ADiplomaticDilemma

1、A Diplomatic DilemmaSince armed clashes between government forces andethnic insurgents in Myanmar s Kokang region broke out in midFebruary ， conflict has raged for more than a month along the country s border with China.The violence spilled across the border in March as jetsfrom Myanmar entered Chin

2、ese airspace and dropped several bombs on farmland in Yunnan Province ， killing five Chinese nationals. The incident has further contributed to mounting pressure on the Chinese government to intervene to forestall further collateral damage. However ， given the strategic importance of Myanmar in Chin

3、a s global strategy， and with the US playing a “ curious” role in Myanmar ，China may have to uphold its official policy of non-interference.China s Crimea？Compared to earlier ethnic conflicts near the Chineseborder with Myanmar ， such as the Kachin uprisings in late 2012 and early 2013， a major diff

4、erence of this recent conflict is that it is taking place in a region home to 200 ， 000 Kokang ，an ethnically Chinese minority group with a total population inMyanmar of around 1 million.The conflict began when the leader of Kokang s MyanmarNational Democratic Alliance Army （ MNDAA ） led byPheung Ky

5、a-Shin ， who also goes by the Chinese name PengJiasheng， launched attacks on government military bases atLaukkai ， the regional capital. Pheung was forced out of power after a ceasefire agreement between the MNDAA and theMNDAA forcesgovernment expired in 2009.After briefly taking control of Laukkaiq

6、uickly retreated ， with government troops in pursuit. In the following month ， clashes continued throughout the Kokang region.Throughout the uprising ， Pheung has consistentlyappealed to the Chinese public to support their “ compatriots inKokang ” through the Internet and the mainstream media. In on

7、e video addressed to the Chinese public， the 84-year-old ， who speaks fluent Mandarin ， urged the Chinese people to support his cause. Taking advantage of China s unease regarding theUS strategic intentions in the region and a rising tide of nationalism among the Chinese public in recent years ， Phe

8、ung portrays the Myanmar mili- tary s control of Kokang as servingAmerica s strategic interests as part of a broader China containment policy. Pheung even allowed some Chinese media outlets， such as the nationalist Global Times ， to conduct immersion reporting among its troops.The strategy appears t

9、o be working. Pheung s appeal， andhis claims that the Kokang are treated as second-class citizens by Naypyidaw ， has elicited sympathy among the Chinese public for his insurgency. Denied national IDs ， ethnic Kokang have no freedom of movement within Myanmar s borders despite the government taking c

10、ontrol of the region in 2009.This has led some media commentators to describe Kokang asChina s Crimea.” But for most Chinese experts ， such a comparison is a leap too far. According to Sun Yun ， a fellow with the East Asia program at the Henry L. Stimson Center and a non-resident fellow with the Bro

11、okings Institution ， other than a complex ethnic makeup ， there is little similarity betweenKokang and Crimea.For China ， the strategic importance of Myanmarsignificantly outweighs China s interest in its border ethnic groups，” Sun commented， adding that Myanmar not only protects key cross-border na

12、tural gas pipelines ， but also serves as a critical link in China s One Belt， One Road strategy( bothBeijing s hallmark Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st CenturyMaritime Silk Road initiatives necessitate Myanmar s involvement ）， as well as a priority coun try in Chinaperiphery diplomacy.The fact that

13、 Pheung， leader of the Kokang insurgency ，has a long history of switching allegiances between various political factions ， has also led many experts to warn that his fight is more about gaining political capital for his own group rather than supporting the interests of the Kokang.According to Sun ，

14、the Chinese government has explicitlyrejected the idea of supporting the Kokang insurgency. Even theGlobal Times ， which has run a number of sympathetic reports on the Kokang fighters ， published an editorial in February supporting the continuation of China s“ hands off” policy.EscalationHowever ， a

15、s China and Myanmar share a 2，200-kilometerborder in a region characterized for millennia by broad ethnic mixing ， China may struggle to keep itself out of the conflict.On the one hand， China aspires to have a closer relationship with Myanmar ， but on the other， China is deeply concerned about borde

