speedrailtransportationconnectingTangiertoCasablanca–consolidatedMorocco’sunrivalledpositionasaEurope-Africacommercialcorridor(Figure2).Thefirstsegmentofthe2.3billionUSdollars,362kmrail-linkwasbuiltasaFranco-Moroccanjointventure.TheBoraqlineislinkedtoMorocco’snewstate-of-the-artTangerMedportonthecountry’sMediterraneancoast40kmeastofTangier.InJune2019,TangerMedbecametheMediterranean’s

7Micha?lTanchum,“Morocco’sAfrica-to-EuropeCorridor:GatekeeperofaTrans-RegionalStrategicArchitecture”,inAIESFokus,No.8/2020(July2020),

https://www.aies.at/publikationen/2020/

fokus-20-08.php.

6

ISSN2610-9603|ISBN978-88-9368-194-0?2021IAI

IAIPAPERS21|20-MAY2021

Europe–AfricaConnectivityOutlook2021:

Post-Covid-19ChallengesandStrategicOpportunities

largestportwithatotalcontainercapacityof9milliontwenty-footequivalentunits(TEU),surpassingSpain’sAlgecirasandValenciaports.The1.5billionUSdollarscapacityexpansionwassupportedbysubstantialChineseinvestment,8butChinahasfailedtocapitaliseontheinvestmentasBeijinghassofarbeenunsuccessfulinestablishinganindependent,Chinese-ledmanufacturingchaininMorocco.

TheimportanceofintegratinginfrastructureinvestmentwithindustrialmanufacturingchainsisillustratedbyMorocco’ssuccessfulautomotiveindustry,producingover700,000vehiclesannuallyandservingasthewesterncorridor’scentrepiece.In2012,GroupeRenaultestablishedasecondMoroccanmanufacturingplantinTangiertobenefitfromtheexpandedTangerMedPortandraillink.In2019,Europe’sthirdlargestautomakersentsixtrainloadsofRenaultvehiclesdailyfromitsTangierfactorytotheTangerMedportforshipment.9InJune2019,France’sGroupePSA,Europe’ssecondlargestautomaker,openedamanufacturingplantinKénitra,northofRabat,becauseoftheBoraqhigh-speedraillinktotheTangerMedport.10

Inearly2019,automotivesectorssalesaccountedfor27.6percentofMorocco’sexports.11Morocco’spresentvehicleproductionledbyGroupeRenaultandGroupePSAissupportedbyapproximately200internationalsuppliersoperatingtheirownmanufacturingplantsinthecountry,includingmajorfirmsheadquarteredinGermany,France,Italy,SpainandBelgium.SomeChinesemanufacturersareusingtheopportunityofGroupePSA’snewplantinKénitratointegrateintotheFrench-ledEuropeanvaluechain,suchasCITICDicastal,whose400millionUSdollarsKénitraplantcanproduce6millionpiecesannuallytosupplyGroupePSA.12

1.1ThefutureWesternCorridor:BetweenEuropeandtheWesternSahara

TheEUfacesseveralchallengescoordinatingitspolicytowardsMorocco,theprincipalofwhichisthedisputedWesternSahararegion.AsMoroccocontinuestoexpanditsBoraqrailline,Rabat’shighestpriorityistoextendthehigh-speedrailtoLagouira(LaGüera)inthesouthernmostpointoftheWesternSahara,whichMoroccoconsidersitsSouthernProvinces.RunningfromMorocco’sTangerMedPortwestwardandthendowntheAtlanticcoasttotheMauritanianborder,theTangier–Lagouiralinewouldcreatehigh-speedcommercialtransportationconnectivityfromthewesternMediterraneanshoretotheborderofWestAfrica.

8ChinaMerchantsGroup,ChairmanLiJianhongVisitsTanger,5August2017,

https://www.cmhk.

com/home/a/2017/h07/a34075_34173.shtml.

9ElMehdiBerrada,“MoroccoNowHastheLargestCapacityforShippingContainersintheMediterranean”,inTheAfricaReport,7August2019,

/16021.

10KawtarEnnaji,“PSAKenitraPlantOfficiallyOpens”,inMoroccoWorldNews,20June2019,

https://

/2019/06/276284.

11“MoroccoTradeDeficitExpands2.5%Year/YearinJan-May”,inReuters,1July2019,

https://reut.

rs/2FI7Mdy.

12Micha?lTanchum,“Morocco’sAfrica-to-EuropeCorridor”,cit.,p.4.

7

ISSN2610-9603|ISBN978-88-9368-194-0?2021IAI

IAIPAPERS21|20-MAY2021

Europe–AfricaConnectivityOutlook2021:

Post-Covid-19ChallengesandStrategicOpportunities

AsMoroccoexpandedthehigh-speedraillinesouthwardin2020,RabatconcurrentlyobtaineddiplomaticrecognitionofitsWesternSaharasovereigntyclaimsbyasignificantnumberofnations.FromDecember2019toOctober2020,fifteenAfricannationsopenedconsulatesacknowledgingMorocco’ssovereigntythere.13InNovember2020,theUAEbecamethefirstArabcountrytodoso.InDecember,BahrainopenedaconsulateandJordanannounceditsintentiontofollowsuit.AsAfricanandArabsolidaritywithAlgeria’soppositiontoMorocco’ssovereigntyclaimserodedin2020,tensionsbetweenAlgiersandRabatincreased.

Since1991,theAlgerian-backedPolisarioFront,whichseeksanindependentSahrawistateintheWesternSahara,abandoneditsarmedstruggleinfavourofworkingthroughtheUnitedNationsMissionfortheReferenduminWesternSahara(MINURSO)framework.TheCovid-19pandemicandMorocco’sdiplomaticsuccesses,culminatingwiththeDecember2020recognitionofMoroccansovereigntyovertheWesternSaharabytheUnitedStates,14havealteredthelong-standingregionalstatusquo.InNovember2020,thePolisarioFrontendedits29-yearceasefirewithRabatandresumedarmedresistance.

Againstthisbackdrop,theEUfacesincreasingchallengestoformacoordinatedpolicyontheWesternSahara,asillustratedbytherecentriftinGerman–Moroccanrelations.ImmediatelyfollowingBerlin’sJune2020promulgationofitsGerman“NationalHydrogenStrategy”,15MoroccobecamethefirstcountrytosignagreenhydrogenagreementwithGermany.16TheGerman–MoroccaninitiativeseekstocreateAfrica’sfirstindustrialplantforgreenhydrogenproductionusingMorocco’sextensivesolarpowerinfrastructure.InJanuary2021,MoroccoandGermanysignedaletterofintentforthetransportofMoroccan-producedhydrogenfromTangerMedtoGermany’sHamburgport.Thepromisinginitiativetocreateagreenhydrogenvaluechainhas,atleasttemporarily,beenpausedwithRabat’s2March2021suspensionofdiplomaticcontactwithGermanyoverBerlin’soppositiontoMoroccanclaimstotheWesternSahara.17China,ontheotherhand,maintainsamoreneutralpolicyonthedispute,18supportingtheeffortsofMINURSOwhile

13AliHaidar,“ZambiaandEswatiniOpenConsulatesinLaayoune”,inSaharaNews,27October

2020,

/?p=2587.

14TheUSrecognitionofMoroccansovereigntyovertheWesternSaharawaspartofabroaderUSdiplomaticinitiativetofacilitatethenormalisationofrelationsbetweenMoroccoandIsrael.

15GermanFederalMinistryforEconomicAffairsandEnergy,SecuringaGlobalLeadershipRoleonHydrogenTechnologies:FederalGovernmentAdoptsNationalHydrogenStrategyandEstablishesNationalHydrogenCouncil,10June2020,

https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/

EN/Pressemitteilungen/2020/20200610-securing-a-global-leadership-role-on-hydrogen-

technologies.html.

16InèsMagoum,“Morocco:PartnershipwithGermanyforGreenHydrogen”,inAfrik21,15June

2020,

https://www.afrik21.africa/en/morocco-partnership-with-germany-for-green-hydrogen.

17MalekBachir,“Germany-MoroccoTensions:WhyIsRabatSoUpsetwithBerlin?”,inMiddleEastEye,5March2021,

/node/202721;

SafaaKasraoui,“Morocco-GermanyTensions,WesternSaharaTipoftheIceberg”,inMoroccoWorldNews,2March2021,

/2021/03/336408.

18HangZhou,“China’sBalancingActintheWesternSaharaConflict”,inAfricanaStudia,n.29

8

ISSN2610-9603|ISBN978-88-9368-194-0?2021IAI

IAIPAPERS21|20-MAY2021

Europe–AfricaConnectivityOutlook2021:

Post-Covid-19ChallengesandStrategicOpportunities

carefullybalancingitseconomicinterestsinMoroccoandAlgeria.Withlargeinvestmentsinbothcountriesandplayingaconciliatingrole,BeijinghasthepotentialtobridgethedivideandreorienttheWesternMediterraneanclosertowardtheBRI.

TheBoraqhigh-speedrailline,asaFrench–Moroccanjointventure,isemblematicofFrance’sroleasMorocco’sleadingforeigninvestor.Franceprovided51percentofthefinancingfortheinitialsegmentwithMoroccoprovidinganother27percent.Theproject’sremaining22percentwasfinancedbytheUAE,SaudiArabiaandKuwait.19AlongwithFrance,GCCnations–particularlytheUAE–havebeenmainstaysofforeigninvestmentinMorocco,withtheBoraqlinerepresentingagoodexample.TheEU27collectivelyisMorocco’slargesttradepartner,accountingfor55percentofMorocco’s2019totalbilateraltradevolume.Nonetheless,France’sprincipalpartnersforstrategiceconomicengagementwithMoroccoareAbuDhabiandRiyadh,notMadrid,RomeorevenBerlin.