16、r security， particularly a large-scale influx of refugees into Yunnan Province. According to China s ForeignMinistry ， by March 7， 2015， more than 60， 000 refugees had entered China since the Kokang conflict began.China s position on Myanmar s ethnic conflicts hasremained consistent； Beijing has cal

17、led for peaceful negotiation and a sincere attempt to find a political solution ， in some cases even facilitating negotiations between the Myanmar government and ethnic insurgents.Analysts believe that after failing to regain control of theKokang region ， a major goal of the latest insurgency is to

18、force the Myanmar government to recognize the MNDAA s status in broader negotiations with other ethnic rebel groups ， including the Kachin ， the Karen and the Rohingya. After defeating theMNDAA in the 2009 Kokang conflict ， the Myanmar government ended recognition of the group in its negotiationsAcc

19、ording to a report bywith other ethnic insurgencies.Chinese online news portal S ， after the recent conflict broke out ， China proposed that Naypyidaw recognize theMNDAA s political status in its negotiations with ethnic groups， a request which was rejected by Myanmar ， signaling impatience with bot

20、h the country s insurgent groups and China.For Myanmar s military ， which enjoys a clear numericaland technological advantage in all the country s ethnic conflicts ， China s advocacy of peaceful negotiation seems to favor the insurgents ， especially as the country has provided a safe haven for forme

21、r ethnic fighters masquerading as refugees ?C many of whom later return to the front lines.In addition ， concerns over cross-border fire have alsoconstrained the ability of Myanmar s armed forces to pursue fleeing insurgents ， giving a tactical advantage to their enemy. It is reported that various a

22、rmed ethnic groups have stationed their command centers near Chinas border， in some cases less than a hundred meters away， to discourage airstrikes by Naypyidaw.In late February ， Myanmar officials openly accusedChinese authorities of supplying the Kokang rebels with weapons and supplies， a claim de

23、nied by both Beijing and the insurgents themselves.However ， as clashes have continued， the Myanmarmilitary appears to have become increasingly impatient. In earlyMarch ， Burmese jets strayed into Chinese airspace and dropped ordnance on several occasions. Then， on March 12 ，2015， bombs dropped by a

24、 Burmese jet hit a Chinese sugar cane plantation， killing five and wounding seven Chinese nationals， which immediately led to accusations that thePeople s Liberation Army （PLA ） was failing to protectChinese citizens.In response to mounting public pressure ， the PLA AirForce swiftly dispatched fight

25、er jets ， helicopters， and anti-air missile platforms to the region ， while Fan Changlong ， vice chairman of the Central Military Commission ， made an urgent call to Min Aung Hlaing ， commander-in-chief of Myanmar s armed forces， requesting that Myanmar investigate the incident and punish those resp

26、onsible.After initially denying that its air force had participated inthe aerial bombardment， instead claiming that the Kokang rebels should be held responsible， Naypyidaw admitted in a statement released on March 17， 2015， that “ harm had been done” to China ， though the statement stopped short of

27、admitting responsibility.American DreamsAs the relationship between China and Myanmar has beenstrained by the cross-border conflict ， many have placed presenttensions within the context of the ongoing regional rivalry research fellow with the China Institute of International Studies ，between the US

28、and China.Shi Yongming ， an associatesuggested that the US has played a “ curious” role inMyanmar s ethnic conflicts. Shi pointed out that ， just before the outbreak of the Kokang conflict at the beginning of 2015 ，the US sent a delegation to Myanmar ， including AssistantSecretary of State for Democ

29、racy ， Human Rights and LaborTom Malinowski ， Deputy Assistant Secretary of DefenseThomas Harvey and the Deputy Commander of the US PacificCommand Anthony Crutchfield.The fact that Crutchfield paid a visit to Myitkyina ， capitalof the Kachin State in north Myanmar ， a major ethnic region and a principal source of unrest since a long-dormant Kachin insurgency resumed in 2011， led many to suspect that the US may have a hand in the resumption of ethnic insurge