In2020,Morocco’seconomyunderwenta7percentcontraction,butisexpectedtoaccelerateto4percentGDPgrowthin2021.20TheEU27accountsfor59percentofMorocco’sforeigndirectinvestment(FDI).21AslowdownintheEU’seconomicengagementwithMoroccoopensfurtheropportunitiesforChina.Beijing’sattempttoestablishitsownindustrialchaininMoroccothoughChineseAutomakerBYD’sefforttocreateanelectricvehicle(EV)manufacturingplanthassofarstalled.22BYD’ssuccessfulcreationofanEVmanufacturingvaluechainwouldsignificantlyalterChina’spositioninthewesterncorridor,transformingitintooneofthecorridor’sprincipalagenda-setters.

FranceremainsbereftofEuropeanpartnerswillingtoplayastrategicroleinMorocco’sinfrastructuredevelopment.Moroccoiswell-suitedforelectricvehiclemanufacturingandhydrogenproduction,bothEUpriorities.Spain’snewHorizonteáfrica(HorizonAfrica)initiativetofacilitatetheoperationofSpanishcompaniesinAfrica,withMoroccoatitscore,23mayprovideaplatformfordeeperFrench–Spanishcoordination.IntheabsenceofstrategiccoordinationbetweenFranceandotherEUmembers,Morocco’sAfrica-to-EuropecorridorwillincreasinglydependonthestrategicrelationshipbetweenFranceanditsArabGulfpartnersontheonehandoronChineseinvestmentsontheother.

(2018),p.145-156,

https://ojs.letras.up.pt/index.php/1_Africana_2/article/view/7635.

19LahssenMoqana,“MoroccanKing,FrenchPresidentInaugurateAlBoraqHighSpeedTrain”,inAsharqAl-Awsat,16November2018,

/node/1465551.

20WorldBank,TheWorldBankinMorocco–Overview,lastupdated25March2021,

https://www.

/en/country/morocco/overview.

21MohamedChtatou,“CoronavirusinMorocco:EconomicandSocialImplications”,inFikraForum,

23April2020,

https://bit.ly/3n4rCmi.

22Micha?lTanchum,“Morocco’sAfrica-to-EuropeCorridor”,cit.,p.4.

23NicholasNorbrookandMarieVillacèque,”SpainLaunchesHorizonteáfricatoIncreaseRegionalPresence”,inTheAfricaReport,23February2021,

/67642.

9

ISSN2610-9603|ISBN978-88-9368-194-0?2021IAI

IAIPAPERS21|20-MAY2021

Europe–AfricaConnectivityOutlook2021:

Post-Covid-19ChallengesandStrategicOpportunities

2.TheCentralMaghrebcorridor:Post-Covidchallenges

ThecentralMaghrebEurope–AfricacorridorpresentlycentresonAlgeria’sroadconnectivityfromitsMediterraneancoasttoWestAfricaviatheTrans-AfricanHighwaysystem(Figure3),buthasmuchpotentialtolinkupwithotherinfrastructureconnectionswithTunisia.

Figure3|Trans-AfricanHighways

Source:WikipediaCommons:MapofTrans-AfricanHighwaysbasedondata2000to2003,

/wiki/File:Map_of_Trans-African_Highways.PNG.

Indeed,therecentlyformedTurkey–Italy–TunisiatransportationnetworkthatslicesacrossthecentreoftheMediterranean,creatinganarcofcommercial

10

ISSN2610-9603|ISBN978-88-9368-194-0?2021IAI

IAIPAPERS21|20-MAY2021

Europe–AfricaConnectivityOutlook2021:

Post-Covid-19ChallengesandStrategicOpportunities

connectivityfromtheMaghrebtothewiderBlackSea,formstheprimarylinkintheembryoniccentralMaghrebEurope–AfricacorridorthatutilisesAlgeria’sconnectivity.24

TheTurkey–Italy–Tunisianetwork’scentralhubisItaly’sdeep-seaportofTarantolocatedonItaly’ssoutherntipattheheartoftheMediterraneanSea.ManagedbyTurkishportoperatorYilport,theTarantoportbeganservicingtheTurkey–Italy–TunisianetworkinearlyJuly2020(Figure4).TheTaranto–TunisiasegmentofthenetworksimultaneouslyformsthecorelinkofapotentialEurope–AfricacommercialtransportationcorridorbyconnectingthecentralMaghreb’scoasttoEuropeviaItaly’shigh-speedrailsystem.FromTunisia’sBizerteport,thecorridorcanalsoreach(byhighway)Algiers,theMediterraneanterminalfortheTrans-SaharanHighway(Route2intheTrans-AfricanHighwaysysteminFigure3),potentiallyextendingtheItaly–TunisiacorridorsouthwardintoWestAfricaasfarasLagos,Nigeria.

Figure4|TheTurkey–Italy–Tunisiacorridor

Source:Micha?lTanchum,“Libya,Energy,andtheMedit